



MILITARY NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE

Issue 1/2022

NATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW

BUDAPEST

**Scientific Periodical of the
Military National Security Service**

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HU ISSN 2063-2908

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THEORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

BARNABÁS ÁDÁM

THE HUSSARS AS FUNCTIONAL PLAYERS IN 21ST CENTURY MILITARY SECURITY

Abstract

Throughout universal history, the interpretation of security has influenced the factors of military security and the evolution of armed forces. Over the past half-millennium, the Hussars, a type of cavalry unit of Hungarian origin, have played an important role in the defense systems of thirty-four countries around the world. The study examines the functional role of Hussars in the 21st century and the perceptions related to it.

Keywords: Hussars, Hussar regiments, military security, defense systems, armed forces

Introduction

Throughout universal history, changes in the understanding of security¹ have always had a significant influence on the understanding of military security at a given time. States have either responded to the political and military challenges of the potentially threatening – and in some cases already opposing – party, or have sought to achieve their will through coercion or war, in accordance with their political and economic interests. This has led to the emergence of a qualitatively new structure of forces that is in keeping more and more with the level of the threat,² the challenges and the political ambitions of the time, and the disappearance of the old structure, which was in decline.

We Hungarians can be proud that we have given the history a cavalry unit, the Hussars, which, as an active and inevitable functional player, took part in the structure of the armed forces and its formation. In the defense sector, the Hungarian Hussars have become a model and a concept that span continents, since in their heyday, the armies of thirty-four countries³ around the world adopted Hussars' organization, combat procedures, equipment and dress. From the beginning of the 16th century, the Hussars appeared in the armies of more and more European countries outside Hungary, and in the late 18th century, this kind of unit was brought to another continent by the army of Mihály Kováts, a Hussar Colonel, hero of the American Revolutionary War, trainer and founding father of the American cavalry. In the course of the growing

¹ GAZDAG, Ferenc – REMEK, Éva: The basics of security studies; Dialog Campus Kiadó, 2018. p. 21.

² SZENES, Zoltán: Military security today. His study New Threats, New Wars, New Theories; Dialogue Campus Kiadó, Budapest, 2017. p. 73. <https://www.uni-nke.hu/document/uni-nke-hu/3.%20Szemes%20k%C3%B3nyv,%20k%C3%B3nyvr%C3%A9szlet.pdf> (downloaded 24 March 2020)

³ ZACHAR, József PhD: The Hungarian Hussar; (Laudatio), Equestrian Courier, 2007/11. pp. 25-26.

colonialism of the 19th century, the Hussars also reached Latin America and India, and the Far East, playing a small, but important role in shaping the role of contemporary Europe in the global space.

The 20th century had seen significant events and changes in Europe's role in the global space and its military security posture. The Hussars, who had a long history in the eastern part of a divided Europe after the Second World War, and had been effective for centuries as a functional player in military security, disappeared completely from the Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav forces. On the other hand, in the western part of Europe, they have been preserved and are still active in the armed forces of many countries that are now our allies. The very existence of modern Hussar regiments in the 21st century defense systems requires an examination of the functional role of Hussars and the perceptions of Hussars from the perspective of military security.

The functional role of Hussars in the perception of homeland military security

In the domestic context, it is a historical fact that after World War II, the security policy conditions changed, the Cold War and the expected military conflict facing the Warsaw Pact – established in 1955 – necessitated technical modernization, to which the Hungarian Hussars, with their long history, which was highly undesirable from the point of view of Hungarian communist military policy, following the Soviet model, fell victim.

The departure of the Soviet troops, the change in the security policy environment and the political regime change gave the Hungarian armed forces the opportunity to restore the Hussars, but leaders involved in domestic security policy and military security were right to believe that the era of the Hussars was, once and for all, over, and could no longer be part of the modern Hungarian defense system. The fundamental origin and characteristic of this perception is that we Hungarians can only imagine the Hussar together with his horse and on horseback, as he appeared on the battlefield for centuries⁴: in picturesque uniform, on prancing horses, with a handsome, smart, a twirled moustache and a sharp sabre in his hand. After his demise in the 20th century, this is the image of the Hungarian Hussar, who is still part of our national consciousness as a popular soldier of Hungarian history, a figure who has been part of Hungarian culture for centuries. This image of the Hussar is preserved and presented by Hussar preservation societies and the National Equestrian Unit,⁵ which, in addition to public order and crowd control tasks, is subordinate to the Minister of the Interior⁶ and acts as a Hussar - albeit without a moustache - at protocol, ceremonial and tourist events. At the same time, the Ludovika Hussar Honor

⁴ NOLAN, Louis Edward: Cavalry; Its History and Tactics, London, Bosworth & Harrison, 1860. p. 323.

⁵ After guard of honor duty at the Hoisting of the National Flag Ceremony on 23 October, 2006, since the mounted charge against peaceful demonstrators, and dispersing them with the flat of the sword, only active duty police officers take part in performing its functions. (Author's note.)

⁶ MOI Decree No. 24/2005 (BK) on the operating rules of the National Equestrian Ceremonial Unit of the Republic of Hungary. (BK 14) BM instruction

Detachment,⁷ which follows in the footsteps of the 1st Hussar Regiment of the 1st Hussars, was established in 2014 at the Faculty of Military Science and Military Officer Training of the National University of Public Service. The commanding officer of the honor detachment that performs protocol functions is an active-duty army officer and the subunit is made up of students of the university.

As a consequence of the domestic perception of 30 years ago, but perhaps still current today, we have seen that when planning the defense sector's Zrínyi 2026 program for the modernization of the armed forces, the idea of restoring the Hussars, who are acknowledged worldwide as the most Hungarian in origin, as a player in the domestic defense system was not even considered, and no one looked at their security, foreign, national and military policy implications. Based on these findings, it can be said that decision-makers do not consider the Hussars, which have become, and are still regarded as a Hungarian "brand" in the world, as a functional player in the domestic military security and defense system.

However, we also see a different perception among the former Eastern Bloc member states. After the war, similar processes to those in Hungary took place in Poland, and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Polish security policy and military security experts carefully analyzed the foreign, national and military policy implications of the restoration of the late world-famous Polish cavalry for regional and military security.⁸ The 1992 reorganization of the defense structure in the Polish Armed Forces included the restoration and modernization of an armored cavalry division,⁹ which considers the Winged Hussars (Husaria polska) established by the King of Poland Stephen Báthori as its predecessor, and the restoration on 30 March 2000 of the ceremonial Uhlan cavalry unit, a 44-horse ceremonial unit representing the historic Polish military cavalry culture, as part of the Polish Army's Honor Guard Regiment.¹⁰

The functional role of the Hussars in the Allied conception of military security

Military solutions continue to play a role in addressing global security challenges following the Cold War, so military conflicts that threaten security require constant analysis. The destabilizing events that occurred in Eastern Europe, the realization and analysis of the application of the Gerasimov Doctrine¹¹ had an impact on the European

⁷ Tibor SZABÓ; Tibor HORVÁTH (The interviewee) The Ludovika Hussar Ceremonial Section in the Saddle; BONUM PUBLICUM 2015/4. pp. 46-47.

⁸ The author graduated from the Polish National Defense University in 2002, with a degree in Military Leadership.

⁹ 11 Lubuska Dywizja Kawalerii Pancernej / 11. Lubuska Armored Cavalry Division; <https://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/11dkpanc/> (downloaded 21 June 2021)

¹⁰ Najprzystojniejszy battalion / The smartest battalion; <http://www.polska-zbrojna.pl/home/articleinmagazineshow/20257?t=Najprzystojniejszy-batalion> (downloaded 21 January 2021)

¹¹ GERASIMOV, Valery: Основные тенденции развития форм и способов применения ВС, актуальные задачи военной науки по их совершенствованию / Main trends in the development of forms and ways of deployment of the armed forces and the current tasks of military science to perfect them; Vestnik, 2013/1. p. 42.

approach to military security, which seeks to address the security threat posed by the alleged Eastern Challenge by strengthening cooperation between the forces of the member states of the existing North Atlantic Alliance. In Hungary, the literature on military policy and military security also knows little about the fact that there are Hussar units in the Allied forces that make up NATO's military force, with the establishment of the late Hungarian Hussar in Denmark: a (Gardehusarregiment¹²) in Denmark – founded by Hungarians; In France, three (1er Régiment de Hussards Parachutistes¹³; 2e Régiment de Hussards¹⁴; 3e Régiment de Hussards¹⁵) – all three were founded by Hungarian Hussar officers; In the Netherlands, one (Regiment Huzaren van Boreel¹⁶) – organized on the Hungarian model; In Canada, four (8th Canadian Hussars¹⁷; Sherbrooke Hussars¹⁸; The Royal Canadian Hussars¹⁹; 1st Hussars²⁰) – their legal predecessors were all organized on the Hungarian model; in the United Kingdom, two (The Queen's Royal Hussars²¹; The King's Royal Hussars²²) – the legal predecessors of both are based on a Hungarian model.

I believe that the mere existence of modern Hussar units maintained in the system by the forces of those countries proves that the Hussar remained a functional actor in the military security and defense system in the Allied concept of security. As a response to today's military challenges²³, the position of the functional actors of the defense systems guaranteeing military security became more important in the

<http://www.avnrf.ru/index.php/zhurnal-qvoennyj-vestnikq/arkhivnomerov/534-vestnik-avn-1-2013> (downloaded 11 September 2020)

¹² Om Gardehusarregimentet / The Guard Hussar Regiment; Gardehusarregimentets opgaver og enheder (forsvaret.dk) (downloaded 10 May 2021)

¹³ 1er Régiment de Hussards Parachutistes / The 1st Parachute Hussar Regiment;
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/node_64/l-armee-de-terre/le-niveau-divisionnaire/3e- division/11e-brigade-parachutiste / regiments / 1er-regiment-de-hussards-parachutistes (downloaded 10 May 2021)

¹⁴ 2e Régiment de Hussards / The 2nd Hussar Regiment;
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/node_64/l-armee-de-terre/le-niveau-divisionnaire/commandement-du- renseignement / 2e-regiment-de-hussards ; (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹⁵ 3e Régiment de Hussards / The 3rd Hussar Regiment;
https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/node_64/l-armee-de-terre/le-niveau-divisionnaire/1re-division/3e-regiment-de-hussards; (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹⁶ Regiment Huzaren van Boreel / The Boreel Hussar Regiment; <https://www.huzarenvamboreel.nl/> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹⁷ 8th Canadian Hussars / A 8th Canadian Hussar Regiment; <http://www.army-armee.forces.gc.ca/en/5-canadian-division/8-canadian-hussars/index.page> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹⁸ The Sherbrooke Hussars – Canadian Army (forces.gc.ca) (downloaded 23 October 2021)

¹⁹ The Royal Canadian Hussars / The Royal Canadian Hussar Regiment; The Royal Canadian Hussars (Montreal) - Canadian Army (forces.gc.ca) (downloaded 23 October 2021)

²⁰ 1st Hussars / The 1st Hussar Regiment; 1st Hussars | Reserve Unit | Canadian Army (forces.gc.ca) (downloaded 23 March 2021)

²¹ The Queen's Royal Hussars; <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/royal-armoured-corps/queens-royal-hussars> / (downloaded 22 February 2021)

²² The King's Royal Hussars; <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/royal-armoured-corps/kings-royal-hussars> / (downloaded 22 October 2021)

²³ Maj. Gen. (N.S) BODA, József– Col. BOLDIZSÁR, Gábor PhD – Col. KOVÁCS, László PhD – Lt. Gen. OROSZ, Zoltán PhD – Bde. Gen. PADÁNYI, József –Col. RESPERGER, István DSc – Gen. (Ret.) SZENES, Zoltán: Focus and Cooperation. Some research tasks of the military science; Hungarian Defense Review, 2016/3. pp. 3-20

military security concept of the allied countries, the combat reconnaissance and security tasks of the remaining Hussars in the defense structures are given higher value, as they are, and will be, intended to play a significant role in determining the direction of a presumed massive tank assault coming from the east, in securing designated sections and facilities, in carrying out planned counterattacks on the wings, as well as in the delaying actions.

Functional missions of the 21st century hussars

The Danish Hussars

Examined from a military security approach, it can be concluded that the Danish forces underwent a significant restructuring after the 2000s, based on the experience of their international involvement.²⁴²⁵ The operational unit of the Land Forces is the division, which consists of two mechanized brigades, the Royal Bodyguard, the Guard Hussar Regiment, the Jutland Dragoon Regiment, the Engineer Regiment, the Signals Regiment and the Logistics Regiment²⁵²⁶.

The Guard Hussar Regiment, stationed in Slagelse, is an armored reconnaissance unit of the division, whose basic mission is to detect the forces of the opposing party and to capture and, if possible, destroy the opposing forces by maintaining constant contact with them. In crisis management operations (Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan), the classic security and reconnaissance activities of the Hussars are used. The regiment is actively involved in international operations²⁶²⁷ in both combat support and reconstruction missions. Very much attention is paid to the utilization of the experience of asymmetric operations and missions at home, to the high-quality preparation of reserve Hussars. At the same time, the Guard Hussar Regiment is one of the prominent representative units of the Danish army, in addition to the Royal Bodyguard, in the direct service of the members of the royal house, with a similar protocol guard and protection duties as the Queen's cavalry.

The French Hussars

The 1st Parachute Hussar Regiment is the only regiment of the 3rd Division of the French Land Forces, including the 11th Parachute Brigade, which is equipped with armored airmobile and airborne capabilities.²⁷ The parachute

Hussar regiment is primarily a combat security unit equipped with light armored equipment, the personnel of which are prepared for parachute use, their technical equipment for airmobile or airborne deployment. The regiment's basic mission is to

²⁴ VÉGH, Ferenc: The Danish Armed Forces; Military Technology, 2007/3 (May – June), pp. 2-6.

²⁵ Danish Land Forces Organization; Structure of the Army (forsvaret.dk) (downloaded 22 October 2021)

²⁶ Gardehussaren / Guard Hussars; 2013/1. pp. 3-5. Gardehusaren nr. 1, 2012 by Danske Gardehusarforeninger – issuu (downloaded 07 October 2021)

²⁷ Organismes et formations rattachés / Organization and Link Chart; [https://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/l-armee-de-terre/le-niveau-divisionnaire/3e-division/ organismes-et-formations-rattachees](https://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/l-armee-de-terre/le-niveau-divisionnaire/3e-division/3e-division/ organismes-et-formations-rattachees) (downloaded 22 September 2021)

occupy and secure objects and key positions designated by rapid air or ground maneuvers in the depths of the enemy or at a specified location until the arrival of combined arms units. The regiment typically carries the initiative, agility, independence of the old Hussar, and with its dual specialization of Hussar and parachute capability, versatility and striking power. Using these capabilities, they have ensured the effective advocacy of French national interests and stakes for more than thirty years anywhere in the world. The regiment became the "Bercheny Hussars", which has participated or continues to participate in annual rotations in all UNPROFOR, IFOR, KFOR and ISAF missions. The regiment faithfully preserves the memory and Hungarian roots of its founder, an important manifestation of which is that the March Song of the regiment, "LE CHANT DE BERCHENY HONGROIS", "The branch of the fragile gillyflower has broken off", is still sung in Hungarian and members of the regiment wear a Hungarian Hussar soutache braid on their berets.

It is worth knowing about the 2nd „Chamborant” Hussar Regiment that was formed in January 1735, on the model of the 1st Hussar Regiment, Count József Bálint Esterházy, who was the captain of the 1st Hussar Regiment, founded the 2nd Hussar Regiment from Hungarian volunteers, but the unit became really famous in 1761-1791. The name of its famous commander is really known as “Chamborant Hussards”. Today, the 2nd Hussar Regiment is part of the Commandement du renseignement (COMRENS) of the French Land Forces. The regiment is stationed near the German border in Haguenau and its basic mission is to collect reconnaissance data from the enemy and the terrain. Hussar patrols equipped with armored vehicles acquire reconnaissance data in the rear of the enemy and transmit them to the delegating or designated headquarters, having full autonomy and discretion for the mission assigned to them. Their full autonomy and discretion means that an enemy target that has been discovered, if it is deemed to be successfully destroyed, may also be attacked in order to achieve the intention of the superior. The 2nd Hussar Regiment supports ground forces with reconnaissance information in most foreign operations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, Ivory Coast, former Yugoslavia, Haiti, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mali, and Chad.

The French 3rd "Eszterházy" Hussar Regiment for the 1st Division of the French Land Forces²⁸, the only diversely modular combat support unit of the Brigade Franco-Allemande (BFA), a Franco-German brigade²⁹ that can be used with great efficiency in combat in both national and multinational environments. The mission of the Hussar Regiment is to carry out combat support reconnaissance missions independently, during which the enemy is primarily detected by the active use of combat reconnaissance and destroyed by the combined use of fire weapons and firearms. Its main task is to detect the enemy's armored formations, prevent their deployment and destroy them with their own armor-piercing means as much as possible.

²⁸ 1re division / 1st Division; <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/l-armee-de-terre/le-niveau-divisionnaire/1re-division> (downloaded 22 September 2021)

²⁹ Brigade franco-allemande / Franco-German Brigade; <https://www.defense.gouv.fr/terre/l-armee-de-terre/le-niveau-divisionnaire/1re-division/brigade-franco -allemande> (downloaded 22 September 2021)

The Dutch Hussars

The reduction of forces following the Cold War also had an impact on the armed forces in the Netherlands, units were disestablished or merged, respectively. Currently, the main land forces of the Royal Dutch Army consists of three brigades. In terms of the set of missions, the protection of the home territory and the contribution to the protection of the territory of the NATO allied countries were supplemented by peacekeeping operations and foreign mission tasks, humanitarian aid, protection of citizens and support of non-governmental organizations. The structure of the force was placed on a modular base, consisting of smaller units capable of independent combat operations and mission execution, appropriate to the challenges and tasks. This organizational structure is ideal for setting up higher units or even temporary battle formations. The Royal Dutch Army is also in a state of constant restructuring and modernization.

The Boreel Hussar Regiment³⁰ is a special ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) unit of the Dutch Armed Forces, whose subunits are reassigned on a modular basis to the various brigades of the Dutch Land Forces. The regiment's armored reconnaissance company and airborne reconnaissance squadron are attached to the three active brigades of the Royal Dutch Army, the 43rd Mechanized Brigade, the 13th Light Brigade and the 11th Airborne Brigade, as brigade reconnaissance squadrons, and perform reconnaissance duties for the brigade. The HUMINT Regiment and Tank Company of the Hussar Regiment carry out reconnaissance missions for the land forces command. For the subunits of the Boreel Hussar Regiment, the same set of requirements and a capability-oriented approach allow to be effective in continuous combat support, regardless of the nature of the contingent, whether it is a battalion or brigade battle group, transported by land or air. The organizational structure of the Hussar Regiment, the composition of the subunits, and the combat equipment also predestine the rapid formation of a temporary combat support detachment created for a specific temporary mission, its reassignment in line with the commander's intent, or its use as an augmentation force in both traditional and asymmetric operations.

The Canadian Hussars

The Canadian Army as the land component of the Canadian Armed Forces³¹ is the largest one in the country's defense system. Due to the geostrategic situation of the country³² and to its low level of military threat, it mainly performs mission tasks with its active-duty and reserve personnel. Today, the four Canadian Hussar regiments operate as echelon 1 armored Hussar regiments as brigade level battle groups, filled

³⁰ Voorwoord regimentscommandant / Regiment Commander's Preface; <https://www.huzarenvanboreel.nl/index.php/voorwoord-regimentscommandant/> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

³¹ Canadian Army of Today; The Canadian Army of Today – Canadian Army (forces.gc.ca) (downloaded 21 July 2021)

³² KRAJNC, Zoltán PhD: Canada and the fight against international terrorism (Analysis of the policy and practice of a NATO member). Submitted to the Geo-Political Council of NATO academic competition on the subject "the fight against international terrorism from a Canadian perspective" <http://real.mtak.hu/6403/1/Kanada.pdf> (downloaded 20 March 2021)

with reservists, of three divisions, the 2nd Division, 4th Division and the 5th Division of the Canadian Land Forces, primarily in peacetime, supporting the regular Canadian Land Forces' missions with reserve personnel human resources.

The British Hussars

We find the cavalry regiments with up-to-date combat equipment in the ranks of the United Kingdom Army Armored Corps,³³ which are worthy descendants of the famous British cavalry formations that rode into battle on horseback and played a significant role in horse breeding around the world.

The two British Hussar regiments, the Queen's Hussars and the King's Hussars, are modern armored formations specializing in delaying action and meeting engagement. The mission of the Hussar regiments is to detect enemy forces and to destroy or defeat them with the firepower of tanks. In terms of effectiveness, they have the ability to break the opposing party's tactical initiative and through inflicting significant losses deflect it from its objective.

In the British-Hungarian relation, it is of military political interest that the regiments of the legal predecessor of the British Hussars took part in the bloody cavalry charge in Balaclava, where one of the “protagonists” was Hussar Captain Luis Edward Nolan (January 4, 1818 – October 25, 1854) (Buttery, 2008), he was an aide-de-camp who, in his youth, studied at the same Austrian Military Sapper Academy in Tulln, where our General Artúr Görgei (January 30, 1818 – May 21, 1916) also attended. In terms of their year of birth, they could have been in the same year or possibly even classmates. The young Nolan served in a Hungarian Hussar Regiment for several years after graduating from the academy,³⁴ then returning home to England, he became a riding master, and wrote two famous books on the history of cavalry³⁵ and (Hussar) horse training.³⁶ In addition, combining the simplicity and practicality of the Hungarian hussar saddle with the advantages of the English hunting saddle, he created the predecessor of the universal English sports saddle still in use today.³⁷

Conclusion

Taking into account the above international examples, it can be concluded that the Hussars survived the world wars of the 20th century, the Cold War, the post-Cold War general force reductions and today, they have remained an active player in the conflicts of the pre-modern, modern and postmodern world³⁸³⁹ of the 21st century,

³³ The Royal Armored Corps; <https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/corps-regiments-and-units/royal-armoured-corps/> (downloaded 22 September 2021)

³⁴ NOLAN, Louis Edward: The training of cavalry remount horses; London, Parker son & Bourn, 1861, p. 3

³⁵ NOLAN (1860) op. cit.

³⁶ NOLAN (1861) op. cit.

³⁷ NOLAN (1860) op. cit.

³⁸ COOPER, Robert: The Post-modern State and the world order; Demos, 2000. www.demos.co.uk/files/postmodernstate.pdf (downloaded 06 February 2021)

through the effective use of their classical set of missions; and in some allied states, they have remained active players in the 21st century defense systems.

The Hussars can be used effectively in military operations, both in wartime military operations and in crisis-response actions; and as for the nature of the military operations, they can carry out combat or combat support missions. In peacetime, they have ceremonial duties in the 21st century as well. The armed forces of nations with modernized Hussar units employ them in serious missions and small wars, proving that the Hussar has a high level of adaptability and is able to adapt to the conditions of battle, in the same way as in ancient times.

The regular review of the Zrínyi Force Development Program provides an opportunity for decision-makers to “revitalize” the modernized Hussar as a functional player, with one of the highest combat values, complex sets of missions and modular capabilities in our historical past, while performing ceremonial tasks.

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Abstract

The study examines the relevant leadership and organizational theory models of the military and the private sector, presents change management aspects of the intelligence system, explores connections between change and organizational culture, analyses the reform of the Central Intelligence Agency from an intelligence and organizational theory point of view, and draws conclusions.

Keywords: intelligence, organizational theory, change management, CIA

Relevant leadership and organizational theory models of the military and the private sector

Intelligence services fill a specific role in the organization of states. Secrecy surrounding intelligence work separated these services from other state organizations, the little knowledge of organizational structure and operations of the services, and a relative lack of competition hinder the introduction of change. However, the social and technological realities of the 21st century affect intelligence organizations in a direct way, while the effects of progress on the security environment have an indirect (at least in peacetime) impact on the services. This process has begun with the end of the Cold War, at the beginning of the information age and the latest stage of globalization, exerting a continuously strengthening pressure on the intelligence sector to introduce an institutional change. In the changed world, the urge to change became permanent. For intelligence services, the stability and the tradition are important values, which makes it hard to accept that an ad hoc change in the organizational structure to adapt it to particular problems is not a satisfying answer.

Leadership and organizational culture of intelligence services share many similarities with those of military organizations. At the same time, the special, creative nature of intelligence activity stirs up the hierarchical system even in military intelligence, making more possibilities for individual initiative and creativity. Too often, the phenomenon is present in an unconscious way, leading to frictions, since military-like discipline and creative freedom – without the necessary directions from the leadership and appropriate organization frameworks and culture – are hardly compatible concepts. The mental state required for this can best be described by the self-contradiction of “elastic rigidity”.

Imre Porkoláb's *A stratégia művészete – Szervezeti innováció kiszámíthatatlan üzleti környezetben – Szun-ce gondolatai alapján*¹ (The Art of Strategy – Organizational Innovation in an Unpredictable Business Environment – Based on Sun

¹ PORKOLÁB, Imre: *A stratégia művészete – Szervezeti innováció kiszámíthatatlan üzleti környezetben – Szun-ce gondolatai alapján*; HVG Könyvek, Budapest, 2019.

Tzu's Thoughts) – although not in the sphere of intelligence – examines the above issues.

He points out that modern militaries have only partially processed the lessons learned from the Napoleonic Wars by the Prussian General Staff, in the wake of the Battle of Jena in 1806, that a rigid system of command essential in previous wars has an undesirable effect and thus hinders victory. The Prussian response to this recognition was mission-type tactics.² According to the new approach, military leaders were no longer required to merely execute orders, but to take creative action that would result in the successful completion of the task. Each level of command enjoyed varying degrees of freedom of action, with a clear framework for it. Dysfunction occurs when mission-type tactics does not clearly and unambiguously replace the standard tactics.^{3,4}

Imre Porkoláb also reviews the main stages of the organizational development of industrial companies, which is significant, because the organizational models of industrial companies has had a profound effect on the development of the American intelligence enterprise, after World War II. This is not surprising as the American leadership and the public saw the victory in World War II at least as much a triumph of the capitalist market economy as the merit of the millions involved in the fighting. The American model was adopted by the Western Allies, and in part by the Warsaw Pact members and other countries, with modifications.

The modern monolithic corporate model, built according to functions (design, production, sales, etc.), was formed at the beginning of the 20th century. Organizations based on corporate governance models with a formal hierarchy consist of a small number of senior executives, a mass of subordinates, without independent decision-making authority, and middle managers who assign the tasks, measure the performance and exercise the control. The first model of the monolithic organization is the pyramid, where tasks are defined by top management, assigned by middle managers, and performed by the lower layer of the hierarchy.

With the growth of companies, more and more organizational elements were created, organized around a functional task (product, service, industry, finance, manufacturing, design, etc.) or territorial division. In addition, a number of new types of organizational elements have emerged (e.g.: research and development, supply chain management, marketing, etc.). By the start of World War II, the increase in the number and diversity of functions in U.S. companies had made the pyramid structure outdated.

The monolithic model began to be replaced in the 1920s by the structure based on business units, which is still the most common, where the organizational elements of companies are set up according to the product or the customer, or by region. In this model, each division is responsible for its own profits and losses.⁵ In order to achieve cooperation between the multitudes of organizational elements, inter-organizational

² Auftragstaktik

³ Normaltaktik

⁴ PORKOLÁB op. cit. p. 21.

⁵ Ibid. pp. 25-28.

units were created. This approach is called the matrix model. In the matrix model, collaboration between divisions is based on complex and time-consuming decision-making processes.⁶ By the turn of millennium, hierarchical structures began to lose their advantages. The overly rigid structure favored stability, but it was less and less capable to respond to the new demands created by the accelerating market change. The answer to the latest challenge has been decentralization and the emergence of strategic networks.

According to Porkoláb, corporate governance was heavily impacted by U.S. responses to the asymmetric challenges following the first, traditional phase of the 2003 Iraq War. Lieutenant General Stanley McChrystal (promoted to General in 2009), who served as commander of the U.S. Special Operations Forces stationed in Iraq from 2006 to 2008, became aware – from the outset – that the Iraqi resistance had no classic military, but a networked organizational structure, and realized that effective action is only possible by transforming the special forces into a network as well. A network can only be defeated by another network. The goal was to increase the flow of information by creating a joint command post (a fusion center) for subordinate organizational elements. Taking advantage of the technological possibilities, he held daily video teleconferences with the participation of thousands of people. In addition to the presentation of the commander's intent at these conferences, operational experiences were also shared. The new approach created common situational awareness, which made it possible to delegate decisions to the lowest possible level. It was then that the concept of "strategic corporal" emerged, as an indication that independent initiative and taking responsibility had become a requirement at lower management levels as well.

The new, results-oriented approach created by General McChrystal, as a modern version of Prussian mission-type tactics, allows lower-level leaders to endure chaos in the knowledge of the commander's intent. An in extremis leadership approach has been developed, which prepares proactively for chaotic situations before crises occur. It examines what needs to be preserved and what needs to change. The new organizational culture also expects a new approach from subordinates. An effective follower manages himself or herself well, is committed to organizational goals and values, builds his or her own abilities, voices his or her opinion to leaders, and does not need to be supervised. It is important that the goals of superiors and subordinates to be aligned.

The combination of a corporate structure based on business units and the strategic networks is the complex adaptive system, where the company operates different systems in parallel. The traditional, bureaucratic organizational form ensures stability, while the adaptive and innovative organizational elements make it possible to prepare for new challenges.

Imre Porkoláb describes the change in organizational culture as a four-step model. In the exclusion phase (1), employees of the new organizational element are separated from the rest of the company. During the incubation phase (2), the new

⁶ MINNAAR, Joost: The Evolution Of (Progressive) Scalable Organizational Structures; 2020. <https://corporate-rebels.com/the-evolution-of-progressive-organizational-structures/> (downloaded 24 December 2021)

organizational element develops its operational procedures, under the protection of the management. In the phase of integration (3), the new organizational element becomes part of the company. This is the most dangerous part of the process, because this is when attacks occur from the rest of the organization. At this phase, it is essential to win the middle management of the organization by presenting the effectiveness of the new methods. If this is successful, assimilation (4) will take place.⁷

Change management in the intelligence system

Implementing change in intelligence organizations is greatly hampered by the fact that leaders and subordinates rarely have the specific skills and routine to make real, comprehensive changes. Like in the defense sector, frequent rotation of tasks, positions and stations are common in the intelligence system, but this does not facilitate rapid introduction of change but, on the contrary, postpones an actual change.

An antidote to the lack of routine that exists in planning, leading, and managing change in the intelligence system might be the adaptation of already developed, business-proven models to its own needs. In his book *A változásmentesztelmélete és gyakorlata*⁸ (The Theory and Practice of Change Management), Ferenc Farkas presents Barbara Senior's PETS test and John Kotter's eight-stage model of change management. Both could be adaptable to the needs of intelligence organization.

The PETS test assesses the environmental influences effecting an organization by examining Political, Economic, Technological, and Sociocultural factors.⁹ The approach can be used almost unchanged by the intelligence sphere, as it is affected by similar political, economic, technological and sociocultural factors as the actors in the business world. The most important political factors are the laws and the strategies regulating intelligence activities, above all the National Defense Strategy (as well as the National Military Strategy for military intelligence services), laws on the handling of classified information, the country's official and informal foreign policy strategy, membership in international organizations and alliances, participation in international military and crisis management operations, etc. Political factors include the information requirements of decision-makers and other tasks they impose. Among the sociocultural factors, the phenomena and processes that mainly affect employees and candidates, e.g., an examination of the social perception of intelligence services may be relevant. In order to retain staff and to recruit effectively, it is necessary to monitor general (labor) market developments, as long-term disregard of the requirements of employees (competitive income, cultured working conditions, family-friendly approach, flexible working hours, opportunities to work from home, etc.) deprives services of the quality workforce that underpins their operations. Technological factors also have far-reaching implications for intelligence services. The slowness of change is perhaps most conspicuous in this area, as services that do not keep pace with

⁷ PORKOLÁB op. cit. pp. 181-193.

⁸ FARKAS, Ferenc: *A változásmentesztelmélete és gyakorlata*; Akadémia Kiadó, Budapest, 2013.

⁹ Ibid. pp. 51-53.

technological competition and delay innovation are less capable to retain newly recruited young staff. Of the four factors in the PETS test, the economic appears to have the least effect on the services, as they do not “live off the market” but operate from budgetary sources. In fact, sustainability of public finances directly affects the operation of the services, and competitors include not only rival (partner) services and other organizations, but also market players (news agencies, research institutes, private intelligence companies and content providers). At the same time, we must not forget that their real ‘competitors’ are opposing and hostile intelligence services, terrorist organizations and organized crime!

The PETS test can provide effective support to increase situational awareness, especially before changes occur. Actual change can then be managed based on John Kotter’s model published in 1999. The model consists of eight steps:

- Creating a sense of urgency among stakeholders by arousing a healthy sense of danger.
- Building a guiding coalition from the ranks of the organization to manage change.
- Forming a strategic vision and strategy for change.
- Communicating the vision of change to enlist a volunteer army.
- Empowering employees to propose and carry out creative solutions to broad-based action.
- Generating short-term wins by achieving quick successes.
- Consolidating results and initiating further change to sustain acceleration.
- Institute change in the corporate culture.

The change introduced and the problems encountered by the “Shipping Company” in the case study presented by Ferenc Farkas to demonstrate Kotter’s model are surprisingly well suited to the challenges of the intelligence system. In the subchapter on demonstrating the urgency of change, the Shipping Company is confronted with the fact that the number of standard twenty-foot containers (TEUs) carried is no longer suitable for measuring performance, but instead the more relevant profitability, while more difficult to track, must be measured. For intelligence services, the number of TEUs is compatible with the number of reports produced, while the profit would be the usefulness of the information provided to decision makers. As with the TEUs, tracking the number of reports is easy to do, but reflects perhaps even less the usefulness of the service by itself. It is a common procedure mostly of Western services to provide a chance for feed back to decision makers e.g., through short questionnaires, improving the objectivity of measuring their own performance. Liaisons supporting the flow of information between decision-makers and intelligence services also play a key role in measuring performance.

The Shipping Company set up a separate team to manage change. The team did not operate as a separate island, but involved middle managers, country managers, account managers dealing with customers, the sales department, as well as the human resources and training departments in its activities.¹⁰ The case study can be used almost unchanged here as well, only the organizational specificities need to be taken

¹⁰ Ibid. pp. 56-58.

into account. That is, it is important to involve middle managers (directors) and country managers (area managers: department heads, case officers) as soon as possible so that they can prepare to communicate change and signal problems that are considered problematic in a timely manner. In the intelligence system, the customers are the decision-makers; therefore, the tasks of “account managers” are performed primarily by the top management of the services and the directors of various (operational) organizational units, with the support of the department heads. The “sales department” corresponds in part to the analysis directorate, as it is the analysts who produce and often present the reports (the end products of most intelligence activities) to the users, while sales tasks are also regularly performed by the top management. The importance of involving personnel and education departments is also unquestionable. The lack of dedicated account managers can be seen as a shortcoming at intelligence organizations, because their activities would be increasingly needed to maintain direct, institutionalized contact with decision-makers. This is well indicated by the fact that the management devotes a significant part of its working time to account management. Further steps (communicating the vision of change, empowering employees, making quick successes, consolidating results, and instituting change in the organizational culture) can be implemented by the intelligence system without modifications. It is indispensable to emphasize, as Kotter does, the importance of each step and of the sequence, because intelligence organizations also tend to opt for easier, faster and cheaper solutions. The risk is especially high when change is pressured from outside (by direction of political or military leaders) or the leadership of the intelligence service is satisfied with superficial solutions, due to the time factor or the lack of belief in the need for change.

Change and organizational culture

The PETS test and Kotter’s model can be well complemented by rolling planning used by military organizations, where changes are continuously evaluated, feedback is sent, and the organization is modified accordingly. The essence of the idea behind rolling planning is that change is not a one-time, painful, unwanted and externally forced event, but a fundamental, positive process, also from the perspective of individuals operating within the organization. The latter approach is reflected in the so-called “off-site” common in Western corporate, military and intelligence culture. The essence of this activity is that, possibly far from the day-to-day location of the organization (hence the name), a group representing the entire organization, or even the entire staff, divided into sections; examines certain aspects of the organization (reports, information flow and cooperation between departments, organizational culture, etc.) at regular intervals (quarterly, semi-annually or annually). The activities of the group are regulated by specially trained professionals. The essence of the event is to eliminate unnecessary work processes, improve faulty processes and systematize new processes if necessary. At the end of the meetings, participants make recommendations to the management. “Off-sites” can be used to streamline the operation of organizations and eliminate activities merely governed by routines.

Reform of the Central Intelligence Agency

In September 2014, John Brennan, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),¹¹ commissioned nine CIA senior executives to prepare a proposal to modernize the organization. Based on interviews with 80 decision-makers during the 90 days of the research and suggestions from 4,000 staff members of the Agency, as well as studying corporate working methods, Brennan implemented comprehensive organizational changes between March and October 2015. According to Director Brennan, the study was needed because in the second decade of the 21st century, the processes and events of interest to decision-makers became increasingly complex, while unprecedented technological advances were underway.¹²



The CIA has put its human resource development and training system (so-called “talent management”) on a new footing. As a result, the Talent Management Centre of Excellence has been established, which develops human resources through specialized and managerial training from the time of recruitment. The aim of the new unit is to give the staff a broader perspective on the activities of other disciplines and the CIA as a whole, in addition to developing their own areas of expertise.

Recognizing that the development of digital technologies is both a challenge and an opportunity for the CIA, the Directorate of Digital Innovation has been established. The task of the Directorate is to accelerate the integration of new technologies, including cyber capabilities, within the CIA and to develop digital tradecraft methods. The dedicated OSINT organization of the CIA, serving the entire Intelligence Community, has been placed under the authority of the Directorate.¹³

The speed of world political processes requires that decisions be taken as quickly as possible, at the appropriate level, with the necessary quantity and quality of information, taking into account the interests of the CIA as a whole. To this end,

¹¹ Brennan held the position of CIA Director between the 8th of March 2013 and the 20th of January 2017.

¹² BRENNAN, John: Our Agency’s Blueprint for the Future; (Unclassified Version of March 6, 2015 Message to the Workforce from CIA Director). <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/2015-press-releases-statements/message-to-workforce-agencys-blueprint-for-the-future.html> (downloaded 06 June 2017)

¹³ During the reorganization, the Open Source Center (OSC) has been renamed to Open Source Enterprise (OSE). See: AFTERGOOD, Steven: Open Source Center (OSC) Becomes Open Source Enterprise (OSE); 2015. <https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2015/10/osc-ose/> (downloaded 16 February 2022)

Director Brennan resolved that decisions should be taken at the lowest possible levels. In order to better manage the day-to-day tasks, he strengthened the powers and responsibilities of the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) and has delegated an independent office to him (“corporate model”¹⁴).

Finally, he has set up ten Mission Centers (Africa; counterintelligence; counterterrorism; East Asia and Pacific; Europe and Eurasia; global issues; the Near East; South and Central Asia; weapons and counterproliferation; Western Hemisphere) by integrating a part of the staffs of disbanded operational divisions and intelligence production offices, as well as science and technical professionals and support personnel. The heads of the Mission Centers are Assistant Directors from the field of operations or analysis. With the establishment of the Centers, the traditional, territorially divided divisions of operations and analysis (e.g., the Middle East, Latin America, South Asia, etc.) have ceased to operate. Recognizing that informed decision-making on tasks of operational or analytical nature is impossible without a high level of expertise, he appointed assistants with analytical background under Mission Center heads, with an operational background and vice versa. In parallel with the new Centers, Directorates of Analysis, Operations, Science & Technology and Support continue to operate, but they no longer deal with the management of day-to-day processes, only with specialist training, strategic planning and the operation of advancement systems (matrix model). The heads of the Mission Centers carry out their duties in cooperation with Directors of Operations and Analysis, but under the authority of the Director of the CIA. It is the responsibility of the Deputy Director for Operations to guarantee the high professional standard of operational activities.

The new organizational structure put in place by Director Brennan, still in operation with minor modifications, aimed to break down the often counterproductive walls erected between the operational and analyst organizational cultures, existing in parallel within the CIA, and replace it with a single culture of ‘intelligence officers’. Following the implementation of the reforms, the head of the National Clandestine Service¹⁵ and of Counterintelligence, together with several of their high-ranking subordinates requested their dismissal, citing in particular the alleged violation of the ‘need to know’ principle as unacceptable. The disappearance of decades-long structures, practices and privileges, in many cases even predating World War II, also played a major role in the outrage.¹⁶

¹⁴ The business parallel to the position of Deputy Director for Operations would be that of the Executive Director, while the CIA Director’s business counterpart would be the Chief Executive Officer. Decision-making and information management processes were designed with corporate methods in mind.

¹⁵ The organizational unit that was until 2015 responsible for covert and secret intelligence gathering and intelligence operations.

¹⁶ IGNATIUS, David: Will John Brennan’s controversial CIA modernization survive Trump? 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/will-john-brennans-controversial-cia-modernization-survive-trump/2017/01/17/54e6cc1c-dcd5-11e6-ad42-f3375f271c9c_story.html?utm_term=.42d39667023b (downloaded 06 June 2017)

CIA reform from an organizational theory point of view

The process of reorganizing the CIA can be used as an example of the application of advanced organizational theory models in the modernization of intelligence organizations. To understand the aspects of organizational theory, it is worth examining the recent evolution of the CIA's organizational structure.




Figure 1: CIA organizational chart, 1996¹⁷

The figure above shows the classic organizational model of intelligence services. The organizing principle of a monolithic organization is the function: administration, analysis and counterintelligence (Directorate of Intelligence), science and technology, covert and secret intelligence gathering and intelligence operations (Directorate of Operations), and various additional specialties. There are sharp boundaries between functions, with segregated activities meeting only at the top management level. The CIA's 1996 organizational chart follows an elaborate version of the pyramid model.




Figure 2: CIA organizational chart, 2009¹⁸

¹⁸ CIA Organizational Chart; <https://irp.fas.org/cia/orgchart.pdf> (downloaded 25 December 2021)

Despite the fact that by 2009, U.S. intelligence had long left the Cold War times behind and had continued the War on Terror for eight years, the structure of the organization hardly changed since 1996. The CIA continued to feature a pyramid-like model in 2009, while new features (such as the by then essential Open Source Center) appeared.



Figure 3: Current CIA organizational chart¹⁹

¹⁹ CIA Leadership

The current organizational structure of the CIA following the reforms launched in 2015 reflects the matrix structure. In addition to the functional and territorial divisions, the organizational units between the functions were grouped under the title “enterprise functions”. In addition, independent units (subordinated only to the senior management) have appeared in the form of the Mission Centers.




Figure 4: Operations room in the National Counterterrorism Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence²⁰

²⁰ STANDING WATCH 24/7: NCTC OPERATIONS CENTER;
<https://www.odni.gov/index.php/newsroom/news-articles/news-articles-2021/item/2199-standing-watch-24-7-nctc-operations-center> (downloaded 25 December 2021)

Mission Centers follow the operating model of strategic networks, as their establishment, termination and conversion are relatively simple, the flow of information in the Centers is fast,²¹ and the common situational awareness of professionals representing different fields is easy to implement. In addition to the minimal management staff (commander and deputy), the Centers are staffed by professionals, who work according to the principles of mission-type tactics, are aware of their tasks, take responsibility for their work, and perform well individually and in groups. Overall, the CIA therefore meets the requirements of complex adaptive leadership.

The CIA's organizational model has become commonplace in the U.S. Intelligence Community. The long delay in setting up the new structure and the internal resistance to reform are examples of how difficult for intelligence organizations isolated from the outside world to innovate.

Conclusion

The main lesson of the reforms already in place in the U.S. Intelligence Community is that the digital innovation, the dismantling of organizational barriers, and the training system are in dialectical correlation, and they cannot function without each other. These three basic elements of the reform must permeate the fabric not only of the individual services, but the entire intelligence system; otherwise, as separate islands, they are not only doomed to failure, but can cause work process anomalies and can pose a security risk.

The efficient operation of a modern intelligence system is inconceivable without the continuous training of personnel. The diversification of tasks, the mass emergence of new technological solutions and the accelerating convergence of previously separate organizational cultures necessitate the creation and the continuous development of stable professional foundations. The members of the new generation of intelligence (1) do not require manual control of their daily activities, (2) at the same time, they expect their leaders to assign clear tasks to them, and (3) to give them clear authority, also to provide them with the necessary material and intellectual resources, with special emphasis on training, and (4) to keep them informed of the tasks, the work-related cooperation and processes. Once this has been realized, the assimilation of the spirituality of McChrystal's strategic networks in the intelligence system is fulfilled.

Other obstacles to the development of intelligence services are the "fixed" organizational structure and the "fixed" work processes rooted in the 20th century. The outdated organizational structure makes the staff of intelligence services reluctant to introduce improvements, so there must be a clear and unequivocal leadership intent behind the reforms. The monolithic model, built according to functions has to be replaced by a task-oriented architecture, and complemented by flexibility provided by strategic networks. Utilizing general examples that are already in place, adopting new solutions according to the tasks, the needs and the capabilities of the individual

²¹ The flow of information is greatly facilitated simply by co-location.

service. All this requires both the experience and the will of management and the dynamism of professional subordinates desiring change.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that reforms should be introduced continuously but carefully, with a dynamic and experimental approach. It is advisable to introduce the new solutions in smaller groups, on an experimental basis, to synthesize the experiences gained, in order to apply them to the whole system. The reform of the subfields and their impact on each other must be kept under constant review, allowing for rapid correction.

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Abstract

The aim of this publication is to paint a comprehensive picture about the consequences of the novel coronavirus pandemic that broke out in 2020, its impact on the global supply chains; as well as to introduce the effects of goods shortages in Europe, specifically on the semiconductor market; furthermore, to present the bullwhip effect phenomenon noticeable throughout the entire value chain, as well as the shift in balance on the producer side towards China. The relevant research extends to the alternative procurement opportunities and to the realization of a unified European production.

Keywords: supply chain management, bullwhip effect, chip shortage

INTRODUCTION

When the first wave of COVID-19 rolled around the globe in early 2020, it caught most businesses off-guard, as it disrupted supply chains at an unprecedented level. People started panic-buying, factories had to shut down, because of their workforce was under government-imposed lockdowns. These events quickly created previously unknown gaps in global supply chains.¹ For a large-scale event such as a global pandemic, standard risk models fell short. Because many companies had adopted to a LEAN logistic model², close to 70% of them were not ready to sustain business operations for more than three weeks, after the initial outbreak.³ This led to a phenomenon that companies were falling like domino pieces one after the other, as each ran out of means of production, not to mention the border closures blockading the channels of transportation, the airports being shut down and the seaports in disarray from stranded cargo ships. Essentially, all remaining logistic capacities were turned to maintaining the flow of basic goods and medical equipment. The world as we knew it came to a halt because of the pandemic, and its effects are still being felt at the beginning of 2022.⁴

¹ BBC: Building resilient supply chains after disruption, [online] <https://www.bbc.com/storyworks/future/a-better-tomorrow/building-resilient-supply-chains-after-disruption> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

² BAUDIN, Michel: Lean Logistics. The Nuts and Bolts of Delivering Materials and Goods; Productivity Press, New York, 2005.

³ CABALLERO, Pablo – GEORGE, Mark O. – LAGUNAS, Jaime – LUTHRA, Vivek – SENG, Dirk: Rapid Response. A pragmatic approach to maintaining supply chain resilience in times of uncertainty; https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/Thought-Leadership-Assets/PDF-2/Accenture-COVID19-Maintaining-Supply-Chain-Resilience-in-Times-of-Uncertainty.pdf%20-%20zoom=50 (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁴ GARZÓN GUINEA, Carlos – GUPTA, Harsh – LOPEZ CONDE, Maria – LUO, Jiayuan – PEREA ROJAS, Daniel – TWINN, Ian – QURESHI, Naveed: The Impact of COVID-19 on Logistics; https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/2d16ec419-41df-46c9-8b7b-96384cd36ab3/IFC-Covid19-Logistics-final_webpdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=naqOED5 (downloaded 24 January 2022)

If we look at national defence as a business, we can see that it is not excluded from these disruptive effects, especially as the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) are in the middle of a previously unprecedented investment and development process, known as Zrínyi National Defence and Armed Forces Development Programme.⁵ This paper aims to collect ideas how to improve supply chain security, as such disruptions in the global supply chains can and will have an effect on national security.

1. DEFINING ‘LOGISTICS VS. SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT’

As the foundation of this document, the terms logistics and supply chain need to be defined, as it is often the cause of confusion when interactions in economy are discussed.

The word logistics is defined as “*the detailed coordination of a complex operation involving many people, facilities, or supplies. Origin late 19th century in the sense ‘movement and supplying of troops and equipment’, from French logistique, from loger lodge*”⁶ As we can see the word was used to describe military supply, in the sense of transporting food and ammunition to troops, as supply was a key issue at the times of Napoleonic Wars. As the meaning of the word evolved throughout the centuries, it reached a more complex definition, issued by the Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals, as “the process of planning, implementing, and controlling procedures for the efficient and effective transportation and storage of goods including services, and related information from the point of origin to the point of consumption for the purpose of conforming to customer requirements. This definition includes inbound, outbound, internal, and external movements”.⁷ This version is much better applicable to civilian life as the term logistics grew out of military terminology.

Next is to find a definition for the term Supply Chain. To simply put, a supply chain starts with unprocessed raw materials and ends with the final consumer, using the finished goods, also the supply chain links lots of companies together. To put it more elaborately, “supply chain is the material and informational interchanges in the logistical process stretching from acquisition of raw materials to delivery of finished products to the end user. All vendors, service providers and customers are links in the supply chain”.⁸ It does not only encapsulate the stages of production from the mining of raw materials, through the refineries, the manufacturing plants ending with the sale and use or consumption of the product, but all the information that is generated at each stage.

⁵ Zrínyi 2026 honvédelmi és haderőfejlesztési program; Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2017. https://web.archive.org/web/20180306144605/https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/108409/zrinyi2026_190_190_7.pdf (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁶ HANKS, Patrick – PEARSON, Judy: The New Oxford Dictionary of English; Oxford University, Oxford, 2001.

⁷ VITASEK, Kate: Supply Chain Management Glossary and Terms; https://cscmp.org/CSCMP/Academia/SCM_Definitions_and_Glossary_of_Terms/CSCP/Educate/SCM_Definitions_and_Glossary_of_Terms.aspx?hkey=60879588-f65f-4ab5-8c4b-6878815ef921 (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁸ Ibid. p. 186

Supply Chain Management (SCM) came to life in the 1980s as companies began to realize the benefits of sharing information, collaborating, and ultimately integrating production processes in the hunt for efficiency and profitability. SCM, by definition, “encompasses the planning and management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, conversion, and all logistics management activities. Importantly, it also includes coordination and collaboration with channel partners, which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third-party service providers, and customers. In essence, SCM integrates supply and demand management within and across companies. SCM is an integrating function with primary responsibility for linking major business functions and business processes within and across companies into a cohesive and high-performing business model. It includes all of the logistics management activities noted above, as well as manufacturing operations, and it drives coordination of processes and activities with and across marketing, sales, product design, financing and information technology.”⁹ In another, perhaps easier wording, “*SCM is the management, across and within a network of upstream and downstream organisations, of both relationships and flows of material, information and resources. The purpose of SCM is to create value, enhance efficiency and satisfy customers.*”¹⁰

2. SECURITY IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN

The fact that there is an unquestionable connection between national economic power and national defence capability has been observed throughout the history. Perhaps it was best described by socialist thinkers in the 1950s in an empirical form. They stated that “*the technical capabilities and the nature of military aggression throughout the history have always had a strong and direct correlation with the level of economic development and the potential of a nation. Military aggression is not simply an act of will, but an act that needs to fulfil realistic preconditions to prevail, namely tools, among which the more developed tools conquer the less developed ones. Furthermore, these tools need to be manufactured, which means that the producer of the better tools of military aggression – commonly known as weapons – will conquer the producer of the worse tools. In conclusion, the victory of military aggression depends on the production of weapons, what depends on production itself, ergo on economic potential of a nation and the material resources available to carry out military aggression.*”¹¹

The measure of economic potential is most commonly described as the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a nation¹², and in our military alliance, NATO, member states agree to spend 2% of their own GDP on national defence.¹³ The more the base sum is, the more the benefit their military institutions gain from it. Therefore, affecting a nation’s economic power, indirectly affects its military capabilities as well. It is the

⁹ Ibid. p. 187

¹⁰ MANGAN, John – LALWANI, Chandra: Global Logistics and Supply Chain Management; Wiley, Padstow, 2016. p. 11.

¹¹ HAHN, István: A hadművészeti ókori klasszikusa; Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 1963. p. 11.

¹² CSATH, Magdolna – FÁSI, Csaba – NAGY, Balázs – TAKSÁS, Balázs – VINOGRADOV, Szergej – Versenyképesség: Új elméleti és módszertani megközelítések, Budapest, Dialóg, 2020.

¹³ NATO: Wales Summit Declaration; 2014/5.

fundamental theory behind materiel centric warfare¹⁴ that aims to blockade trading routes, disrupt supply chains, and cut a nation off from the basic resources it needs to keep on fighting. For example, during the Cold War, instead of using military, so called direct means of conflict, the application of non-military coercive measures became more and more prevalent. Economic competition, psychological and ideological warfare, known as the indirect means of warfare, were used almost exclusively.¹⁵ This makes supply chains prime targets in today's globalized world economy.

Supply chain security consists of two main factors, physical security¹⁶ and supply chain integrity¹⁷. The first term consists of the security of trade routes, such as sea- and airports, railway networks, storage facilities and choke points. The second term emphasises the trust and the common understanding throughout the entire supply chain, the shared standards, and the willingness to provide services to each other. Maintaining the supply chain security is not only a national interest, but entire regions depend on it. As an indirect mean of warfare, attacking sensitive links in the supply chain can have far reaching effects. Regardless of the origin of the COVID-19 pandemic, the theory was proved without a doubt.

On the one hand, ensuring physical security in the supply chain means defence against terrorist attacks on key infrastructure or pirate activity on sea, but also includes preparing alternative means of transportation for goods, in cases of border closures (such as the lockdowns, due to the pandemic) or natural disasters (such as the Iceland volcano eruption in 2010¹⁸). Often it is the case that a significant portion of expenses will be paid to security providers, who offer their services against such irregular attacks.¹⁹ Supply chain integrity, on the other hand, deals with the intellectual side of security. Much like the quality control standardisation initiatives in the 1990s²⁰, the aim is to create a trust inspiring environment for exchanging data and processing information on a common understanding. Making sure that the know-how does not get out of the manufacturing facilities constitutes a priority, similarly to the free flow of goods throughout the supply chain. In defence industries the relevant data often include military intelligence and technological data for the next generation equipment. Protecting these is of the highest interest; therefore, implementing strict security measures through audits and background checks is essential.

¹⁴ FORGÁCS, Balázs: Hadelmélet. A magyar katonai gondolkodás története és a hadikultúrák; Dialóg Kiadó, Budapest, 2017. p. 47

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 31

¹⁶ CLOSS, David – McGARRELL, Edmund: Enhancing Security Throughout the Supply Chain.;Armonk, IBM, 2004

¹⁷ BELL, John E. – BOZDOGAN, Hamparsum – CASTILLO, Vincent E. – MOLLENKOPF, Diane A.: Supply Chain Integrity. A Key to Sustainable Supply Chain Management; Journal of Business Logistics, 2018/1. pp. 38-56.

¹⁸ National Center for Atmospheric Science – Eyjafjallajökull 2010: How Icelandic volcano eruption closed European skies; <https://ncas.ac.uk/eyjafjallajokull-2010-how-an-icelandic-volcano-eruption-closed-european-skies/> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

¹⁹ Marine Insight: 11 Companies Offering Maritime Security Services; <https://www.marineinsight.com/marine-safety/11-companies-offering-maritime-security-services/> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

²⁰ HOOVER, Marcey L. – KOLB, Rachel R.: The History of Quality in Industry; Sandia National Laboratories, Albaquerque, 2012.

3. CHIP-SHORTAGE

In the never-ending hunt for profit maximalization,²¹ companies began outsourcing their production to countries with cheaper workforce,²² mainly regarding the assembly processes. East-Asian countries, mainly China became a hub for manufacturing plants owned by corporations residing in the Western World. China built its economy on an inexhaustible and extremely disciplined workforce, and a communist ideology of providing work for everyone. They started attracting bigger and bigger companies to open their plants on Chinese soil, and with an opportunity to cut costs, Western capital started flooding in.²³ Also with about 20% of the world's population living there,²⁴ it is an exponentially growing consumer market, with an appetite for everything from motor vehicles to electronics and everything in between. With 124 from the 500 companies being Chinese in 2020,²⁵ the COVID-19 pandemic hit the global economy on a previously unprecedented scale.

In December 2019, the pandemic started in the city of Wuhan, the transportation and industrial hub of Central-China, where close to 300 of the world's 500 biggest companies have a market presence,²⁶ forcing a virtually total lockdown of the city. The spread of the virus kept the Chinese labourers locked in their homes, and as a consequence, factories had to close down production temporarily. This was the start of a wave of uncertainty in the supply chain for many industries, whose effects are still being felt in the beginning of 2022. As the demands all over the rest of the globe maintained, Chinese production was idling, then only 3 months later the tables turned. The whole Western world came under lockdown, just as the Chinese government's efforts of containing the pandemic began to bear fruit. With global demand shrinking to a minimum, companies had to stop manufacturing the parts because they did not have the storage capacity, due to adapting to LEAN and Just in Time (JIT)²⁷ philosophies in the globalized economic environment. Because of the duration of the pandemic, these companies ran out of capital and were forced to shut down completely, liquidate their assets, and let go of their workers.

In the second half of 2021, with adequate vaccines on hand, the global demands began to climb back to their pre-outbreak levels, but the factories to satisfy these demands were nowhere to be found. This led to shortages in many different areas, with each country having to deal with its own problems first, diverting efforts from restoring global supply chains. China suffered from shortages of coal and paper, the USA from consumer electronics and toilet paper, India from cars and computer chips,

²¹ PORTER, Michael E.: Versenystratégia, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2006. pp. 255-273.

²² PORTER, Michael E.: The Competitive Advantage of Nations; The Free Press, New York, 1990. p. 72.

²³ MA, Jun: The Chinese Economy in the 1990s; Macmillan, Hounds-mills, 2000.

²⁴ <https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/china-population/> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

²⁵ https://fortune.com/global500/2020/search/?fg500_country=China (downloaded 24 January 2022)

²⁶ HE, Hufeng: Why Wuhan is so important to China's economy and the potential impact of the coronavirus; <https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3047426/explained-why-wuhan-so-important-chinas-economy-and-potential> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

²⁷ HUTCHINS, David: Just in Time; Gower, Aldershot, 1999.

Nigeria from liquified natural gas used for cooking, and Lebanon from water and medicines, just to mention a few examples.²⁸ Even McDonald's in Japan is facing a potato import shortage, due to troubles at Canadian seaports, forcing them to exclude large portion fries from their menus,²⁹ a previously unthinkable example. But most importantly a global shortage of semiconductors, with far more outreaching consequences of the aforementioned examples came about.

The Bullwhip effect,³⁰ as it is known in economy, is the distortion of information about demands, which is felt by each link in the supply chain and orders additional safety stocks of supplies, in case of emergency, or cuts back orders when there are still stocks on hand. This leads to grossly exaggerated swings in ordered quantities that the suppliers are unable to satisfy. Especially with many production plants being no more capable, due to the pandemic, of satisfying the semiconductor demands of the world, because the demands outgrew the supply, leading to what is called the 'chip shortage'. But what drove up the demands to this level?




Figure 1: Bullwhip effect charts³¹

²⁸ KRAEMER, Daniel: The shortages hitting countries around the world; <https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-58868636> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

²⁹ BBC: McDonald's faces a French fries shortage in Japan; <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-59750613> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

³⁰ LEE, Hau L. – PADMANABHAN, V. – WHANG, Seungjin: The Bullwhip Effect in Supply Chains; Sloan Management Review, 1997. pp. 93-102.

³¹ Ibid. p. 94.

New regulations to counter the effects of climate change demand a switch from the use of fossil fuels to renewable energy³² that includes mandates aiming to enforce zero-emission passenger vehicles in the EU by 2035.³³ Household mini-powerplants (solar panels and wind turbines) and electric vehicles both incorporate a large number of semiconductors. Also, the explosion in popularity of cryptocurrencies (mining and trading), as well as lockdown induced remote working (home-office) and e-learning also drove up demand for computers and electronic equipment. In addition to increased demands, various adverse events, such as fires and droughts, affected large manufacturing plants, further aggravating the global supply shortage of semiconductors.³⁴ Compiling these facts together with the disruption in supply routes caused by the pandemic, we get the answer to our question.

4. EFFECTS ON NATIONAL ECONOMY

Hungary has created an economic model that is very inviting to foreign capital. Multinational companies from automotive and electronic industries have opened factories in ever increasing numbers, with German and South Korean investments leading the charge. Companies, to name only a few, such as Audi, Mercedes, BMW, Opel, Bosch, Knorr-Bremse, Continental and Samsung have become the backbone of Hungarian economy since the financial crisis of 2008.³⁵ These companies, without exception, felt the effects of the global semiconductor shortage, halting production for multiple weeks at a time. And as the pandemic wound down, demand for new vehicles matched the growing pace of consumer electronics and computers. A demand that, without the adequate supply of semiconductors, these companies were unable to satisfy. This contributed significantly to the Hungarian economy shrinking by 5%.³⁶

Meanwhile, in an effort to satisfy the rising global demand, the semiconductor industry relocated to such country that got the pandemic under control the fastest, The People's Republic of China. With the aim to improve their international competitive advantage with long term investments,³⁷ the Chinese government has made the development of the semiconductor industry a national priority in its 14th Five Year Plan, targeting 70% import substitution by 2025 and a complete import substitution by 2030.³⁸ They even went as far as offering total, 10-year tax exemptions to advanced

³² European Commission: A clean planet for all; COM 773, Brussels, 2018.

³³ Council of European Union – Fit for 55 package, 14585/21, Brussels, 2021.

³⁴ ATTINASI, Maria Grazia – DE STEFANI, Roberta – FROHM, Erik – GUNELLA, Vanessa – KOESTER, Gerrit – MELLEMENIDIS, Alexandros – TÓTH, Máté: The semiconductor shortage and its implication for euro area trade, production and prices; ECB Economic Bulletin, 4/2021.

³⁵ SANTALÓCZY, Katalin – SASS, Magdolna: The impact of the crisis on the Hungarian automotive industry; In: EADI-DSA 2011 conference 'Rethinking development in an age of scarcity and uncertainty: new values, voices and alliances for increased resilience'; 2011.

³⁶ KSH: Gyorstájékoztató: Bruttó hazai termék (GDP). 2020. IV. negyedév (második becslés); <https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/gyor/gdp/gdp2012.html> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

³⁷ PORTER (1990) op. cit. pp. 591-592.

³⁸ US Chamber of Commerce: Made in China 2025: Global Ambitions Built on Local Protections; 2017.

nodes semiconductor companies.³⁹ Obviously, many South-East Asian chip producers, who had to close down their factories due to the pandemic, relocated quickly, and some have already started operations in China. This means that the semiconductor market will be polarized between the USA, the world leader in production (as of 2021), and China in the near future.⁴⁰

Franz Fehrenbach, former CEO of Bosch (largest supplier of original automotive parts in the world⁴¹), has stated in an interview that the European automotive industry has become over-reliant on suppliers from other regions, mainly from Asia. As battery cells and electronic circuits are becoming the most important parts of new vehicles, the idea of creating regional production capacity became more and more prevalent. That is why Bosch has already built its first semiconductor producing facility in Germany, and the Volkswagen-group is planning to open six more, in partnership with other automotive companies by 2030. Much like China, the European Union also has initiated a funding scheme to establish regional semiconductor production facilities.⁴²

Scarcity⁴³ is the biggest issue in today's global economy, and the relevant effects are noticeable in Hungary. 30% of companies experience scarcity, as the main limiting factor to their growth potential. Either insufficient material supplies or the lack of capacity are the reasons, the situation has not been this dire since 1999, which is a sign of a fundamental problem of the whole economy. Pairing this with a fluctuating deficit in well-trained workforce, that not only effects production, but transportation of goods as well, we can find our main reasons for the drop in production.⁴⁴

5. EFFECTS ON NATIONAL DEFENCE

With disruption in global supply chains, Hungary is right in the middle of carrying out the Zrínyi National Defence and Armed Forces Development Programme, where a complete overhaul of national defence capabilities and a switch away from deteriorating Soviet era to NATO-conform equipment is set in plans. Another main proposition of the Programme is to re-establish Hungarian

³⁹ ZHANG, Jane: China unveils major tax incentive policy to encourage innovation in domestic semiconductor industry; South China Morning Post, August 5, 2020.

⁴⁰ GREENE, Henry – GUMMER, Megan – YAN, Derek: Zero to One: The Rise of China's Semiconductor Industry; <https://kraneshares.com/zero-to-one-the-rise-of-chinas-semiconductor-industry/> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁴¹ TAYLOR, Michael: Bosch and ZF Rank as Europe's Top Automotive Suppliers; <https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaeltaylor/2021/06/29/bosch-and-zf-rank-as-europe-s-top-automotive-suppliers/?sh=53488e1e36ef> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁴² MTI: Fájdalmas vallomás a távozó Bosch-vezéről: túlságosan függő az európai autóipar más régiók alkatrészgyártótól; <https://www.portfolio.hu/uzlet/20211211/fajdalmas-vallomas-a-tavozo-bosch-vezertol-tulsagosan-fuggo-az-europai-autoipar-mas-regiok-alkatreszgyartoitol-515656> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁴³ DEFARCO, Joanna – KSHETRI, Nir – VOAS, Jeffrey: Scarcity and Global Insecurity. The Semiconductor Shortage; IT Professional, 2021/5. pp. 78-82.

⁴⁴ HORNYÁK, József: Magyarországot is elérte a világ legsúlyosabb problémája, ami mindenkit térdre kényszerít; <https://www.portfolio.hu/gazdasag/20211203/magyarorszagot-is-elerte-a-vilag-legsulyosabb-problemaja-ami-mindenkit-terdre-kenyszerit-514158> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

manufacturing capabilities in defence commodities, by setting up government owned factories inland. News of contracts being signed on both land and air force vehicles appeared nearly every month. Some vehicles have already arrived to the HDF, some are still in test phase and some having already started active duty. The list of acquisitions includes the following:

- LYNX Tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV), manufactured in a newly built factory in Zalaegerszeg, sharing ownership and know-how with Rheinmetall AG, German defence industry giant;
- Ejder Yalcin 4x4 Wheeled IFV, known as Gidrán in the HDF, licensed by the Turkish Nurol Makina corporation;
- Establishing a factory in Kaposvár, capable of producing 6x6 and 8x8 Wheeled IFVs, also in cooperation with Rheinmetall AG;
- Leopard 2A7+ battle tanks and leasing of Leopard 2A4 battle tanks (for training purposes) from Rheinmetall AG;
- Panzerhaibitze 2000, from German Krauss-Maffei Wegmann;
- KC-390 medium sized cargo planes, from Brazilian Embraer;
- H145M small, and H225M medium sized helicopters, from Airbus;
- Helicopter parts production in Gyula, by Airbus Helicopters Hungary, sister company of the French aviation technology giant Airbus;
- NASAMS air-defence system, from Norwegian Kongsberg and American Raytheon;
- Iron Dome radio-locator system, from Israeli ELTA Systems;
- Purchase of Aero Vodochody, Czech airplane manufacturer;
- Purchase of British-Austrian Hirtenberger Defence Systems company and using their know-how, re-establishing medium- and large calibre ammunition and explosives production in Várpalota;
- New central logistic warehouses, first of which was built in Szentkirályszabadja.⁴⁵

As we can see, a plethora of high-tech, next generation military equipment is on the way to serve the Hungarian people, but will they arrive in time? The defence industry is no different from any of the previously mentioned ones, as its products include vast amounts of highly specialized electronics, and they are also affected by the chip shortage. In a regional economic environment, where the biggest car manufacturers must halt production for weeks because of scarcity in supplies,⁴⁶ why would the defence sector be any different? Even if the supply chains recover quickly enough, there is a year or possibly there are two years already lost, that cannot be recovered.

However, supply chains do not only transfer goods, but information as well. As regards information, it is paramount to assess to whom and which phase of production is outsourced. Handing over sensitive data, e.g., the schematics of military equipment to anyone without proper checks would be a huge mistake. That is the reason for the

⁴⁵ MARÓTH, Gáspár: Resetting Defence: Modernization of the Hungarian Defence Forces and reestablishing the national defence and aerospace industry; Katonai Logisztika, 2021/1-2.

⁴⁶ LAWRENCE, Kelsey: “Chipageddon”. What the Global Chip Drought Means for Manufacturing and Supply Chains; SAGE Business Cases, SAGE, London, 2022.

supply chain integrity was emphasised previously. Trust in the supply chain⁴⁷ partners upstream and downstream, with whom the information can be shared safely is the hardest thing to assess. New cybersecurity protocols were established in Hungary in late 2021, which made the Military National Security Service responsible for ensuring information safety in defence industry and trade.⁴⁸ This laid down the foundations of proper information management in the supply chain and brought national standards, in line with EU regulations. Now the Service is tasked to assess levels of trust in members of the supply chain at three levels, basic, significant and high. These privileges have to be earned by the companies on the basis of regulation mandated self-controls, also providing sufficient data on request of the Service for their rigorous screening procedures. Only after the check-ups are done, the trusted partners are able to do business and participate in research and development in the Hungarian defence industry.

6. CONCLUSION

Hungary has a military that is currently reliant on Russian-made spare-parts for maintaining the aging vehicle park of both its land and its air forces; and is reliant also on foreign know-how to manufacture next generation equipment. All pieces of this modern equipment are full of cutting-edge technologies, and all of them are incorporating semiconductors. For the sufficient supply of microchips, the ever-growing reliance on China exists. Also, the reliance on Russia in energy (oil and natural gas supply) must be mentioned, as it is the most pressing issue of winter 2021/2022.⁴⁹ Both these issues effect not just Hungary, but the entire region as well.

NATO's Strategic Concept⁵⁰ lays East and South down as two directions from which Europe has to expect and counter malicious threats. The problem is that Europe is dependent on supply chains originating in the East (Asia), and minerals mined in the South (Africa). In case of an armed conflict, can we exclude that China halts export of semiconductors, and Russia does the same with natural gas and oil? Can we imagine that nations use the infrastructure – built under the massive Eurasian “Belt and Road” initiative⁵¹ – to advance their armed forces towards Europe? All this is absolutely not out of the realm of possibility.

⁴⁷ JONES, Stephen L. – FAWCETT, Amydee M. – FAWCETT, Stanley E.: Supply chain trust: The catalyst for collaborative innovation; *Business Horizons*, 2012/2. pp. 163-178.

⁴⁸ A Kormány 718/2021. (XII. 20.) Korm. rendelete a hadiipari kutatással, fejlesztéssel, gyártással és kereskedelemmel összefüggő kiberbiztonsági tanúsításról

⁴⁹ Euronews: 15 évre kötött gázvásárlási szerződést a Gazprommal Magyarország; <https://hu.euronews.com/2021/09/27/15-evre-kotott-gazvasarlesi-szerzodest-a-gazprommal-magyarorszag> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁵⁰ Active Engagement, Modern Defence – NATO's Strategic Concept 2010; Lisbon, 2010.

⁵¹ HUANG, Yiping: Understanding China's Belt & Road Initiative: Motivation, framework and assessment; *China Economic Review* 2016/9.




Figure 2: Map of “Belt and Road” initiative⁵²

To decrease reliance on these supply chains and support the creation of a self-sufficient semiconductor industry in Europe, and to find alternative routes to energy import are of the greatest importance. There are already plans in motion to make this happen. First, it is the European Chips Act⁵³, to which 22 EU member states have already pledged their support⁵⁴, with the aim of creating European semiconductor sovereignty in the near future, preferably by 2025. Second plan is the European Cyber Resilience Act⁵⁵, with the aim to establish common cybersecurity standards for products, to award “trusted partner” status to suppliers, and to create the framework for secure information exchange between industries.⁵⁶ Third plan is to reduce excessive reliance on Russian energy by diversifying the source of imports, such as by joining the Black Sea – Central EU pipeline⁵⁷, or reserving capacities in the Croatian Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) terminal⁵⁸, as well as creating national capacity, with powerplants producing renewable⁵⁹ and nuclear energy (Paks II⁶⁰).

⁵² <https://www.beltroad-initiative.com/belt-and-road/> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁵³ European Commission: State of the Union 2021. Letter of Intent to President David Maria Sassoli and Prime Minister Janez Janša

⁵⁴ Declaration: A European Initiative on Processors and semiconductor technologies; https://www.eusemiconductors.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/20201209_EuropeanInitiativeonProcessorsandsemiconductortechologies.pdf (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁵⁵ European Commission: State of the Union 2021. Letter of Intent to President David Maria Sassoli and Prime Minister Janez Janša

⁵⁶ European Commission: Commission work programme 2022. Making Europe stronger together;

⁵⁷ MTI: Hungary and Serbia Connect Black Sea-Central EU Gas Pipeline Networks; <https://hungarytoday.hu/hungary-serbia-pipeline-trade-europe/> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁵⁸ MTI: FM Szíjjártó Attends Krk LNG Terminal Inauguration; <https://hungarytoday.hu/szijjarto-krk-lng-terminal-natural-gas-inauguration-energy-security/> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁵⁹ MNB: Financing the Hungarian renewable energy sector; <https://mnb.hu/letoltes/20210121-financing-the-hungarian-renewable-energy-sector.pdf> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

⁶⁰ MTI: Construction Phase of Paks Nuclear Plant Upgrade Set to Start in 2022; <https://hungarytoday.hu/paks-nuclear-plant-janos-suli/> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

By supporting the listed initiatives, the further expansion and development of Hungarian industry can be secured. A secure economic environment, independent of outside interference will bring economic stability and breed innovation. These long-term investments in supply chain security will bear fruit eventually, especially as the threat of international conflict (Russia – Ukraine conflict⁶¹) is certainly a possibility.

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⁶¹ KIRBY, Paul: Is Russia preparing to invade Ukraine? And other questions; <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56720589> (downloaded 24 January 2022)

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ISTVÁN JUHÁSZ

**NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN 2050,
BUILDING FUTURE RESILIENCE - IN WHAT DIRECTION DIPLOMACY
IS CHANGING UNTIL 2050 AND BEYOND**

Abstract

The future has begun. The Earth's resources face a supply strain. The global security environment exhibits a deteriorating trend, which is exacerbated with the reorganization of global powers. The global security environment is going through dynamic and fundamental changes. These evolving processes necessitate and increase the importance of identifying the rational responses to the new risks and threats. In my study, I summarize and analyze the most important megatrends, characterize the main and most dangerous global problems and challenges in 2050 and beyond, as well as the threats that have long term effect on our nation. A possible future solution is to implement a comprehensive national resilience plan that is vital for all of us.

Keywords: Vision of 2050, global environment, resources, risk and threats, future resilience

*"Measured against the array of global threats that we face today and there are many – terrorism, extremism, epidemics, poverty and nuclear proliferation – all challenges that know no borders, climate change absolutely ranks up there equal with all of them."*¹

John Kerry, US Secretary of State

INTRODUCITON

Globalization has entered a new era of information technology, which builds on a long-term sustainable growth. The new era revolves around the dominance and rise of geography and economic geography, the geopolitical processes are being replaced by geo-economic processes, instead of land acquisitions typical of earlier times. There is already an entrenched competition for markets and business.

Technology has revolutionised how we live today, but the globalization of technology has introduced new challenges. Humans are having a devastating impact on the natural world by fueling dangerous levels of climate change, more turbulent

¹ KERRY, John: The Climate Crisis Is Here; LIMA, Peru,
<https://www.businessinsider.com/kerry-the-climate-crisis-is-here-2014-12> (downloaded 5 October 2021)

weather and destroying biodiversity. Most recently, the COVID-19² pandemic has affected us in unprecedented ways. We are at a crossroads and our choices today will define our future.³

The 21st century has been defined by knowledge and creativity, where individual ideas and innovations are the most important currency. Nations that do not have enough knowledge will be forced to buy it, and the value of knowledge as a currency will rise exponentially. This era would be based on networks and fusions. The renewed geographical locations have become geofusion hubs, where the stored data (the Big Data⁴) are the most sought after commodity. New cooperation of economic actors will be established, and these cooperations will form centres, emerging to the forefront of commerce. The three most important keywords of the new world order would be complexity, connectivity, and sustainability.

With the reorganization of the global power, the current infrastructure of global security will further deteriorate. In turn, this may increase uncertainty and unease amongst allies. Possible multipolarity of the world order is expected to be determined by the increase in economic competition between the United States and China, as well as the intensification of the growing political opposition at the same time. In recent years, U.S. attention has turned eastward to Asia, which has led to a shift in transatlantic relations. Nowadays, does China seem to be leading the economic competition between the two superpowers of the world?

Our world is moving from a global civilization to a sustainable, new “geocivilization”. The 21st century is to become a Eurasian era, ending a 500-year Atlantic era. Today, 147 global companies produce 40% of world’s GDP⁵, and nearly 700 companies account for 80% of global GDP. These companies are concentrated in hubs and cities, where the workforce with specialized skills is available. In addition to strategic corporations and nation-states, the new power centers of the 21st century will be cities. Today, in an era of the rise of cities and urban networks, there are 64 global urban areas that produce more than half of the world’s GDP.⁶

² Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) is an infectious disease caused by the SARS-CoV-2 virus; https://www.who.int/health-topics/coronavirus#tab=tab_1 (downloaded 30 September 2021)

³ What might the world look like in 2050?; <https://imperialtechforesight.com/the-world-in-2050/> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

⁴ The Big Data is a combination of structured, semistructured and unstructured data collected by organizations that can be mined for information, and used in machine learning projects, predictive modeling and other advanced analytics applications. <https://searchdatamanagement.techtarget.com/definition/big-data> (downloaded 2 October 2021)

⁵ Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the total monetary or market value of all the finished goods and services produced within a country’s borders in a specific time period. <https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gdp.asp> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

⁶ 21 items for the 21st century – Theses for the new world order in geoeconomics; <https://novekedes.hu/mag/21-tetel-a-21-szazadhoz-tezisek-a-geookonomiai-uj-vilagrendhez> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

The three most important areas for the coming period, according to the World Economic Forum⁷ forecast, will be the land area – between the Indian Ocean, the Arctic Ocean and the two oceans – Eurasia.⁸

In 2013, China began implementing the “The Belt and Road program” that is also the largest and most significant investment in human history. China’s long-term objective is to recover the former historical, cultural, economic and commercial significance of Eurasia by building the new Silk Road⁹ and shifting the focus from the oceans to the mainland, in terms of development axes and routes. The New Silk Road connects the actors that make up the new phase of globalization: it accounts for about 40% of world’s GDP and 70% of the Earth’s population.¹⁰ Owing to these facts – security challenges, risks and threats – we have to analyse the states’ intentions and military capabilities, reviewing those possible hazards that could affect our country.

STRATEGIC RESEARCHERS VISION FOR THE WORLD 2050 AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN 2050 – FACTS AND TRENDS

In 2050, according to the Roland Berger Trend Compendium, the 9.7 billion people living on Earth would find a way to manage the planetary system effectively. Hunger and poverty would have been eliminated.¹¹

Everyone would have access to adequate food, clothing, housing, healthcare, education, energy, clean water and sanitation. Children under the age of five would

⁷ The World Economic Forum is the International Organization for Public-Private Cooperation. The Forum engages the foremost political, business, cultural and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. It was established in 1971 as a not-for-profit foundation and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. It is independent, impartial and not tied to any special interests. <https://www.weforum.org/about/world-economic-forum> (downloaded 02 October 2021)

⁸ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world, p. 7. <https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Insights/Publications/Roland-Berger-Trend-Compendium-2050-Population-and-Society.html> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

⁹ The New Silk Road is also called the Belt and Road Initiative. It links countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa together. The plan was initiated by Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China. The New Silk Road focuses on investment for railway, highway and port construction. <https://www.chinahighlights.com/silkroad/new-silk-road.htm> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹⁰ China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), sometimes referred to as the New Silk Road, is one of the most ambitious infrastructure projects ever conceived. Launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping, the vast collection of development and investment initiatives would stretch from East Asia to Europe, significantly expanding China’s economic and political influence. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹¹ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; p. 7. <https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Insights/Global-Topics/Trend-Compendium/> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

no longer die from preventable disease; virtually no elderly would die from cold or heat exposure.¹²

The planet's limited resources are under pressure. In 2050, 1.9 billion more people will inhabit our planet (2020: 7.8 billion, 2050: 9.7 billion, and 2100: 10.9 billion), World population growth is fueled by growth in less developed countries. Population in Sub-Saharan Africa¹³ will double from 2020 to 2050. The world also faces the challenge of changing age demographics. In 2050 there will be more than 1.5 billion people aged 65+ years (2020: 727 million) and 3.2 million aged 100+. Around 2027, India is expected to overtake China as the world's most populous country. In 2050, India will have more than 1.6 billion inhabitants. Standing side by side, the predicted 9.7 billion strong population of 2050 would span the equator¹⁴ more than 240 times. However, average global population density will only rise to 71 people (2021: 58 people) per km².¹⁵ (Figure 1.)

¹² Global Change: International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme; <http://www.igbp.net/news/features/features/2050avisionforourplanet.5.1b8ae20512db692f2a680003425.html> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹³ Sub-Saharan Africa – Africa's 54 countries as “sub-Saharan,” excluding Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Somalia, Sudan and Tunisia. <https://qz.com/africa/770350/why-do-we-still-say-subsaharan-africa/> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹⁴ Equator - The Equator is an imaginary line around the middle of the Earth. It is halfway between the North and South Poles, and divides the Earth into the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. The distance around the Earth at the Equator, its circumference, is 40,075 kilometers (24,901 miles). <https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/equator/> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

¹⁵ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050. op. cit.

The rate of population growth is decreasing due to lower fertility rates – In 2050, a vast majority of the 9.7 billion will live in less developed regions




Figure 1: The rate of population growth in 2050¹⁶

¹⁶ Source: Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: UN Population Division; op. cit. p. 7.
50

International net migration flows between regions are expected to be at a high level toward 2050. Without global action until 2050, up to 143 million internal climate migrants¹⁷ are projected from Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.¹⁸ (Figure 2.)



Figure 2: Internal climate migrants in 2050¹⁹

¹⁷ Climate migrants - Environmental migrants are persons or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave their habitual homes. (IOM, 2007:33). <https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/environmental-migration-1> (downloaded 2 October 2021)

¹⁸ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit. pp. 7-11.

¹⁹ Sources: World Bank, IOM, Roland-Berger Trend Compendium 2050. op. cit. p. 11.

Pandemics are not the only threat to global health. Numerous other challenges lie ahead on the way toward 2050. Air pollution would kill approx. 7 million people every year.

Climate change would cause more extreme weather events exacerbating malnutrition²⁰ and the spread of infectious diseases. Due to unregulated prescription practices and the overuse of antibiotics (among other factors), Anti-Microbial Resistance²¹ would be rising, jeopardizing achievements of modern medicine. Both a more targeted use of antibiotics and the development of new antibiotics would be key issues.

One third of the global population would lack access to medicines, vaccines, and diagnostic tools. Improving access to medication while ensuring its quality would also require fighting against sub-standard and black market products.

Manmade global temperature increases could only be limited to 2°C if significant additional efforts are undertaken to become carbon-free in 2100. Other types of pollution would damage our environment and threaten human health, informed limitation and directed efforts would be key issues. Air pollution is a serious problem in today's world. 9 out of 10 people breathe air that exceeds WHO air pollution guidelines. Air pollution is responsible for 1 in 8 deaths worldwide. Water pollution remains a similar challenge. The Great Pacific Ocean Garbage Patch contains 1.8 trillion pieces of plastic in an area of 1.6 million m², which is approximately 3 times the size of France. Land pollution faces logistic crises. Globally, 33% of waste is still openly dumped and approx. 40% goes to landfills. Noise pollution in work environments remains underregulated, as roughly 466 million people globally suffer from disabling hearing loss, not due to their age. There is even an issue of light pollution, as 83% of the world's population live under light-polluted skies. An inconvenient truth about energy consumption is that unless coordinated efforts change global usage patterns, fossil fuels still top the 2050 energy mix. The demand for water and food is expected to grow significantly toward 2050. Water, food, and energy resources aside, a high number of raw materials are critical for our economy. China is the dominant supplier for these commodities.²² (Figure 3.)

²⁰ Malnutrition is a serious condition that happens when your diet does not contain the right amount of nutrients. It means "poor nutrition" and can refer to: undernutrition – not getting enough nutrients. overnutrition - getting more nutrients than needed.

https://www.google.com/search?rlz=1C1NDGM_huHU871HU872&sxsrf=AOaemvKNIdJrYY59Nyy1saMJeb1RLGgLag:1633176798919&q=What+is+malnutrition&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwj8q9HX2avzAhUPqxoKHUlPAMQ1QJ6BAgqEAE&biw=1242&bih=568&dpr=1.1 (downloaded 2 October 2021)

²¹ Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a global health and development threat. It requires urgent multisectoral action in order to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/antimicrobial-resistance> (downloaded 2 October 2021)

²² Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit. pp. 17-34.

Water, food, and energy resources aside, a high number of raw materials are critical for our economy – China is the dominant supplier

An analysis of the EU: Countries accounting for largest share of global supply of critical raw materials (CRM) 2020¹ [%]




Figure 3: Water, food and energy resources²³

Demand for rare earths used in permanent magnets, e.g. for electric vehicles, digital technologies or wind generators, could increase tenfold by 2050. By that time, the EU will require around 60 times more lithium, essential for e-mobility, and 15 times more cobalt, used in electric car batteries.

²³ Sources: Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: European Commission; op. cit. p. 34.

The EU analysis concerning CRMs

- > Since 2011 the EU reports on the global supply of raw materials
- > The 2020 (fourth) assessment covers 80+ raw materials with a view to these being critical – or not – for the EU
- > The EU defines a raw material as critical when its **economic importance** and its **supply risk** is **high**
- > At present, the EU identified 30 raw materials or raw material groups as critical



Looking ahead to 2050

- > Demand for rare earths used in permanent magnets, e.g. for electric vehicles, digital technologies or wind generators, could increase tenfold by 2050. By 2050, the EU will require around 60 times more lithium, essential for e-mobility, and 15 times more cobalt, used in electric car batteries

Selected CRMs and examples of end-use

Beryllium: electronic and telecommunications equipment; Germanium: infrared optics; Hafnium: superalloy;
 Niobium: magnets; Rhodium: auto catalyst; Phosphate rock: mineral fertilizer; Tantalum: capacitors;
 Tungsten: tools

1) Percentage shares refer to the study "Report on critical raw materials for the EU" (2020), European Commission 2) REEs: Rare Earth Elements
 Sources: European Commission; Roland Berger

Global trade has long been the engine of globalization and growth, but since the Global Financial Crisis, growth rates of trade have nearly halved. While the global marketplace provides a growing number of people with a seemingly unending flow of goods, too many people in developing countries struggle to meet their daily needs, with limited access to basic services and functional markets. Demand for food, water, and energy is increasing, particularly where the population or the economy is growing rapidly. Widespread unemployment, rapid urbanization, and environmental degradation challenge efforts to reduce poverty and increase economic development in many poor countries.²⁴ (Figure 4.)


²⁴ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit. pp. 34-42.

Economic power is shifting further toward emerging countries – With RCEP, Asia-Pacific countries set the course for a global economic power bloc

In 2050, 3 of the top 5 global economic players will stem from emerging markets

Geographically, Asia reaffirms its position at the center of global economic power

Top 10 countries in terms of nominal GDP in 2019 and 2050 [USD bn]



> In November 2020, the **Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)**, formed by the **ten ASEAN member states plus five other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, including China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia, was announced**

> The agreement **accounts for almost 30 percent of world trade** with the countries involved representing around 2.2 billion people, making the agreement the largest free trade area in the world – ahead of the EU
> RCEP is clearly a competitive force amongst free trade areas, but equally a new opportunity for its members and other such trading blocs: The agreement may make it easier for other free trade areas to trade with the Asia-Pacific states, as it can reduce or replace the number of bilateral or country-level agreements

Sources: Oxford Economics, EEAS, Roland Berger

²⁵ Sources: Oxford Economics, EEAS, Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050. p. 42.

Economic power is shifting further toward emerging countries, with Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)²⁶ Asia-Pacific countries set the course for a global economic power bloc.

In 2050, 3 of the top 5 global economic players will stem from emerging markets. In November 2020, the RCEP was formed by the ten ASEAN²⁷ member states, plus five other countries in the Asia-Pacific region including China, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and Australia.²⁸

Technology and innovation would drive prosperity, a lack of such capabilities is a major hurdle for developing countries to level with developed countries. The progression of Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities would be expected to be near limitless, intelligent machines would accomplish more and more ambitious tasks. In 2026, AI – would write an essay for a high school history class that would receive high grades and pass plagiarism detectors. In 2034, AI would defeat the best Go players (a game; AI would get the same training as humans), training only on as many games as the best Go players have played. In 2049, AI – would write New York Times Bestseller, write a novel or short story good enough to put it on the New York Times bestseller list. AI experts expect that – with a probability of 50% – around 2060 unaided machines will be able to accomplish every task better and more cheaply than human workers. Around 2140, all occupations will be fully automatable.²⁹

By the World Economic Forum³⁰'s Global Risks Report that is based on its annual Global Risks Perception Survey, the Top 10 global risks over the next 10 years are as follows: Extreme weather, Climate action failure, Human environmental damage, Infectious diseases, Biodiversity loss, Digital power concentration, Digital inequality, Interstate relations fracture, Cybersecurity failure and Livelihood crises.

The changes of the global strategic environment and future frontiers negatively affect defense and deterrence. The nature and the distribution of global power have changed, too (geopolitical and geoeconomic shifts, systemic competitions, rapid

²⁶ Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) - is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) between the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) <https://rcepsec.org/> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

²⁷ Association of Southeast Asian Nations – ASEAN The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok, Thailand, with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) by the Founding Fathers of ASEAN, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei Darussalam then joined on 7 January 1984, Viet Nam on 28 July 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999, making up what is today the ten Member States of ASEAN. <https://asean.org/> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

²⁸ Roland-Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ World Economic Forum – The Forum engages the foremost political, business, cultural and other leaders of society to shape global, regional and industry agendas. It was established in 1971 as a not-for-profit foundation and is headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland. It is independent, impartial and not tied to any special interests. The Forum strives in all its efforts to demonstrate entrepreneurship in the global public interest while upholding the highest standards of governance. Moral and intellectual integrity is at the heart of everything it does. See: World Economic Forum op. cit.

technological change, and transnational challenges are occurred and have become typical).³¹

FOCUSING TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES

In my study I do not analyze and research all of the transnational challenges³² and megatrends today. Based on and focusing on the Roland-Berger Trend Compendium 2050: "Six megatrends that will shape the world" research, we can separate the following main megatrends and subsystems:

1. **People and Society:** Population, Migration, Values and Education;
2. **Health and Care:** Pandemics and other Wildcards, Diseases and Treatments, Caregiving;
3. **Environment and Resources:** Climate change and Pollution, Resources and Raw materials, Ecosystems at Risk;
4. **Economic and Business:** Globalization Revisited, Power Shifts, Sectoral Transformation, Debt Challenge;
5. **Technology and Innovation:** Value of technologie, Artificial Intelligence, Humans and Machines;
6. **Politics and Governance:** Future of democracy, Governance and Geopolitics, Global Risk.³³

By summarizing the analized most important megatrends, in my opinion, we can characterize the main global problems, challenges and threats that would have long term effects on our nation. An overview of these megatrends are as follows:

PEOPLE AND SOCIETY – OVERPOPULATION, MIGRATION FLOWS, EDUCATION

Population and Population trends toward 2050 point at a countless of changes across the globe, for continents and countries, their growth rates and age structures. In 2050, 1.9 billion more people will inhabit our planet, adding up to a total of 9.7 billion. Our global society will be older, with nearly 3.2 million people 100 years old by 2050, but with huge regional differences in median age and old-age support ratios. India will be the most populous country, overtaking China around 2027.

³¹ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit. pp. 42-50.

³² Transnational Challenges: There is a growing overlap between the EU's internal and external security problems. Terrorism, organised crime and unregulated migration not only pose a threat to European internal security, but also have a serious impact on the stability of Europe's immediate neighbourhood. Very often, they find their roots in conflicts and instability further abroad in Africa or Asia. The 2015 migration crisis showed the limits of that approach, and has sparked a new wave of reforms. <https://www.iss.europa.eu/topics/transnational-challenges> (downloaded 01 October 2021)

³³ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Population and Society; op. cit. pp. 6-15.

Migration, intraregional and interregional migration, in all its complexity, would be mainly driven by the pursuit of an economic betterment.³⁴ For internally displaced people, their story would be to escape from local conflict, violence, and/or disasters within their own borders.

Values and the evolution of human freedoms would present a mixed picture: The global consensus on the values based on human rights and the personal, civil, religious and economic freedoms will shift alongside the global power shift.³⁵

Education on the plus side, staying in education longer would become the global norm and – judging by the positively correlated per capita GDP/length of educational attainment curve – nationally speaking, it would pay well enough to stay in education longer, too.

HEALTH AND CARE - GLOBAL HEALTH

Pandemics and Other Wildcards: We are very vulnerable to pandemics, this much is clear in 2020 and, least we forget, also in earlier 21st century epidemics: SARS, ZIKA, MERS, Ebola et al. Alongside this, we are increasingly facing climate change as a health risk. Now and in 2050, global access to medical care and funding will remain highly uneven.

Diseases and Treatments: Healthcare and medical technology predictions and expectations, including vis-à-vis technological advancements, are manifold; not all will materialize but cell and gene therapies are some of the most promising.³⁶ (Figure 5.)

³⁴ Climate Action: A new competitiveness paradigm;
<https://www.rolandberger.com/en/Insights/Publications/Climate-action-A-new-competitiveness-paradigm.html> (downloaded 01 October 2021)

³⁵ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Population and Society; op. cit. pp. 5-15.

³⁶ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit. pp. 17-25.

Globally, more than half of deaths are due to 9 diseases plus road injuries – Diseases of civilization and age such as dementia see strongest rises

The 10 leading causes of deaths, world, 2016 and 2045 [% of all deaths]



Figure 5: Leading diseases of civilization³⁷

³⁷ Sources: World Health Organization: WHO's primary role is to direct international health within the United Nations' system and to lead partners in global health responses.

<https://www.who.int/> (downloaded 3 October 2021)

Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050. op. cit. p. 21.

> In 2016 the 10 leading causes of deaths have been responsible for 53% of all deaths globally. By 2045, this number is expected to increase to 59%. With the exception of road injuries all of these causes are diseases

> Diseases of civilization and age, like ischemic heart disease, COPD, Alzheimer's or diabetes prevail. Due to demographic trends such as the aging of society, the rise of the global middle class, and an ongoing shift in lifestyles (e.g. more meat consumption, more sedentary etc.) the dominance of such diseases is growing

> Alzheimer disease and other forms of dementia – notably not among the top ten leading causes of deaths in 2016 – will climb to fourth position in 2045, responsible for 6% of all deaths globally

> Cancer (malignant neoplasms) is responsible for 16% of global deaths in 2016 and 18% in 2045 (expected). It is not listed in the 10 leading causes of deaths as the WHO calculates the share for each single form of cancer. With 1.5% (2016) resp. 1.7% (2045) liver cancer causes the most cancer deaths

Caregiving and the trend in increasingly age-related diseases such as dementia point at a strong increase in the need for cost-intensive care. An increasing number of professional caregivers is required to support the growing number of older people and their complex care needs.

ENVIRONMENT AND RESOURCES - CLIMATE CHANGE AND POLLUTION

Climate change will be one of the major threats to the stability of states and societies in the decades to come. Climate change will stress the world's economic, social, and political systems, where institutions and governments are unable to manage the stress or absorb the shocks of a changing climate, the risks to the stability of states and societies will increase. The capacity of states and societies to manage change, including climate changes, can be measured along a spectrum of fragility, from most fragile to most resilient. The sharpest risks arise when multiple pressures converge. As climate change interacts with other contextual factors, seven compound risks emerge: local resource competition, livelihood insecurity and migration, extreme weather events and disasters, volatile food prices and provision, transboundary water management, sea-level rise and coastal degradation, and unintended effects of climate policies.

Climate change mitigation efforts in the period to 2050 must be stepped up by the global community, and a rethink is on the cards regarding the current target of keeping global warming below 2°C. More recently, 1.5°C has been considered safer. This will require rapid, far-reaching, and unprecedented changes across all aspects of society.³⁸ (Figure 6.)

³⁸ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit. pp. 26-37.

Manmade global temperature increases can only be limited to 2°C if significant additional efforts are undertaken to become carbon-free in 2100




Figure 6: Manmade global temperature increases³⁹

Is the limit of 2°C enough?

To keep the global warming below 2°C had long been regarded as the right target measure to limit the most dangerous risks. More recently, 1.5°C has been considered safer, which requires rapid, far-reaching, and unprecedented changes across all aspects of society

³⁹ Compared to the pre-industrial temperature level
Sources: NOAA, Climate Interactive, IPCC, Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050.

Resources and Raw Materials: On current trajectories, our 2050 global energy mix is expected to still be dominated by fossil fuels. The battle to contain CO₂ and other forms of pollution requires proactive and innovative action. Nearly half a billion people would be suffering from disabling, mostly work-related hearing loss, due to excessive noise levels. In the future, water demand is going to be growing, and so is food demand; we need more calories to feed a more populous world, but we also need to waste less. Raw materials face supply-side issues; China is the main supplier of raw materials deemed critical.

Ecosystems at Risk: Globally, we have already lost one third of terrestrial species. To halt this trend, we must make more funding available for biodiversity measures and for ecosystems that are at risk, estimated to equate to 1% of global GDP – annually.⁴⁰

TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION


Value of Technology: A tale of two halves; while technology and innovation drive prosperity, the lack of such capabilities is a major hurdle for developing countries to draw level with developed nations. While the latter have made high levels of investment commitments going forward, e.g. in quantum computing technologies, AI, and cybersecurity, such levels are simply not within the reach of the former. Artificial Intelligence (AI) and particularly in the field of AI, an ever more evident number of technologies are being lined up and/or are coming out of the pipeline.⁴¹ (Figure 7.)

⁴⁰ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit. pp. 26-37.

⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 45-51.

The progression of AI capabilities is expected to be near limitless – Intelligent machines will accomplish more and more ambitious tasks

Timeline of AI achieving human performance with a probability of 50%⁴²



All experts expect that – with a probability of 50% – around 2060 unaided machines will be able to accomplish every task better and more cheaply than human workers. Around 2140 all occupations will be fully automatable¹⁾

1) Based on an international survey of machine learning researchers
Sources: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Roland Berger

⁴² Sources: Journal of AI Research, Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050. p. 50.

Human & Machines: AI experts predict a near limitless progression of the capabilities of AI technologies; such powerful developments would be faced with enthusiasm mixed with concern for human values and agency.

ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS

Globalization Revisited: Since the Global Financial Crisis, global rates of growth have nearly halved. With global supply chains weakened a trend toward more domestic production has been observed.

Power Shifts: The newly announced Asian trading power bloc, RCEP, is taking its position as a global force; this also highlights future opportunities for other established power blocs in terms of ease of trade.

Sectoral Transformation: On a sectoral analysis, industrial transformation is the key challenge. The main drivers are decarbonization and new technologies across sectors such as utilities and automotive, among others. For states and governments, the rise in national debt levels – partly due to the cost of the coronavirus pandemic – will be a challenge.

Debt Challenge: There is significant uncertainty about how the global economy can deleverage without significant adverse implications for economic activity. The next decade could bring a reflationary fiscal response, in sharp contrast to the austerity measures undertaken in the 2010s.⁴³

BUILDING FUTURE RESILIENCE AT HOME AND OVER BOUNDARIES

The priority and significant aim is building and developing resilience at home in our national and regional level. We need to place greater emphasis on resilience by recognising that it is not possible to predict or prevent every risk to our security and prosperity; whether it be natural hazards such as extreme weather events or threats such as cyber-attacks. The crucial aim is to improve our own ability to anticipate, prevent, prepare for, respond to and recover from risks, as well as that of our allies and partners, recognising the closely interconnected nature of our world. And we need to prioritise efforts to tackle climate change and biodiversity loss, long-term challenges that if left unchecked threaten the future of humanity; in addition to building global health resilience.⁴⁴

⁴³ Roland Berger Trend Compendium 2050: Six megatrends that will shape the world; op. cit. pp. 34-38.

⁴⁴ Global Britain in a competitive age;
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/975077/Global_Britain_in_a_Competitive_Age—the_Integrated_Review_of_Security_Defence_Development_and_Foreign_Policy.pdf
(downloaded 30 September 2021)

Due to the global nature and complexity of the threats, a wider range of actors will need to be involved in addressing transnational and trans-regional challenges in the future, both inside and outside the Euro-Atlantic area. Because instability spans state borders, no nation or organization can deal with future challenges or crises alone.

This requires the creation of an ecosystem consisting of a wide network of partners, including nations, international organizations, NGOs, the private sector and scientific actors. These collaborators must provide a system with the capacity to exchange information, provide early warning and awareness, and must be able to make use of the most existing expertise.

Nations, as well as institutions such as NATO and the EU, can use this information and expertise to support the development of coordinated strategies to address potential risks and to make recommendations to address non-normal challenges, using available capabilities and resources.⁴⁵ Furthermore, in addition to the development of traditional military capabilities, resilience is a special area where planned and coordinated preparations are needed to guarantee the security of the nation and the Alliance. Improving resilience requires significant resources to be focused on both human and material development. An essential element of it is to create design and practice procedures (tactics, techniques and procedures) of preparation of exercise, planning reserve resources and to organize wargaming events in peace time, before the crisis. In the lack of these crucial capabilities and preparedness, military force can not be alone sufficient to deal optimally with crisis situations.⁴⁶

Clearly, China would remain the biggest threat to NATO, so the modernization of deterrence and defense capabilities, NATO's military structures, will be a high priority. In the future, more emphasis will be placed on the security risks inherent in the Arctic, as well as the security challenges of China's rise. At the level of non-state actors, the proliferation of arms, the deteriorating European border situation, and the spread of migration and its possible consequences of organized crime and extremism remain significant threats.

MITIGATING GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE FOR OUR PROSPERITY CONCLUSION

Based on our global security environment, the most important guidelines of our defense vision may be the strengthening of innovation, modernization, information and technology-based methods of warfare. Unforeseen events or new types of security

⁴⁵ JUHÁSZ, István: Kihívások, kockázatok, fenyegetések – a katonai képességek transzformációja a jövő műveleti környezetében / Challenges, Risks, Threats – Transforming Military Capabilities in the Operational Environment of the Future; Szakmai Szemle, Budapest, 2021/2. p. 35.
https://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/szsz/2021_2_szam.pdf (downloaded 02 October 2021)

⁴⁶ KÁDÁR, Pál PhD: A pandémia kezelése, mint a nemzeti ellenálló képesség „tesztje” – Pandemic management as a “test” of national resilience – DOI: 10.35926/HSZ.2021.2.1; Honvédelmi Szemle, 2021/2. p.12. http://real-j.mtak.hu/15069/7/HSZ_2021_2.pdf (downloaded 4 October 2021)

challenges are playing an increasing role. Non-military threats include political and economic pressures, demographic challenges, migration, information/disinformation, cyber operations and the intensification of the struggle for natural resources (drinking water, food, energy). The increasing emphasis on non-military challenges would require increased flexibility and adaptability, as well as a comprehensive approach on the part of nations, states and national forces.

The rapid development of innovation and technology can also offer an opportunity to address global challenges. The rapidly changing, complex security environment will continue to be a key driver of NATO's adaptation efforts. These efforts focus on transforming NATO's military capabilities to ensure that the Alliance remains relevant and credible now and for the foreseeable future, and can perform its core tasks of collective defense, cooperative security and crisis management.

By another approach, the poverty would be an additional source of danger on the border of Europe. This threat when coupled with demographic trends in Africa, overpopulation, urbanization challenges, unpredictable natural phenomena and increasing "climate migration", will continue to weaken governance in some African states. These circumstances will affect and influence national forces at the borders of Europe and shape our operational capabilities. Masses of unemployed young people – immigrating from the Middle East and the South – would also put increasing pressure on Europe's borders; contributing to the replenishment of organized crime and jihadist groups as well as contributing to the strengthening of far-right and radical nationalist ideologies in our region. That is why civilian and military crisis management operations and peace operations in the Western Balkans, the Middle East and Africa can continue to make a major contribution to the security of Europe, and thus, to the security of our region and our country.

From the point of view of Hungary, the stability of the Western Balkans would remain a fundamental strategic priority. In addition, due to the current trends of security challenges directly and indirectly affecting Hungary (among others, migration and international terrorism), the African operational theatre is expected to be more important in the future. In addition to the strategic shocks⁴⁷ that have emerged in recent years, we have to keep in mind that technological developments are expected to further increase the challenges posed by cyberspace and space. Furthermore, the challenges posed by the proliferation of dual-use technologies and the spread of emerging and disruptive technologies may pose an increased challenge in the future. It is expected that the organizations that define the security policy framework of Hungary, such as NATO and the EU, will be able to address the challenges more decisively in the future. In order to guarantee national security against hybrid threats,

⁴⁷ „The three most pressing medium-term defence-policy related challenges Hungary is facing are the persistent pressures of illegal mass migration, the challenges of transnational terrorism, along with the activity of rising and great powers and the subsequent potential for peer conflicts. These challenges share several characteristics which make them especially demanding in the form of unanticipated strategic shocks.”
BAK, Pál – NÉMETH, Gergely – SZÖKE, Diána: Foundations of hungarian defence policy; Hungarian Defence Review, Special Issue, 2020/2. p. 17.
<https://kiadvany.magyarhonvedseg.hu/index.php/honvszemle/issue/view/85> (downloaded 2 October 2021)

the military sector must place great emphasis on national resilience and close cooperation with civil and law enforcement agencies.

Hungary's geostrategic situation is quite unique, as it lies at an intersection. This intersection is unique in that both its "eastern" and "southern" borders can face security challenges. Hungary's strategic goal is to develop the national resilience, deterrence, defense, crisis management and coordination capabilities by 2030, which are preconditions for the stability and the security, necessary for the development of the nation in a changing international environment.

In line with crisis management mechanisms, Hungary has a set of goals assuming in allied framework. We have an interest in developing the resilience and responsiveness of NATO and the EU to unconventional attacks. With regard to key risks and challenges mentioned earlier, enhancing resilience is also highlighted in relation to hybrid and cyber threats, disaster management and management of certain strategic resources (national supervision, reduction of dependency), such as energy, industry, agriculture, food safety and freshwater.

The future has started. The global security risk and threat level are increasingly higher, which will continue to influence the future of our nation. Protecting the future of our children, defending our national values and national independence, including the freedom of all Hungarians, would remain vital and crucial requirements to ensure the national efficiency of governance at all levels. In order to reach the strategic goals and the most fruitful effects, it is vital to adapt a sophisticated Comprehensive National Resilience Plan that is fully synchronized with regional, EU and NATO allied plans, too.

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LAJOS SZABÓ – ZSUZSANNA BALOGH PHD
**OVER THE HEDGE – FORMATION OF THE EXTERNAL DEFENSE RING
OF FACILITIES**

Abstract

Owners tend to initiate their defense against those security risks that may pose a threat, at the perimeter of their buildings and facilities. While creating a built environment in the modern era, the solutions applied for thousands of years have been somewhat forgotten. These solutions include the extension and multiplication of security zones beyond the limits of the facility, with multifunctional and aesthetically pleasing objects, such as a hedge for instance.

Keywords: Security of facilities, built environment, preventive measures, increasing level of security, security zones

Introduction

A major activity of humanity is the transformation of its environment. Security can be determined as the main reason for this. The primary thing created by a migrating, hunter-gatherer group of humans, was a place for accommodation where they could rest. The main expectation from the lodgment is protection from the outside elements, in other words, demarcation. The simplest solution is when a rock wall or bushes serve as protection from one or multiple directions from the effects of wind, precipitation, sunrays, wildlife, or other humans.

This though is not transformation of the environment, rather utilization of resources. As soon as it has been recognized that certain directions are unprotected, the modification begins immediately. Shelters can be built from twigs – similar to the lodgment built from acacia branches known as „boma”¹ –, rocks, or from any adequate and available material at the unprotected sides. These covers hide the owners behind it and on the other hand also serve as obstacles against the wind or even attackers.

The simplest hut – or igloo – made of branches is only suitable for providing protection against the elements. It is not a coincidence that bomas used as permanent accommodations known from Africa are complex protective lodgings made from fences built on top of each other, as seen on Figure 1.

¹ Boma meaning – (*noun*) (In eastern and southern Africa) an enclosure, especially for animals.



*Figure 1: Boma*²

A permanent lodging requires an increasing number of modifications to the environment. Separate areas are required for public and private functions. Secluded locations are necessary for food, tools and clothes that have to be stored somewhere as well. In the case of breeding livestock a place for the animals and for their fodder is needed too.

The covers indeed provide protection, but there is no way seeing anything from behind them. High ground or a tower is necessary to oversee the surroundings. In order to make sure that the incoming enemies do not have cover, the vegetation, the rocks and the geographical features should be eliminated. Fences made from rock, wood or soil should be built behind the covers, while ditches should be dug in front of them to provide extra protection.

The needs can be numerous, and the built environment is shaped in accordance, depending on the available materials, technology and resources. Multiple systems of obstacles are created to fulfill the demand, certain protective objects are utilized in various zones. This is best illustrated in forts and cities from the middle ages. To picture this, the cross section of the city of Simmern is shown on Figure 2.

² Source: Maasai boma; http://www.greatbuildings.com/cgi-bin/gbi.cgi/Maasai_Houses.html/cid_1261349055_Natron_Maasai_boma.html (downloaded 20 March 2017)




Figure 2: City of Simmern³

We can exactly see on the medieval picture the perfect example of the multiplied obstacle system. The aim is to erect a system of mechanical barriers and obstacles; thus slowing down the offensive, recognizing maneuvers, and of course activate the protection. The use of the hedgerow was very widespread in the ancient times and in the middle ages, as József Könyöki⁴ reports in his special encyclopedia "Medieval castles in Hungary" under the banner of "Hedgerow (Gebücke, Hage, Hackelzeume, Knicke)".

Why the hedge is useful in the defensive systems? It is because although damage with hand tools is possible, but very slowly, burning is difficult and it is almost impossible to go underneath it or climb over it.

When it grows up to an appropriate height, it also hinders the insight. In case of sufficient compactness, it has also a noise and dust protection function. In addition to slowing down the possible intrusion attempt, the penetration of it may also be perceived. For these reasons, the intrusion attempt can be discovered, detected, and the intruder can be attacked, captured or can be frightened off.

³ Source: MÜNSTER, Sebastian: Cosmographia, published in 1554. The engraving of city of Simmern made in 1550 is from the book; <https://rlp.museum-digital.de/data/rlp/images/201008/06163721859.jpg> (downloaded 07 August 2018)

⁴ KÖNYÖKI, József: A középkori várak különös tekintettel Magyarországra; Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Történelmi Bizottsága, 1905.
<http://mek.oszk.hu/11800/11899/11899.pdf> (downloaded 25 April 2018)

1. Zones applied in the protection of built environments

The goal of creating built environment is to control a certain area but also to build facilities to ensure activities – residential, industrial and agricultural etc. – normally performed there. In the following, for the sake of simplicity the word “facility” will be used for all buildings, areas that are parts of the built environment.

Various facilities can be categorized in several different ways, for example based on their:


- environment,
- height,
- function,
- material,
- application,
- stored value,
- threat level etc.

Depending on the importance of the activity performed in the facility from the point of view of the operator, the following becomes increasingly important:

- the integrity of the building (facility);
- the life, safety, and health of the workers;
- data associated with the activity;
- the valuables and tools used during the activity;
- ensuring the business continuity from other human actions or changes in the environment.

Activities associated with the protection of facilities have been divided into circular zones, based on the earliest evidence, as represented in the introduction.

The illustration of protective zones is represented schematically in Figure 3.



*Figure 3: Schematic defense zones of facilities
(Author's own edition)*

Preventive measures: Security equipment installed in the surroundings of the facility and beyond its perimeters, as well as forces, who are tasked with detecting and obstructing and repelling attacks along the fences – as primary defensive line.

Outside protection I.: Security equipment installed at the limits of the area (near the fence).

Outside protection II.: Security equipment and personnel placed between the fence lines and the buildings.

Defense layer of buildings: Security equipment of the walls, ceiling, floor and windows and doors.

Internal defense zones: Any further zones within the layer equipped with security systems and personnel.

Protection of personnel and valuables: Any personnel or valuable (not only including objects, but also information) in need for protection and its protection is increased by security equipment or forces. Within this any number of internal protective zones can be created if necessary.

Technically the same scheme can be found in the figure 3., in the study of Mary Lynn Garcia: The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems.⁵ Within, the targets located inside the facility are explained according to the author's very own point of view. The so called "adjacent physical areas" are categorized by their functions. These are the following:

- a) Off site – *equivalent to preventive zone*;
- b) Limited Area – *analogous to perimeter defense I. (fence) zone*;
- c) Protected Area – *equivalent to outside defense II. zone*;
- d) Controlled Area – *not clearly defined, interpretable as protective layer and internal, monitored (by guards and/or technical equipment) zone*;
- e) Controlled Building – *the same as defense layer*;
- f) Controlled Room – *equivalent to object protection zone*;
- g) Target Enclosure – *multiplied object protection zone*;
- h) Target – *multiplied object protection zone*.




Figure 4: Scheme of zones by Garcia⁶

⁵ Source: GARCIA, Mary Lynn: The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems Second Edition; CPP Sandia National Laboratories, ISBN-10: 0-7506-8352-X

⁶ Sample facility representing adjacent physical areas. Each area is represented by a rectangle.

This study was specifically aimed at discussing such protective zones that are neglected – due to the lack of extreme threat – by private security or even by the state, disregarding the military, within Hungary.

Experts generally view terrorist attacks as extreme threats, in the absence of this the preventive measures are taken if the facility houses valuables pose an extra level of risk.

2. The essence and role of preventive measures

Preventive measures are taken outside the perimeters of a facility in order to decrease the possibility of illegal activities by revealing the intentions. This cannot be achieved at all or at a sufficient level by only applying fences or security equipment placed at the walls of the facility.

This special field of facility protection is a system of security equipment applied in private and public spaces, which ensures prevention of any incident or extraordinary event with mechanical, technical, electronical equipment and security forces.

The zones of preventive measures are also the vital parts of facility protection. Its task, with respect to the facility is the detection, identification, prevention of the development and obstruction of any extraordinary occurrence stemming from environmental risks. In case of everything else fails, it gives sound of alarms and react in accordance with regulations to decrease the effects of the consequences.

The zones of preventive measures can be further divided into more zones, similar to facility protection.

The right decision then seems to be to thoroughly assess the possibilities and to take into account the experiences of the predecessors, minimize the risks. This requires the control of the environment and the implementation of physical protection, with regard to the risks, even outside the limits of the facility.

3. The practices of the predecessors and the possibilities of the 21st century

Our ancestors raised their castles on the top of mountains to which often only one road led and was under constant surveillance. Control points were set up, the roads were designed in a way that the attackers were not able to reach the walls quickly. Vegetation was exterminated around the walls and therefore the immediate surroundings could be constantly controlled.

Where the geographical features were not able to do so, it was purposefully modified. The construction of ditches by sappers was known as a seriously researched scientific topic in the middle ages. Ramparts and the system of ditches behind them are an extremely effective way of protection, not only against military offensives, but also in case of flooding as well. Similar geographical modifications were performed in case of each fort, where the natural geographical features were not adequate.

Circumstances nowadays give plenty of reason why these solutions are not applicable anymore.

First of all, it is difficult to find a facility that is located far from everything in an area that belongs to the owner of the facility. In the case of this scenario though, there are only financial limits to copying the surroundings of a medieval castle or fort, completed with modern technical solutions.

In case of a residential area the possibilities are already limited, since beyond the fence the neighboring area is either private property or public space. The biggest problem though is caused by the densely built, tall structures in an urban environment, where the wall represents the property limits in most cases. Beyond that, legal walls get in the way that are tough to break through.

The legal status of the surroundings, which happen to be public areas, is the largest obstacle when trying to increase defensive value via private security solutions. Security patrol personnel have a limited authority and private video surveillance cannot legally be utilized, at least in Hungary.

If the neighboring areas are not public but private, the video surveillance might arise many problems and this activity might be judged as a way to seek sensitive private or business information. It is obvious then, that a large portion of the available security equipment are inapplicable, at least from the technical solutions point of view.

What are our tools then, with which one can take steps to broaden the security net beyond the limits of the building?


Remaining with the issues within the boundaries of an urban environment, let us examine the opportunities provided by the suburbs and the downtown. It is evident that the problem at hand is security organization, hence the only potential solutions are the ones accepted by the surroundings, meaning an agreement must be reached with the neighbors.

The most problematic area is the public places, since as it is called – it is for public –, thus, anyone can use it without any limitation during his/her everyday life. We cannot limit the number of people appearing in public places and not even their activities.

In case of new building design – if the local regulations allow us – we can create a proper stand-off distance for safety by providing space between our building front line and the line of the public area. This might cause some concerns of losing a part of the expensive land, but security is a must to pay for and it is always worth it.

These solutions should fit to the surroundings, they should be camouflaged, since the aim is to give protection against unauthorized access and vandalism. The available 2-3 meters are enough to monitor all those who come to our building walls closer than 1-2 meters. As this area is legally our property, if intruders are detected, we are entitled to use even security services for our own defense.

If we can play with this distance, we can apply different security equipment and solutions – of course not the traditional water tranches and wire fences. There are other modern tools and techniques to do the job. The simplest solution is to create a forecourt on ground level. (Fig.5)



*Figure 5: Forecourts*⁷

If the modern surroundings do not allow a small garden, then a decorative gravel bed with a small fountain can serve for the same purposes. (Fig. 6)



*Figure 6: Gravel bed*⁸

⁷ Source: <http://www.pandapont.hu/wp-content/uploads/bajor-gizi-park-006.jpg> (downloaded 07. August 2018)
<http://www.pandapont.hu/wp-content/uploads/izabella-residences-005.jpg> (downloaded 07 August 2018)

⁸ <https://filleresotletek.hu/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/filleresotletek-hu-japan-kert-011.jpg> (downloaded 07 August 2018)

The advantage of this gravel bed is that it makes walking harder and noisier. On this loose field, no structure can be installed to reach a lower window or other openings on the wall. Another solution could be a higher curbside, a retaining wall, or a street furniture. The latter one can be a masked bollard that is able to stop a 2-ton vehicle, speeding with 90 km/h.

In these beds detectors can be installed to give an alarm signal when a heavier person than a five-year-old child would step onto it. For the nights, spot lightings or motion sensors can be activated. This kind of hidden equipment can be frightening enough just being there. The intruder would be angry not having an easy target, while a peaceful passer-by is happy not to fall in the dark street. This security system can be monitored by cameras as far as legally allowed.

Certainly, the entrance also a problematic area. With a few decorative planters next to the entrance the way can be narrowed, so it becomes impossible to approach it by vehicle. An EU regulated obstacle-free access can be created by ramps that cross the stairs, so not only people with disabilities are forced to slalom. We can do more by marking the street as one way street or installing street furniture that divides the mass of people in case of a riot. If our outside defense zone is a park, a green place, we have plenty of options. The walkways should go parallel with the building façade only at the corner of the building should turn perpendicularly to provide access to the sidewalk or the street.

Streetlight's pylons and bollards serve not just for the protection of the park. The vegetation should be carefully designed as well to make movements more difficult towards the protected building. Creeping plants and thorny hedges at the ground level work like a razor wire. Loose soils in flower beds would be useful as well, supplemented by motion sensor spotlights. This kind of well-maintained green area can add even ten meters to our line of defense, where security equipment can be installed to monitor the vicinity of our building.

In case of a new building complex, the roads should be led to parking lots situated farther from our facility. These parking areas can be elevated or sunk a bit so only through stairs and ramps one can reach the building. Alongside these walkways, street furniture, big planters can be placed, in order to avoid the gathering of more than 20 people in one place and form a mass.

In case of existing buildings in urban surroundings, the possibilities of defense are less, since the location and the adjacent buildings' features – heights, distances, materials etc. – are given. To keep the required stand-off distance and see clearly what is happening at the perimeter is harder. It is still worth to think over what kind of tools can be effective. Benches, trash bins all can be masked bollards to keep away a speeding car.

The suburb generally gives more space, there are trenches in front of the buildings, elevated walkways; and hedges are planted at the property line – all of this raises the security level. In this kind of small communities, it is easier to unite the effort for a common goal. Every neighbor will join to have a common camera system and share his/her maintenance fee if it protects his/her property as well. For example, it gives mutual benefits if an alarm system automatically turns the emergency lights

on not just in our front yard, but in our neighbors' as well. It does not cost much more, and it is just a matter of agreement between the parties for having a higher level of security.

Conclusion

Fortunately, there are several good examples, thanks to the facts that the so called "multinational companies" (Lidl, Auchan, Tesco etc.) were allowed to open their stores in Hungary. They have brought their standard buildings and storages from Germany, France and England. They have bollards in front of the entrance. Parking lots are designed not to lead the traffic to the façade etc. All these characteristics are not derived from any Hungarian regulation – unfortunately – but from foreign pattern.

Free spaces and parking lots behind the stores – as being the property of the companies – are well equipped with floodlights, camera system, and the guards are also a part of the equation. Their cooperation with local law enforcement – in the past two decades – to enhance the security is exemplary. It shows how the private security service can contribute to institutionalization of preventive measures.

The importance of the problem has been recognized all over the world, for example in 2004 a publication was issued as a part of the strategy of National Security of Singapore, which describes the possibilities of strengthening the buildings against terrorist attacks. Within this, in 2004, the city of Singapore published a brochure titled: *Guidelines for enhancing building security in Singapore*, then it organized a conference to discuss its findings.⁹ Australia did not waste much time, it issued the "*Urban Design Guidelines for Perimeter Security in the National Capital*", based on which at least the public areas and buildings of the capital city were designed.¹⁰ The EU also issued the "*EN-14383 Prevention of crime - Urban planning and building design*"¹¹ standard in 2006, which consists of several sections. Only the first one, containing technical terms and definitions – "*MSZ EN 14383-1:2006 Prevention of crime. Urban planning and building design. Part 1: Definition of specific terms*"¹² was translated into Hungarian, but not in its entirety.

⁹ Guidelines for Enhancing Building Security in Singapore;
https://www.mha.gov.sg/docs/default-source/others/mha_guidelines_for_enhancing_building_security_in_singapore_2018.pdf (downloaded 28 October 2019)

¹⁰ Urban Design Guidelines for Perimeter Security in the National Capital;
<https://www.nca.gov.au/planning-heritage/strategic-planning/guidelines-development/guidelines-perimeter-security-national> (downloaded 28 October 2019)

¹¹ EN-14383 Prevention of crime – Urban planning and building design;
http://www.mszt.hu/web/guest/webaruhaz?p_p_id=msztwebshop_WAR_MsztWAportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_pos=1&p_p_col_count=2&_msztwebshop_WAR_MsztWAportlet_ref=141837&_msztwebshop_WAR_MsztWAportlet_javascript.portlet.action=search (downloaded 20 June 2018)

¹² MSZ EN 14383-1:2006 Prevention of crime. Urban planning and building design. Part 1: Definition of specific terms;
http://www.mszt.hu/web/guest/webaruhaz?p_p_id=msztwebshop_WAR_MsztWAportlet&p_p_lifecycle=1&p_p_state=normal&p_p_mode=view&p_p_col_id=column-1&p_p_col_pos=1&p_p_col_count=2&_msztwebshop_WAR_MsztWAportlet_ref=141837&_msztwebshop_WAR_MsztWAportlet_javascript.portlet.action=search

The EU document would have other advantages besides being a part of the fight against terrorism, but it has not been implemented for over 15 years, even though attacks other than ramming have occurred in Europe in recent years, against which only improvised concrete obstacles and planters were utilized.

In Hungary, there is no such a regulation that was mentioned earlier in Singapore, Australia or in the USA (the UFC 4-010-01 9 February 2012 Unified Facilities Criteria DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings¹³ or a Certification Standard Forced Entry And Ballistic Resistance Of Structural Systems,¹⁴ and the Guide to Active Vehicle Barrier Specification and Selection Resources).¹⁵

In the past decade, as individuals and as co-authors, we have published several articles.^{16,17} Unfortunately, despite the changing of security level, due to mass migration, there is no higher awareness on the topic in Hungary.

In summary, the possibilities for improvement are given. The easiest way to handle the problem is with administrative tools. Although any number and quality recommendations can be provided, but until they are not obligatory to apply, design and fund, they will be ignored, primarily for cost reduction purposes. It would be obvious to adapt the listed standards to issue a normative regulation. The security awareness of people should be raised and the leadership – in decision making position – should set itself these goals.

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¹³ UFC 4-010-01 9 February 2012 Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings
https://www.wbdg.org/FFC/DOD/UFC/ARCHIVES/ufc_4_010_01_2012.pdf
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¹⁴ Certification Standard Forced Entry And Ballistic Resistance Of Structural Systems;
<https://www.shieldsecuritydoors.com/uploads/2/7/3/6/27366561/sd-std-01-01.pdf>
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¹⁵ Guide to Active Vehicle Barrier (AVB). Specification and Selection Resources;
<https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Guide-to-Active-Vehicle-Barrier-2014-508.pdf> (downloaded 28 October 2019)

¹⁶ BALOGH Zsuzsanna – SZABÓ Lajos: Defense of public buildings against forcible entry; Complementary Research Results from Middle European Researches Area, Bratislava, 2011. pp. 65-70. ISBN 978-80-8054-506-2

¹⁷ BALOGH Zsuzsanna mk. örnagy: Repülőtéri épületek védelme terrorista robbantások ellen Repüléstudományi Konferencia Szolnok 2009. április 24.
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GEOPOLITICS

PÉTER BODA¹ – BENCE TÓTH²

INVESTIGATION OF THE DISASTER VULNERABILITY OF THE ROAD NETWORK IN HUNGARY

Abstract

In our opinion, the road network and the connected road infrastructure are at the heart of the road transport system. This includes motorways, roads, streets and essential equipment, services and facilities necessary for operating the traffic. The road infrastructure covers a wide range of areas and activates: land use and network planning, road section and intersection redevelopment, road signs and surface markings, as well as the maintenance thereof; and, last but not least, the quality assurance procedures such as safety audits, safety impact assessments and safety verifications. In general, the road infrastructure should be designed and operated in such a way that road users understand what they can expect and what is expected from them, considering that a person has a limited information-processing capacity and is able to make mistakes.

Keywords: road network, security, network planning, safety impact assessments

*"No matter how high humanity soars,
no matter how many trials we face,
disaster is always around the
corner."*

Tom Phillips

Hungary's road network, conclusions to be drawn from the characteristics of the road network

Hungary's road network consists of the national road network, local roads, managed by local governments, and private roads (forestry, agricultural and other industrial roads).

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HUNGARY'S ROAD NETWORK	DATA OF HUNGARIAN PUBLIC ROADS NP. LTD. 2011 ³	DATA OF HCSO 2016 ⁴	DATA OF HUNGARIAN PUBLIC ROADS NP. LTD. 2020 ⁵
Length of national public roads (km)⁶	31,698.1	31,986	32,204
Of which main network (of which "E" roads)	8,839.8 (2,253.6)	8,861	9,077 (2,470)
Of which expressway network	1,304.3	1,506	1,586 (with node branches 2,076)
Number of bridges	7,435	7,529	7,903
Length of local public roads (km)	167,940	n/a	181,396
Of which main road	n/a	n/a	
	n/a	n/a	6,727
	n/a	n/a	8,633.8
	163,396		182,589

*Figure 1: Comparison of the main data of the Hungarian road network
(Authors' own edition)*

Currently, the length of national roads is 32,204 kilometers, and the length of local roads is 181,396 kilometers. The national road network manages approx. 75% of the country's total road traffic. 9,077 kilometers of national roads are the main network, of which 2,470 kilometers are "E" roads, i.e., part of the European road network. The length of the expressway network (motorways, expressways) is 1,586 km, and including motorway branch junctions, it is 2,076 km. 27% of the length of national roads pass through settlements, so, they also play a significant role in the local traffic of settlements. There are 7,903 bridges, 1,773 road-rail crossings (of which 1,413 level crossings, 81 from them are unsecured), as well as 8,985 road junctions and 5,557 level pedestrian/bicycle crossings on national roads.

³ Based on Tóth, Bálint: A kritikus infrastruktúraelemek azonosításának kérdései a közúti közlekedés területén. Published: Fejezetek a kritikus infrastruktúra védelemből, kiemelten a közlekedési alrendszer, Study volume. Hungarian Association of Military Science, Budapest 2013. ISBN 978-963-08-6926-3, p. 46.

⁴ Source: https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xstadat/xstadat_eves/i_odu003b.html (downloaded 02 September 2017)

⁵ Source: <https://internet.kozut.hu/kozerdeku-adatok/orszagos-kozuti-adatbank/az-allami-kozuthalozatrol/> (downloaded 17 January 2021)

⁶ 27% thereof pass through settlements, handle about 75% of the country's total road traffic

From the comparison of the 2011, 2016 and 2020 data in the table, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- the length of national roads is still low, but their length passing through settlements is relatively large (small number of bypasses);
- in almost 10 years, just over 500 kilometers of national and 13,456 kilometers of local roads have been built (there is no data on their breakdown by category);
- the length of "E" roads has only increased by 216 kilometers in ten years;
- although Hungary's expressway network has increased by 281 kilometers in the period under review, the growth can be said to be slow, as the length of these road types in Hungary does not reach the EU average;
- although the number of bridges on the national road network has increased by 468, according to the table, it should be noted that most of them (pedestrian, bicycle, limited load capacity) are not relevant for road transport;
- the number of level crossings is still very high.

It can be seen from the above list that even an approximate investigation of the road transport network infrastructure requires a great amount of data⁷. It should be noted that, in addition to all this, it must be borne in mind that all transport facilities are fixed and not substitutable. This means that, although the development of the infrastructural elements of the transport network cannot be said to be bad at national level, there are no options to the territorial level (regional, territorial, municipal or given road facility level) that could be replaced in case of failure. As a result, there is an almost constant risk that an incident (disaster) may occur that could have a significant impact on its immediate environment, and prevent the traffic from flowing normally from time to time (or for a longer period of time).

Hungary's disaster vulnerability

As regards Hungary's disaster management system – the national protection/defense system –, the main emphasis is placed on prevention tasks. Studying the threat to a given country by disasters, from the aspect of national economy and disaster management, it can be concluded that the implementation of protection against all kinds of threats cannot be considered a realistic goal. Therefore, the aim of disaster prevention is in all cases to minimize the consequences and impacts of potential disasters through preventive preparedness.

The scope of tasks in the preventive (normal) period, the key role of preparedness, the definition of the disaster risk based on risk assessment at national level allow us to prevent certain disasters. At the same time, to appropriately prepare for responding to disasters, from the aspect of leadership and management, logistics

⁷ TÓTH, Bálint: A kritikus infrastruktúraelemek azonosításának kérdései a közúti közlekedés területén; In: HORVÁTH, Attila – BÁNYÁSZ, Péter: Fejezetek a kritikus infrastruktúra védelemből, kiemelten a közlekedési alrendszer; Study volume, Hungarian Association of Military Science, Budapest, 2013. p. 47. ISBN: 9789630869263

and civil protection, and to respond to situations where the occurrence can only be slightly influenced, but the adverse impacts can significantly be reduced, it is necessary to provide effective and efficient intervention.

The types of disasters typical of Hungary can be divided into two groups. Natural disasters are characterized by little or no impact, unpredictability and extremely devastating damage, depending on their extent. Efficient action is further hampered by the fact that most natural disasters cannot be, or can only be predicted shortly before their occurrence, so that the basis for preparing for protection, response and recovery rests on the experience and trends of past incidents. Understanding the natural disasters, the practices developed during past incidents and their development, and the conscious planning can enable effective protection. With regard to natural disasters, the impacts of global climate change are gradually and continuously making it more difficult to deal with emerging events. Climate change is a lasting and/or short-term, or even irreversible change in climate elements towards higher or lower values, the practical impacts of which are perceptible and measurable, and even have significant human-social consequences. The steady rise in annual average temperature trends, the increasing frequency of extreme weather phenomena, the drastic changes in rainfall intensity and the resulting flooding and inland water incidents over and over again have increasingly required an efficient preparedness of the national protection system. These incidents also have impact on the travelling people, and it has now been proven how extreme weather conditions (extreme cold or summer heat) affect the human psyche. These events can also lead to accidents.

Here, we are connected to the second type, the human-triggered disasters, the impact of which is basically more predictable, the framework for action against their occurrence can be better defined; thus, the management of the situations is more procedural. However, it must also be borne in mind that such incidents can assume such dimensions that may create conditions that, like the unpredictable force of natural disasters, are difficult to deal with.

In addition to the hazards posed by the natural environment, special attention should be paid also to the threats of developed society of the 21st century and its built environment to meet its needs. The challenges posed by the level of development of the modern age, the compulsion of constant technological competition, and the declining capacity of the Earth to sustain can all pose potential, so-called threats to civilization. These are conditions that are mostly independent of natural factors, but can also be influenced by them, which can be managed with more disaster-friendly and more targeted methodologies, in terms of disaster prevention. Investigating the fields of industrial safety, it can be stated that today's advanced society and technological environment, the activities of hazardous substances present in businesses, which are essential for operation, incur vulnerabilities that increasingly require a comprehensive, integrated approach from the authorities responsible for protection. Although the production, storage, processing and use of hazardous substances is stationary and regulated by an extremely strict legal background, with constant regulatory restrictions, it is still one of the most prominent sources of hazards to the population, based on the experience of recent years. In Hungary, the number of hazardous industrial facilities differs from county to county, most of which are typical of Budapest, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén and Veszprém counties. Industrial plants processing hazardous substances can be grouped according to 13 types of activities

and the amount of hazardous substances used. The operation of these facilities poses a significant risk to the population living in their immediate vicinity, to properties, to the environment and to the national economy (as exemplified by the October 2010 accident at the Ajka red sludge reservoir). According to law, the activity related to hazardous substances must also be taken into account in town planning, especially with regard to the lower and upper tier plants, for which the designation of hazard zones is also mandatory.

This is complemented by the transportation of hazardous materials, which is much less controllable than the above, and which affects all segments of transport. The chances of accidents resulting from traffic and the responses to hazardous materials are an increased challenge in this respect.⁸

As regards transit routes (road, rail and water) through Hungary, as well as international freight transport, more and more emphasis should be placed on controlling the transport of hazardous goods, on the authoritative work that can significantly contribute to reducing the number of accidents under uncontrolled conditions.

Based on the natural and human-triggered disaster risks identified in Hungary, it can be stated that Hungary is located in an average vulnerable area, which is specifically determined by the risk of flood and inland water incidents among the less predictable natural disasters. Vulnerability due to the development of civilization, as in most cases, can be attributed mainly to human factors, based on intent or the likelihood of accidents.

Before investigating a specific case for a given road section, we examine the specifics of road network design in Hungary in the light of vulnerability.

Conclusions to be drawn from the characteristics of Hungary's road infrastructure

Land use planning related to the construction, widening and reconstruction of roads

Over the past two decades, dozens of land use models have been developed that differ in their methods and principles. The materials developed focus on special models, since they lack complex, hierarchical solutions that comprehensively evaluate humankind-nature interactions. Later, however, models that provide more and more information – can dynamically feed back, based on flexible components, and expanded with modules – were increasingly able to coordinate the knowledge-base of different disciplines and become increasingly suitable for supporting decision-making processes at different territorial levels.⁹ In the evolution of models, a shift towards

⁸ http://www.katasztrofavedelem.hu/index2.php?pageid=iparbiztonsag_terkep (downloaded 09 June 2013)

⁹ VAN DELDEN, H. – SEPPELT, R. – WHITE, R.: A methodology for the design and development of integrated models for policy support; Environmental Modelling and Software, 2011/3. pp. 266-279, DOI: 10.1016/j.envsoft.2010.03.021

regional, local, micro levels and complexity can be observed.¹⁰ The latter two authors (comparing all previously known models) distinguish basically three model types: LUT – land use/transportation model, CA – cellular automated model and ABM – agent-based model. The essence of these models is illustrated in Figure 2.




Figure 2: Basic land use models¹¹

As the figure illustrates well, the establishment of land use models as a theoretical and applied science requires the work of specialists, so, in this article we draw attention only to one problem, which in our opinion exists and is relevant.

Network planning of roads

The development of the economy and the creation of new industrial areas increase the demand for transport. This mainly affects freight traffic, but the commuting of workers, the so-called professional travel also takes place on longer and longer transport routes. Therefore, the transport policy¹² of the European Union, the directives¹³ related to intelligent transport systems and the Hungarian Unified Transport Development Strategy (White Paper) emphasize the preference for public

¹⁰ NRC 2013 Annual Report For Norwegian Refugee Council; (downloaded 02 June 2019)

¹¹ Source: Földhasználati modellezés módszertani megújítása, területi mintaértékelés elvégzése, p. 18, table 4. Horizontal Research Directorate, Agricultural Economics Research Institute, 2018.

https://nater.mbfesz.gov.hu/sites/nater.mfgi.hu/files/files/Foldhasznalat_NATER2.pdf (downloaded 02 June 2019)

¹² Inter alia: Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area - Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system (COM, (2011, White Paper) 144, final, 28 March 2011).

¹³ Directive 2010/40/EU – on the framework for the deployment of Intelligent Transport Systems in the field of road transport and for interfaces with other modes of transport.

transport over private transport. These principles must, of course, be taken into account in the design of the road network.

When designing roads in a network, designers face a number of challenges. I would only address a few of them, which are summarized below¹⁴:

- to favor the traditional four-step traffic planning process or other simulation models (such as system dynamics simulation modeling);
- if a four-step traffic planning procedure is chosen, the objectives should be defined and the results of each planning step should set out the methods and models used in the traffic generation, distribution and congestion steps;
- if one of the modeling systems supporting traffic planning is to be chosen, attention should be paid to the principles of problem solving in the system, the accounting of system dynamic cause-effect interactions, the system dynamic feedback principle and relationship types, and the nature and impact of system dynamic delay.

From the above, it can be seen that whichever design procedure we select, we need to be aware of the basic elements, and the usage of its simulation modeling, the presentation of which goes beyond the scope of this article.

In this article, we deal with the simulation of a traffic situation on motorway M3, due to an accident or other failure, taking into account the specificities of the road network, and investigate what would happen if, for some reason, a certain section of motorway M3 became completely or partially unusable.

Mathematical model of motorway m3 and its possible detours

A common way to deal with analytical systems is to describe them with mathematical objects. In the case of networks, the most suitable mathematical model for this is a so-called graph. A set of vertices and edges is called a graph, where each edge fits exactly two vertices.¹⁵ The vertices usually represent the nodes of the network, and the edges correspond to the connections between them. In the case of a graph model of transport networks, for example, the road network of a settlement can be represented by a graph in such a way that the intersections where you can go in several directions are the vertices of the graph and the streets between them are the edges of the graph. The concepts to be presented are illustrated in Figure 1.

¹⁴ Based on HORVÁTH, Richárd: Rendszerdinamika, mint a közlekedési rendszerek igénymodellezésének új lehetősége; PhD dissertation, Széchenyi István University, 2012,
https://mmtdi.sze.hu/images/Dokumentumok/HR_ertekezes.pdf (downloaded 22 May 2019)

¹⁵ BRONSSTEYN, I. N. – SEMENDYAEV, K. A. – MUSIOL, G. – MÜHLING, H.: Mathematics manual; Typotex, Budapest, 2002. p. 351. ISBN 9639326534




Figure 3: Illustration of graph theory concepts
(Author's own edition)

The edges may be directed,¹⁶ in the example, this may mean one-way streets. A graph containing directed edge(s) is called a directed graph. Edges can also be assigned a so-called weight to represent a property of the network.¹⁷ In our example, we can assign each edge the appropriate length of street or the time it takes to pass through it. The graph thus obtained is called a weighted graph.

The definition of a graph only states that an edge fits exactly two vertices, not that it connects two vertices. So, it also means that an edge fits on the same one vertex. Such a loop is called a living loop;¹⁸ this is how the “street structure” of a sack (no through road) village can be represented. Two vertices can be connected by more than one edge, these are called multiple edges. It is difficult to find a strict example of this in an urban street network, it is much more common in fixed track networks.¹⁹

For our investigations, we corresponded to the edges of a graph of certain representative elements of the Hungarian road network, the nominal capacity of which and the amount of traffic measured on them were assigned to them as weights.

The road sections examined were as follows:

- M3: Budapest – Hatvan, Hatvan – Füzesabony, Füzesabony – Polgár, Polgár – Nyíregyháza and Nyíregyháza – Vásárosnamény, with a capacity of 6,800 car units/hour (U/hour) in both directions;
- M35: Polgár – Debrecen and Debrecen – Berettyóújfalu, with a capacity of 6,800 U/hour in both directions;
- 3: Budapest – Hatvan, Hatvan – Füzesabony and Füzesabony – Polgár, with a total capacity of 2,000 U/hour;

¹⁶ HAJNAL, P.: Gráfelmélet; Szeged University Publishing House Polygon, Szeged, 2017, pp. 21-22. ISSN 1417 0590

¹⁷ Ibid. p. 36.

¹⁸ Ibid. p. 13.

¹⁹ TÓTH, Bence: Állomások és állomásközök zavarának gráfelméleti alapú vizsgálata a magyarországi vasúthálózaton; Hadmérnök, 2017/4. pp. 52–66.

TÓTH, Bence: Menetidő- és menetvonalhossz növekedés gráfelméleti alapú vizsgálata a magyarországi vasúthálózaton állomások és állomásközök zavara esetén; Hadmérnök, 2018/1. pp. 118-132.

- 31: Budapest – Nagykáta, Nagykáta – Jászberény and Jászberény – Füzesabony, with a total capacity of 2,000 U/hour;
- 32: Hatvan – Jászberény and Jászberény – Szolnok, with a total capacity of 2,000 U/hour;
- 4: Budapest – Cegléd, with a capacity of 6,400 U/hour in both directions; Cegléd – Szolnok, Szolnok – Püspökladány, Püspökladány – Debrecen, Debrecen – Nyíregyháza, Nyíregyháza – Kisvárda and Kisvárda – Záhony, national border, with a total capacity of 2,000 U/hour;
- 41: Vásárosnamény – national border with a total capacity of 2,000 U/hour;
- 42: Püspökladány – Berettyóújfalu with a total capacity of 2,000 U/hour;
- 311: Nagykáta – Cegléd with a total capacity of 2,000 U/hour.

We assumed motorway M0 to be surrounding Budapest with infinite capacity, because in the present study, we were not interested in its traffic diversion capacity, but in the diversion of the M3 traffic.

Programming environment

For our calculations (and for the development of the figure presented earlier), we used the *R* programming language,²⁰ including the *igraph* package developed by Gábor Csárdi and Tamás Nepusz.²¹ In this environment, a graph describing a network can be specified by a two-column matrix, called an edge list. Each line describes a road segment, the first number being the starting number and the second the number of the arriving node. For each such edge, a weight can also be given, using a vector with a dimension equal to the number of edges, which in our case was the capacity of each road section.

Figure 4 shows the above roads with their nominal capacity on the map of Hungary, which can be represented by the *plot.igraph()* function of the *igraph* package. Motorway M3 will be marked in red throughout to be separable from main road 3.

Similarly, the measured traffic volume²² is plotted on the road sections examined to obtain Figure 5.

²⁰ R Core Team: A language and environment for statistical computing; R Foundation for Statistical Computing, Austria, Vienna, 2012. ISBN 3-900051-07-0, URL <http://www.R-project.org/> (downloaded 02 June 2019)

²¹ CSARDI, G. – NEPUSZ, T.: The igraph software package for complex network research; InterJournal, Complex Systems 1695. 2006. <http://igraph.org> (downloaded 02 June 2019)

²² Az országos közutak 2019. évre vonatkozó keresztszetű forgalma; Hungarian Public Roads Nonprofit Ltd., Budapest, 2020.




Figure 4: Nominal capacity of each road section
(Author's own edition)

The thicknesses of the graph edges representing each road segment are proportional to the capacity. Between Hatvan and Füzesabony and Füzesabony and Polgár, where there are four graph edges (M3 and main road 3 in both directions), the road sections are not represented by straight, but by curved lines for better visibility.





Figure 5: The amount of traffic measured on each road section
(Author's own edition)

Maximum flow

The difference between the data shown in Figures 4 and 5 determines how much traffic the network is still able to carry, i.e. how much total free capacity there is. However, individual capacity bottlenecks can have a strong impact on the traffic that can pass through. The use of several algorithms between any two points to determine the maximum throughput, the so-called maximum flow,²³ is also common²⁴.

The *igraph* package uses the Goldberg – Tarjan algorithm²⁵ to calculate the maximum flow implemented in the *igraph* package as a function of *maxflow*. With the help of this, the capacity that can still be transmitted by the network between the Záhony and the M1 – M0 nodes can be determined, the value of which is 1,361 U/hour. The exact geographical distribution of this can be seen in Figure 6.



*Figure 6: Representation of the maximum flow between Záhony and node M1-M0
(Author's own edition)*

Existing problem: investigation of the failure of main road m3

Without a complete investigation of Hungary's road network, ignoring the steps of land use planning, and tangentially studying the road network planning, we would like to draw the attention to an existing problem that we consider important, such as the failure of certain sections of main road M3 and its possible consequences.

Let us investigate if a road section is deleted from the list of edges describing the network, the traffic of the lost road section can be diverted on the given route. To do this, we found the value of the maximum flow (in the appropriate direction)

²³ ANDRÁSFAI, B.: Gráfelmélet; HAC Publishing House, Budapest, 1983, pp. 61-79
ISBN 9630531461

²⁴ The best known are the greedy Ford–Fulkerson algorithm, its improvement according to the Edmonds–Karp algorithm; and the Dinitz algorithm.


²⁵ GOLDBERG, A. V. – TARJAN, R. E.: A New Approach to the Maximum Flow Problem; Journal of the ACM 1988/35 pp. 921-940.

between the two endpoints of the excluded road section and compared it with the measured traffic on it.

We found that traffic on motorway M3 could not be diverted on the other road sections examined. On the Budapest – Hatvan route, there is a lack of capacity in 1,932 and 3,244 U/hour in the direction leading outwards and inwards from Budapest; on the Hatvan – Füzesabony section it is 690 and 885 U/hour; on the Füzesabony – Polgár section there is a capacity shortage of 1,163 and 840 U/hour on the left and right tracks, respectively. Motorway M3 is therefore essential in diverting traffic.

In contrast, main road 3 is now replaceable. Excluding the Budapest-Hatvan section, there is still 2,868 and 1,556 U/hour free capacity from Budapest outwards and inwards; on the Hatvan – Füzesabony section 4,110 and 3,915 U/hour; on the Füzesabony – Polgár section 2,732 and 3,134 U/hour free capacity on the right and left track, respectively.

Excluding the Füzesabony-Hatvan road section, we found that the network (within the margin of error, with 8 U/hour of remaining capacity) is still able to divert traffic. The traffic situation can be seen in Figure 7.



*Figure 7: Distribution of traffic diverted on the network when main road 3 is closed between Hatvan and Füzesabony
(Author's own edition)*

Conclusion

Based on our model calculations, we found that the traffic on motorway M3 cannot, but main road 3 can still be diverted under the current conditions of the road network. Therefore, if a route needs to be planned for a consignment that can only be resolved with complete exclusion, it is not advisable to take it on the motorway, even though it only requires a halfway closure, and the duration of the closure may be shorter as it will inevitably lead to congestion. It is preferable to carry out the transport on an inferior road, despite the total exclusion and the longer-term traffic restriction, as there is a realistic chance for the traffic being diverted.

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DR. ALBERT TORMA¹

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AGGRESSION AND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC

Abstract

The increased presence of physical or verbal aggression, hostile emotions, like hostility or anger in human relationships, is an almost predictable consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic, which limits daily life and is associated with closeness and lockdown. Among the many approaches and theories of aggression, the justification of the frustration theory is the primary one that emerges in relation to the epidemic. The presence of aggression may also appear in our dreams, as a result of stress experienced during waking life, which, by disrupting the sleep cycle of the individual, may further impair daily functioning. The long-term consequences of the COVID-19 epidemic may require the support of a professional staff.

Keywords: aggression, COVID-19, pandemic, dream

Pandemic theories of aggression

The origin of the word aggression comes from the Latin term “aggredior,” meaning “ad-gredi,” meaning “approaching” or “going there,” meaning that in the event of aggression, the parties must come into contact with each other in some way. In general parlance, an aggressive, physically or mentally hostile person is aggressive, which can be verbal or manifested in action. The Anglo-Saxon language also refers to the aggressive manifestations as “violences” or “violent acts”. Aggressive attitudes are generally associated with a negative connotation, despite the fact that aggression may serve for pursuing a noble cause, protect the disadvantaged, a minority, or to struggle for perceived or real truth.

The first step in the COVID-19 pandemic-path leading to the development of aggression is to suffer from the possibility of threat and to experience the threat. Such a threat can be the horror of losing a job in the life of an individual, the occurrence of possible unemployment, the financial impossibility, the development of incapacity for work, due to an illness and the experience of vulnerability. All of these factors trigger anxiety, which leads to addiction, which in turn, exacerbates the anxiety state and the situation escalates. The consequence of the process is the development and manifestation of aggression, the division of which has come to light, and its analysis has already taken place from different perspectives.

In the simplest approach, physical and verbal aggression can be distinguished, with the remark that physical aggression can be directed not only against living beings, but also against objects by damaging them. In the emotional world, hostile emotions, tension, irritability and anger indicate the manifestation of aggression. In

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the latter case, we speak of internal aggression, while in the course of external aggression, the act can be described as an interactive phenomenon between people and groups of people in the outside world. The offensive action is intermittent (Breakwell, 1998) and each of these phases is directly perceptible through the forced isolation that occurred during a pandemic. According to this, during the period of induction, the individual's behaviour changes, he or she communicates abnormally, and the signs of metacommunication are different from the normal ones. In the subsequent escalation phase, a gradual narrowing of the state of consciousness with respect to the perceived or real injury develops, in proportion to the increase in internal tension. In the phase of the crisis, self-control is lost, an "explosion" takes place, and the aggression that has been suppressed so far manifests itself in physical or verbal form. The event is followed by sobriety, the state of consciousness subsides, and then depressive signs can develop, accompanied by fatigue, exhaustion and remorse.

Aggressive emotions include anger, rage, hatred, envy, and jealousy, within which the concepts of anger, rage, and hatred need to be clarified for the COVID-19 epidemic. Anger is a behavioural expression of aggression emotionally, in action, in behaviour, or verbally. In the field of metacommunication, the anger can be accompanied by hostile facial expressions, muscle tension and fisted hands, etc. The intense, short-lived appearance of anger, which can lead to uncriticism, a foggy state of consciousness, uncontrollability, is an intense manifestation of aggression. Hate can be defined as a hostile feeling, although these two terms are referred to separately by the Anglo-Saxon language ("hatred" and "hostility"). The feeling of hostility may be directed at another person, group, people, even in a transient manner, due to a temporary difference of interest – e.g., rivalry –, but it can also become permanent and lasting over the years. There is also a literary example of the latter in Shakespeare's drama Romeo and Juliet in the Capulet and Montague family's hostility to life and death.

Attempts have been made to explore the concept of aggression through theories of neurophysiology, biochemistry, psychology, learning psychology, psychoanalysis and frustration, of which frustration is important for COVID-19 and is cited as a reference in one of the studies described below. According to the theory of frustration, unattainable goals and dissatisfaction with needs lead to aggression. The name actually comes from Freud, and from the observations of experimental psychology it was concluded that all aggression is the result of frustration. Within the theory of frustration, three groups can be distinguished: the first, when an obstacle rolls in the way of an action for a purpose, the second is the provocation, in which self-esteem is violated, and finally the group of physical stimuli – a typical example of this is closedness. If the frustration is not temporary but a lasting one, an aggressive personality can develop, which will determine the long-term living conditions of the individual and his environment. It should be noted, however, that not all frustrations cause aggression and not all aggressions stem from frustration².

² HÁRDI, István: The word of aggression; Medicina Könyvkiadó Rt., Budapest, 2000. pp. 17-60.

Effect of COVID-19 on aggression

As a result of the pandemic, some governments have been forced to take measures that interfere with people's daily lives, in order to save society as a whole. The usual order and the usual way of life can be overturned in a short time, almost from one moment to the next, and can generate a new way of life, which can be described as "closedness". This can cause to give up certain things, e.g. free movement, leaving the residence at any time for any purpose, visiting community spaces and programs that seemed natural at times, such as going to restaurants, theatres, gyms. The initial shock was only exacerbated by the escalation of the situation, with the spread of the epidemic somehow affecting almost every single person, whether for personal, family, economic or emotional reasons.

Unsurprisingly, the suffering of travel, routine work, recreation, and feelings of personal freedom resulted in mental problems among the population, such as depression, nervousness, and suicidal tendencies³. According to general experience, a person has to have many negative experiences during his / her life, hunger, illness, financial difficulties, humiliation at work, and many other situations can occur that put physical and mental balance to the test, but forced isolation from fellow human beings is perhaps the hardest to bear after it happens against our will and we are not or can hardly change the situation ourselves. To prove this fact, we find a series of historical examples, where the punishment has taken the form of exile, or includes solitary confinement, used as a sanction for violating internal regulations and behavioural problems, and is unprecedented in the international arrest warrant. The background of the fall of a standing criminal is the intolerance of isolation and contact with typically family members for identification. Based on all these considerations, it is not surprising that the saturation of homes, economic and social difficulties and the impossibility of contact with peers for young people, and the reduction of external stimuli lead to domestic violence or its potential, which can typically be suffered by women or children. The problem outlined further escalates, due to the impossibility of escaping, as well as the lack of substantive, physical, or spiritual assistance. Although crime, including the reduction of violent crime, can be assessed as a positive effect during the epidemic, certain forms of violence, in particular domestic abuse, have shown an increasing trend, including behaviours that do not reach the level of crime but can be classified as criminal violent scope as well⁴. An example of the latter was in the context of a pandemic, when there was a potentially hostile behaviour towards the people of the capital when they rested in their weekend house. Empirical research on domestic violence suggests that confinement alone increases the chances of relieving tension between family members in the form of aggression. The latter is supported by the international literature that quarantined work at home, study at home, and general stay at home increased the incidence of domestic violence. The latter is also supported by the fact that NGOs working against the abuse of women and children have reported an increase in the number of calls for help and new clients⁵.

³ KILLGORE William D. S. et al.: Increasing aggression during the COVID-19 lockdowns; Journal of Affective Disorders Reports, 2021/5. pp. 1-2.

⁴ PÓCZIK, Szilveszter et al.: Particular criminalistic aspects of the COVID-19 pandemic; Belügyi Szemle, 2021/3. pp. 389.

⁵ Ibid. pp. 389-399.

Based on all these considerations, it can be assumed that the response of the urban population to the changed circumstances differed from the attitudes of those living in the countryside, due to the latter's greater room for manoeuvre, less congestion and proximity to nature. It is also thought-provoking that the computer with which we do our work is an inseparable part of our current life, we can be "friends" on social media sites, the machine has become our almost 24-hour companion, but we don't know what to do with our family or living alone because of a quarantine order. Why is the loneliness created by compulsion frustrating when we have been hiding behind a computer and commented on the events? Perhaps the indispensable achievements of technology today are not able to satisfy our needs in all areas of everyday life, it is possible that many of our relationships on social media do not replace personal, physically viable communication. It is also possible that concepts such as friendship, love, affection cannot be interpreted in cyberspace or even transferred there. Looking at the issue from another angle, it is a concern if we feel more comfortable sitting in the darkened room in front of a computer than talking to our family members in the living room. It seems that it was difficult for single people to live during the epidemic, because they became even more isolated, and their families suffered from isolation, forced congestion. Nevertheless, the COVID-19 epidemic, despite all its horrors, has also drawn attention to certain social problems mentioned above.

In the United States, 5,928 individuals were examined to confirm – or refute – the presumed increase in aggression at the time of the epidemic. Based on the results of completing the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire online, the questionnaire consists of 29 variables that examine self-reported aggressive behaviour and feeling on a four-point scale: physical aggression, verbal aggression, hostile emotions, and anger. As seen above, the physical and verbal levels are two basic manifestations of aggression, hostile sentiment is a conceptual form of hatred, and anger is an intense, short-lived manifestation of anger. The study defined the examined manifestations of aggression, according to which physical aggression is hitting the other person, verbal aggression is a quarrel, scolding, an individual loses self-control during anger, while the hostile feeling includes jealousy, distrust, and unjust regret. 61% of the subjects in the study fell into the "confinement" category, i.e., they were unable to live their normal lives as a result of various austerity measures, were forced to settle in a new home environment, while 39% were not living a normal life without such restrictions. The period covered was between April and August 2020, so the questions asked related to the initial period of the pandemic. The latter is an important moment for the research, given that the results showed not only an increase in all the forms of aggression examined, but also a period in June - July. This meant that as the period of confinement progressed, the early loss of self-control, verbal assault, and even physical violence increased. Overall, the level of aggression among those with incarceration increased significantly during the study period compared to the range of non-confinement, which supported the above-mentioned theory of frustration; restricting basic spiritual needs such as autonomy or self-fulfilment raises the level of aggression⁶.

⁶ KILLGORE op. cit. pp. 2-4.

It is known from previous research that a traumatic event can be followed by the appearance of nightmares and the interruption and fragmentation of the sleep process, although the underlying processes are not yet known in every detail. The content of a dream, in general, is adapted to waking, as if it is a reflection of it. The latter finding is reflected in the Threat Simulation Theory (TST), according to which, experiencing aggression in a dream strengthens and supports the management of a real-life threat, where the threat does not necessarily have to be physical, including social security, including feelings of isolation, fear of illness, or death. TST theory also suggests that negative overweight events in the dream world during wakefulness reinforce positive living. According to the theory of social modelling related to TST, dreams sort of sample, “try” the social relationships and contexts of real life, a mechanism that supports real-life situations.

Appearance of aggression in dreams during a pandemic

Restriction-induced changes during the COVID-19 epidemic, the expression of aggression in possible dreams, were studied in a study involving 71 students at the University of Toronto. The University of Toronto closed its doors to students on March 19, 2020, asking them to leave their previous living space, and that's when the institution switched to online education. In Toronto, the number of cases affected by the epidemic has risen dramatically, with the number of 108 registered cases, jumping to 2,363 from March 17 to April 13, 2020. Due to the pandemic, students were suddenly financially disadvantaged and socially isolated, with 50% losing their jobs and 68% consuming their financial reserves. The composition of the students is multicultural, with 21% coming from 168 different countries to study.

The on-line survey period, i.e. the collection of answers to the questions asked, lasted from 17 July to 10 August 2020, involving 51 women and 19 men (1 of unspecified sex) between the ages of 18 and 49, of different ethnicities. The study used the so-called Hall-Van de Castle system (1966), which systematizes dreams in general, based on the characters that appear in the dream, examining how these characters behave with each other, what relationships are formed, and how these relationships affect later characters. In this context, a three-level group of questions had to be answered. The first set of questions was for a participant to present a dream in a 50–250-word essay during the isolation period, due to the COVID-19 epidemic from 16 March to 25 July 2020, taking into account the requirements of Hall-Van de Castle, such as the location and environment of the dream, the negative, positive, or neutral perception of the participants, the expression of emotions about the dream. The second set of questions concerned the set of dreams in the study period, and if so, how the participant's dreams changed during the pandemic. The third level was related to the participant, demographics: age, gender, place of birth, ethnicity, which department of the university you belong to.

The results reported in the study showed that 81% of the subjects reported changes in their dreams during the isolation period under COVID-19, of which 27% had a significant association with the pandemic, the so-called Based on Fisher statistical significance test results. Women were significantly more likely to experience aggression in their dreams than men, and women were significantly more likely to experience physical aggression than verbal aggression. Regarding the content

of dreams, several nightmares and stressful features were detected, causing sleep fragmentation, which leads directly to a deterioration in the quality of sleep and, in the long run, to psychological changes. Overall, the study highlighted that a stressful period like the COVID-19 epidemic affects our dreams, and thus, our entire emotional lives, and that, women are particularly affected in this regard during a pandemic⁷.

Conclusion

The COVID-19 epidemic has confronted the vast majority of humanity with unprecedented challenges, and the normal living has been upset at individual and societal levels alike. One of the common sources of the many prompting problems is isolation and loneliness, which have brought with them some side effects as well. According to the frustration theory of aggression, the unattainable goals as well as the dissatisfaction with needs can lead to an aggressive action, which can manifest itself in several forms of aggression. The restrictions that have come into force, the isolation, and the non-fulfilment of the individual's task have intensified not only the aggression of those living in a narrow – typically family – environment, but also the aggression of general social relations, which affects not only the social relations but also our behaviour, dreams and sleep; furthermore, it also affects our hygiene and, in this context, our physical and mental health as well. The effects of the pandemic will not go away with the officially declared end of epidemic, with the social lifting of restrictions or with the return to a normal way of life. The treatment, the cure and the mitigation of any possible health effects may require the support of a specialist, in order to avoid the development of further negative consequences or the escalation of the process⁸.

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⁷ KILIUS, Erica et al.: Pandemic Nightmares: COVID-19 Lockdown Associated With Increased Aggression in Female University Students' Dreams; Frontiers in Psychology, 2021/12. pp. 1-9.

⁸ MAZZA, Marianna et al.: Danger in danger: Interpersonal violence during COVID-19 quarantine; Psychiatry Research, 2020, Issue No. 289, pp. 1-3.

JÓZSEF HOLECZ¹
THE ORIGINAL ‘HYBRID WARFARE’ - PART II.

Abstract

At the end of the 20th century, a concept was created, which before its creation had already undergone a long development process in its meaning, and then, it continued its development. ‘Hybrid Warfare’, as a terminology, for many people was born in 2014, as a result of the events in Ukraine, but it had been already known to soldiers long before that. In the second part of the two-part study, we examine when and due to whom the concept reached its accepted meaning today, and when the phenomenon reached the interest of the governmental level.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, hybrid threats, Four Block War, Frank G. Hoffman

Introduction

„Looking at today’s armed conflicts, we can say that there is little danger of an outbreak of war on a global scale, but there has been no reduction in the number and intensity of conflicts at the regional and sub-regional levels. We continue to hold true the assertion made in 2008 that there is a significant asymmetry in armaments, materiel and human resources between the opposing parties in these armed conflicts. Inequality can be observed in all segments of the war, including in the procedures used and in the way the war is fought.”

Balázs Forgács²

In the first part of our study, we had already set our research goal, according to which, we present in two publications the origin of the definition of ‘hybrid warfare’, which is so “popular” nowadays. In the first part, we had outlined the pre- ‘hybrid warfare’ variants we most accepted and their developmental effects on each other, while in the second part, a developmental stage related to Frank G. Hoffman is described.

With the two studies, we set several goals for ourselves. On the one hand, we wanted to clarify the fact already described in the first part, from where and with what content the terminology developed and was formed. We considered this to be particularly important, as almost all scientific researchers use Hoffman or William J.

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² FORGÁCS, Balázs: Guerrillas, partisans, insurgents; History of the Theory of Irregular Warfare – The Challenges of Our Time; Zrínyi Publishing House, Budapest, 2020. ISBN 978 963 327 798 0 p. 217.

Nemeth's study and theory³, which are recorded as the origin of 'hybrid warfare'; however, we have already refuted this in the first part of our study, as we also presented two American ideas that had already dealt with hybrid warfare in 1998. We have formulated as an equally important goal for ourselves to clarify how identical is Nemeth's and Hoffman's 'hybrid warfare'. By presenting the work of Frank G. Hoffman in this second part of our study, we believe we make this apparent as well.

In addition to theories, perhaps our most important goal is to describe and present the cause of the emergence of the terminology/phenomenon. In addition to presenting the development of the concept that has existed since 1998, we have tried to highlight the changes in the strategic and operational environments, their effects and their ever increasing complexity, and to make them more understandable.⁴ In the first part, we had already outlined how the growing complexity of the environment has shaped and induced the development of theories, which together led to these changes already being recorded in one of the most important strategic documents of the United States by 2005. As a continuation of our research, in this section we come to the hybrid warfare of today, with all its positive and – in many cases – contradictory features. The works of the theorists described in the two sections are interwoven with one another, that is, it is the mere limitation of size and publication that justified the division of this paper. Accordingly, the first part was completed, i.e., with the release of *The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*, adopted in 2005, the process of development practically continues with Mattis-Hoffman's theory.

The Mattis-Hoffman's 'hybrid warfare'

Following the publication of the 2005 strategy, focusing on the lessons learned from the conflicts in Chechnya, the operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, many researchers have noted the drastically increased strategic and operational environmental complexity already outlined in the first part of our study. It can be said that in the American academic life, the topic and its various approaches were elaborated; however, in this period (2005-2007) hybrid warfare as a name existed with even more content, showing the signs of the initial development phase.

According to our research, the concept of 'hybrid warfare' by Frank G. Hoffman is the one that, in terms of our topic, at the time of its formation, best describes the concept adopted today in its initial form. According to Hoffman, the first person to publicly use the term 'hybrid warfare' was James N. Mattis, who used the term for the first time on 8 September 2005, at the US Defense Forum.⁵ Knowing Hoffman's work, it can be said that he had already known about Walker's concept of 'hybrid warfare' as early as in 2007, as he mentions the theory in a footnote in his *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, only as a factor with identical terminology but

³ NEMET, William J.: Future war and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare; Naval Postgraduate School, California, Monterey, 2002.

<https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5865> (downloaded 21 March 2017)

⁴ SZENDY, István: Our Age and Warfare; Military Science, 2018/2. pp. 3-17.

⁵ HOFFMAN, Frank G.: Conflict in the 21st Century. The Rise of Hybrid Wars; Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, Virginia, 2007, p. 14.

https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications/potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf (downloaded 10 July 2021)

different meaning. Nemeth's concept of 'hybrid warfare' in Chechnya does not appear in this work, however, it is likely that it is due to its spirituality based on completely different foundations.⁶ From the above, it is clear that the spiritual fathers of the concept of 'hybrid warfare' prevalent today are Mattis and Hoffman, the former being the first to use the term publicly in this sense, the latter explaining this theory in publications in a way relevant today. It is perhaps no coincidence that, as noted above, the first study was still published as a joint publication in 2005.⁷

The study; the *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* by Mattis-Hoffman appeared in the November 2005 issue of the US Naval Institute, its subtitle is rather suggestive: *Remember General Krulak's Three Block War? Are you ready for the Four Block War? You better be, says General James Mattis.* The short study is the logical continuation of Kulak's Three Block War, and strategic document '*The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 2005*', presented in the first part of our study, and it practically paves the way for Hoffman's 'hybrid warfare'. In their brief assessment of the situation, of course interpreted from an American perspective, Mattis and Hoffman, state that while technological advances permeate future warfare and include U.S. military thinking, one should not believe that future wars will be conducted under American rules. Although the pursuit of military supremacy in the traditional wars of the past has always proved to be an important criterion for military victory, an analysis of recent conflicts shows that today's enemy creates their own rules of the game and creatively seeks to achieve their own goals.⁸

The authors of the study clarify the reason for the above logic: U.S. military superiority provides no other option for potential opponents/enemies. A potential enemy with an intent to harm can only hope for success if they deliberately step

⁶ Hoffman makes no mention of Nemeth's hybrid warfare in his study, while the American study of Thomas HUBER's Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot and QIAO Liang and WANG Xiangsui's Unrestricted Warfare can be found in it as a starting point. Later, in 2009, published Hybrid Warfare and Challenges studies on such resources is included in the published in 2002, Nemeth-type publications as well.

In: HUBER, Thomas M.: Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot. U.S. Army Command and General Staff Collage Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002.

<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA481548.pdf>, (downloaded 12 July 2021)

QIAO Liang – WANG Xiangsui: Unrestricted Warfare; 1999.

<http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf>, (downloaded: 10 March 2017)

HOFFMAN (2007) op. cit. pp. 65-72.; HOFFMAN, Frank G.: Hybrid Warfare and Challenges; <https://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf> (downloaded 10 June 2016)

⁷ CHIFU, Iulian: Hybrid warfare, lawfare, information warfare – The wars of the future, In: SIMON, Greg – CHIFU, Iulian (eds.): *The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century*; Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2019, pp. 35-47. ISBN 978-0-367-90134-9 p. 39;

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⁸ MATTIS, James N. – HOFFMAN, Frank G.: Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars; US Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2005.

<http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf> (downloaded 10 February 2017);

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outside the framework provided by the rules, looking for weaknesses, vulnerabilities in the U.S. military. What's more, they state that precisely because of the above line of reasoning, although traditional – inter-state – military conflicts do not disappear, they are realistically unlikely given the extent of technology-based military hegemony. It follows that the enemy may be a kind of irregular force, but not necessarily in the traditional sense of military science, but rather in a broader sense. Irregular challengers can be not only guerrillas or insurgents, but also criminals, terrorists and those who use unlimited warfare – ultimately anyone who is irregular – who does not respect the rules of warfare⁹ and intends to act in an irregular way of thinking and approaching the US military.¹⁰

In their forecast, they state that these actors pose a modern challenge to the military not only in terms of methods, but also because a combination of them appears in terms of detrimental tools and methods, in order to maximize the impact.¹¹ “We expect future enemies to look at the four approaches [look at National Defense Strategy (2005): the traditional, the irregular, the catastrophic and the disruptive threats] as a sort of menu and select a combination of techniques or tactics appealing to them. We do not face a range of four separate challengers as much as the combination of novel approaches – a merger of different modes and means of war. This unprecedented synthesis is what we call Hybrid Warfare” they say.¹²

‘Hybrid warfare’ can be identified according to their view of Krulak’s Three Block War version, many added that even another ‘block’ is needed. As an additional element, psychological or information operations appear in today’s conflicts, but in such a way that this area cannot be separated from the other three, but covers all three as a whole as an information system. They consider information oversight of the entire system to be important, as they find that different blocks do not feature separate, independent actors as enemies, but differ only in terms of the threat and the device used. What connects them is the linguistic and cultural link that military leaders must understand in each block, as this segment must be able to read as well as the map, the opportunities and the limitations provided by the terrain.¹³

⁹ Balázs Forgács discusses the modern interpretation of the irregular approach and its relation to asymmetry in a similar way to Hoffman, who identified various forms of actors who consciously circumvent the rules (including forms such as private military companies, on which Hoffman did not yet formulate his thoughts in 2005). In: FORGÁCS, Balázs: New Wars. Old Theories; Commentary, 2021/1. p. 85.

¹⁰ The same idea is further analyzed in Hoffman’s 2006 study, in which he talks about ‘complex irregular warfare’ in the same broad sense, and declares that this complexity stems from the amalgamation of malicious intentions with a validated approach exceeding rules. In: MATTIS – HOFFMAN (2005) op. cit. HOFFMAN (2007) op. cit. pp. 395-399.

¹¹ MATTIS – HOFFMAN (2005) pp. 18-19.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid. pp. 18-19.;

KRULAK, Charles C.: The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a399413.pdf> (downloaded 10 July 2021)

Hoffman's 'hybrid warfare'

Nowadays, it is no coincidence that Frank G. Hoffman is considered unavoidable in terms of the origin of hybrid warfare, as his statements best reflect the complexity of today's hybrid warfare, if we examine the earliest theories made in the period between 1998 and 2007. However, the above-mentioned 2005 study has only shown that Hoffman's 'hybrid warfare' seeks to explain the 'warfare deviances' induced by changes in the operational environment from a different approach. In his 2007 study *Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, he described the the hybrid warfare in much more detail, drawing on the experience of the Second Lebanon War. It is most apparent here why he does not deal with Nemeth's concept: while Nemeth¹⁴ bases his theory on the characteristics of the conflicts in Chechnya, Hoffman examines the Hezbollah's activities in 2006, i.e. the factors that can be identified in its background; thus, he shows a somewhat different 'hybrid warfare'.¹⁵

In this work, Hoffman already states that hybrid warfare is a new form of warfare for the 21st century.¹⁶ He states that today's enemies/opponents no longer accept the previously applied and generally accepted rules of warfare/war. Their aim is to maximize unpredictability and surprise, which can best be achieved by avoiding regularities and legal-social-procedural-organizational norms. According to Hoffman, today's potential opponents are extremely "good learners", who are able to use the available options, tools, and procedures "plagiarized", but even if they need to achieve the required effect, even completely ignoring known regularities.¹⁷

Hoffman, like Nemeth, believes that although the high-tech equipment does appear in modern irregular use of tools, yet many primitive instruments, methods and procedures can also be recognized that sometimes may seem barbaric in the eyes of modern Western societies. It is customary to consider actors using such a system, as non-state entities, they are also usually classified as irregular, while states use traditional forces against them. Hoffman argues that it was the Second Lebanon War of 2006 that showed that alternative structures and more complex strategies are the main challenges in terms of future will-assertion. The Hezbollah proved that a non-state actor is also capable of assessing the vulnerability of a state in possession of conventional military high potential, to take advantage of the inherent opportunities and harm that State. He emphasizes that not only non-state actors can apply hybrid warfare, but also those states that are unable or unwilling to engage in traditional armed conflict.¹⁸

¹⁴ The theory of Nemeth was described in detail in our study, The Original 'Hybrid Warfare' I, prior to this study.

¹⁵ To dissect this, Hoffman devotes a chapter in his publication in which he presents the operation and procedures of Hezbollah as a kind of prototype. In: HOFFMAN (2007) op. cit. pp. 35-42.

¹⁶ Ibid. p. 39.

¹⁷ Ibid. pp. 15-16.:

KAJÁRI, Ferenc: Hybrid War in Ukraine; Honvédségi Szemle / Defense Review, 2015/5. pp. 37-38.

¹⁸ HOFFMAN (2007) op. cit. p. 8. pp. 15-16.

The spectrum of the set of tools applied is quite wide. According to Hoffman, hybrid threats include a variety of tools and methods of warfare, perhaps it is more fortunate to call them traditional military capabilities of will-assertion, irregular methods and organizational forms, terrorist actions, but even criminal activities. Activities and procedures can be linked to state and non-state actors and can be carried out in different organizational forms, but also by the same organization. The point is the synergistic effect.¹⁹

Synergy, as an effect multiplier, was available to the political and military elite in all eras and was mostly used by leaders according to the technological possibilities of that era. However, by the end of the 20th century, thanks to a number of closely interrelated development processes, this opportunity of synergy provides an incredible potential for the strategic actors in terms of will-assertion.

According to Hoffman, at the strategic level, regular and irregular forces on the same side could be identified in many wars, but in most cases they operated either on different battlefields or in different organizational structures, but in no case they could be applied synergistically. At the same time, in the world of hybrid wars, the different forms and methods of combat activities are blurred, no specific line can be drawn between them. Often these forces operate in the same operational space, for the same purposes, under the same leadership. He emphasizes that the irregular force and the entity using this method are no longer just a tactical factor, but a higher level of operation. Not only does it use a tiring set of procedures well known in history, but it even becomes a decisive factor in trying to provoke an overreacting response from the enemy and result in disproportionately high defense costs for the opposing party.²⁰ Based on these characteristics, he states that mixing these procedures is no longer possible to make a clear distinction between soldiers and civilians, but it is also difficult to draw the lines between the procedures used, namely to legally interpret the activities.²¹

Of course, the author tries to interpret this complex formation and its difficult field of activity, which is difficult to analyze, from the perspective of the leader. He declares that the activities used by different actors lead to the emergence of different types of conflicts (crises), the convergence of which is difficult to interpret - that is, the political end-goal of the adversary is barely recognizable. This finding is particularly important in the case of hybrid warfare, as the enemy is already difficult to identify (due to the large number of non-state and proxy actors), and due to the complexity of the activities experienced, it is not possible to know the exact purpose of the opposing party. Hoffman believes this requires a fundamentally novel approach on the part of policy makers. On the one hand, we need to change our approach intellectually, and on the other hand, we need to develop in terms of organizational adaptation.²² Both compulsions to change are fundamentally cultural in nature, as it is not possible to make appropriate decisions on the use of force when our adversary is attacking our vulnerability in a way that calls into question the fundamentals of decision-making mechanisms.

¹⁹ Ibid. p. 8.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 8; p. 14.

²¹ Ibid. p. 11; pp. 55-59.

²² Ibid. p. 9; pp. 43-46.

Hoffman confronts us, researchers of 21st century warfare, with the unpleasant fact that we tend to ignore the ambiguous or multi-meaning security environment of today, the cumbersome interpretation of the features that can be identified in it. Because of the blurred line between peace and war, the unidentifiable image of the enemy, he believes that today's Western military thinkers nostalgically miss the enemy with traditional military capabilities rather than facing the elusive challenges of the 21st century.²³ He emphasizes that the situation of decision-makers is further aggravated by the fact that the mere use of military force today, i.e. war, does not ensure the achievement of strategic goals, i.e. today's 'wars' are much more multi-faceted and are fought not only by soldiers.²⁴

The conflicts of the late 20th century show that American defense developments have not been done with the right focus, Hoffman says. In the modernization of the military equipment system, maximizing impact in destructive power and accuracy, as well as in gaining and maintaining information supremacy, are not able to provide an adequate response to the actions of all possible adversaries. Of course, these technical improvements were necessary, but the 'haze of war' as uncertainty remains, due to the hybridization of conflict and complexity, and this haze has even grown, according to Hoffman.²⁵

Hoffman, like his study of 2005, welcomes the new National Defense Strategy, since hybrid warfare as a concept is not yet mentioned in it, but the diversity of possible forms of conflicts and images of the adversary are reflected. He also considers this kind of mental development to be important and to be followed for hybrid warfare.²⁶ Hoffman interprets the Quadrennial Defense Review (2006), published in the year following the publication of the defense strategy, as a kind of development, since the report already partially breaks with the separate image of enemies outlined in the strategy. „*This paper suggests that we still have a way to go. Instead of the four distinct challengers presented in a two by two matrix chart (known as the Quad chart in the Pentagon) found in the new NDS, future scenarios will more likely present unique combinations and deliberate synergies that are specifically designed to target Western societies in general and American vulnerabilities in particular. The defense strategy created the impression that our portfolio of capabilities would be measured against four distinct kinds of challengers using different approaches. Our take on the future suggests that future adversaries are smarter than before and will rarely limit themselves to a single tool in their tool kit. Conventional, irregular and catastrophic terrorist challenges will not be distinct styles; they will all be present in some form. The blurring of modes of war, the blurring of who fights, and what technologies are brought to bear, produce a wide range of variety and complexity... „*²⁷

In addition to the mixed and ambiguous image of the enemy and the uncertain political end-goal of the enemy/adversary, the fact that the field of operations in hybrid wars has become complex and deliberately uses dimensions where traditional forces cannot operate effectively and humanely, what's more, it provides the party using

²³ Ibid. p. 12; pp. 28-30.

²⁴ Ibid. pp. 11-12.; pp. 43-46.

²⁵ Ibid. pp. 13-14.

²⁶ Ibid. pp. 13-14.; pp. 47-51.

²⁷ Ibid. p. 14.

hybrid warfare with a protracted conflict and an excessive increase in costs for the other party.²⁸ It also makes an interesting finding regarding the length of the conflict. Just as it is not clear whether a conflict is of a traditional or irregular nature, or whether it is a low- or high-intensity operation, a hybrid war cannot be called short or long, the hybrid conflict is timeless.²⁹

Hoffman notes that a change in the mindset of the U.S. political and military leadership has begun, as evidenced by the 2005 and 2006 strategy papers, but further changes are needed. He stresses that it would be a mistake to push traditional capabilities into the background, as historical experience does not rule out such an armed conflict, but at the same time, views on traditional military confrontation need to be updated and complemented by an analysis of the challenges of hybrid warfare. These analyses require a creative approach, setting aside the use of conservative blinders and cultural boundaries, as hybridity requires innovative thinking, constant experimentation, and continuous adaptation.³⁰

In addition to the importance of changing the way of thinking and attitudes, it is necessary to redesign the defense budget accordingly, to rethink the setting of technological developments above all in terms of strategic priorities. However, the above is not only relevant at the strategic level. At all levels of military leadership, in terms of force development, and even more so, training and education, adapting attitudes and integrating them into capability development are paramount tasks.³¹

Due to the non-military equipment of hybrid warfare, not only the military but also the non-military equipment of the government must be made suitable for the implementation of complex operations on the battlefield. The applicability of non-military government instruments is a key issue in this warfare. In addition, according to Hoffman, military and non-military means and their use are not clearly separable, as it was possible in the case of operations with separable characteristics so far. In terms of military force, this situation is also interesting because so far, as in the theory of the Three-Block Wars, different operational situations have required military forces of different readiness, which have been relatively easy to provide, due to their spatial and/or temporal separation. In hybrid warfare, the shapers of the operational environment pose ever-changing challenges to the military force operating in the operational space, which requires a multifunctional applicability, i.e., preparedness. This unit/sub-unit is professional and multi-purpose trained, flexible in its management, organizational form and procedures.³²

Integrating this approach and way of thinking into the system of training and education is not easy, but it is even more challenging to create a doctrinal background for this. Hoffman believes that the variable hybrid procedures combatants follow, the changes in the ever newer security environment are difficult to follow-up in the doctrines and regulations with equal speed.³³ And this is an essential condition, according to Hoffman, for a force to be prepared for hybrid threats. At the doctrinal

²⁸ Ibid. p. 15.

²⁹ Ibid. pp. 28-29.

³⁰ Ibid. p. 9; pp. 43-50; pp. 55-59.

³¹ Ibid. pp. 8-9; pp. 46-51; pp. 55-59.

³² Ibid. pp. 47-50.; pp. 55-59.

³³ Ibid. p. 49; pp. 55-59.

and regulatory level, it is necessary to analyze the changes that are taking place again and again, because this form of warfare is the biggest challenge in terms of the preparedness of military leaders. A holistic strategic and operational environment that is at once difficult to interpret, uncertain, volatile, and unpredictable, and in which a given military leader must consciously conduct a situation assessment on an ongoing basis, is a startling challenge. This requires cognitive tolerance, high stress tolerance, rapid decision-making and subsequent continuous adaptation. In addition to leadership preparedness, the need for organizational learning and adaptation needs to be developed at the sub-unit level as well. All this should be part of both education and training and should be regularly updated.³⁴

In addition to military organizational and individual capability development, education and training, an important area within the art of operations is the development of operations planning procedures in a complex environment. According to Hoffman, the procedures used in 2007 are too linear, while many unforeseen and therefore unpredictable changes in the operation induce new branching plans. He emphasizes that not only the command staff of small units needs to be able to adapt to environmental dynamism, but also the decision-making organizations of larger units. In such an environment, it is important to have a novel approach to strategy, integrate kinetic and non-kinetic effects, use the effects of modern media, combine military and non-military tools, and to tailor intelligence and reconnaissance information systems.³⁵

Hoffman repeatedly points out that the history teaching used to prepare soldiers and shape attitudes is useful, but it is not enough to evaluate the current events, in order to defeat today's novel adversaries/ enemies. „*There is much to learn from history but it rarely repeats itself, and as the new Army/Marine counterinsurgency manual correctly states, «You cannot fight former Saddamists and Islamic extremists the same way you would have fought the Viet Cong, Moros, or Tupamaros.»*”³⁶

In this work, Hoffman, about seven years before the annexation of the Crimea in 2014, formulated the terminology of hybrid warfare, which briefly summarizes what was said in our study, and also served as the basis for the post-2014 definitions. „*The blurring of modes of war, the blurring of who fights, and what technologies are brought to bear, produces a wide range of variety and complexity that we call Hybrid Warfare. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. Hybrid Wars incorporate a range of different modes of warfare, including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion and criminal disorder. These multimodal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects.*”³⁷

In summary and conclusion, Hoffman notes at the end of the study that hybrid opponents will not disappear. What's more, they will increasingly be able to apply

³⁴ Ibid. pp. 49-50.; pp. 55-59.

³⁵ Ibid. pp. 50-54.

³⁶ Ibid. p. 56.

³⁷ Ibid. p. 14.

modern technological advances to their goals, as they are able to adapt immediately after quick learning. The innovative and adaptive approach to the diverse and changeable adversaries/enemies results in such a completely new strategic and operational environment in which false analysis, narrow-mindedness and complacency may bring about tragic decisions and consequences. „This assessment suggests an increasingly complex environment for future irregular conflicts that will require institutional adaptation and significantly more attention than it receives today”, the author concludes.³⁸

Conclusion

Of course, even after his 2007 monograph, Frank G. Hoffman addressed the characteristics of complex environments and irregular warriors as well as their development, while placing the ‘hybrid warfare’ as a phenomenon before the public eye. Between 2005 and 2009, he analyzed also the characteristic features and components as well as the key elements of the functioning of the form of will-assertion that he called ‘hybrid warfare’. To this end, more and more “ammunitions” were constantly provided for him from two sources: on the one hand, the world “provided” many conflicts that were worth analyzing, and on the other hand, the professional discussion generated by the analysis of many researchers ensured some theories.

The theories of researchers and the recognition that something has changed in warfare have not yielded decisive results in raising the ‘hybrid warfare’ to government level. Articles written about the relevant initial phenomena were very difficult to find the understanding of the audience. Accordingly, in publications and monographs, the specialists tried to clash their ideas with one another, and the different types of forces began to update their regulations, using these and their own experiences.

Practically it was first the Army to issue a publication called Hybrid Threats, in which the terminology ‘hybrid threats’ first appeared as a version of ‘hybrid warfare’. According to the publication, ‘hybrid threats’ can be described as follows: „*The diverse and dynamic combination of regular and irregular forces, and/or criminal elements all unified to achieve mutually benefitting effects.*”³⁹ One year later, the Army Field Manual 3-0 Operations also included the same term.⁴⁰

A breakthrough at government level also occurred in 2010, when the terminology of ‘hybrid warfare’ and the meaning behind it, as well as the environmental complexity reached the government’s stimulus threshold, as a result of which, the concept also appeared in strategic-level documents. However, it is important to stress that although the concept was already addressed at political strategic level in 2010, this did not mean an immediate and undisputed introduction

³⁸ Ibid. p. 10; p. 59.

³⁹ Hybrid Threats, TC 7-100, Headquarters, Department of the Army, November 2010, Glossary-3

https://www.benning.army.mil/mssp/security%20topics/Potential%20Adversaries/content/pdf/tc7_100.pdf, (downloaded 11 August 2021)

⁴⁰ Field Manual 3-0 Operations C1; 2008. Glossary-7
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-0/fm3-0_c1_2011.pdf (downloaded 11 August 2021)

of the terminology at all. The U.S. congressional report, while acknowledging that warfare is likely to shift into a ‘mixed’ direction in the future, officially refused to address hybrid warfare, because it did not see it as a new form of warfare and the concept was interpreted differently by various military leaders.⁴¹

However, the report also recorded several very important facts, which we believe are of paramount importance. On the one hand, it recommends the use of the adjective ‘hybrid’ to characterize operational complexity – that is – it allows military professionals to use the term in this way. It was also decided to include the operational specificities of hybrid warfare in strategic planning documents, while acknowledging that warfare is evolving towards the intricacy and complexity of operations; but it notes that the concept is not planned to be introduced into doctrines.⁴²

As stated above, up to now, the virtually officially non-existent concept began to appear in the US at government level, in reports, in military doctrines and regulations. The adjective ‘hybrid’ is thus increasingly incorporated into the terminology dictionary of U.S. security and defense policy as well as into the military sector. By way of concluding our two studies, let us quote one of Hoffman’s ideas, which we believe is one of the most important thoughts in his 2007 monograph, looking to the future, but relevant to this day too:

„The future poses a more diverse set of challengers, with a more varied set of approaches than the past. In Hybrid Wars, the adversaries will exploit the modern technologies of a global economy, and present us with asymmetric modes of operations and unanticipated tactics. They will exploit military systems in novel ways, potentially with state or conventional force and combat power. They will not remain static or subject to predictive analysis, but will continuously evolve and exploit the diffusion of innovative tactics, techniques and procedures that offer the greatest return on investment. This assessment suggests an increasingly complex environment for future irregular conflicts, which will require institutional adaptation and significantly more attention than it receives today.“⁴³

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⁴¹ GAO-101036R Hybrid Warfare; p. 2. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-10-1036r.pdf> (downloaded 10 July 2021)

⁴² Ibid. pp. 2-3.

⁴³ HOFFMAN (2007) op. cit. p. 59.

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Abstract

After the historic inter-Korean summit in 2018, a wind of peace blew on the Korean Peninsula. However, North Korea fired eight missiles in January and February 2022. It was not the first time to have such a short-term peace in Korean Peninsula. It has been already patterned as follows: 1) threats by North Korea, 2) bilateral or multilateral negotiation, 3) short-term peace, 4) threats again. This article aims to figure out whether North Korea's denuclearization strategy is for discarding or retaining nuclear weapons. Another goal is to determine the limits of denuclearization and predict the future outlook by analyzing the two Korea's strategies. This paper tentatively concluded that the future outlook of denuclearization is unlikely to be realized, and the future inter-Korean relations will be strained, due to the new administration established after the presidential election of South Korea and the existent lesson drawn from the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Keywords: North Korea, South Korea, National Strategy, denuclearization, five-step pattern

Introduction

Sixty-nine years have passed since the Korean Armistice Agreement. North Korea's three generations have insisted on peace and denuclearization in the Korean peninsula, but denuclearization has not become a reality yet.

In this sense, Chapter 1 will introduce North Korean history of insisting on peace and denuclearization. Furthermore, it will figure out why North Korea did not give up nuclear weapons, even though North Korea defined itself as a peace-loving country. This article will also show North Korea's peculiar intention by interpreting the period and frequency of North Korea's missile launches, nuclear tests, and missile types, under three generations (1984-2020). Through three strategies of North Korea, this article will figure out whether North Korea hopes to be denuclearized or retain nuclear weapons.

Chapter 2 analyzes South Korea's three denuclearization strategies by comparing the five recent administrations. South Korea's current denuclearization strategy is friendly towards North Korea. However, Chapter II will examine the contrasting changes in denuclearization and North Korea's strategies, depending on the ruling party of South Korea. It will evaluate the Moon Jae-in administration's strategy toward North Korea.

Chapter 3 will predict the future of inter-Korean relations, denuclearization, and the ROK-U.S. alliance, through the 20th presidential election of the Republic of Korea and the lessons learned from the Russian-Ukrainian war.

1. North Korea's denuclearization strategy

Is North Korea a peace-loving country? At the 2018 inter-Korean summit, the touching scene of the leaders of the two Koreas meeting and holding hands to cross the Military Demarcation Line was broadcast live around the world. However, this peaceful, but false mood that North Korea created was not the first time.

Although most countries may deem North Korea an anti-pacifist, outlaw, or irrational country, three generations of the Kim family – Kim Il-sung (1950-1994), Kim Jong-il (1994-2011), and Kim Jong-un (2012- current) – have announced several times that North Korea is a peace-loving country and is willing to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.

These references began in 1954, just after the end of the Korean war (1953). North Korea participated in the Asian Socialist Conference in 1954 and stood for peace, bringing up the concept of the Zone of Peace (ZOP) against the American nuclear threat in the Asian-Pacific region. This concept was evolved into Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) around 1957 and 1958, by accepting the Soviet Union's definition.¹

According to an interview with the then Minister of Unification in South Korea in 2005, Kim Jong-il said that “*the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is a ‘dying instruction’ of President Kim Il-sung and remains in effect. If our regime stability is guaranteed, there is no reason to have nuclear weapons.*”² In addition, KIM Jong-un, the third supreme leader of North Korea, spoke in the same tone at the Inter-Korea Summit in 2018: “*If the United States promises an end to the war and inviolability, then why would we have a hard time living with nuclear weapons?*”³

¹ Koo, Gab-woo: A Prototype Discourse in North Korea, 1947–1964: Reading the Systems of Mind; Modern North Korean Studies 2014/1. pp. 230-231. DOI: 10.17321/rnks.2014.17.1.005

LEE, Choongkoo: The Birth and Revival of North Korea’s Denuclearization Policy for the Korean Peninsula; The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 2018/3. p . 355

² KIM, Sejin (김세진): Kim Jong-il: ‘Denuclearization is Kim Il-sung’s Will, When the US Guarantees the North Korea Regime’ (김정일 “미국체제보장시 비핵화는 김일성 유언), MBC News, 13 OCTOBER 2015

https://imnews.imbc.com/news/2015/politics/article/3788955_31223.html (downloaded 14 March 2022)

³ SON, Jae min (손제민): KIM Jong-un: “Why do we have a hard time living with nuclear weapons?”(김정은 “왜 우리가 핵을 가지고 어렵게 살겠느냐?) Kyunghyang Shinmun (경향신문), 29 April 2018, <https://www.khan.co.kr/politics/politics-general/article/201804291115001> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

Judging from the above fact, it is clear that North Korea has also hoped for peace and denuclearization for 68 years. While keeping in mind why the denuclearization has not been achieved so far, the next part will analyze North Korea's current denuclearization strategy.

1.1. The current strategy: The repeated five-step pattern

As of February 2022, North Korea launched eight missiles only in 2022. Out of the eight missiles, seven missile tests were conducted in January 2022, and one missile was launched on 26 February 2022, after the Beijing Winter Olympics. It seems reasonable to understand that North Korea avoided the missile test during the Olympics period for the sake of China, an allied country of North Korea. According to the New York Times, during Russo-Ukrainian War and the presidential campaign in South Korea, North Korea intends to launch the missile for the sake of negotiation.⁴

Given this interpretation, Figure 1 and 2 show and support that North Korea's missile tests have more negotiation functions than simple threats.

⁴ CHOE, Sang-Hun: North Korea Launches a Ballistic Missile, South Korea Says, The New York Times, 26 February 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/26/world/asia/north-korea-missile-launch.html> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

Month Year	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	Total	SRBM	MRBM	IRBM	ICBM	SLBM	ASCM	Nuclear Test			
84			1										1	1 (7)*									
85													0										
86				1									1	1 (1)									
87													0										
88													0										
89													0										
90				1									1		1 (1)								
91						1				1			2	2 (2)									
92						1							1		1 (1)								
93						2							2	1 (2)	1 (1)								
	subtotal			1	4	2				1			8	5 (12)	3 (3)								
94					1								1	1									
95													0										
96													0										
97								1					0										
98													1		1 (1)								
99													0										
00													0										
01													0										
02													0										
03		1	1	1									1	4	4 (4)								
04				1									1	1 (1)									
05					1								1	1 (2)									
06			1			2				1			4	1 (2)	1 (6)	1 (1)			1				
07					1	3							4	4 (7)									
08				1	1	1				1			4	4 (11)									
09					1	4	2			1			8	5 (15)	1 (7)	1 (1)			1				
10													0										
11													0										
	subtotal			1	3	3	8	4	4	1	4		28	21 (42)	2 (13)	1 (1)	2 (2)			2			
12		1	1	1						1			1	5	3 (6)			2 (2)					
13		1	1		3								5	4 (8)					1				
14		2	6		2	5	1	2					18	17 (113)	1 (2)								
15		1	3	2	3	2	1						1	14	10 (31)			4 (3)					
16		1	1	6	5	1	2	3	2	2	2		25	6 (18)	4 (9)	8 (8)	1 (1)	4 (4)		2			
17		1	2	3	4	1	2	2	1				16	4 (6)	4 (7)	1 (1)	6 (6)			1			
18													0										
19				1	2		2	5	1	2	2		15	15 (26)									
20					4	1		1					6	4 (2)				2 (3)					
	subtotal			3	8	22	14	12	6	13	10	7	4	3	2	104	63 (209)	9 (18)	9 (9)	9 (9)	8 (7)	2 (3)	4
	Total			3	9	15	16	22	13	16	11	7	9	3	2	140	89 (263)	14 (34)	10 (10)	11 (11)	8 (7)	2 (3)	6

* Number of missile launches (Number of missiles)

SRBM: Short-range ballistic missile; MRBM: Medium-range ballistic missile; IRBM: Intermediate-range ballistic missile; ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile

Figure 1: The Number of North Korea's Nuclear tests / launching missiles⁵

⁵ HONG, Min: Analysis of North Korea's nuclear and missile-related major activities (북한의 핵·미사일 관련 주요 활동 분석), Korea Institute for National Unification, 2017, KINU Insight 17-01, <https://repo.kinu.or.kr/handle/2015.oak/8491> (downloaded 14 March 2022), redesigned edited, and updated by author.

As we have seen from Figure 1, it is clear that the number of North Korea's missile tests is increasing. KIM Il-sung conducted eight missile tests only for nine years. After then, twenty-six missile tests and two nuclear tests were carried out for 17 years, under the reign of KIM Jong-il. From 2012 to 2020, Kim Jong-un conducted one hundred missile tests and four nuclear tests. As mentioned above, there were eight missile tests alone in January and February 2022. Although SRBMs and MRBMs are the overwhelming majority of missiles launched by North Korea, they also launched IRBM, ICBM, SLBM, and ASCM. In this sense, in order to formulate South Korea's denuclearization policy toward North Korea, it is vital to figure out its aim by using missile and nuclear tests and whether these missile tests and nuclear tests have a genuine offensive intention.

The most interesting thing about Figure 1 is the total number of missile tests "by Month." It unquestionably shows that North Korea's missile tests are overwhelmingly conducted between March and May from 1984 to 2020. Figure 2 will explain why North Korea launched missiles mainly between March and May.

		2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
J A N	US SK				13~14: Silent Shark					
	NK	11: SRBM (3)*			23: SLBM (1)	6: 4 th Nuclear Test				
F E B	US SK	27, 29: KR	4~6: Combined naval exercise 19~24: Combined anti-submarine warfare drill	24~: KR		13, 15: combined submarine exercise				
	NK		12: 3 rd Nuclear Test	21, 27: SRBM (8)	6, 8, 20: SRBM (10+)	7: ICBM (1)	12: MRBM (1)			
	US SK	9: KR	11~21: KR 20~: FE	~7: KR 14~ : FE	2~13: KR 31~ : FE	7~18: KR 7~ : FE	1~: FE 13~ (for 2 weeks); KR		4~12: 19-1 alliance	
M A R	NK	29: SRBM (2)	15: SRBM (2)	3, 4, 16, 22, 23: SRBM (80) 26: MRBM (2)	2, 12: SRBM (9)	3, 10, 16, 21, 29: SRBM (15) 18: MRBM (1)	6: MRBM (4) 22: IRBM(1)		2, 21: SRBM (4) 9,29: Unknown (3+)	
A P R	US SK	11: NAE	~30: FE	~4,7,11,18 : FE	2,3,7,23, 24: FE	~30: FE	~30: FE	1~ (for 4 weeks); FE 16~ (for 2 weeks); KR	20~24: Vigilant ACE	
	NK	13: ICBM (1)			2, 3, 7: SRBM (7)	1: SRBM (3) 15: IRBM (1) 23: SLBM (1) 28: IRBM (2)	5: MRBM (1) 16, 29: IRBM (2)		16: Unknown (1)	14: SRBM (1)

M A Y	US SK NK	6-10: Combined anti-submarine warfare drill (the West Sea) 13-14: Combined anti-submarine warfare drill (the East Sea) 18-20: SRBM (6)	8,9: SRBM (4)	31: IRBM (1)	14: IRBM (1) 21: MRBM (1) 27-29: SRBM (2)	4, 9: SRBM (4)	27~30: 19-2 alliance
J U N	US SK NK			14: SRBM(3)	22: IRBM (2)	12-13: Silent Shark	Silent Shark
						8: SRBM (2+)	
J U L	US SK NK		16th~21st: ROK-US Combined Exercises	9:SLBM 19: MRBM (2), SRBM(1)	4: IRBM (1) 28: ICBM (1)	25,31: SRBM (4)	5~20: CPT
A U G	US SK NK		19-29 : UFG	18, 20,27: UFG 14: SRBM (5)	22: UFG 3: MRBM (2) 24: SLBM (1)	21~: UFG 26: SRBM (3) 29: IRBM (1)	18~28: CPT 2, 6, 10, 16, 24: SRBM (10)

S	US SK				~ 2: UFG 5: MRBM (3)	2: UFG			
E	NK	27: SRBM (1)		1, 6: SRBM (4)	9: 5 th Nuclear Test	15: IRBM (1)		10: SRBM (2)	
P	US SK		8,10: Combined naval exercise		10, 15: Combined naval exercise				
O	NK				15, 20: IRBM (2)			2, 31: SRBM (3)	
C	US SK			2-6: Vigilant ACE	4, 10: Invincible Shield (ROK- US-US)	15-17: RSO			
T	NK			28: SLBM (1)				23: Unknown (+) 28: SRBM (2)	
N	US SK								
O	NK								
V	US SK	19: PE							
D	NK	12: ICBM (1)		1: SLBM (1)					
E					4-8: Vigilant ACE	3-7: Comprehensive Combat Readiness Training		7-11: Comprehensive Combat Readiness Training	
C									

* Date: Type of missiles (number of missiles)

CPT: Command Post Training; FE (Foal Eagle Exercise); KR (Key Resolve Exercise); Silent Shark (Combined naval exercise by ROK-US); RSO (Reception Staging Onward Movement); UFG (Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, a computer-simulated defensive exercise); Vigilant Ace (ROK-US annual joint air force drill); NAE: National Assembly Election; PE: Presidential Election; 19-1: former KR (name changed); 19-2: Former UFC (name changed)

Figure 2: Correlation: the US-ROK alliance's Military Exercises / Elections and North Korea's missile/nuclear tests⁶

From Figure 2, it is quite evident that the US-ROK military training is intensively scheduled between February and May from 2012 to 2020. In February, the combined naval exercise, combined anti-submarine warfare drill and combined submarine exercise were conducted. 19-1 alliance in March and Foal Eagle Exercise and Key Resolve Exercise in March and April were carried out. There are two combined anti-submarine warfare drills in the West Sea and East Sea and one Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, a computer-simulated defensive exercise in May. Thus, it must be admitted that North Korea's missile tests between March and May are in response to concerns over the military exercises of the ROK-U.S. alliance. Moreover, during the South Korean Presidential Election and National Assembly Election, North Korea launched ICBMs (see Figure 2 above). It is obviously no coincidence that North Korea appears to be trying to put pressure on the US and South Korea not to choose an oppressive policy toward North Korea after the elections.

The row of 2018 from Figure 2 above offers further evidence. It is exceptionally unusual that military exercises were significantly reduced after the Inter-Korean Summit in April 2018. As we have seen, there are military exercises in April and December alone. In February 2018, the US-ROK military exercise was postponed,

⁶ Ibid. pp. 125-191. Redesigned edited, and updated by the author.

due to Pyeongchang Winter Olympics held by South Korea.⁷ In response to the peaceful inter-Korean Summit, North Korea also completely dismantled the northern nuclear test ground announced in May 2018.⁸ In August of the same year, UFG, a defensive role, was also postponed after then president Trump said the US would stop “very provocative” and costly military exercises with South Korea to facilitate denuclearization negotiations with North Korea.⁹ Furthermore, in December 2018, the US and ROK decided to skip Vigilant ACE, the US-ROK joint aerial exercise, but South Korea conducted the independent airforce exercise in December 2018.

As a result, unusually, there was no single missile test in North Korea in 2018. However, South Korea’s solo drill in December 2018 again stimulated North Korea. According to Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the state news agency of North Korea said that *“This is a dangerous military move, contrary to the military confidence measures between the north and the south and the current phase of reconciliation between the north and the south.”*¹⁰

In March 2019, the US and ROK abolished the Key Resolve Exercise (KR) and implemented the 19-1 alliance exercise. To put it more concretely, the 19-1 alliance exercise was more downscaled than KR. Original KR was divided into two parts. The first part is the defense exercise, and the second part is the counterattack exercise. However, the second part was omitted in the 19-1 alliance exercise, and the practice period was also reduced from 2 weeks to 1 week.¹¹

⁷ KIM, Hoe-kyung (김회경): South Korea-U.S. leaders agree to postpone U.S.-ROK military exercises during Pyeongchang Winter Olympics” (“한미 정상, 평창 올림픽 중 한미군사훈련 연기 합의”), Hankook Ilbo (한국일보), 4 January 2018, <https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201801042330249841> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

⁸ BBC NEWS Korea: South Korea and US military decide to suspend joint exercise in August... Future plans undecided (한미 군, 8월 연합훈련 유예결정...추후 계획은 미정), 19 June 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/korean/news-44529540> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

⁹ Ibid.
REUTERS: Trump says to stop ‘expensive’, ‘provocative’ South Korea war games; 12 June 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-wargames-idUSKBN1J80T5> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

¹⁰ Ministry of Unification (통일부): Main contents of North Korean broadcasting on 5 December 2018 (2018.12.05. 북한방송 주요내용), North Korea information portal (북한정보포털), <https://nkinfo.unikorea.go.kr/nkp/argument/viewArgument.do?pageIndex=1&argumentBbsId=6650&tabType=> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

¹¹ KIM, Ho-Jun (김호준): New US-ROK joint exercise, ‘19-1 Alliance’ is over... Focusing on ‘defense’ (comprehensive), (새 韓美연합훈련 ‘19-1동맹’ 종료...’ 방어’ 위주로 진행(종합)), YNA, 12 March 2019, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20190311138251503> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

In the following month, in April 2019, however, North Korea re-launched missiles after about 19 months, because North Korea accused the 19-1 alliance exercise of violating the agreement between South Korea and North Korea.¹²

North Korea repeated the five-step pattern of 1) threatening neighboring countries and the US through missile and nuclear tests, 2) being imposed international sanctions, 3) bilateral or multilateral negotiating, 4) receiving compensation, and 5) maintaining a short period of peace.

After the short peace, North Korea threatened neighboring countries again. This vicious circle has been patterned and fixed. In this way, North Korea developed weapons over three generations for over 70 years.

Proceeding from what we have seen in this part, it is logical to assume North Korea's primary strategy, the five-step pattern is not giving up nuclear weapons, but negotiating with neighboring countries and the US to maintain their nuclear capabilities.

1.2. Current Strategy: Strategic ambiguity on the concept of denuclearization

North Korea's second strategy is strategic ambiguity on the concept of denuclearization. This ambiguity creates gaps in understanding denuclearization between the US and North Korea and becomes a stumbling block for negotiations. Therefore, ambiguity not only plays a strategic role for North Korea, but will be a limitation in denuclearization.

North Korea		The US
The entire Korean Peninsula	Target	North Korea
Short-term: withdrawing sanctions Long-term: Ensuring regime by withdrawing the USFK in South Korea	Goal	PVID: Permanent, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement
It should be conducted simultaneously and in phases.	Method	Package deal / big deal

Figure 3: Differences in the concept of denuclearization between the US and North Korea¹³

¹² Ibid.

¹³ SHIN, Beom-chul (신범철): Analysis of North Korea's Strategic Intention Through the Denuclearization Process of 2018-2019 (2018-2019 비핵화 프로세스를 통해 본 북한의 전략적 의도 분석); The Journal of Strategic Studies (전략연구) Korea Research Institute For Strategy, 2019/2. pp. 41-43
NAM, Kwang Kyu: The Moon Jae-in administration's North Korea policy and Korea-US relations, Asian Education and Development Studies 2019/1. pp. 66-70, resource: multiple, created by the author.

Despite the stark differences in target, goal and method of denuclearization between North Korea and the US (see Figure 3 above), it seemed that President Donald J. Trump and Chairman Kim Jong Un took strategic ambiguity for each other's political positions on the Joint Statement at 2018 DPRK–USA Singapore Summit.

It may be essential to quote the Joint Statement that: “*The DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.*”¹⁴ The quote shows that PVID (Permanent, Verifiable, Irreversible Dismantlement) was not specified in the Joint Statement, but only a “*complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula*” was mentioned. It shows North Korea’s hidden intention of verification. It also reflects North Korea’s intention to induce the US army to withdraw from the territory of South Korea or to dissolve the US-ROK alliance by expanding the scope of denuclearization from North Korea to the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea has insisted on the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, because the Chinese military withdrew from North Korea in 1959, under the Korean Armistice Agreement. Therefore, North Korea has chosen a strategy that extends denuclearization from North Korea to the entire Korean peninsula and maintains strategic ambiguity. Due to this strategic ambiguity, however, the 2019 DPRK–USA Hanoi Summit agreement was broken down.

It seems reasonable to conclude that the strategic ambiguity of North Korea is the most significant factor in the failure in realizing denuclearization. However, it is also one of the most critical factors in allowing North Korea to possess nuclear weapons.

1.3. Current Strategy: Continuous North Korea’s nuclear activities during negotiations

Several reports claim that North Korea continues to develop its nuclear activities during negotiations on denuclearization. According to an IAEA report, operations were observed between 2017 and 2018 in the Yongbyon Experimental Nuclear Power Plant, in the Radiochemical Laboratory, and in the Pyongsan Mine and Concentration Plant.¹⁵ Additionally, the National Intelligence Service of South Korea estimated that nuclear and missile-related activities in North Korea continue even after the US-North

¹⁴ TRUMP Donald J. – KIM Jong Un: Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit; Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ROK), 12 June 2018. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319135&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_itm_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm= (downloaded 14 March 2022)

¹⁵ Application of Safeguards in the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Report by the Director General; IAEA Board of Governors General Conference, Gov/2018/34-GC(62)/12. 20 August 2018 http://isis-online.org/uploads/iaea-reports/documents/DPRK_safeguards_report_IAEA_20Aug2018.pdf (downloaded 14 March 2022)

Korea summit.¹⁶ The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) also provided commercial satellite imagery to be able to think logically that North Korea began to rebuild the Dongchang-ri missile test site.¹⁷

Proceeding from what has been said above, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that North Korea's actions appear to favor retaining nuclear power, which is advantageous in negotiations, rather than its will to give up its nuclear weapons.

2. South Korea's denuclearization strategy

This chapter will not cover the denuclearization strategies of all successive South Korean governments. Instead, the current administration's denuclearization strategy will be more focused on comparing the recent four administrations. Also, it will be analyzed, based on the MOON Jae-in government's national security strategy, which the Office of National Security publishes.

2.1. Current Strategy: Peaceful approach

The current ruling party is the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) under the MOON Jae-in administration. Traditionally, DPK, a progressive party, has been relatively more friendly towards North Korea than towards the US-ROK alliance. On the contrary, the People's Power Party (PPP), a conservative party, concentrated on the US-ROK alliance rather than on the inter-Korean relations. In this sense, Figure 4 proves that DPK has taken a friendly stand by representing all three presidents from the Democratic Party, who launched the inter-Korean summits.

¹⁶ NIS: North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Activities After the North Korea-US Summit (Comprehensive) (국정원 “북미정상회담 이후에도 북한 핵·미사일 활동”(종합)), yna, 14 November 2018, <https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20181114080200001> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

¹⁷ CSIS: Sohae Launch Facility Update: North Korean Snapback After Hanoi , Beyond Parallel, (March 7, 2019) https://beyondparallel.csis.org/sohae-launch-facility-update-north-korean-snapback-hanoi/?utm_source=CSIS+All&utm_campaign=aad3c8676a-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_07_05_26&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_f326fc46b6-aad3c8676a-161801969 (viewed date: 14 March 2022)
CSIS: Sohae Launch Facility Update Work Continues; Concealment of Launch Pad and Engine Test Stand, Beyond Parallel 9 March 2019. <https://beyondparallel.csis.org/sohae-launch-facility-update-work-continues-concealment-of-launch-pad-and-engine-test-stand/> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

South Korea	Kim Dae-joong	Roh Moo-hyun	Moon Jae-in
North Korea	Kim Jong-il	Kim Jong-il	Kim Jong-un
Year/ Place	13~15 June 2000/ Pyongyang	2~4 October 2007/ Pyongyang	1 st : 27 April 2018/ Inter-Korean Peace House, South Korea 2 nd : 26 May 2018/ Joint Security Area (JSA) 3 rd : 18 ~ 20 September 2018/ Pyongyang
Ruling Party of SK	Democratic Party of Korea	Democratic Party of Korea	Democratic Party of Korea
Results	6.15 North-South Joint Declaration	10.4 North-South Joint Declaration	1 st : Panmunjom Declaration 2 nd : - 3 rd : Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September

Figure 4: The history of the Inter-Korean Summit¹⁸

Especially, former president Kim Dae-joong realized the first peaceful transfer of power between rival parties in 50 years and he is also the only Nobel Peace Prize winner for his implementation of the Sunshine Policy in Korean history.¹⁹ The Sunshine policy, which came from one of Aesop's Fables – “The North Wind and the Sun” can be understood as the Reconciliation and Cooperation Policy Towards the North or the Embracing Policy.²⁰ Former President Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy is passed on to former President Roh Moo-hyun and current president Moon Jae-in. Nam (2019) also analyzed that the former Roh administration expanded sunshine policy and developed inter-Korean cooperation rather than the US-ROK alliance.²¹

Presidential term	President	Ruling Party
1998-2003	KIM Dae-joong	Democratic Party of Korea (DPK)
2003-2008	ROH Moo-hyun	Democratic Party of Korea (DPK)
2008-2013	LEE Myung-bak	People Power Party (PPP)
2013-2017	PARK Geun-hye	People Power Party (PPP)
2017-2022	MOON Jae-in	Democratic Party of Korea (DPK)

*Figure 5: Recent five South Korea’s administrations from 1998 to 2022
(Author’s own edition)*

¹⁸ Inter Korean Summit, <https://www.koreasummit.kr/> (KOR), (downloaded 14 March 2022), created by the author.

¹⁹ The Nobel Prize: The Nobel Peace Prize for 2000, <https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/peace/2000/press-release/> (downloaded 14 March 2022)
Kim, Dae-jung: Dedicated to reconciliation, CNN, 14 June 2001; <https://web.archive.org/web/20060922050400/http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asia/pct/east/06/12/bio.kim.daejung/> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

²⁰ Kim, Hyun-Key: South Korea’s Sunshine Policy; Reciprocity and Nationhood; Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 2012. pp. 99-111.

²¹ NAM op. cit. p. 60

Figure 5 shows that two former presidents from PPP were elected after the Roh administration in a row. Figure 1 clearly shows how much inter-Korean relations have deteriorated. The number of missile launches and nuclear tests has increased rapidly since 2008, and in 2016, missile and nuclear tests reached the highest point (see Figure 1 above).

In contrast, president Moon Jae-in peacefully approached North Korea's denuclearization in a DPK way by highlighting that we are the same Korean people. The inter-Korean summits, one-off events under the previous administration, were held three times in 2018. One of the inter-Korean summits was held in the territory of the Republic of Korea for the first time in history (See Figure 4 above).

2.2. Current Strategy: taking a driver's seat on Korean Peninsula issues

Moon's will to play a leading role in the Korean Peninsula issue has been demonstrated since his election campaign. According to his interview with the Washington Post, he expressed gratitude to the US-ROK alliance, but at the same time emphasized South Korea's leading role in Korean Peninsula matters. To help more understand South Korea's leading role in inter-Korea issues, a quotation from President Moon's interview with the Washington Post would be a good start. "*I do not see it as desirable for South Korea to take the back seat and watch discussions between the U.S. and China and dialogues between North Korea and the U.S. I believe South Korea taking the initiative would eventually strengthen our bilateral alliance with the U.S.*"²²

Furthermore, Panmunjeom Declaration in 2018 also emphasized South and North Korea's leading role in inter-Korea matters by stating the blood relations. "*South and North Korea will reconnect the blood relations of the people and bring forward the future of co-prosperity and unification led by Koreans by facilitating comprehensive and groundbreaking advancement in inter-Korean relations.*"²³

As part of its efforts, in 2019, South Korea, as a host country, held the Koreas-United States DMZ Summit. It refers to the three-party talks between the leaders of the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the United States of America. It shows that South Korea and North Korea are willing to take the lead in discussing the Korean Peninsula issue, and it is in line with the interview mentioned above with the Washington Post, before President Moon Jae-in was elected.

²² FIFIELD, Anna: Interview with Moon Jae-in, set to become South Korea's next president; The Washington Post, 2 May 2017, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/02/interview-with-moon-jae-in-set-to-become-south-koreas-next-president/> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

²³ JAE-IN, Moon – JONG UN, Kim: Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018. https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5478/view.do?seq=319130&srchFr=&srchTo=&srchWord=&srchTp=&multi_item_seq=0&itm_seq_1=0&itm_seq_2=0&company_cd=&company_nm=&page=1&titleNm= (downloaded 14 March 2022)

Despite the sides preferred to settle their problems themselves, the fate of the Korean Peninsula was discussed by China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and the United States under six-party talks (in 2003-2007). Compared to the six-party talks in the past, the Koreas-United States DMZ Summit has a tremendous symbolic meaning for the two Koreas. It implies that the two Koreas are willing to take a driver's seat through three-party talks, not the back seat anymore.

2.3. Current Strategy: Building military trust between North and South Korea and promoting arms control

According to “Moon Jae-in government’s national security strategy,” which was published by the Office of National Security, in order to establish lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, it is essential to ease military tensions and build trust between the two Koreas.

Thus, the South and North Korean military authorities agreed to completely stop all hostile acts against the other side in all spaces, including land, sea, and air, under the Military Agreement for Implementation of the Panmunjom Declaration.²⁴

Furthermore, when military tensions between the two Koreas are relieved, and the foundation for trust-building is laid, South Korea will promote operational arms control, which coordinates military forces’ deployment and operation in stages.²⁵

Currently, military trust and arms control in the Korean peninsula are still not progressing. As mentioned in the previous chapter, extraordinarily, South Korea canceled almost all ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, after the inter-Korean summit in April 2018. South Korea only conducted defense exercises alone in December 2018. North Korea began firing missiles again in 2019, claiming that South Korea violated the inter-Korean agreement in the military field. Therefore, this strategy was not achieved by now.

3. Future outlook of inter two Korean relations and denuclearization

3.1. Variable: 2022 Presidential election in the Republic of Korea

As mentioned in part 1 of chapter II earlier, South Korea’s security strategy toward North Korea is inconsistent and changes depending on the ruling party. So in order to prospect future outlook, it is essential to know which party will become the ruling party in 2022.

²⁴ Office of National Security (국가안보실): Moon Jae-in government’s national security strategy (문재인 정부의 국가안보전략), 2018.

²⁵ <https://www1.president.go.kr/dn/5c1b2e9a52b8e> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

Ibid.

Candidates	LEE Jae-myung	YOON Suk-yeol
Party	Democratic Party of Korea (DPK)	People Power Party (PPP)
Security Strategy towards North Korea	Peace is to win without fighting or to make it unnecessary to fight.	Peace comes from restraint by force. - Emphasis on military power - Criticism of the current policy toward North Korea
	No need for THAAD	- Possibility of deploying THAAD if North Korea's nuclear crisis escalates - Considering the Korea-US-Japan military alliance
View on the Russo-Ukraine War	- A stark example of a failure in diplomacy that soon leads to war - Should not think war is too easy	It shows that national security cannot be guaranteed by Memorandum on Security Assurances. - Emphasis on military power and alliances - the possibility of preemptive strike

Figure 6: 20th South Korean Presidential Election Candidate Debate on Security Strategy²⁶
(Author's own edition)

As mentioned earlier, traditionally, DPK has pursued a friendly strategy, while PPP has taken a hard line against North Korea. The stark contrast between the two major parties in strategy towards North Korea and the awareness of national security can be represented as shown in Figure 5.

Mr. Yoon Suk-yeol was elected as the president of South Korea on 10 March 2022, and his presidential term will start on 10 May 2022. It means PPP becomes the ruling party, and significant changes are expected in South Korea's strategy toward North Korea. It is highly possible that South Korea will take a strong stand against North Korea, under the Yoon administration. In this situation, North Korea will become even more obsessed with nuclear and missile tests.

This prediction became a reality as soon as the president-elect was announced on 10 March 2022. According to Rodong Sinmun, a North Korean newspaper Kim Jong-un visited the National Space Agency and guided a five-year plan. The goal is to develop and operate many military reconnaissance satellites within five years to build the ability to collect reconnaissance information by satellites²⁷ Therefore, it is

²⁶ The 2nd debate of the 20th Presidential Election Candidate (20대 대통령선거 후보자토론회 2차): KBS, 25 February 2022,

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pkv906DP52c> (downloaded 14 March 2022)

²⁷ Respected Comrade Kim Jong-un gave field guidance to the National Space Development Agency, Rodong Sinmun (로동신문), 10 March 2022.

expected that tensions between the two Koreas will increase for the time being and the ROK-U.S. alliance seems to be getting stronger.

3.2. Lesson: from the Russo-Ukraine War

The annexation of Crimea in 2014 was traumatic event for North Korea. Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 will give another critical lesson to North Korea. Because North Korea's denuclearization is highly likely to proceed through the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program that Ukraine used to dismantle its nuclear program.

CTR is a plan conducted by the threatening countries and threatened countries to resolve security threats posed by weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weapons. CTR provides funding and expertise and supports defense and military cooperation for a country instead of discarding the nuclear weapons. The beginning of the CTR was the denuclearization program to support the dismantlement of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which had nuclear weapons and nuclear-related facilities in the process of independence from the former Soviet Union.²⁸

Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom signed the Budapest Memorandum to denuclearize Ukraine, jointly pledged to guarantee the territorial integrity and security of Ukraine in 1994. However, 28 years later, Russia invaded Ukraine. The bottom line is that any country signing the Budapest Memorandum could not guarantee Ukraine's security.

It would be quite traumatic for North Korea because North Korea has been following a similar path with Ukraine through the six-party talks in the past and the recent three-party talks, which can be understood as CTR. At this time, North Korea would have realized once again that such a memorandum could not guarantee the North Korean regime at all. Therefore, denuclearization will be an even more irrational option for North Korea, and the need for South Korea to focus on the ROK-US alliance and the number of nuclear weapons will increase.

Conclusion

North Korea's denuclearization strategy seems to retain nuclear weapons rather than give them up. The repeated five-step pattern can explain this. 1) threatening neighboring countries and the US through missile and nuclear tests, 2) being under international sanctions, 3) following bilateral and multilateral negotiations, 4) receiving compensation, and 5) maintaining a short period of peace. For 69 years, North Korea has repeated this pattern over and over, making it possible to obtain what it wanted through negotiations and maintain their regime. South Korea also has a pattern of pursuing a strategy toward North Korea and toward denuclearization,

http://www.rodong.rep.kp/ko/index.php?strPageID=SF01_02_01&newsID=2022-03-10-0001 (downloaded 14 March 2022)

²⁸ SUNG, Ki-Young (성기영): Korean Peninsula-type Cooperative Security and Cooperative Threat Reduction 한반도형 협력안보와 협력적 위협감축, 2020, Institute for National Security Strategy, 2020-10 (국가안보전략연구원)

depending on the actual ruling party. The analysis of the period and the frequency of North Korea's missile launches and nuclear tests show that North Korea understands and uses South Korean patterns well. Also, based on this research, there is a pattern of provocations, in line with the ROK-U.S. alliance's military training and South Korea's election period, rather than North Korea's intention to strike the South directly. In other words, missile and nuclear tests seem to be used as a negotiation tool, while repeating this pattern.

North Korea's strategic ambiguity seems to have paid off in the short term, but the negotiations will break down in the long run, due to the distrust issue. Indeed, for that reason, the 2019 DPRK–USA Hanoi Summit came to a rupture. In addition, North Korea continued nuclear activities during the negotiations. These strategies may have failed in denuclearization, but appear to acquire nuclear weapons successfully.

South Korea also played an essential role in facilitating the 2018 DPRK–USA Singapore Summit and the 2019 Koreas–United States DMZ Summit. This role of South Korea showed the Moon administration's will to take the driver's seat on the Korean Peninsula issue. However, building military trust between North and South Korea, and promoting arms control seem to be still premature in the midst of a pattern of repeated short-term peace and post-threat negotiations on the Korean Peninsula.

Lastly, there is a change in the strategy pattern toward North Korea, depending on the ruling party. The PPP will be the next ruling party, as a result of the recent presidential election. Therefore, the new DPK administration's strategy against North Korea will be in a striking contrast with the current government's strategy. Furthermore, it will be even more difficult for North Korea to denuclearize and follow a similar path to Ukraine, due to the Russian-Ukrainian war.

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Abstract

Social, scientific and technological progress has significantly altered the international environment. New, previously unseen and unanalyzed phenomena, such as the dual or multi identities, the ideological limits to law enforcement and military power, the continuous decline of nation-state as well as the astronomical costs of conventional warfare have brought a new set of tools for interest advancement. In the article, the author analyses super-empowered individuals, and non-governmental organizations as the new factors of exerting power and influencing sovereign states, without the need for resorting to direct means.

Keywords: post-truth world, super empowered individual, non-governmental organization, interest advancement

"Fighting power is one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, diplomatic pressure, commercial pressure, and – not least – ethical pressure, to weaken the opponents' will [...] Unlike strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita – still awaiting exploration, and understanding."

Basil Liddel-Hart

Introduction

Due to their high financial, social and manpower costs, the classical, heavy industry and high technology-based military conflicts are becoming very rare. Yet interest advancement does not cease to exist with the decline of kinetic maneuvers. Combining old and new methods, the major and new medium powers increase their zone of influence through new methods. Be they the White Helmets in Syria, the Fethullah Gülen organizations (FETO), or PMCs like Vagner, not to mention other NGOs with even more suspicious backgrounds, the social activity-based “active measures” have become the norm in today’s highly interconnected world. A news outlet, a television station, an ideology-based social organization or even charity relief funds can all act as proxies, and in many occasions, they do so, for nation states, non-state actors or even for super empowered individuals alike. With the advent of this new phenomenon, in the spirit of Basil Liddell Hart’s grand strategy, no country can allow to leave its most vulnerable, yet most crucial resource unguarded: the social cohesion.

Conflicts arise for various reasons, yet in most cases, for some ideology-based motivations. In our world where there is a constant clash of narratives, warring truths that is, who is right is usually well hidden behind lies of various degree. And after digging through heinous amount of information, even the most educated and prepared analyst arrives at a moment when he/she can do nothing else but pick one of the two or more equally well supported opinions, based on previous experience or interests.

In most European Union countries, there is a growing number of disenfranchised citizens. Be they former members of the slowly disintegrating middle class (yellow vests in France), or the illegal migrants, who don't get what they were promised (2015 migrant crisis) or the aging people losing their jobs, who feel a slow but steady collapse of the "old" world they got used to and liked. Their grievances, be them real or perceived, are caused by globalization, negligent governments, major powers' interference, technological advances and the list goes on. All the above groups are vulnerable to counter narratives.

With the continuous disintegration of the nation-state and the parallel strengthening of undemocratic, international, obscure-funded, and sometimes malicious non-state actors, such as NGOs, mega companies as well as corrosive, exclusive ideologies, we experience events in Europe or in the US, which were previously unseen for centuries. Under the United Nation's Charter, organized violence, i.e. war, is slowly going out of fashion, the actors with access to new tools and methods to advance their interests will continue to stir trouble.

Divided identities and/or desperate private life situations bring more and more people to do things previously unimaginable, bringing such chaotic events like the mass riot between Turks and Kurds on the Hannover airport in January 2018. Such "third world" occurrences probably will become more and more common in Europe as well.

All this – coupled with sky high social, political and financial costs of classical, intrastate warfare – brings us to the point where emerging or reemerging powers, or even allies with conflicting interests are finding novel ways of forcing their will on us. Classical economic-political-military pressure is slowly replaced by less direct, yet just as efficient means used by states and other actors alike.

To clarify their position, the author discusses the subject in relation to recent phenomena such as:

1. Ongoing proliferation of strictly military terms, concepts and tools, such as 'campaign', 'division', organizational unit, 'strategy' or 'GPS', used in civilian life and public speech;
2. In conjunction with 1., continuous merging of previously sharply divided military or civilian methods and tools, such as leadership, doctrines or UAVs/drones; creating an environment where any occurrence can be labeled military or vice versa
3. Combining 1. and 2., the appearance of private, global, non-governmental as well as governmental organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Private Military Companies (Blackwater; Academi; Xe Services; Wagner) or National Endowment for Democracy organizing professional campaigns with civilian participants;

4. Combining 1., 2., and 3., a continuous total, but low intensity worldwide conflict, as formulated in the theories such as hybrid warfare or 4GW, bringing a gradual, but visible hollowing out of terms of peace and war, and events like military strikes by US in Syria, with questionable legal background, Russian intervention in Ukrainian civil war, or Chinese-American trade/legal war not to mention the Color revolutions.

Due to the above factors, the author approaches the proxies as a broader term, he understands under ‘proxy’, in conjunction with the common use of the word, as defined by Merriam Webster Dictionary.

So, how does conflict in this “brave new world” of intertwined interests, conflicting theories and obscure actors look like? The author will try to shed new light on the not so shiny present and future of interest advancement, which clearly threatens not only our security, but also the way we live our lives.

Every good analysis has three obligatory elements: describe the situation, present its roots and causes, and finally provide guidance how to deal with it. Going along this train of thought, in this present article, the author describes military aspects of the international environment of the 2010s: the limits of modern warfare, the effects of emerging powers and their proxies, as well as changes in the society and economy: super empowered individuals and their NGOs, along with fake news used as strategic communication tools. As a conclusion, the fundaments of a grand strategy, in the sense of Liddel Hart, to deal with these challenges are presented.

1. Effects of a globalized world

1.1. *Limits of modern warfare*

The way a state wages wars mirrors a lot of factors including technological level, social system, historical experiences, ruling ideology, economic potential and sometimes the limitations imposed upon it by intrastate relations. The above are true, whether the subject of a study is ancient Athens, the Roman Empire, Napoleon’s France or the Mao Ze Dong’s China. After the end of Cold War, in the age globalization, most aspects defining interest advancement have undergone serious changes. As the widely quoted, and mostly misinterpreted work of Chinese Major Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui wrote “*strong countries make the rules while rising ones break them and exploit loopholes.*”¹ NGOs (non-governmental organizations), global media outlets and other actors have also greatly attributed to those changes in the way wars are fought in the 21st century. The assumption, repeated many times by the Chinese theorists, and for unknown reasons disregarded by the most who quote their work, is that this new war will have no limits. No internationally accepted rules apply, no target is taboo enough to be spared, no territory – be it physical or cyber – is safe, there is no “hinterland”, no limits in war at all. This total, but at the same time limited warfare is already with us. This new way of war is not only omnidirectional, synchronized and asymmetrical, but also a war fought along

¹ QIAO L. – LIANG W.: Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America; Echo Point Book and Media, Brattleboro, Vermont, 2015.

long forgotten motivations, methods and by fighters who are not soldiers. This situation still seems to be incomprehensible for most western analysts.

Even though there are exceptions, but in most cases there are serious limitations on using conventional warfare as a tool to resolve international disputes. Not only the UN Charter forbids it, human, economic, social and other costs related to it skyrocketed recently. Not to mention deterrence, which Martin Van Creveld characterizes as: “*nuclear weapons are making it impossible for large sovereign territorial units such as states to fight each other in earnest without running the risk of mutual suicide. [...] If states are decreasingly able to fight each other points to [...] low-intensity conflict as an alternative.*”² This struggle encompasses all aspects of life, blurring the lines of armed conflicts we got used to. The above supports the statement in Unrestricted Warfare’s foreword, quoting one of the authors “*the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden.*”³ As the late analyst Colin S. Gray has said, seven points have to be kept in sight all the times, when discussing warfare of which the first five have relevance to our studies.

- “*1. War and warfare will always be with us: war is a permanent feature of the human condition.*
- 2. War, and warfare, has an enduring, unchanging nature, but a highly variable character. It follows that history is our best, albeit incomplete, guide to the future.*
- 3. Irregular warfare between states and non-state foes may well be the dominant form of belligerency for some years to come, but interstate war, including great power conflict, is very much alive and well. In fact, today, while most eyes are fixed on irregular forms of conflict as the supposed wave of the future, the next round in strategic history’s cycle of great power antagonism are already taking shape. A possible Sino-Russian axis may be emerging that in time, would pose a formidable challenge to the American notion of a desirable unipolar world order.*
- 4. The political context is the principal, though far from sole, driver of war’s incidence and character. Above all else, warfare is political.*
- 5. Warfare is social and cultural, as well as political, and strategic behavior. As such it must reflect the characteristics of the communities that wage it.*”⁴

1.2. Changes in society

Yet creating a low-intensity conflict as an interest advancement method is not as easy as it seems. Even though globalization as such has its negative effects, be them irregular parking with luxury cars in downtown Budapest, or a clear breach of Islamic dress code in Teheran. Or the visible disappearance of the middle class, the increasing poverty and the resulting polarization of western societies. This hotly debated opinion received a blast like support when Thomas Piketty’s book became available in English, in 2014⁵ The above combined factor leads, on one hand, to disenfranchised masses in their own lands /citizens/, and to disenfranchised masses in foreign lands /migrants/, on the other hand.

² VAN CREVELD, Martin: Nuclear Proliferation and the Future of Conflict; Free Pr. 1993. p. 207. ISBN: 978-0029331569

³ QIAO – LIANG op. cit.

⁴ GRAY, C. S.: Another Bloody Century; Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2005. p. 24.

⁵ PIKETTY, Thomas: Capital in the Twenty-First Century; Belknap Press, 2017. ISBN: 978-0674979857

Open world, or to be more precise an open source world to use the term coined by John Robb⁶ only enhances the problem. This phenomenon created freely available and useable knowledge, mostly through the internet. This bazaar of ideas, tools and means increases the chances of terrorist or other malevolent organizations too. The tactics, techniques and procedures for which in previous centuries blood had to shed, are now freely available.

So all of the above combined “*warfare uses all available networks – political, economic, social and military – to convince the enemy’s political decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.*”⁷

1.3. One ideology to rule them all

Even though Francis Fukuyama officially “postponed” the End of History,⁸ instead of the “liberal democracy for all”, what we have now are human rights on steroids. The all-consuming ‘cancel culture’ which feeds on grievances, seems to attack the very roots of rules meant to support western civilization. Every single person has grievances, yet some groups are keen on intensifying them into political gains, loudly and aggressively using even the meanest terms to gain attention, thus destroying credibility. Outside the US, these groups usually have excellent foreign relations, press support and the means to organize protests. Srđan Popović and his OTPOR movement have successfully brought down the oppressive Milošević system, which was responsible for untold suffering on the Balkans.⁹ Oddly enough, the oppressive face of the system became apparent to the majority of the Serbian population after the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. Sarcasm aside, any democratically elected, or outright authoritarian government can become unpopular for a number of reasons, starting from natural disasters, through international economic crises to low living standards, due to mismanagement or famine. Yet somehow liberating movements, supported by foreign funded NGOs, always end up promoting human rights. So when we analyze proxies, we need to analyze human rights-led activity, which became mainstream activity recently, and thus, it cannot be avoided.

⁶ ROBB, John: *Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization*; Wiley, 2007. ISBN: 978-0471780793

⁷ HAMMES, T.X.: *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century*; Zenith Press, Minnesota, 2006.

⁸ MENAND, L.: *The New Yorker*, Francis Fukuyama Postpones the End of History, 3 Sept, 2018. <https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2018/09/03/francis-fukuyama-postpones-the-end-of-history> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

⁹ CANVAS homepage; <https://canvasopedia.org/about-us/> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

2. The world we live in

2.1. Super empowered individuals

The term super empowered individual is relatively seldom used, but summarizes the issue very well. Although the term was used as early as 2003,¹⁰ and usually in conjunction to “lone wolf” terrorists and cybercriminals by 2020, we can say with reassurance that term refers to some people worthy of concentration wealth, power and networks.

Fethullah Gülen: Not too many have heard these two words, the name of a person before the 2016 *coup d'état* in Turkey. Even those who have had usually praised the Turkish founder of a “secular Islamism” movement, spanning schools, foundations, banks, media companies and even the Forum for Intercultural Dialogue in Berlin. Most visible were the schools, which used high technology in the classrooms, and in most occasions hired non-Muslim, unsuspecting teachers, who only saw a modern, enlightened religious school, with sound financial support, offered by a local network of various-sized entrepreneurs. The externally interfaith dialogue movement ran schools in 140 countries, and its founder liked to show himself as the Gandhi of Islam, yet within his own circles, he tolerated no dissent, was only interested in power and influence, and not tolerance according to a 2012 Spiegel article. Former members claim that Gülen dreamed of a new age in which Islam will dominate the West starting from Turkey.¹¹

What makes the Gülen network more interesting is the basic concept, which lays on Islamic traditions of goodwill, such as *sadaka* (voluntary charity-benevolence), *zekat* (obligatory almsgiving), *vakif* (charitable endowment) making its participants refer to the network under the names *Hizmet* (Service) or *Cemaat* (Community). These benevolent and widely supported ideological foundations were supplemented with a decentralized organization, which also confirms the local habits, and the spirit of *Islam*, where no central religious authority exists.

“The success of Gülen-inspired projects relied on the numerous local circles of businessmen, professionals and workers in Turkish cities, towns and rural areas. The model of the local circles arose within the cemaat. A type of social group that evolved in Turkey, after the formation of the Republic and the outlawing of the Sufi orders and the abolishment of the madrasas. Within the cemaats the sohbets or small groups were established that had no formal membership, no initiation rites, required no building to convene the group and had no public insignia or recognition of membership.”¹²

People gathered to participate in socially beneficial and widely supported activities. These *sohbets* were loosely organized and members were not required to

¹⁰ BARNETT, Thomas, P.M.: Why the Pentagon Changes Its Maps, and why we'll keep going to war; Esquire, March 2003, <https://www.esquire.com/news-politics/a1546/thomas-barnett-iraq-war-primer/> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

¹¹ POPP, M.: Altruistic Society or Sect? The Shadowy World of the Islamic Gülen Movement; 2012. <https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/guelen-movement-accused-of-being-a-sect-a-848763.html>, (downloaded 02 September 2020)

¹² EBAUGH, H. R.: The Gülen Movement: A Sociological Analysis of a Civic Movement Rooted in Moderate Islam; Springer, Dordrecht-Heidelberg, 2009. p. 47.

make religious or social pledges, oaths or even contracts when joining the Gülen movement. Contributors became participants simply by working with the others to support the movement's unquestionable objectives of education and service. Gülen himself encouraged the members to maximize the opportunities of the network. The system has not carried out subversive activities, so typical for secret cults, at all. Its mystique Sufi origins only added to the movement's exoticism, drawing people seeking spiritual enlightenment as well as small entrepreneurs looking for networks and business possibilities. The lack of administrative means also supported the central idea of volunteering for a greater good.

Due to its extremely decentralized and loose system, it was and still is extremely difficult to guess membership levels, but probably it was many hundreds of thousands of moderate Sunni Muslims all around the world. The movement's schools and businesses were organized locally and linked themselves into informal networks.

To sum up, the Gülen movement had a seemingly benevolent ideology and was organized along principles, in line with traditional Muslim/Ottoman values. It was run through a decentralized international system, bound together by the common goal and the ideological leader himself. Only the innermost members saw the real objective of the network, which was characterized by the Guardian: "it also has some of the characteristics of a cult of Islamic Opus Dei." Following the alleged support by the movement for the 2016 *coup d'état*, it was declared a terrorist organization in Turkey, Pakistan and the Gulf Country Council, calling it Fethullah Terrorist Organization (FETO).

By all accounts, Fethullah Gülen was a super empowered individual (SEI). According to the semi-official Mad Scientist blog, the characteristics of SEIs include:

- “• *Highly connected and able to reach far beyond their geographic location;*
- *Access to powerful, low-cost commercial technology;*
- *Often more difficult to trace or attribute responsibility to actions;*
- *Not beholden to nation-state policies, ethics, or international law;*
- *Varying motivations (political, ideological, economic, and monetary);*
- *Often unpredictable, may not operate or execute like a traditional rational actor.*”¹³

Talking of SEIs, one just cannot leave out one of the most often overlooked, yet most influential books of the 20th century: Unrestricted War by Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. The two Chinese Senior Colonels named 3 important persons, much rather personifying certain aspects of modern international environment than the actual persona themselves, but they have more than hit the nail on the head: 1. Pablo Escobar, who back in the day ran some 80% of the world's cocaine traffic, 2. Osama bin Laden, the terrorist-ideologue, whose eloquent messages still echo in the Middle-East, and of course the usual suspect 3. George Soros, hedge-fund manager turned “philanthropist”.¹⁴

¹³ MAD: Emergent Threat Posed by Super-Empowered Individuals, 02-01-2018,
https://madsciblog.tradoc.army.mil/16-emergent-threat-posed-by-super-empowered-individuals/?doing_wp_cron=1600066040.2279920578002929687500 (downloaded 02 September 2020)

¹⁴ QIAO L. – LIANG op. cit.

2.2. *Ersatz blitzkrieg – NGOs and foundations*

Analysts cannot escape comparing the Gülen movement with the Open Society Foundation (OSF - formerly Open Society Institute), run by the usual suspect George Soros. Unlike in the case of FETOs, OSF withheld increasing pressure from many sides. In his famous step shorting the British Pound in 1992, which earned him 1 billion dollars, and at the same time, prevented the United Kingdom from joining the European monetary mechanism aimed at creating the Euro some 10 years later. This step is a typical move, which we like to call ersatz blitzkrieg – a tool replacing blitzkrieg. On the one hand, the hedge fund manager made a fortune in a day, on the other hand, the soon-to-be European Monetary Union took a serious blow. Asking the ubiquitous question ‘cui prodest?’ would take us far from the objective of present analysis, yet it is suffice to say that even an ardent progressive magazine such as the Atlantic admits that “*it hasn't been Soros's financial buccaneering or even his political giving that have featured most prominently in the conspiracies about him. It has been his philanthropy. Soros has long been one of the leading donors to progressive causes in the United States and is the most generous financial supporter of pro-democracy organizations around the world.*”¹⁵

One must ask the question who can stop a billionaire if he/she wants to spend money on issues seen as important? Why isn't such person a supreme-powered individual? Eastern European countries are sensitive to any move interfering with their only recently acquired independence. Especially when this is done by non-transparent organizations and are rightfully seen as interference into one's internal affairs, which is clearly forbidden by the UN Charter.¹⁶

The Endowment of Democracy openly speaks about its roles taken over from CIA, the controversies of its actions and about the role it plays in US foreign policy. Tracking its activity like the previously mentioned networks' of FETO and Open Society, it can be done through open sources, since the declared objective is, or at least should be without having second thoughts. It would worth to study the case of OTPOR, later CANVAS (Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies), which is a non-profit, non-governmental, international network, oriented to educational work related to strategic nonviolent conflict, according to their homepage.¹⁷ Well in the old Hungarian adage “*Who pays the gypsy (musician) tells what kind of music is played.*” Following the old folk wisdom, the first step is to check who supports and funds CANVAS. By clicking on the ‘Friends of CANVAS’ tab likeminded NGOs appear. What is the next logical step of a curious researcher? Picking one and clicking on their funders. I guess it is no surprise that one of the ‘Friends of CANVAS’ has funders, like The National Endowment for Democracy and US Department of State. Truly only two questions remain. If this can be done using not open source information, but only two clicks, where is the ‘non-interference into one's internal affairs’ and what is the fake news anyway?

¹⁵ SOSKIS B.: The Atlantic Business, George Soros and the Demonization of Philanthropy, 5 Dec 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/12/soros-philanthropy/547247/> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

¹⁶ Purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; https://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20III/2010-2011_Part%20III.pdf (downloaded 02 September 2020)

¹⁷ CANVAS homepage

One doesn't have to be an autocratic leader to see that there are lots of non-governmental organizations with lots of money going after clear and narrow interests of theirs. Their goals – no matter how noble, or beneficent may be – they do not align with the perception of the majority of local population or that of the government, and we are now talking about the best possible scenario. While non-interference into others' internal affairs is a United Nations principle this is probably the least observed UN principle of all.

2.3 *Fake news and media*

Usually when speaking of fake news, most people think of Russia Today and other Russian state-owned news outlets.¹⁸ But we have had in Hungary the famous scandal when an Axel Springer-owned magazine (Ede Teller letter scandal in Népszabadság), not blurred the truth, but outright faked it. Anyway fake news as a term is also not new. It is 130 years old.¹⁹

So which news are really fake? There are countless examples where tarnished news outlets have clearly lied about some issues. But a fake news is a weapon. A weapon in information warfare, also called PSYOPS, which really should not be a surprise for anybody. Fake news has garnered some real interest since for the first time it was used on us, on the western civilization, with success.²⁰ But why are we so obsessed with countering a clearly propaganda message? Why we plan to suppress "fake news" whose lies should be obvious to anyone, and all that in the name of free speech? Why don't we strive to build a society with transparency where half-truths are self-evidently refuted? But fake news are not necessarily spread by Russia Today, like state televisions, and there is not only one state which can use media as a weapon.

*"Al Qaeda's most important growth since the 11 September attacks has not been physical but has been, rather, its expansion into the Internet. Bin Laden's fighters had used the Internet for propaganda and communication purposes before the attacks, but their use expanded quickly also thereafter. Part of this expansion is due to necessity: Afghanistan has somewhat less useful than it was previously as a safe haven, and the consequent dispersal of fighters has forced the organization to become more "virtual," or "al Qaeda 2.0," as CNN's Peter Berger insightfully has described its current status. Al Qaeda's reach into the Internet also is due to the rapid development of both the medium and the computers, the cell and satellite phones, and the Inmarsat radios."*²¹

¹⁸ ELLIOTT R.: The Guardian, Opinion Media, How Russia spreads disinformation via RT is more nuanced than we realize; 26 Jul 2019, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/jul/26/russia-disinformation-rt-nuanced-online-ofcom-fine> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

¹⁹ MERRIAM WEBSTER Dictionary: Fake News, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/words-at-play/the-real-story-of-fake-news>, (downloaded 02 September 2020)

²⁰ RAMSAY G. – ROBERTSHAW S.: Weaponising news RT, Sputnik and targeted disinformation; King's College London, The policy institute centre for the study of media, communication and power, 2019. <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/policy-institute/assets/weaponising-news.pdf> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

²¹ SCHEUER, Michael: Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror; Brassey's, 2004; p.78. ISBN: 1-57488-849-8.

Terrorist groups can also have charity functions, focused on institutions garnering popular support, and at least balancing their objectives like in the case of Hezbollah.²² On the top of that they also run as media network.

3. Sum of all fears and the way out

3.1. Hybrid warfare as a new way of waging war?

*"Under hybrid warfare we usually understand the use of special forces supported by cyber and information warfare and deception. The Russians occupied Crimea through this method and support Eastern Ukrainian rebels in the same way, but this method is not a cure for all. The mixture is new, but the ingredients are known to everybody"*²³

We have to understand that this so called ‘hybrid warfare’ has limits too. To be more precise, the ‘hybrid warfare and hybrid threats’ concept is the very limit to itself. It suggests that we face something new, something really threatening, a challenge beyond our present capabilities. Which is clearly not the case. András Rácz deserves both credit and the opposite at the same time for clearly identifying the serious and difficult conditions for the success of a ‘hybrid warfare’ operation, and at the same time, giving scientific weight to such a shaky concept.

When factors such as the local superiority of (military) force by the attacker, a weak state as target, the strong dislike toward the central government by the local population, the significant ethnic minority, the logistic support from outside and the media presence both inside and abroad are taken into account the specter of hybrid warfare seem to be way less intimidating.²⁴ On the top of the above, most of the above can easily be replaced by other concepts, such as guerilla warfare. For example ideology can be as varied as ethnic, religious, other ideological party affiliated or combination of the above, not to mention countless guerilla organizations that have fought successfully for decades, while obviously being militarily, economically weaker than their opponents. And since Mao Ze Dong, we all know about the three phases of guerilla warfare.

"Hybrid warfare" in the style of Crimea cannot really be repeated. Contrary to most scholars' views, the author upholds his point that the so-called hybrid warfare as seen in Crimea was and is a rare if not unique phenomenon. The physical proximity of Russia, the beforehand (even if for other reasons) deployed troops, the lack of border control, the ethnical Russians fearing oppression in an already divided and weak society, the low Ukrainian living standards and the list goes on and on, all contributed to the open arms reception, awaiting the little green men. In most places of the world, especially in developed countries, the appearance of "little green men" (light infantry) occupying critical infrastructure and blocking roads will most likely

²² HOFFMANN, F. G.: Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars; Arlington, December 2007.

²³ USAF General Phillip M Breedlove NATO Saceur, Jane's Defence Weekly, 15 April 2015, p. 34

²⁴ RÁCZ, A.: Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist; Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, vol. 43, 2015 p. 11.

*prompt a reaction by superior firepower. As one Estonian military officer's answer to the question shows about hybrid scenarios: "if we see little green men we simply shoot them"*²⁵

If that is not viable for some reason, after the initial surprise, the defender still could call up its allies to restore *status quo ante* by joint military force. Only a nuclear power is safe from forceful reversal of such situation. All other means listed under the European Center of Excellence Countering Hybrid Threats are merely cyber, information or clandestine operations, using modern tools and methods, none of which should come as a surprise.²⁶

So while the systematic risks listed under "hybrid threats" are real, they are not because of some heinous enemy's evil doing, but our own complacency and incompetence. A conventional, diesel-electronic hunter (SSK) sub chasing a nuclear ballistic missile carrier (SSBN), and taking advantage of its own, less noisy propulsion is not using a "hybrid method", just taking advantage of the situation and the dissimilarities of the subs. Most hybrid or proxy wars taking place are in weak, or even outright failed states. See Ukraine or Syria. Can anyone seriously imagine in any of the Visegrad 4 countries a Crimea or even a Maidan square scenario, with snipers shooting both sides?

3.2. *Proxy ante portas!*

The above paraphrased version of Titus Livius shows that we face much rather proxies carrying foreign influence than tanks carrying foreign flags. Yet proxies are definitely upon us, because kinetic military operations are very unlikely in and between developed countries. Or at least within and around their borders.

Popular unrest, demonstrations and riots just like we see in USA now, form the real threat we face. And these are the most likely to include proxies. Like the presented cases of Gülen and Soros, a seemingly benevolent case can be easily turned into a popular resistance, with the aid of foreign tutors and financial support, capable of overturning a democratically elected government. Even if the popular unrest does not get mass support, like Black Lives Matter in the US, the number of dissatisfied citizens are enough to keep unrest ongoing for 100 consecutive days with the help of the media.²⁷

Russian "active measures" have been thoroughly analyzed, yet still form a challenge to be reckoned with as even the Soviets have been rather successful at employing them. Until recently, Chinese influence usually surfaced in the form of economic cooperation; yet recently information operations are suspected behind

²⁵ RADIN, A.: Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses; 2017. p. 25. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf, (downloaded 02 September 2020)

²⁶ EUROPEAN Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats; <https://www.hybridcoe.fi/hybrid-threats/> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

²⁷ SELSKY A.: Time, Portland Protests Continue After 100 Straight Days, 2020. <https://time.com/5886464/portland-protests-100-day/> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

Confucius institute activities, and US officials have started an investigation.²⁸ It is not difficult to see the similarities of events leading to the closure of British Council offices in Russia. Based on the above literally any organization can become a proxy or be charged with being one.

3.3. Towards a modern grand strategy

“Grand strategy should both calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations, in order to sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people's willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the opponent's will. ... ” – Basil Liddel-Hart.

In a book, titled *Kaigun*, about tactics, and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941, written by Peattie and Evans, a treatise distant both geographically and chronologically from present essay, the authors discuss grand strategy, unreferenced, as a system of using all resources of a nation: military, political, diplomatic, and economic for national policy objectives.²⁹ This old term seem to have gone out of fashion. Some use grand strategy occasionally, but in general security policy-related speech, it is seldom used. Which is a pity, since we have abundant literature on grand strategies, defeating an adversary also using a combined, all out approach, even if today only some would like us to believe that this is the case. Instead of obscure and misleading buzzwords, we really should focus on real events. As a starter, the author would like to offer a definition of his own.

“Fourth generation warfare is an activity aimed at achieving clearly defined political goals. In most cases, this activity is carried out through non-military means, by one or more organizations, sharing a common ideology. Generally accepted rules about military activities do not confine their methods applied to one or more areas simultaneously, in a way that their effects strengthen or enable each other. To apply this method, the following criteria are prerequisite: adherence to human rights, presence of non-governmental organizations, a globalized economy and a high level of information technological interconnectedness.

Its sub-areas are:

- Global guerillas;*
- Information warfare, including cyber warfare;*
- Economic manipulation, financial maneuvers, supported by media;*
- Ideological, human rights, and other perception-based operations;*
- Or a combination of the above by state and non-state actors alike.”³⁰*

²⁸ WONG, E.: The New York Times, Politics, U.S. Labels Chinese Language Education Group a Diplomatic Mission, 13 Aug 2020, <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/13/us/politics/state-department-confucius-institutes.html> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

²⁹ EVANS, David C. – PEATTIE, Mark R.: *Kaigun: Strategy, tactics and technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*. Naval Institute Press, New York, 2013, pp. 492-493.

³⁰ SOMKUTI B.: A negyedik generációs hadviselés – az érdekkérvényesítés új lehetőségei; NKE HDI doctoral thesis, 2012. <http://m.ludita.uni-nke.hu/repositorium/handle/11410/9570?show=full> (downloaded 02 September 2020)

3.4. Conclusion: good governance, responsible citizens, and financial, military/police freedom of action are needed

Figuratively speaking, the bear has awoken, the dragon is coming, and the eagle has schizophrenia, while Europe is waiting for Zeus. So we have to take care of ourselves.

While some of the good governance principles are self-explanatory, some look like utopia, but until Immanuel Kant's Eternal Peace befalls us, we really should not put on blinkers voluntarily. We should spare ourselves from ignoring the moving shadow of the tree 'specters' and renaming or rebranding old methods, just because they are more marketable. At last, we really should stop acting like the proverbial shepherd, crying wolf too many times, until the wolf (or the bear) really appears and it is too late. Interests are real and all actors – be they state or non-state – will use all available means to advance their interests. We can and should do the same. We should create our own comprehensive European security strategy, where all aspects of security are taken into account.

Using an analogy from the animal world, a combined security approach should look like the fame of the African honey badger or *ratel*. The small sized, distinctive black and silver furred predator is well known for its toughness, fearlessness and creativity. Even though the average size of a ratel is only 80 cm and its weight is only 10-15 kg, thanks to its thick skin and ferocity, even large predators like lions evade the badger. In one story told in a 2011 issued in a National Geographic document, a ratel has killed a 800 kg caffer buffalo, by bleeding it dry, while hanging on to his nose. One zoo specimen has escaped from its new place by cleverly using two tree branches, and returned to its old cage to take it back from the new residents; a lion couple. By the morning, the zoo crew has found the heavily wounded, but still breathing ratel beside the lions. The fame of the ratel is characterized by the 2007 case from Basra, Iraq, where "*fake news were spread about the British forces stationing there, to have released a man eating ratel to intimidate the population.*"³¹

Our system is not without its faults which nation-states or other adversaries can exploit. Yet we should strive to be a place where no wedges can be driven into the fabric of society. Taking into consideration the Good Governance, presented in more details at the Council of Europe homepage, could be a good start. While no single government fits all of its criteria, and some are understood differently in every single country, but these 12 ideas form a good start.³²

There are many different, real interests out there, some people confront the democratically elected governments' objectives and there are those who openly incite public unrest. We don't have to reinvent the wheel. Just use the modern grand strategy and the common sense to counter proxies controlled by states or other entities.

³¹ BBC News: British blamed for Basra badgers; 12 July 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6295138.stm, (downloaded 02 September 2020)

³² Good governance principles; <https://www.coe.int/en/web/good-governance/12-principles>
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EVA BEKE

POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 5G NETWORK TECHNOLOGY ON INDUSTRY 4.0

Abstract

With the arrival of Industry 4.0, the known manufacturing systems went beyond simple mass production and needed connection. This new industry is capable to communicate via sensors or RFDI bands, analyze and use collected information, to drive further intelligent actions to smart logistics, cloud computing and robotics. Its design principles represent an integration of IoT, additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, augmented reality and cyber protection. The paper looks at the 5G deployment and the technologies that have been impacted by 5G. The proposed features of 5G technologies are listed and described how these features impact the industries of the future with imminent security concerns. 5G promises to be a key enabler for Smart Factories, IoT systems providing unified communication platform to avoid the shortcomings of current communication technologies. The fifth generation of wireless technology pledges lightning-fast speed, incredibly low latency, and the capacity to carry massive numbers of connections simultaneously. Admittedly, besides its great opportunities, it also brings some new challenges.

Keywords: 5G challenges, 3GPP, Industry 4.0, slicing network security,

1. Introduction

The arrival of 5G will have a profound impact on wireless providers, on companies in more than one way, on the participants across the communications value chain and on the entire Industry 4.0 enabled systems. From manufacturers to governments, to programming providers, and regular users, 5G will radically alter the industry's dynamics, speed and availability. The time to plan a strategy for this transformative new technology is actual now.

Many of the network technologies that we have today do not really fit for the future enterprises. The expected features of 5G, like the reliability up to 99.999%, the latency of <1mS and the low power will satisfy the shortcomings of the existing communication technologies. 5G provides the promise to be able to handle very high capacity of IoT devices. The flexibility which is also an apparent demand for today systems also is being offered by 5G through standardization.¹

¹ SAUTER, T.: The three generations of field-level networks – Evolution and compatibility issues; IEEE Trans. Ind. Electron., 2010/11, pp. 3585-3595.

Industry 4.0 can be described by many definitions, but the authors in this article only take into consideration two major factors, such as the design principles and the related technologies. While the first group contains service orientation, vitality, connectivity and real-time analysis and decision-making, the second would contain – among others – such technologies like embedded systems, sensors, robotics, additive manufacturing, Internet of Things, cloud computing and services and cyber-physical systems and also artificial intelligence.

The above listed technologies and design propositions have existed only for a while.² With the new platform of communication technologies, they will grow and will drive Industries 4.0. Unlike the previous systems when “one size fits all 4G core networks”, the 5G core network must be flexible and adaptable, as Industry 4.0 needs a communication technology and platform, which can satisfy the industry specific needs including, but not limited to reliability, security, low latency and heterogeneous communication.

Each generation of new technology opens a wide range of opportunities as well as challenges. While many things regarding 5G are uncertain, it is easy to imagine that new and innovative investments are to fully enjoy all present capabilities of 5G.³ The most basic requirements have enhanced mobile broadband, IoT, and mission-critical applications.

While 5G will be able to support virtual, cyber-physical and new cloud-based concepts and a wide variety of applications in dynamic ways, it has major security issues to deal with as well. Since many of these applications will be critical for human lives, as they all will depend on the availability and integrity of these applications and infrastructure, the protection of 5G networks against cyber-attacks is of fundamental importance.

2. Challenges and solutions

2.1 Machine Learning and 5G security

Implementing the security architecture for mobile net-work functions as standardized by 3GPP is an essential pillar for building highly secure and reliable 5G networks. It is also aimed at carefully protecting the cloud infrastructure and the virtualized network functions as well as securing the dynamic network operations.⁴

Although Machine Learning (ML) is expected to solve multiple challenges in the fifth generation (5G) of mobile networks, at the same time ML will also open the

² BEKE, E. – BÓDI, A. – MAROS, D. – KOVÁCS, T. – TAKÁCSNÉ GYÖRGY, K. – GÁSPÁR, L.: The Role of Drones in Linking Industry 4.0 and ITS Ecosystems; Ieeeexplore.ieee.org, 2018. <https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/8928239/> (downloaded 11 February 2022)

³ PHUYAL, S. – BISTA, D. – BISTA, R.: Challenges, Opportunities and Future Directions of Smart Manufacturing: A State of Art Review; Sustainable Futures, 2020/2. p. 100023. (downloaded 10 February 2022)

⁴ 5G Infrastructure Market Size & Share Report, 2021-2028; Grandviewresearch.com, 2022. <https://www.grandviewresearch.com/industry-analysis/5g-infrastructure-market> (downloaded 10 February 2022)

network to several serious cybersecurity vulnerabilities. Among those are the unfair use of resources, denial of service, as well as leakage of private and confidential information or even denial of detection. 5G will connect many aspects of society through the network, ranging from critical infrastructures to e-health, logistics and transportation, to user environments such as smart homes and handheld devices.

Furthermore, 5G will be able to support virtual, cyber-physical and new cloud-based concepts and a wide variety of applications in dynamic ways, and will have major security issues to deal with as well. Since many of these applications will be critical for human lives as they all will depend on the availability and integrity of these applications and infrastructure, protecting 5G networks against cyber-attacks is of fundamental importance. There is an unquestionable need for solutions that can track the security situation of the whole 5G network or end-to-end. At the network level, the system becomes more complex as the number of data sources and ML elements increases.

Statista has conducted a worldwide survey in 2020, asking 344 industry professional respondents what was the main concern about 5G security?




Figure 1: Largest security concern surrounding 5G⁵

⁵ Main concerns for 5G security 2020 Statista; Statista, 2022. <https://lb-ap-frontend.statista.com/statistics/1178145/main-concerns-about-5g-security/> (downloaded 10 February 2022)

“When industry professionals were asked their main concerns surrounding 5G, the most significant concern, with 41 percent of respondents, was the usage of more complex and potentially unsecured network technologies, such as cloud native and virtualization. In the second place, there were increased cybersecurity attacks with 26 percent”, closely followed with 22% of personal and sensitive data breach. After that, they indicated only 8% poor identity and access management, while at last, they mentioned only 3% other cyber security threats.

As the attack surface opens with the increased number of applications and services provided by 5G, including the upward rising number of IoT devices connected, there are greater concerns surrounding 5G's security.

Many literatures also indicate that network slicing has two major challenges, namely security and the implementation of 5G radio access network (RAN) to accommodate slicing. The way to achieve a sliced network is to transform it into a set of logical networks on top of a shared infrastructure. Network slicing is also about transforming the system from a static, one-size-fits-all paradigm to a new paradigm, where logical networks and partitions are created with appropriate isolation, resources, and optimized topology to serve a particular purpose, service category, or individual customer. The potential solutions to this risk include network isolation through slicing, cryptography, authentication, and manual slice allocation to different devices. Customers or industry players can enable three types of security on supported firewalls to protect 5G networks: network slice security, equipment ID security, and subscriber ID security. Security policy rules and correlation are based on 5G network slice, equipment ID, and subscriber ID. The conclusions derived from different studies are that the network slicing is suitable for 5G, and the solutions remain effective in minimizing the security risks it poses to the network.

Not surprisingly, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) are the two main regulatory bodies that have legal rights to decide on spectrum frequencies, to establish global technical standards and facilitate global transfers of data across networks.⁶ These two are responsible for bringing together standard-setting organizations, industry representatives, and regional telecommunications groups to develop frameworks, directives and protocols that can enhance competition and solve diverse security issues.

The European Commission and individual countries or regions in Europe are striving to emerge as leaders in setting global standards and developing secure 5G infrastructures. The EU is setting an example for implementing comprehensive oversight and regulatory policies. In 2020, the EC introduced the so called 5G Toolbox which was to identify some common measures that could reduce the most severe digital threats to 5G networks.

ENISA's (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) main aim is to help national and regulatory authorities to better understand the standardization of 5G

⁶ Specifications; 3gpp.org, 2022. <https://www.3gpp.org/specifications> (downloaded 11 February 2022)

security, the 3GPP security specifications and key security controls that must be implemented to secure 5G networks.⁷

Sweden and its neighboring Nordic countries signed a common declaration to be the first interconnected 5G region in the world for common security framework, while the Czech Republic hosted the first Prague 5G Security Conference in 2019, [8] announcing a series of recommendations relevant to 5G security regarding technology, economy and privacy issues. The Prague Proposals summarize cybersecurity as a technical issue that requires national defense strategies, grounded policies, a comprehensive legal framework, and a network of dedicated experts.

“Stakeholders should regularly conduct vulnerability assessments and risk mitigation within all components and network systems, prior to product release and during system operation, and promote a culture of find/fix/patch to mitigate identified vulnerabilities and rapidly deploy fixes or patches.”

“Security and risk assessments of vendors and network technologies should take into account rule of law, security environment, vendor malfeasance, and compliance with open, interoperable, secure standards, and industry best practices to promote a vibrant and robust cyber security supply of products and services to deal with the rising challenges.”

“Robust investment in research and development benefits the global economy and technological advancement and is a way to potentially increase diversity of technological solutions with positive effects on security of communication networks.”

2.2. The cost – as a challenge – of implementing 5G

Each generation of new technology opens a wide range of opportunities as well as challenges. While many future things and applications regarding 5G are uncertain, it is easy to imagine that new and innovative investments are a must to fully enjoy all present capabilities of 5G. The most basic requirements are enhanced mobile broadband, IoT, and mission-critical applications.

The deployment of 5G infrastructure is increasing worldwide, owing to the imminent need to establish quick communication with first responders during emergencies. In the presence of the ongoing pandemic, the demand for next-generation high-speed networks is expected to raise, especially for the healthcare industry. Digital services including telemedicine and remote patient monitoring will remain popular even after the pandemic is contained, thereby ensuring robust market growth.

The critical infrastructure and utility sector are expected to showcase enormous growth because of the raising need for high-speed internet connectivity across energy plants and distribution applications. The growing demand to provide improved connectivity to marine logistics such as containers/vessels and ocean cruisers for

⁷ Enisa.europa.eu, 2022. <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-news/member-states-report-on-eu-5g-toolbox-released-today> (downloaded 11 February 2022)

efficient monitoring from remote locations is further expected to fuel the adoption of 5G technology and related infrastructure in the transportation and logistics sector.




Figure 2: Global 5G infrastructure market⁸

As Figure 2 shows the most prominent fields of the use of 5G technologies are besides healthcare, residential, industrial and smart city, energy and utility as well as logistics and transports with a generated revenue of USD 2,64B by 2025.

When Statista in 2020 has conducted an online survey, asking 235 respondents only from Europe, namely executives from key European technology firms (with more than 10 million Euros annual turnover), members of the investment community with a technology focus, and government officials focused on technology policymaking and drew the conclusion it became clear that 60% of them considered the necessary investments one of the biggest challenges.




Figure 3: Challenges of 5G connectivity⁹

⁸ 5G Infrastructure Market Size & Share Report, 2021-2028. op. cit.

⁹ Biggest challenges of 5G connectivity in Europe 2020; Statista, 2022.

<https://www.statista.com/statistics/1165965/biggest-challenges-of-5g-connectivity-in-europe/> (downloaded 10 February 2022)

Followed by 53% of increased cost of connectivity, right after with 51% of developing use-cases, while 31% believe the high cost of cross-border costs and accessibility.

As the chart shows most providers' major concern is cost. Deploying 5G network requires initial substantial investment for two reasons: first is the necessary upgrade to the existing RAN (Radio Access Network) and core network, the second one is coming from the development of the small cell system. The required network densification can also be costlier, however introducing new technologies such as network slicing might reduce the cost of investment.

The European Commission has prepared a study about the cost of 5G deployment for its Member States. In this study the estimated cost would be USD 59 billion by 2020, however the general benefit by 2025 would be an estimated USD 148 billion.¹⁰

The cost and investments related to 5G will differ over time and highly depend on local conditions and population even within a respective country. The Netherlands provided a detailed cost model for urban and rural area of 5G introduction, in which there is a rough estimation of a USD 66 cost per user for 5G mobile only services, while the same technology for rural area would run around USD 436-891¹¹. Operators have at least two options. The first one is the implementation a lean-in strategy, in which the priority of 5G investments with the hope of economic prospects. The second one is a more conservative approach, in which they delay 5G expenditure, if possible, in the main time they are upgrading their existing networks.

3. How 5G could impact Industry 4.0?

The objective of Industry 4.0 is not only building a wireless network system, but at the same time, having an intelligent and smart industry as well. All results of the fourth revolution represented by Industry 4.0, are gaining ground worldwide. The entire production line – such as manufacturing, production, people, and machines – is closely linked through 5G to achieve a more coordinated and efficient manufacturing system.¹²

5G is unlike any previous generation of cellular technology. It encompasses a greater number of attributes that are a step ahead of functions above the capabilities of previous generations. These features enable 5G to expand into industrial applications, which will introduce major changes in the industrial space.

¹⁰ 5G supply market trends: executive summary; Op.europa.eu, 2022. <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/4fbb62aa-f981-11eb-b520-01aa75ed71a1/language-en> (downloaded 11 February 2022)

¹¹ Stratix.nl; 2022. https://www.stratix.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IoT_report_sept2015.pdf (downloaded: 11 February 2022)

¹² BAJRACHARYA, R. – SHRESTHA, R. – JUNG, H.: Future Is Unlicensed: Private 5G Unlicensed Network for Connecting Industries of Future; Sensors, 2020/10, p. 2774. (downloaded 10 February 2022)




Figure 4: 5G communication opportunity for Industry 4.0.¹³

Smart factories are one of the most prominent application scenarios of 5G technology. The 5G network seamlessly connects production equipment and further opens design, warehousing, logistics, and other links to make production leaner and more intelligent, as well as to construct a future oriented intelligent manufacturing network.¹⁴

For cloud computing network also 5G technology can provide platform. Sensing technology systems act on countless sensors and reports data and status in a very short period. Consequently, a huge amount of big data is collected through 5G networks, and a relevant database is there to use for precise decision making. Industrial robotics combined with super-computing capabilities of cloud computing for autonomous and machine learning provide the best solution for smart factories.¹⁵ Data, which is collected by a D2D system inside smart factories can exist in many forms and be used for a variety of purposes, such as mass counting and geo information, environmental conditions, humidity, temperature and pollutants.

¹³ SISINNI, E. – SAIFULLAH, A. – HAN, S. – JENNEHAG, U.– GIDLUND, M.: Industrial Internet of Things: Challenges opportunities and directions; IEEE Trans. Ind. Informat., 2018/11, pp. 4724-4734

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ GUNDALL, – SCHNEIDER, M. J. – SCHOTTEN, H. D. – M. ALEKSY – SCHULZ, D. – FRANCHI, N. et al.: 5G as enabler for industrie 4.0 use cases: Challenges and concepts; Proc. IEEE 23rd Int. Conf. Emerg. Technol. Factory Autom. (ETFA), Sep. 2018. pp. 1401.




Figure 5: Components of Smart Manufacturing System¹⁶

In the smart factories, the 5G's introduction will greatly improve labor conditions, by reducing manual intervention in the production line, and by improving the controllability of the production process itself.

5G will have a “massive impact” on the entire industry and connected mobility, its usage will go beyond the application of consumer mobile broadband. 5G will allow manufacturers to automate end-to-end operations and setup new product lines or take down what is unneeded or whole factories virtually. With an enormous extent of sensors, machine-controlled robots, and autonomous warehouses and logistics, all capable of communicating and operating remotely in real-time via 5G, consequently manufacturers can achieve massive productivity gains. 5G will be the technology network and platform enabling growth and paradigm shift in many industries, directly contributing to social and economic development.¹⁷

Ultra-low latency, combined with MTC (Machine Type Communication) and smart data analytics, will make it easier for people and robots to work collaboratively. It will also enable maintenance and control of machines in real time. This means the workforce can move and work more freely, away from heavy machinery which helps to increase the safety and security of workplaces. With all these massive connectivity, all the machines can interact with each other, providing continuous updates to decision making and back-office systems.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

With massive Machine Type Communications (MTC), real-time control of machines, robot/human interactions, and edge cloud analytics, 5G will be key to supporting the wireless connectivity needed to power these new “Smart Factories”.¹⁸

IIoT technology (Industrial Internet of Things), cloud computing, big data analysis, and cyber security components are key ingredients for this digitalization. 5G technologies can play a key enabling role in integrating these technologies and offering a unified platform to connect machines, robots, processes, autonomous vehicles, goods, remote workers, warehouses and entire logistics systems. By integrating these technologies in a structured way and extracting data for taking actions, efficiency and flexibility of the system are enhanced.

5G technologies will be the key in supporting all network communication scenarios and offers mobility-features and seamless service experience. This role of 5G technologies very well corresponds with the 5G objective to integrate networking, computing, and storage resources into one programmable and unified infrastructure.¹⁹ This unification will allow for an optimized and more dynamic usage of all distributed resources, and the convergence of fixed, mobile, and broadcast services.

The envisioned 5G platform will need to link wireless access with wired industrial Ethernet and will also include components like edge computing, cloud, local gateways, big data and analytics, IoT management, etc.²⁰ Furthermore, the boundary between wide-, local and personal-area networks is getting more integrated, calling for a seamless interaction between those domains.

4. Conclusion

5G is essential for the implementation of IoT and M2M (Machine to Machine) and forms the backbone of Industries 4.0, and hence, becomes the number one enabler to the vision of Industries 4.0. 5G will connect wireless networks seamlessly to billions of devices and sensors to machines, manufacturing systems, logistics systems etc. Thereby, 5G will enhance the “Industrial Internet of Things” and allow Industries 4.0 to develop.²¹

5G will bring the required flexibility in industrial operations with its faster reliable communications between machinery, sensors and computing systems resulting in real-time, planned automated production processes. This would result in overall productivity and storage improvement. Wireless connectivity makes it easier to reconfigure and redesign the machines in factory floor to meet changing or seasonal

¹⁸ WOLLSCHLAEGER, M. – SAUTER, T. – JASPERNEITE, J.: The future of industrial communication: Automation networks in the era of the Internet of Things and industry 4.0; IEEE Ind. Electron. Mag., 2017/11, pp. 17-27.

¹⁹ CHAMOSO, P. – GONZÁLEZ-BRIONES, A. – RODRÍGUEZ, S. – CORCHADO, J.: Tendencies of Technologies and Platforms in Smart Cities: A State-of-the-Art Review; Wireless Communications and Mobile Computing, 2018, pp. 1-17.

²⁰ RAO, S. – PRASAD, R.: Impact of 5G Technologies on Industry 4.0; Wireless Personal Communications, 2018/1, pp. 145-159, (downloaded 11 February 2022)

²¹ Monetizing 5G White Paper; Go.oracle.com, 2022.
<https://go.oracle.com/LP=90702?elqCampaignId=242545> (downloaded 11 February 2022)

demands of products. Operation cost can be reduced, due to lower wired fixed systems by bringing in wireless operations.

Overall efficiency and productivity are enhanced with automated information and knowledge sharing, throughout the production life cycle, enabled by the ultra-low latency and high reliability offered by 5G.²² Maintenance, repairs and control can also be benefitted by enabling virtual/augmented reality communication between field personnel and factory/product specialists. With 5G, companies and other players can have critical servers on the cloud, so that maintenance and upgrade are done seamlessly, without having to be in person in the factory premises. This can enhance time saving by working remotely and the safety of personnel.

To leverage the complete potential offered by 5G in the industrial sector, it is required that the experts in each sector and university research groups collaborate effectively, bringing new possibilities to the market. Cross-industry collaboration is also essential to redefine the overall 5G architecture that incorporates the requirements of the wider eco-system.²³

IoT and CPS (Cyber Physical Systems) highly depend on mobile internet from a communications perspective. Previously, telecommunication networks have not played an essential role in industrial automation. Now, it provides a great opportunity for Telecom Operators to address this new communication system for automation. 5G will be the platform enabling growth and transformation in many industries, directly contributing to social and economic development.

5G could also bring new development and opportunities in industries by creating employment with new skills and competencies, due to its own network infrastructure implementation.²⁴ As with any new technologies being introduced, job losses is expected in the conventional businesses and trade, due to the automation, since robots replace manual labor, sensors monitor production line etc. There will be more demand for high technology induced jobs. Workers will need to adapt to the new industrial standards and environment, as they must work alongside of capable machines. This will require not only a re-skilling but a renewed talent-management as well.²⁵ There would be demand for highly qualified automation personnel, whereas middle level and low-level jobs would take a hit. Jobs involving routine, repeatable work like production, office support etc. would decrease. Also all those functions which can be easily automated will be showing decreasing demand on job market.

²² O'DONOVAN, P. – GALLAGHER, C. – LEAHY K. – O'SULLIVAN, D.: A comparison of fog and cloud computing cyber-physical interfaces for Industry 4.0 real-time embedded machine learning engineering applications; 2022.

²³ KUMAR, P. – BHAMU, J. – SANGWAN, K. S.: Analysis of Barriers to Industry 4.0 adoption in Manufacturing Organizations: an ISM Approach; Procedia CIRP, 2021/98, pp. 85–90. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2021.01.010>

²⁴ KUMAR M. – M. MANI: Towards an interdisciplinary framework for effective sustainability assessment in manufacturing; Procedia CIRP, 2021/98, pp. 79–84. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2021.01.009>

²⁵ SPALTINI, M. – POLETTI, A. – ACERBI, F. – TAISCH, M.: A quantitative framework for Industry 4.0 enabled Circular Economy; Procedia CIRP, 2021/98, pp. 115–120. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.procir.2021.01.015>

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BENCE LÁZÁR

**COMPARISON OF THE NATO AND EU CYBER DEFENCE IN THE
LIGHT OF RECENTLY APPROVED NATO CYBER DEFENCE POLICY
AND THE DECISION OF ESTABLISHING EU JOINT CYBER UNIT**

Abstract

Based on the NATO Cyber Defence Policy published in 2021 and the EU Cybersecurity Strategy adopted at the end of 2020, I compare their system of tasks, objectives and how Hungary is involved in the topic. The planned EU Joint Cyber Unit in the near future could be a milestone in a system of joint cooperation and information exchange.

Keywords: NATO, EU, cyber defence policy, cyber security, information exchange

Introduction

Cyber-attacks and cybercrime are becoming more common and sophisticated in Europe and around the world. This trend is expected to intensify in the future, as by 2024, 22.3 billion devices are expected to be connected to the World Wide Web.

According to a report by Risk Based Security¹ (RBS), 28,695 vulnerabilities were disclosed in 2021. This figure is a good indication of the risk involved. RBS predicts that the number of vulnerabilities disclosed in the future will continue to increase year by year.

The Covid-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict have further highlighted the vulnerability of our society and the damage that the large-scale cyber security incidents can cause to the economy, the basic services and the critical infrastructure. The events of recent years have highlighted the importance of connectivity, for which a global, open, free, stable and secure internet is a fundamental requirement.

The cyber security threat is cross-border and cross-sectoral in nature, so the level of protection at the weakest link in the chain constitutes a guideline for determining cyber security protection. Enhanced cooperation and a coordinated response between NATO² and EU member states in the field of cyber threats is a key priority.

¹ <https://www.riskbasedsecurity.com/2022/02/14/vulnerability-report-2021-year-end/>
(downloaded 14 February 2022)

² North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

EU Cyber Security - EU Common Cyber Unity Concept

Despite the calls for increasing cooperation in recent years, the various cyber security communities, including civil, law enforcement, diplomatic and cyber defence communities as well as private sector partners, all of them operate too often in isolation. Knowledge sharing and mutual assistance are mostly incomplete and slow, and the processes of cooperation between organizations are complicated, and the sharing of experience is not intensive at all.

In July 2020, the European Commission adopted³ a new strategy for the period 2020-2025, ranging from the fight against terrorism and organized crime to the prevention, detection and resilience of critical infrastructures, to the promotion of cybersecurity and research and development. In order to support innovation, the new strategy sets out the tools and measures to be developed by the end of 2025 to ensure the security of our physical and digital environment.

The adopted strategy identified the need for establishing a Joint Cyber Security Unit (JCU), as a platform for structured and coordinated cooperation. On this basis, the European Commission presented on 23 June 2021 its vision of a common cyber security unit as a solution to the growing number of serious cyber security incidents, affecting public services and the lives of businesses and citizens in the EU.



Figure 1: The goal of the new Joint Cyber Unit

In recent years, several working groups and other cooperation and information sharing initiatives between Member States have started in parallel in the EU, e.g. the "Cyber Security Coordination Centre", coordinated by Lithuania and by the "Cyber Security Information Response Platform" and the "Information Sharing Platform for the Response to Cyber Security", coordinated by Greece. However, the concept of an EU Joint Cyber Unit is different from the ones mentioned above. It aims to rationalize existing processes and structures, so that they be less complex and more accessible

³ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1596452256370&uri=CELEX:52020DC0605> (downloaded 02 January 2022)

and efficient for those seeking assistance or solidarity in the field, in the interests of cohesion within the Union.

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell said: “*The Joint Cyber Unit is a very important step for Europe to protect its governments, citizens and businesses from global cyber threats. When it comes to cyberattacks, we are all vulnerable and that is why cooperation at all levels is crucial. There is no big or small. We need to defend ourselves, but we also need to serve as a beacon for others in promoting a global, open, stable and secure cyberspace.*”⁴

The potential of the EU Joint Cyber Unit can be a milestone in the system of cooperation and exchange of information between Member States. There will be a common space for cooperation between different communities and areas, allowing existing networks to take full advantage of their potential. It will be developed in a gradual and transparent manner, in several steps, together with the Member States and the organizations active in this field. The Joint Cyber Security Unit is scheduled to enter the operational phase as early as in the second half of 2022, and will be fully operational by 30 June 2023, as currently planned. The necessary investments will be provided by the Commission, in particular through the Digital Europe Program and the European Defence Fund. The JCU will be staffed by ENISA (European Union Agency of Cybersecurity), the Member States, the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the European Defence Agency (EDA).

However, when designing the new organization, it is important to bear in mind that the primary responsibility for responding to large-scale cyber security incidents and crises lies with the Member States. The competences of the Member States and their sole responsibility for national security in the field of cyber security⁵ must also be respected. However, measures taken in the framework of common EU diplomatic measures against malicious cyber activities should be based on a common understanding of the situation adopted by the Member States.

The EU is also trying to inspire its Member States to cooperate in cyberspace through a number of projects on other cyber defence cooperation. One such example is the PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation) cooperation framework operating within the framework of the EU, in which Hungary participates in its third round project as a founding member. One of the key steps in the project is the establishment of the Cyber and Information Domain Coordination Centre (CIDCC), which is scheduled to join the EU Joint Cyber Unit in 2023. The CIDCC enables the production of a common cyber picture, using information from member countries as well as information from the EU and NATO. This creates a complete picture of the European cyber situation, making it possible to plan and organize operations.⁶

⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_3088 (downloaded 01 March 2022)

⁵ In accordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union.

⁶ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/11/05/eu-defence-cooperation-council-sets-conditions-for-third-state-participation-in-pesco-projects/> (downloaded 11 December 2021)

Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy of NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is currently facing unprecedented challenges, necessitating continuous monitoring of hostile cyber activities below NATO's Article 5 threshold.⁷ Cyber threats have persisted toward the Alliance and its allies, and cyber defence capabilities need to be further strengthened, both collectively and nationally. In addition to damage and data theft, attacks from the outside are also designed to test the boundaries of international law.

In 2016, NATO recognized cyberspace as an area of operation, where conflicting interests and conflicts could arise at any time. The Russian-Ukrainian conflict clearly demonstrates the need to further strengthen the Allies' national and the Alliance's collective cyber defence capabilities. These capabilities must be prepared, both militarily and politically, in order that the Alliance be able to provide a deterrent response to any cyber-attack, for which resilience is essential.

In order to develop effective responses to cyber-attacks, continuous investigation of cyberspace events and the detection and collection of data on potential attackers are essential. Indeed, effective deterrence is possible if the Alliance is aware of the potential attacks, knows their nature and severity, and has a mechanism in place to deal with potential attacks, including countermeasures that can be put in place to deal with them. Without international cooperation, this is not feasible, as joint cyber cooperation can enable and reinforce the identification of malicious cyber security incidents.

An important tool for deterrence and accountability is attribution, which means tracking, identifying and investigating the perpetrator of cyber-attacks and other hacker attacks. Accurate computer assignment can be very difficult, because the underlying architecture associated with the Internet offers a number of ways for attackers to hide their traces.

At the same time, the Alliance must ensure that Allies see NATO as a trusted platform, which requires the ability to conduct credible, confident, adaptable and effective operations and to protect its own networks.

Launched⁸ in June 2021, NATO's new Comprehensive Cyber Defence Policy is an ambitious framework document to respond effectively to the challenges of the

⁷ The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them, in Europe or North America, shall be regarded as an attack against all of them and therefore agree that, in the event of such an attack, each of them shall be a legitimate individual or collective as recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations exercising its right of self-defense, it will support the Party or Parties attacked in this way by immediately taking the measures – including the use of armed force – individually and in agreement with the other Parties, which are necessary for the restoration and maintenance of peace and security in the North Atlantic region deems necessary. Any such armed attack and any measures taken as a result shall be immediately brought to the attention of the Security Council. These measures will end when the Security Council has adopted the regulations necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

⁸ Brussels Summit Communiqué; https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_185000.htm (downloaded 01 March 2022)

future, providing an opportunity to maintain the long-term stability of cyberspace. It clearly defines the conceptual systems applicable from a political, military and technical perspective. It is essential that at “cyber defence” policy level, the concepts be applied from the military perspective of “cyberspace operations” and from the technical perspective of “cyber security”.

The policy also clearly defines the roles and the associated rights and competencies. It does not make a technical recommendation, as this could be a barrier to development in the long run or could increase complexity at the expense of efficiency. It emphasizes the supporting role and the responsibilities of cyberspace in defending against hybrid warfare. It highlights the mutually supportive work of NATO and the Allies, as cyber defence is the collective responsibility of the Allies.

The practical implementation of what is described in the Cyber Defence Policy is contained in the Implementation Plan, which was finalized in February 2022.

The Tallinn-based Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence⁹ (CCDCE), the NATO Cyber Rapid Reaction Team¹⁰ (CRRT) and the Counter Hybrid Support Team¹¹ (CHST) among others, offer excellent opportunities to enhance collective cyber defence capabilities and NATO resilience.

Conclusion

It is important to note that the goal of developing the EU's cyber capabilities is not linked to the collective defence set out in NATO's Statute, so that NATO is primarily a key player in defence functions, including the protection of cyberspace. The EU-NATO cooperation in the field of cyber defence and security – including the sharing of information – fully respects the principles of transparency, reciprocity and inclusiveness and the decision-making autonomy of the two organizations, with respect for human rights.

However, the rapidly evolving nature of cyberspace also calls for increased cooperation and information sharing between NATO and EU countries at technical, operational and strategic / political levels.

I consider it appropriate to link with each other the existing crisis management mechanisms, networks, structures, processes and procedures, as this can support and improve the effectiveness of event management. Centralization of cyber security management in EU and NATO organizations may be proposed, in order to streamline and make more transparent existing processes and structures; thus making them more accessible and responsive.

However, the role of Alliance in cyberspace is strengthening. Although it is up to the Member States to respond to cyber-attacks and to take the necessary response,

⁹ <https://ccdcce.org/>

¹⁰ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_85161.htm (downloaded 01 March 2022)

¹¹ <https://atlantic-forum.com/content/enhancing-resilience-against-unconventional-attacks-allied-nations-enter-nato-counter-hybrid> (downloaded 01 March 2022)

the question may be raised; whether the Member States are able to respond in all cases; or there is a level of hostile cyber-attack that already requires the Alliance to respond instead of the Member States. If this level can be determined, on what basis it should be determined. These are such questions that would require more serious investigation, but in no way they can be ignored in today's computer-driven age.

With regard to the possibility of collective response, technical attribution should not only be a national competence, but also the Associations should be able to identify and prove the threats. At Member State level, ongoing assessment, detection and incident management capabilities need to be further developed.

Member States with a more advanced Cyber Security Emergency Response Team should, as far as possible, cooperate in the form of mutual assistance, in responding to large-scale cyber security incidents and crises.

Hungary treats the challenges posed by cyberspace as a top priority. In addition to the guidelines of the Alliance, the cyber defence of Hungary is determined by the National Security Strategy published in April 2020. One of the most significant parts of the relevant document is the potential physical responses to cyber-attacks. Its purpose is to act as a deterrent from a security and defence policy point of view, and it is also a key area. During the development of the Hungarian Armed Forces, the development of cyberspace operational capabilities and the organizational framework, necessary for planning, organizing and managing cyberspace operations are of paramount importance. The professional co-ordinating activity in the Hungarian Armed Forces is performed by the Cyber Defence Inspectorate. The Cyber Space Operations Centre operated by the Hungarian Military National Security Service and the Cyber and Information Operations Centre of the Hungarian Armed Forces – established at the beginning of 2022 – serve for preventing and managing the risks posed by the warfare in the information and cyberspace.

In addition to the military, governmental and corporate sectors, cyber security incidents can affect smaller businesses as well, so this layer needs to take the necessary steps to achieve cyber resilience and adequate security awareness, as an incident can have significant financial consequences. The average cost of cybercrime to companies increased by 72 percent¹² between 2013 and 2018 and this trend is growing. On the other hand, if technology-specific organizations and the military work together, the management of the process and the purposefulness can overcome inertia and apathy. This is why it may be appropriate to combine traditional military intelligence with commercial data and public information to support cyber operations.

However, due to the amount of information generated in cyberspace and the growing cybercrime, there is a significant shortage of professionals across the industry. According to some surveys, in 2021, the vacancy rate of experts exceeded 3.5 million worldwide, which will increase in the coming years.

¹² According to data from the multinational professional service provider Accenture.
<https://www.cioinsight.com/security/cyber-security-incidents-brand/> (downloaded 11 December 2021)

Automated solution technologies integrated into various processes can mitigate the problem to a certain extent. Automation can significantly reduce the amount of manual, repetitive tasks performed by professionals. Nonetheless, the real power of mechanization in the discipline lies in helping the competent analysts to cope with the threats with more concise, grouped and richer contextual pieces of information. Productive human resources are definitely needed. However, a complete automation solution – with a complete protection system – is unlikely to be available in the near future.

The current situation requires a new way of thinking. In recruiting future professionals, it is also advisable to promote a cybersecurity career for those social groups that have not previously been interested in or have not had the opportunity to study in this field. It is very important to provide training opportunities for those interested in the framework of educational programs, and to select and highlight talented, more competent persons, and to provide them with the opportunity to acquire specific knowledge.

The building up of well-functioning partnership between the military, government and corporate sectors, and increase their ability to respond to cyber-attacks and cyber operations, in compliance with international law standards, can make a significant contribution to stabilizing global cyberspace.

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HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

ANDRÁS MIKLÓS DEÁK

THE AMERICAN REFUGE OF CARDINAL MINDSZENTY REVISITED

Abstract

The study offers insight into the end and the beginning of the American refuge of Cardinal Mindszenty, with the help of oral interviews. While Lívia Jancsó was present when His Eminence arrived at the Legation, on 4 November 1956, Donald Kursch witnessed the historic departure of the guest, on 28 September 1971. Besides shedding light on numerous details of the refuge, their memories reveal the omnipresent security problems of his long stay as well. Jancsó's version about his arrival has revealed the ingenious tactics of Chargé Edward Wailes to conceal the sensitive aspects of the event that might have led to the arrest and perhaps to the execution of the actual initiators. What he did manage to conceal – from the American staff, but more importantly from the Hungarian local employees reporting to the State Security Authority – was the fact that Cardinal Mindszenty's appearance at the door of the Legation was not his spontaneous act, but the request for his refuge had been made and granted several hours before.

Keywords: Cardinal Mindszenty, American refuge, oral history, eyewitnesses, security

Introduction

The year 2021 marked the 100th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Hungary and the United States of America.¹ However, it was also a remarkable year in the field of the research into the American refuge² of Cardinal József Mindszenty. On September 28, 2021, it was fifty years before that the long³ refuge finally came to an end, and on May 4, 2021, and it was thirty years before that the reburial of the remains of His Eminence took place in the Basilica in Esztergom.⁴ The present study will offer insight into both the end and the beginning of the refuge, with the help of oral interviews with two eyewitnesses and one relative of theirs – Donald Kursch, Lívia Jancsó and Némethy Kesserű Judit.

¹ Hungary and the United States of America signed the Peace Treaty on August 29, 1921 which entered into force after an exchange of notes verbal on December 17, 1921.

² The present study will consistently be using the term "refuge" instead of "asylum", since it was the former that Cardinal Mindszenty was granted by President Dwight Eisenhower on a humanitarian and not on a political basis.

³ The refuge started on November 4, 1956 and came to an end on September 28, 1971. It lasted for a staggering 5,437 days.

⁴ Cardinal Mindszenty died in Vienna on May 6, 1975, at the age of 83.

I. Liaison Officers

The author of the present study is fortunate enough to be in personal contact with an eyewitness of the end of the refuge, who was also the official representative of the Government of the United States of America at the reburial ceremony on May 4, 1991. Donald B. Kursch (b. New York City, 1942) was a graduate of Harvard University, who joined the Department of State in March 1966. In 1970, he attended a Hungarian language course in the Foreign Service Institute (FSI).⁵ In July 1971, he was posted to the small-sized US Embassy⁶ in Budapest as a junior diplomat – a consul, but at the same time the Head of the Consular Department. The size of the mission reflected the long-standing tension in the bilateral relations. In his letter of July 7, 2021, Donald Kursch wrote to the author: “*I do remember the details of the Cardinal's departure from the Embassy vividly ...*” In the first part of our study we will be relying on the oral history interviews conducted with him during our correspondence over the past two years.

The 29-year-old Donald Kursch arrived in Budapest at a time when Cardinal Mindszenty had been residing in the building for the 15th year. From the very first day, his quarters had been on the third floor⁷ in the two-room office of the rotating former Ministers and Chargés⁸. It seems to be obvious that the safest place of the building was this floor. The original decision that Edward Wailes had made on that fateful morning of November 4, 1956 was never changed.⁹ In fact, Edward Wailes had not had any time to feel at home in his own office, since he had arrived in Budapest only on Friday, November 2, 1956. He had not spent a full working day there before he designated his office as the Cardinal's quarters and moved to the office of his deputy. This decision of his also demonstrates that he – like everyone else, including the Cardinal himself – considered the refuge to be temporary.

⁵ Today the Office of the Historian also belongs to the FSI.

⁶ The Legation was elevated to the level of an Embassy in November 1966, that is, in the tenth year of the refuge of Cardinal Mindszenty. His Eminence protested only against the arrival in October 1967 of the first US Ambassador, Martin Hillenbrand but not against the elevation in the diplomatic status.

⁷ At that time the first floor was used by the Consular Department, the second by the military and air attachés and the third by the other political, cultural and press diplomats, including the Deputy Chief of Mission, the DCM.

⁸ Between 1956 and 1967 the Legation was headed by Chargés d'Affaires a. i. Edward Wailes (1903–1969), N. Spencer Barnes (1907–1992), Garret G. Ackerson (1904–1992), Horace G. Torbert (1911–2008), Turner B. Shelton (1915–1982), Owen T. Jones (1907–2003), Richard W. Tims (1912–1996) and Elim O'Shaughnessy (1906–1965). As it is clear from the above dates, Wailes, the appointed Minister who received the Cardinal on that historic morning of November 4 had died before the refuge came to an end. From 1967 till 1971 two Ambassadors were in charge of the Embassy, as well of the refuge: Martin Hillenbrand (1915–2005) and Alfred Puhan (1913–2005).

⁹ The proposal of Chargé Owen T. Jones in 1964 to move the Cardinal's quarters to the fourth floor of the building was rejected by the State Department, since it would have sent the message that the US had given up on resolving the refuge. Another reason was the issue of security: the new quarters would have shared a wall with the building of the Hungarian National Bank which was controlled by State Security Authority. See: DEÁK, András Miklós – SOMORJAI, Ádám OSB – ZINNER, Tibor: Menedékben – Amerikai diplomaták Mindszenty bíborosról 1957–1970; Magyar Napló, Budapest, 2019. p. 166, 168.

From among the American staff of the mission, Cardinal Mindszenty was allowed to meet only a few diplomats, mostly the so-called liaison officers.¹⁰ At the end of the working day, the duty officer – who was always a male diplomat – took the Cardinal from the third floor down to the inner courtyard so that he could make his evening walk. By the time Donald Kursch arrived, the 79-year-old Mindszenty, instead of walking as he used to, had mostly been sitting in an aluminum chair and talking. Here are the exact words of the former consul from his letter to the author on September 9, 2021:

"When I arrived in Budapest in July 1971, Cardinal Mindszenty still resided in our Embassy living in what is now our Ambassador's office where he had been since November 1956. The American Embassy staff members¹¹ were among the few contacts he was able to have on a daily basis. All the male officers¹² of the Embassy took turns seeing him at the end of the day and accompanying him from his office on the third floor of the Embassy to a small courtyard in the Embassy's interior. There the Cardinal took his evening "walk", although by the time I arrived he preferred to just sit in a chair and talk. I was part of this process and got to know him in this way."

Another former liaison officer, William S. Shepherd (1935–),¹³ who has also been corresponding with the author for the past two years, described in one of his letters how the members of the Hungarian State Security had also been photographing these walks from an adjacent building, which at that time belonged to the Hungarian National Bank. Their goal must have been not only to establish the continuing presence and the state of health of Cardinal Mindszenty, but to intimidate both him and the American diplomats as well. The official papers of the American mission¹⁴ keep underlining that the Hungarians were constantly worried that the hosts might somehow smuggle the Cardinal out of the building, although the American side had never had such an intention.¹⁵ On the contrary, the Americans were worried that the Hungarian secret police might break into the building and drag the Cardinal out. Their standing instructions were to gain time by protesting but not offer any resistance.

Since Donald Kursch was a low-ranking diplomat at the Embassy, he was not involved in the ongoing confidential negotiations on ending the refuge. These talks

¹⁰ One of the former liaison officers, Patrick Flood called them "religious attachés". See: DEÁK, András Miklós – SOMORJAI, Ádám OSB: Patrick Flood amerikai konzul összekötői szolgálata Mindszenty bíboros mellett. 1968. július 24. – 1969. június 18; Magyar Egyháztörténeti Vázzlatok 2017/3-4. pp. 125-158.

¹¹ In June 1971, besides Ambassador Puhan there were 14 diplomats working at the US Embassy.

¹² In 1971 there was only one lady diplomat serving at the US Embassy: Second Secretary J. A. F. McGrath. Kursch failed to mention that the military and air attachés were also exempt from duty service.

¹³ William Shepherd was serving in Budapest between 1970–1973 as a consul, later as a political diplomat. He had joined the Foreign Service in 1964.

¹⁴ DEÁK – SOMORJAI – ZINNER (2019) op. cit.

¹⁵ In his Oral History interview on September 24, 2013, Thomas A. Schlenker (1939–), another US diplomat who had been serving in Budapest as a vice consul, shared the following amusing story: One day he dressed up as Father Christmas for the sake of a children's party. On arriving at the entrance of the Embassy, plainclothes Hungarian police checked his identity. They must have suspected that the Father Christmas leaving the building later might be Cardinal Mindszenty himself.

See:<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1BU6kvXdd8> (downloaded 16 March 2022)

were made possible by the fact that after the previous unsuccessful attempts, both the American and the Hungarian governments, as well as the Vatican, wanted to avoid the potential complications of the elderly Cardinal dying at the US Embassy. The fourth player in the long game of the refuge, the Cardinal himself, was inclined to agree – with his certain conditions – to leave the Embassy for the reason that he wished to have his Memoirs published while he was still alive. Ambassador Alfred Puhan¹⁶ had made it clear to him that while he was “the guest” of the Embassy, he would not be allowed to do so. The Cardinal’s previous attempt to appoint – by the unambiguous violation of the ground rules of his refuge – Mons. John Sabo,¹⁷ a Hungarian-born American priest in South Bend, Indiana as the custodian of his memoirs had also failed.¹⁸

Donald Kursch had not expected the refuge to come to an end so soon during his time in Budapest. This also means that before being posted to Budapest, he had not received any briefing in the Department of State concerning this eventuality. Neither had he been reminded of this possibility by his future Ambassador. The principle of the *need to know* was scrupulously observed. Despite this, the memories of the veteran diplomat – one of the last eyewitnesses still alive – are invaluable for us, researchers.

’As a junior officer I was not briefed on the delicate negotiations that were taking place, mostly between the Vatican, the Hungarian authorities and the Cardinal himself regarding his departure from Hungary. Although I had no role in arranging for his departure, as the Consul, and the Embassy officer who had the most contact with both Americans and Hungarians who sought consular services, I did find myself as the person who had to tell American visitors that the Cardinal was not in a position to receive guests.¹⁹ Sometimes they would leave gifts for him and in one instance someone insisted that I pass on a bottle of Scotch whisky.’²⁰

Not long before the departure of Cardinal Mindszenty from the Embassy, when the agreement between Hungary and the Holy See had been signed on September 9, 1971, Ambassador Puhan finally offered a briefing to the staff. Here is how Donald Kursch reacted to it: “*Given Cardinal Mindszenty’s advancing age and the Embassy’s very limited ability to provide him with medical care, his departure struck as a sensible thing to do, and I was therefore not surprised by this development.*”²¹

The originally agreed date of the departure was scheduled to be September 27, 1971, a Monday. However, the Cardinal asked for a delay of one more day. In this

¹⁶ Alfred Puhan arrived in Budapest in May 1969.

¹⁷ Mons. John Sabo (Carteret, New Jersey, 1905–1991) was serving in Our Lady of Hungary Church (South Bend, Indiana) for fifty years. Cardinal Mindszenty and Mons. Sabo had met in 1938 during the Eucharistic Congress in Budapest and then at the Marian Congress in Canada in 1947. After the beginning of the refuge, he started sending mass intentions to the Cardinal and the two of them conducted an exceptional correspondence for almost 15 years.

¹⁸ As far as the future of his Memoirs was concerned, Mindszenty trusted neither the American bureaucracy, nor the Vatican. See: SOMORJAI, Ádám OSB (ed.): Mons. John Sabo és Mindszenty bíboros; METEM, Budapest, 2020. New edition: 2021.

¹⁹ See Section II on Lívia Jancsó.

²⁰ Letter by Donald Kursch to the author on September 9, 2021.

²¹ Letter by Donald Kursch to the author on September 9, 2021.

way, the final day of his American refuge became September 28.²² On the morning of this historic Tuesday, all the American members of the staff gathered on the corridor of the third floor to bid farewell to their old guest. Here are the memories of our eyewitness, Donald Kursch:

"It was a very moving moment as he said goodbye to us and some members of the staff genuflected and kissed his ring. The Cardinal gave me the impression that he was not happy to leave us, but that this was a step he had been obliged to take. After walking down the corridor the Ambassador then accompanied the Cardinal down the elevator to the Embassy's front door to bid him a final farewell as he left the building for the car of the Papal Nuncio²³ to Austria, which was to take him to Vienna. I was then able to get to my office two floors below and watch his departure from the office's balcony, and even take a picture. The Hungarian policeman in the booth in front of the Embassy apparently took a much better photo of this moment which appeared shortly thereafter in the French magazine Paris Match.

There was no announcement regarding Cardinal Mindszenty's possible departure from the Embassy or from Hungary until he actually crossed the Hungarian border, thus there was no public awareness of this event. I recall seeing a curious couple²⁴ in the park across the street from the Embassy's entrance, which was far less fortified than it is today, taking a look at the activity and then walking on, perhaps assuming that this was just another diplomatic visitor."²⁵

At this point let us continue our oral history "interview" with Donald Kursch. He still has plenty of vivid thoughts to share:

"After the Cardinal's departure I believe that all of us at the Embassy realized that we had witnessed an historic moment that would have many implications. The most symbolic action that occurred immediately after the Papal Nuncio's car left for Vienna²⁶ was that the two unmarked Hungarian secret police vehicles, which were stationed at the Embassy's front and side entrances 24 hours a day, drove away and never returned. Thus while we realized that we remained under the close scrutiny of the Hungarian authorities, as representatives of Communism's number one adversary, it was possible that the special attention we had received might be a little less intense than it had been before. Without the Cardinal's presence the Embassy began to operate more like a standard U.S. Mission in Eastern Europe of that era. The Ambassador²⁷ moved into what had been the Cardinal's quarters for almost 15 years."

²² In this way, as András Fejérdy reminds us, the last Sunday mass at the Embassy took place on September 26, 1971. See: FEJÉRDY, András: Igehirdetésem. Mindszenty József bíboros szentbeszédei az amerikai követségen 1957–1961; Magyarországi Mindszenty Alapítvány, Budapest, 2020.

²³ Cardinal Opilio Rossi was Apostolic Nuncio to Vienna between 1961-1976.

²⁴ It might as well be assumed that this „curious couple,” walking in the park outside the entrance of the US Embassy at 8.28 a.m. belonged to the Hungarian secret service.

²⁵ Letter by Donald Kursch to the author on September 9, 2021.

²⁶ Cardinal Mindszenty was driven straight to Schwechat Airport. He was not allowed to visit the grave of his mother.

²⁷ When the refuge came to an end, Alfred Puhan became the first head of the US mission in 15 years who was able to move into his own quarters. According to Donald Kursch, he did so fairly quickly. The last time the veteran diplomat visited Budapest, he participated in the

What the previous “special attention” that Kursch referred to had meant in practice we can learn from the letter that Chargé Garret G. Ackerson²⁸ sent to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on 23 October 1958:

“The Department will have observed the threat of “increasing attention” to the Legation on the part of the Hungarian authorities which was contained in paragraph 4 of the Foreign Ministry’s note of October 22, 1958,²⁹ refusing a safe conduct for Cardinal MINDSZENTY. Manifestation of this “increasing attention” immediately took form on the afternoon of October 22, when the surveillance of the Chancery was morbidly increased. In addition to the three automobiles, three uniformed police, and some ten to fifteen secret police agents [...] another ten or fifteen secret police agents have taken up positions. While they have made no attempt to create incidents or to impede entry to and exit from the Legation, they have tended to hover near the front door and to make their presence abundantly obvious. It remains to be seen how long this over-employment of surveillance will continue and whether other manifestations of “increasing attention” will be accorded the Legation.”

Relying on his experience as a diplomat, Kursch believed that on the morning of November 4, 1956, the Legation as such had not expected the Cardinal to knock on the front door. Neither did Kursch find it unusual that the Cardinal’s legal status was initially not clear. At the recommendation of the Department of State, President Eisenhower made a political decision, leaving the identifying of the legal aspect of the refuge to his subordinates. Kursch also pointed out that Mindszenty’s refuge was exceptional, that no other Hungarian personality was granted the same treatment. Some of them received shelter on the ground floor of the Legation for a few days but not more. However, not one of them was escorted up to the third floor which would practically have meant the granting of a refuge. He explained this fact by the Legation not having enough room for other refugees. The author avails himself of this opportunity to emphasize that granting refuge to some other persons running from the Kádár regime might also have jeopardized the safety of the Cardinal. This was the reason why Smallholder politician Béla Kovács (1919–1959), a member of the Nagy-government, was not granted the refuge that he had applied for. In addition to the above, Edward Wailes was not authorized to grant refuge to anyone. This power remained with the President who was preoccupied with the crisis over the Suez Canal and his own reelection two days after the Soviet invasion of Hungary.

As far as the Memoirs are concerned, Kursch recalled that they were taken to Vienna by Ambassador Puhan himself.³⁰ The second batch – ten suitcases with the

Mindszenty conference held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade on October 19, 2019.

²⁸ Garret G. Ackerson served in Budapest between July 1957 and February 1961. See his papers in: DEÁK, András Miklós – SOMORJAI, Ádám OSB: The Host and His Guest – Chargé Garret G. Ackerson and Cardinal József Mindszenty (1957–1961); Magyar Napló Budapest, 2021.

²⁹ See in: SOMORJAI, Ádám OSB – ZINNER, Tibor: Majd’ halálra ítélezve. Dokumentumok Mindszenty József életrajzához; Magyar Közlöny Lap- és Könyvkiadó Budapest, 2008. pp. 829-831.

³⁰ Ambassador Puhan drove to Vienna with the first batch of the Memoirs on Thursday, September 23, 1971, accompanied by his wife, Fairfax Judd Puhan and John S. Nolton Jr. (1941–), the newly arrived consul.

papers and books of the Cardinal – was delivered to the Pázmáneum in Boltzmanngasse in Vienna on November 9 by Donald Kursch himself. In such a way, he was not only an eyewitness but became instrumental in resolving the related issues of the refuge as well.

II. A Local Employee – Lívia Jancsó

In 1984, Zsolt Csalog³¹ made a long oral history interview³² with Lívia Jancsó, a former local employee of the American Legation in Budapest. She first tried working for the US Legation already in 1949, but managed to do so only on March 1, 1956. She was very well aware of the risk of being employed at the mission – several of the Hungarian local employees had already been detained by the secret police – but she did not care. She pointed out to Csalog that only those employees were in danger who were translating the English language materials into Hungarian. The Hungarian authorities did not seem to mind their propaganda materials reaching Washington. Lívia Jancsó was also provided by the Americans an apartment in Mihály Táncsics Street, in the Castle of Buda. This complex of buildings had belonged to the US since 1948, because it was a part of the reparations of Hungary to one of the winners of World War Two. The marines of the Legation were also staying there. Since the property was a no-go area for the Hungarian secret police, in July 1956 Jancsó was detained for a few hours in the street. The secret police wanted her to spy on her American employers which she flatly refused. This time she was allowed to go free.

On October 23, 1956, Lívia Jancsó went to work as usual. Accidentally hearing from a friend about the planned demonstration at three p. m. on Bem Square, she alerted Anton Nyerges,³³ a Hungarian-speaking American diplomat, who immediately made his way to Buda to see and report about this remarkable event. In the morning on October 24, 1956, Nyerges and Jancsó walked down from the Castle across the Chain Bridge to the Embassy together. What Jancsó could remember very well was the passivity of Washington and the disappointment of the American diplomats at the Legation. She also recalled that the former Minister Plenipotentiary Ravndal³⁴ had already left Budapest in August 1956, and when the revolution broke out, the Legation had only a Chargé d’Affaires ad interim Ravndal’s successor, Edward Wailes was supposed to arrive only before Christmas. In addition, the consul, Ernst A. Nagy had

³¹ Zsolt Csalog (1935-1997) Hungarian writer, sociologist who lived in New York City between 1985-1989.

³² CSALOG, Zsolt: Keserű boldogság, DOKU 56. Öt portré a forradalomról; Unió Kiadó. 1990. pp. 97-153.

³³ Anton N. Nyerges (1917–1989) an American diplomat of Hungarian origin who in 1956 was Second Secretary at the Legation in Budapest. After leaving the Foreign Service in 1970, he published several English translations of famous Hungarian poets. See his photograph with Cardinal Mindszenty from August 1957 on the back cover of SOMORJAI, Ádám OSB – ZINNER, Tibor (eds.): Szeizmográf a Szabadság téren; Hamvas Béla Kultúrakutató Intézet, Budapest, 2010.

³⁴ Envoy extraordinary and Minister plenipotentiary Christian Magelssen Ravndal (1899-1984) presented his credentials on January 11, 1952 and left the Hungarian capital on August 5, 1956.

already left his position too. Jancsó considered the Chargé, N. Spencer Barnes³⁵ to be a coward who was protecting his Russian wife more than Hungary. There were only two American diplomats, Anton Nyerges and Géza Katona³⁶ – both of them of Hungarian extraction – who could speak the language. The new head of mission, Edward Wailes, and the new consul, Richard R. Selby arrived in Budapest only on Friday, November 2, 1956! The former failed to hand over his credentials to the legitimate Hungarian authorities, so he remained a Chargé d’Affaires for the rest of his service, which lasted only till February 1957.

By this time, Jancsó had already moved into the building of the Legation, since there was an obvious need for her work on a continuous basis. Her task was to listen to the Hungarian *Kossuth Rádió* and *Radio Free Europe*, the most important means of communication at that time. And this is how she became an eyewitness of the beginning of the refuge of Cardinal Mindszenty. She recalled that it was her that welcomed the Cardinal and his secretary³⁷ at about six o’clock in the morning. More reliable American sources, however, state accurately that the refugee arrived at the door two hours later, only at 7.58 in the morning. (At six a.m. the Cardinal was still inside the building of the Parliament.) The notification of Edward Wailes through Anton Nyerges was also attributed by Jancsó to herself. The telex exchange of the State Department and Wailes, however, offered a different version: „*The Cardinal is now at the door and we are now taking him in. Cardinal accompanied by his secretary, can we also take him in?*”³⁸ At the same time, Wailes told Nyerges in the presence of Jancsó that he had already reported to Washington the request for refuge, and within ten–fifteen minutes the positive reply did – miraculously – arrive. It seems unambiguous that Wailes was not in the position to call the White House directly, since his superiors were in the Department State who – in turn – had already been notified of the decision of President Eisenhower. The other possibility is that he had not made a call to Washington at all, just pretended to have done so. In both possible cases, he was using the unsuspecting Lívia Jancsó as the messenger of the vital news that Cardinal Mindszenty had received the refuge on entering the building of the Legation and not before!

On the basis of other evidence, the author strongly believes that in this case the two experienced diplomats were simply using Jancsó in order to spread just a version of the granting of the request. The more likely sequence of events must have been that Washington had already notified the Chargé – but only him – of the expected arrival of Mindszenty. The reason why Wailes and Nyerges were pretending not to have

³⁵ Nathan Spencer Barnes (1917–1992) had the diplomatic rank of a Counsellor and had been serving in Budapest since January 16, 1955. He must have met his Russian wife during his previous posting to Moscow between 1946–1948.

³⁶ Assistant Attaché Andrew Géza („Gaza”) Katona (1917–2012) was a second-generation Hungarian American who was translating the letters of Mindszenty and doing – together with Anton Nyerges – the various jobs around the person of the Cardinal. According to the by now unclassified documents, he joined the CIA in 1952 and spent the following four and a half years as a diplomat at the US Legation in Budapest. Katona was an active member of the American-Hungarian Federation (AHF).

³⁷ Albert Egon Turchányi (1894–1969).

³⁸ See: John P. Glennon (ed. in chief): GLENNON, John P. (ed. in chief): Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957. United States Government Printing Office Washington, 1990. p. 379.

known about his arrival was that they wanted to protect the Hungarian person(s) who had actually initiated the whole process. Our research – in harmony with the findings of Professor Margit Balogh – has found that the initiators must have been the Tildy family, who were residing in the building of the Parliament on that morning. In other words, Lívia Jancsó was an extremely “useful” witness of the made-up version – the cover story – of the arrival of the Cardinal in refuge. A version that protected the other people – especially the Hungarians – who had been taking an active part in the process. The version that the Legation learned about the refuge only when Mindszenty was knocking at the front door became widespread and beneficial in covering the actual chain of events and the participants in it. The fact that the Tildy family turned to a mediator in Washington who, in turn, notified the Department of State, and President Eisenhower acted on the advice of latter. When the presidential decision had been made, the Legation and also Mindszenty waiting in the Parliament received a message and started their preparations for implementing the refuge. However, the memories of Lívia Jancsó must not be underestimated. She did play an important role in recalling the cover story of the refuge, and several decades later led us quite a few steps closer to the truth. Even if the staff of the Legation had not expected the Cardinal to show up, Edward Wailes had fully been aware of a special guest arriving at his Legation. This information had, however, come from Washington, since the initiators of the refuge – perhaps fearing phone tapping or some other leaks – had not involved the Legation in this highly risky process.

The other reason why Jancsó was a key figure at the beginning of the refuge is the fact that she was the first person to type Cardinal’s memoirs. When in the early hours of November 4, 1956, Mindszenty drove from his Palace in Úri Street in the Castle of Buda to the Parliament, he had left all his papers behind. According to Jancsó, *Life Magazine* had purchased the manuscript for USD 300.000 and that was what made the typing necessary and urgent. On realizing this problem, the Cardinal started putting his memories down again from the end of November. The handwritten pages were given to Lívia Jancsó by the Cardinal in the morning and she typed them during the day. Only Wailes, Nyerges and Selby were aware of these activities. Jancsó made a point of concealing the typing from the other local employees, many of whom were spying for the Hungarian State Security Authority. She recalled that this work and the daily meetings with the Cardinal were the best experience of her life. For Jancsó, the most valued Christmas present was the fact the Cardinal was praying for her every night.

What happened to Lívia Jancsó later on? She was detained on March 13, 1957. What the State Security wanted to find out was: who were the persons that were staying in shelter at the Legation between 4 and 10 November. She never revealed that she had been typing the memoirs and running errands on behalf of the Cardinal. That must have been the reason that no charges were made against her. Instead, she was interned to Kistarcsa and to Tököl in the countryside. She was allowed to leave the latter in April 1958. She made her way back to the Legation where she met Garret Ackerson for the first time. After spending a week working, she was relocated from Budapest to Kunhegyes, also in the countryside. The Chargé decided to continue to pay her salary even if she was prevented from doing any work for the Legation. This arrangement remained in force till July 1960. Since the State Security forbade her to work for the Americans, Ackerson advised Jancsó to apply to emigrate to Holland (and not to the USA). The Chargé was replaced in February 1961, and Jancsó had to

wait for her passport to Holland till February 1962. Ackerson did one more favor for Jancsó – he paid her air fare to Amsterdam. And soon enough, the former local employee arrived in New York City on May 31, 1962. The next assistance that Ackerson offered was securing her a secretary's job with Béla Varga³⁹ at the *Hungarian Committee*. But not for long, since she decided to graduate⁴⁰ as a librarian, and later on worked for George Washington University for twelve years.

During the long refuge, Jancsó never had the opportunity to see Cardinal Mindszenty, although in the summer of 1971, she returned to Budapest⁴¹ already as an American citizen.⁴² However, due to the sensitive negotiations on ending the refuge, she was not allowed to see the Cardinal. On July 15, 1971 Liaison Officer Theodore Papendorp⁴³ alerted DCM⁴⁴ Francis Meehan⁴⁵ in the following way:

„I am enclosing for your information, and delivery, my letter of even date to Don Kursch about the visit to Budapest of Mrs. Livia Jancsó. I have counseled Livia against going back to Hungary in the light of what happened to her before, but to no avail. Nevertheless, I wanted to point out to you that she was the one who first began to type the Cardinal's memoirs after his arrival, and this was one of the topics on which the AVH⁴⁶ interrogated her after her apprehension in (I believe it was) March 1957. She says she gave them no information. It is possible that once she visits the Embassy she may ask to see the Cardinal. Forewarned is forearmed. You may want to mention to him the fact that she came, since he has a very warm feeling for her – even though she's Reformatus! Best wishes to you, the Puhans, and of course, your guest! Sincerely, J. Theodore Papendorp”⁴⁷

On the same day Papendorp wrote a letter to Consul Donald Kursch to inform him about the planned visit of Lívia Jancsó to Budapest. It is quoted here in order to demonstrate that the Americans have not forgotten about their staunch former employee and her valuable and unselfish services:

“I am writing now to alert you to the arrival of Mrs. Livia Jancsó [...] on July 30. You may recall her as the librarian in the GW⁴⁸ Sino-Soviet Institute. She is a former FSL⁴⁹ of the then-Legation, was imprisoned for some time after the 1956 revolution, and finally was able to immigrate – nominally to the Netherlands – 1962.

³⁹ Béla Varga (1903-1995) from 1947 one of the leaders of the Hungarian immigrants in the USA. Jancsó left her job with Varga after only six months.

⁴⁰ Lívia Jancsó achieved an MA degree.

⁴¹ Her first visit back to Hungary took place in 1969.

⁴² Jancsó received her American citizenship in 1967.

⁴³ J. Theodore „Ted” Papendorp (1928–1998) was the only liaison officer who during the refuge served twice in Budapest. He had a particularly close relationship with the Cardinal. He wrote the quoted letter to the Embassy from the US Embassy in the Hague.

⁴⁴ Deputy Chief of Mission.

⁴⁵ Francis Joseph Meehan (1924–?) worked as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the US Embassy in Budapest between 1968-1972. He and his wife, Margaret had an excellent relationship with Cardinal Mindszenty.

⁴⁶ ÁVH, the State Security Authority.

⁴⁷ SOMORJAI, Ádám OSB (ed.): His Eminence Files; American Embassy, Budapest, From Embassy Archives, 15 (1971), METEM Budapest, 2008. New edition: 2012, p. 179.

⁴⁸ George Washington University.

⁴⁹ A local employee with Hungarian citizenship.

She then came to the US, has become a US citizen (and has been released from Hungarian citizenship by the Presidential Council), got a librarian degree at CU⁵⁰, and has been working for GWU for some time now. With this background, Livia wanted to be sure that the Embassy knew of her coming. She will be living in a privately-rented room rather than a hotel or with relatives, and so she will have to register with the police within 24 hours of her arrival. She wanted to check in with the Embassy before this, but it will probably be closed before she is able to get into town from Ferihegy⁵¹ and get settled. Instead she will telephone to register that evening or next morning, and probably pay a somewhat more formal call early next week. [...] She will be living at Budapest II. Kuruclesi út 25b c/o Dr. Szeregy Ida. If and when you see her, please give Livia my very best wishes for an enjoyable stay [...]”⁵²

Here is also an extract from the internal memorandum of Second Secretary Lawrence D. Russell, dated July 21, 1971, to the Marines: “We expect Mrs. Livia Jancsó to call at the Embassy [...] is a former local employee of the Embassy who emigrated to the US in 1962 [...] Under no circumstances is Mrs. Jancsó to be admitted beyond the main lobby or the Consular Section.”⁵³ In this way, the writer of the memoirs and his first typist at the Legation were able to meet only after the refuge had ended and the Cardinal was already residing in Vienna. Later they were also corresponding with each other, and Jancsó was in possession of six of his letters.

On September 27, 2021, while giving a talk at a Mindszenty event organized by the Danube Institute in Budapest, the author was able to meet a relative of Lívia Jancsó – Némethy Kesserű Judit (1942–) who is currently a professor emerita at New York University. Némethy and András Deák paid a visit to the former American property in Mihály Táncsics Street, and also traced back Lívia Jancsó’s daily walk from the Castle down to the Danube and across to Pest, to the Legation.

⁵⁰ Columbia University (New York City).

⁵¹ The former name of Budapest Airport.

⁵² See: SOMORJAI (2008) op. cit.

⁵³ Ibid p. 190.



Figure 1: Judit Kesserű Némethy in front of 9 Mihály Táncsics Street in Budapest on October 9, 2021. This is the American-owned building in which Lívia Jancsó had her apartment between March 1956 and March 1957, until the time of her detention.
(Photo by the author)

During our oral history interview Judit Kesserű, she confided the following things: the parents of Lívia were Ilona Csák (1889–1933) and Károly Némethy (1861–1941), a lawyer and from 1927 a member of the Upper House of Parliament. Judit Kesserű met Lívia Jancsó in her family circle in 1969, after she had arrived from Argentina in New York in 1967. Jancsó was the niece of Judit's second husband, György Némethy, who left Hungary in 1951. Judit described her as a rather withdrawn person who disappeared from time to time only to return to the family circle some time later.



Figure 2. Lívia Jancsó, a picture in the Budapest home of Judit Kesserű Némethy. You can see a resolute and a resilient person who is not afraid to stand up for her principles, who could say no even to the Hungarian State Security Authority.
(Photo of the author)

What can we learn from the death certificate of Lívia Jancsó provided by Judit Kesserű? She was born on March 9, 1907, in Hungary. That means when she started working for the American Legation, she was already 49 years old, and her parents had already died. When she managed to immigrate to the United States, she had to begin a new life at the age of 55. The age gap between Jancsó and the Cardinal was much smaller than had been anticipated by the author. Jancsó died in Washington on May 15, 1989, at the age of 82. At the time of her death, she was divorced. Her death was reported by her nephew, Francis T. Miko. The body was cremated already on the following day of her death. According to Judit Kesserű, before ending her own life in her apartment in Washington, Jancsó handed out her sensitive documents, including her six letters from Cardinal Mindszenty. She, however, had been talking about this with István Kesserű, the father of Judit, and not Judit herself. In this way, István Kesserű became the executor of Jancsó's last will. The family also had the job of clearing out Jancsó's apartment in Washington D.C.

GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

1983 MAY 17 PM 2:31

se Read tificate refully	FILE DATE	File No. 100-0 0 0 3 5 0 2		
	1. NAME OF DECEASED	First Middle Last		
	Livia (none) Jancso			
	2. SEX	3. Never Married, Married, Widowed, Divorced; Specify Female White Divorced		
	4. RACE	5. DATE OF BIRTH		
	6. PLACE OF DEATH	7. AGE (in years or birthday)		
	NAME OF HOSPITAL, NURSING HOME OR OTHER INSTITUTION (If not in institution, give street address) 730 - 24th Street, N.W., #803 Washington, D.C.	Mar. 9, 1907 • 82		
	8. PLACE OF DEATH	8. DEATH Date Month Year May 15, 1989		
	9. USUAL RESIDENCE	9. If Under 1 Yr. Months Days Hours Min.		
	a. STATE	b. COUNTY		
	c. CITY	d. STREET ADDRESS 730 24th Street, N.W. # 803 (20037)		
	e. INSIDE CITY LIMITS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			
	f. If rural, give location			
	10a. USUAL OCCUPATION (Give kind of work done during most of working life, even if retired) Librarian	10b. KIND OF BUSINESS OR INDUSTRY G. W. University		
	11. BIRTHPLACE (State or foreign country) Hungary	12b. Origin or descent Hungarian		
	12a. CITIZEN OF WHAT COUNTRY?	12c. Hispanic <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO		
	13a. FATHER'S NAME	13b. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME		
	Karoly Nemethy	Ilona Csak		
	15. Ever in U.S. <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	16. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 087 36 4143		
	17a. INFORMANT RELATIONSHIP TO DECEASED	17b. ADDRESS Street City State Francis T. Miko/Nephew/1633 Ridout Rd./Annapolis Maryland		
	18. CAUSE OF DEATH: (Enter only one cause per line for (a), (b), and (c).) PART I. DEATH WAS CAUSED BY: IMMEDIATE CAUSE (a) Pending Further Studies	19. Interval between Onset and Death:		
	Conditions, if any, which gave rise to above cause (a), stating the under- (ing cause (a)).			
	DUE TO (b)	DUE TO (c)		
	PART II. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS: contributing to death but not related to the terminal disease condition given in Part I (a)			
	20a. IF OPERATION WAS PERFORMED COMPLETE ITEMS 20a and 20b	20b. DATE OF OPERATION	20c. CONDITION FOR WHICH OPERATION WAS PERFORMED	
	21a. Specify if accident, suicide, homicide, or manner undetermined	21b. HOUR AND DATE OF INJURY: Month, Day, Year	21c. DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OCCURRED (Enter nature of injury in Part I or Part II) M	
	22. I certify that (I) this hospital attended the deceased from saw the deceased alive on _____, 19_____, to _____, 19_____, that death occurred from the causes and on the date and hour stated above.	22d. DATE SIGNED May 16, 1989		
	22a. SIGNATURE Carol McMahon MD	ATTENDING PHYS. <input type="checkbox"/> MEDICAL DIRECTOR <input type="checkbox"/> STAFF PHYS. <input type="checkbox"/> Carol McMahon, M.D.		
	22c. MEDICAL EXAMINER, D.C. John H. Crandall			
	23a. BURIAL INTERMENT REMOVAL	23b. DATE	23c. NAME OF CEMETERY OR CREMATORIAL METROPOLITAN Crematory	23d. LOCATION (City, town, or county) Alexandria Virginia
	24. FUNERAL HOME Devol Funeral Home ADDRESS 2222 Wisconsin Ave., N.W./Wash. D.C.	25a. UNDERTAKER'S SIGNATURE Robert A. Devol	25b. UNDERTAKER'S REGISTRATION NUMBER 654	
	REMARKS: Carol McMahon MD 5/16/89 CREMATION APPROVED			
	* If under 8 years, Enter Place of Birth-Hospital, or Address if not in hospital.			
	NOT VALID WITHOUT RAISED SEAL			
	DATE ISSUED			
	WARNING: IT IS ILLEGAL TO MAKE COPIES OF THIS DOCUMENT AND PRESENT THEM AS AN ORIGINAL CERTIFIED COPY, OR COPY OF A VITAL RECORD.			
	<i>John H. Crandall, Chief, Vital Records</i>			

I CERTIFY THAT THE ABOVE IS A TRUE AND CORRECT REPRODUCTION OF THE ORIGINAL
CERTIFICATE FILED WITH THE VITAL RECORDS BRANCH, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DEPARTMENT
OF HUMAN SERVICES.
MAY 17, 1989

Figure 3. The Death Certificate of Lívia Jancsó
(Provided by Judit Kesserű Némethy)

Conclusion

We believe that the memories of Donald Kursch and Lívia Jancsó shed more light on the various details of the historic events; on the ending and the beginning of the American refuge of Cardinal Mindszenty. It was also high time that the readers can learn – with the help of a relative of hers – more about the personal life of a strong woman – Lívia Jancsó –, who simply refused to be afraid.⁵⁴ Her version of the Cardinal's arrival at the Legation has revealed the ingenious tactics of Chargé Edward

⁵⁴ On October 15, 2015 a monodrama was presented by József Katona Theater in Budapest with the title „Bitter Happiness.” The play was based on the oral history interview of Zsolt Csalog with Lívia Jancsó in 1984. She was played by actress Györgyi Kari.

Wailes to conceal the sensitive aspects of the refuge that might have led to the arrest and perhaps to the execution of the actual initiators. What he did manage to conceal – from the American staff, but more importantly, from the Hungarian local employees reporting to the State Security Authority – was the fact that Cardinal Mindszenty’s appearance at the door of the Legation was not his spontaneous act, but the request for his refuge had been made and granted several hours before.

We also believe that the oral histories – as indispensable tools of research – have again proved to be very useful.⁵⁵

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⁵⁵ See: DEÁK, András Miklós: Mindszenty bíboros követségi menedékének egyes vetületei az amerikai elbeszélt történelemben; L’Harmattan Kiadó, Budapest, 2021.

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Abstract

This paper examines some specific military-security questions of the Hungarian-Romanian relations, before and during the revolution of December 1989¹. A reply is still sought to question whether there was a foreign – including Hungarian – intervention in the revolution, which question has been arising regularly for 32 years now in the Romanian public. The paper lists the security challenges originating from Romania during 1989; furthermore, it analyses the role played by the Hungarian People's Army during the days of the revolution. It was an interesting event in December the debate between the Hungarian Socialist Party² (herein: MSZP) and the Hungarian Democratic Forum³ (herein: MDF), hoping to clarify the details of how and what troops Hungary should have sent to assist the revolutionaries. The paper is written, based on the materials about Romania of the year 1989, found at the Hungarian National Archives, and on the results of the related professional literature, as well as on the views and memoirs of politicians.

Keywords: Hungary, Romania, 1989, revolution, Hungarian People's Army, security challenges Ceausescu, Securitate⁴ Temesvár/Timisoara⁵, diplomacy, assistance

Introduction

Despite Hungary and Romania belonged to the same economic and security block, being both members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and of the Warsaw Pact, their relations sank to the bottom at the end of the '80s, and their connection continued to worsen. After Nicolae Ceausescu's coming to power in 1965, there was a short improvement in the life of the ethnic minorities in Romania that – later on – became the victim of the dictatorship and the cult of personality built-up from the beginning of the '70s. The suppression became more and more depressing, and led to the total migration (in fact escape) of the Jewish and German population,

¹ In this paper I use the term „revolution” for the events of December 1989 despite the ongoing debate in the related literature about what had really happened: a revolutionary movement, “revolution of ensuring survival (of the old regime)”, “distracted”, “aborted” revolution, an anti-Ceausescu putsch, palace revolution, national uprising, Soviet-Hungarian diversion, etc.

² The so-called Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party's (in Hungarian: Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt)

³ Hungarian Democratic Forum, or in Hungarian: Magyar Demokratikus Fórum (MDF) was the so-called political system changing newly formed democratic party still in opposition during the Romanian revolution

⁴ Romanian communist secret service

⁵ In my paper I give the Hungarian and Romanian names of the cities when first appear

and by the end of the decade, many of the Hungarians of Transylvania chose this way too. Following the 15-16 June 1977 meeting of Mr. János Kádár and Mr. Nicolae Ceausescu in Debrecen and Oradea, the Hungarian (communist) Party's leadership still accepted the Romanian demand that the solution to the problems of ethnic minorities is an internal matter and the responsibility of the two countries, but the passive stance of the Hungarian communists to the fate of the Hungarians of Transylvania gradually changed from the mid '80s (due to the pressure from the opposition and the change of public sentiment in Hungary), which unavoidably led to the sharpening of conflicts with Romania. In this process, the differences were significantly strengthened by the publication of the book titled "The History of Transylvania" in November 1986 and by the 27 June 1988 demonstration in Budapest against the destruction of villages in Romania – with the immediate consequence of the closure of the General Consulate (of Hungary) in Kolozsvár (Cluj, Romania).

The narrative of the Hungarian interference into the outbreak of the revolutionary events of Temesvár (Timisoara, Romania)

On the 20 December 1989, Nicolae Ceausescu returning from Iran, faced that the army and the Securitate could not tame the uprising of Timisoara, broken out on the 17 December 1989, so he tried to give an explanation to the events in a hasty TV speech that evening, in order to retake the initiative. Ceausescu put the blame on "hooligans" who attacked the state institutions, military units and robbed buildings and shops. According to the general secretary of the party, the terrorist acts were organised in close cooperation with the secret services of foreign countries, in order to destabilize and to split the territory of the country, to cease its independence and sovereignty. It is not by chance – continued reading his speech Ceausescu – that the radio stations from Budapest and from other countries started an unscrupulous campaign of slanders and lies against Romania which is a part of a general plan against the sovereignty of those nations that are ready to defend their freedom even by using weapons.⁶ Next day, during the hastily convened assembly in Bucharest, Ceausescu once again painted the picture of a country under the siege of foreign powers (this time already without mentioning Budapest), after the security men mixed into the crowd have tamed the riot erupted on the square.⁷

The Romanian power stressed its accusations against Budapest even through diplomatic channels: Foreign Minister Ion Stoian ordered the Hungarian chargé d'affaires Mr. Ernő Rudas (as the ambassador stayed then in Hungary) into the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in very late hours on the 20 December and informed him that "*in relation with the Timisoara developments, we have data and evidence that they are (...) organised by foreign intelligence organisations, with the support of powers interested in the destabilisation of the situation in Romania as well as in changing the territory of our homeland by attacking our territorial integrity. We have to say that your country's politicians and press organisations have declared such goals. According to the data available to us the intelligence organisations have intensified their activities.*" According to Stoian, "US President Bush and Soviet

⁶ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioBKBXF3LEY> (downloaded 26 April 2022)

⁷ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wWIbCtz_Xwk&t=1s and
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3muDjmU2ozQ> (downloaded 26 April 2022)

Secretary General Gorbachev have addressed Romania, during their talks on Malta about the division of the spheres of influence and “have acted on the basis of a well-developed plan against the independence and territorial integrity of Romania. We have clear information about the Soviet Union’s intentions to intervene in Romania with military force. [...] In this context, we should also refer to the anti-Romanian actions well known to the Hungarian authorities to destabilize Romania and supported by Hungary. [...] The territorial claims, which are unimaginably frequently expressed in Hungary, are not missing from the actions either.”⁸

According to the Romanian highest authorities, the plan of foreign spy organizations is to destabilize Romania, dismantle its territorial integrity and end its independence, and Hungary has a significant role to play in this. Although the Foreign Minister did not say so, he meant that Hungary was trying to achieve these goals with the military help of the Soviet Union. In the light of these specific allegations, let us review the arguments for and against foreign interference.

In the months before the revolution, Bucharest received information from several sources about Hungary's alleged hostile plans. On 9 December, 1989, the Romanian Embassy in Budapest reported to the Ministry of National Defence (MApN) and to the Army Information Directorate (DIA) that Hungary was "working for the internationalization of the Transylvanian issue and the political and economic isolation of Romania." At the same time, "*in parallel with provoking demonstrations among the Hungarian population in Transylvania, Hungary is planning incidents on the common border that would escalate into a military conflict.*"⁹ Romania's military attaché from 1979 to 1990 was Ion Todericiu, who said in a later interview: "*Hungary wanted a civil war in Romania [...]. It would have used this war for an intervention in Transylvania, the stated aim of which would have been to protect the Hungarian minority. Undoubtedly, it is difficult to predict how things would have changed with the emergence of these forces in Romania. The civil war would have allowed a breach of the non-interference agreement between Bush and Gorbachev. The intervention of foreign troops would not have been possible without a civil war.*"¹⁰

According to the narrative of external intervention, Hungary continuously supported the resistance of the Hungarian minority in Romania against Ceausescu and encouraged its action against the united Romanian nation-state. This was part of Budapest's plan to spark a conflict with Romania, thereby involving the West and the Soviet Union in the crisis as arbitrators that would help Hungary repeal the Treaty of Trianon. According to Romanian intelligence sources, Hungary has already taken preparatory steps to intervene: the Army's diversion reconnaissance battalions have been specially trained to conduct operations behind enemy lines, such exercises took

⁸ Foreign Minister Stoian's message to Mátyás Szűrös. Cryptographic telegram of the Embassy of Hungary in Bucharest, 316 / KT (KüM: 004745), 21.12.1989, XIX-J-1-j of the Hungarian National Archives.

⁹ CORNEANU, Constantin Dr.: Armata Romana si prabusirea Comunismului (decembrie 1989); Document (Buletinul Arhivelor Militare Române), Anul XXII, 2019/4. pp. 1-13
8. Citation source: NICOLAESCU, Sergiu: Lupta pentru putere - Decembrie '89, Editura All, Bucureşti, 2005, p. 23.

https://amnr.defense.ro/app/webroot/fileslib/upload/files/Revista_Document/Revista_086_2019.pdf (downloaded 26 April 2022)

¹⁰ CORNEANU op. cit. p. 13.

place on 15-18 December, 15-20 km from the Romanian border, and previously between March and June several times at the training base near the village of Rezi. Romanian authorities identified a number of civilian and military persons at the joint border, who were monitoring the territory of Romania and occasionally crossed the border. In addition, the Romanian services detected Hungarian reconnaissance groups of 5-7 people.¹¹

Despite the Romanian leadership's briefings in support of the acute external threat, the DIA concluded that there was no serious threat to Romania. As Stefan Dinu, the head of the DIA, later said, the leadership of the army knew that there was no threat of external military danger, voicing this only served as a "diversion" to his superiors.¹² Romanian historians have also come to these conclusions.¹³ In post-revolutionary court proceedings, former chief state security officers defended themselves why they had arrested hostile persons: "they were trained and sent to Romania by foreign spy services to destabilize the political situation". In fact, Securitate knew very well that there were no foreign destabilizing forces on Romanian territory. This was later confirmed by Emil Macri, a former General of Securitate: "*The information obtained [...] did not contain any evidence that any foreign force had intervened in the events in Timisoara.*" Incidentally, none of the documents found at the CNSAS confirmed the role of persons trained by "foreigners" or "foreign spy services" in the revolution.¹⁴

We also find a false narrative of external attack in the chronology of the events of 17, December 1989. At 15 December, Minister of Defence Vasile Milea informed by telephone the Commander of the 4th Army that "*there are forces in Hungary that are preparing for aggression at the western border of our country.*" All this happened despite the fact that a few moments earlier the DIA chief had informed him that the border interception stations had not received any indication of a possible western attack and that the mobilization ordered by the Hungarian General Staff was only of standard nature, given the deteriorating situation in Timisoara.¹⁵

According to Colonel Alex Mihai Stoenescu, former head of the Army's Public Relations Directorate (Direcția Relații Publice a Armatei), the external intervention was confirmed by the activities of the Soviet consul in Timisoara, while historians point out that there was no Soviet consul in Timisoara. Among historians, the American Larry Watts most strongly represents the thesis of elements infiltrating from abroad. In his paper on the Romanian Revolution, he describes that "*of the 37,000 Soviet tourists who visited or travelled to Romania in two weeks before the December 1989 revolution, more than 25,000 chose not to leave the country for almost a year, until October 1990.*" In contrast, Romanian historians have shown that 1,525 tourists

¹¹ Ibid p. 9.

¹² Ibid. p. 10.

¹³ URсу, Andrei – HODOR, Mădălin – THOMASSON, Roland O.: 'Cine a nîn noi după 22' Studiu asupra vinovătiilor pentru victimele Revolutiei Române din decembrie 1989. Noua revistă de Drepturile Omului / "Who fired at us after 22?". Study on the Crimes of the Victims of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, 2018/4, pp. 5-128

¹⁴ Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității / National Council for Securing Archives

¹⁵ URсу – HODOR – THOMASSON op. cit. We will discuss later that Minister Milea contacted his Hungarian partner that morning.

stayed in hotels in Timisoara during the revolution, 789 of whom came from different socialist countries. The claim that incitement had been generated between Romanian citizens deported by neighbouring states and those returning to Romania illegally has also been refuted. Investigations in this regard did not yield operationally useful data at all.¹⁶

Among the Romanian official bodies, UM 0110,¹⁷ established to prevent the activities of foreign secret services in Romania, did not reveal any foreign actions. UM 0110 had to use operational methods in December 1989 to investigate whether neighbouring states (Soviet Union, Hungary) were organizing covert operations, but no information was found that the counter-espionage organization had detected any Hungarian intervention operations or would have prevented it. A similar statement was made by Chief of Staff Ștefan Gușă, who admitted before the Senate committee set up to clarify the events in December that the army had been misinformed about an aggression against Romania.¹⁸

The voiced possibility of Soviet intervention was inherent in the air, as the Soviet Union had repeatedly and publicly ruled out any kind of military intervention since 1988. Such an action would have only strengthened Ceausescu's position and anti-Soviet sentiment in Romania, it would have deepened the crisis and destroyed international confidence in Gorbachev, thus being completely contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Due to German reunification and separatist aspirations in the empire, the Soviets could not have paid attention to Romania, which did not directly threaten its economic and military interests, even if they had wanted to. According to Soviet sources, Moscow outright rejected the U.S. request for Romanian intervention in favour of the National Salvation Front.²⁰

In summary, “inventing” an external attack was only in the interests of those in power: Ceausescu saw in it an opportunity to declare a state of war and thus, to retain his power, and the Securitate offered him the “evidence” expected on a tray. And after the revolution, the Securitate tried to justify its actions in Timisoara with an external threat: the forces of state security did not act against the people fighting for freedom, but against an unrest erupted by foreign forces with the aim of destabilizing the country and destroying its territorial unit. However, this “conspiracy theory” also has a message for today, because a section of the public takes it for granted: the forces that wanted to harm Romania at the end of 1989 have not disappeared and may occasionally try to act against Romania again.

¹⁶ BANDI, István: Az 1989-es romániai forradalomba való magyar beavatkozás kérdése / The Question of the Hungarian Intervention in the Romanian Revolution of 1989; Betelekintő 2020/2. p. 106

¹⁷ UM=Unitate Militară (Military Unit)

¹⁸ BANDI op. cit. pp. 108-109

¹⁹ URSU – HODOR – THOMASSON op. cit. p. 81

²⁰ BOTTONI, Stefano: Volt? És hogyan történt? Gondolatok az 1989-es romániai forradalom értelmezéséről / Did it happen? And how did it happen? Thoughts on the Interpretation of the 1989 Romanian Revolution; Hitel 2015/3. p. 34.

Romanian threat, Hungary being threatened

In the years before the Romanian Revolution, and especially in 1989, the deepening of bilateral relations and the growing international isolation of Romania resulted in increasingly aggressive action on the part of Romania, which did not lack the threat of (indirect or vague) military action. At a meeting in Arad on 28 August 1988, Ceausescu made the following harsh hint to Grósz: “*We have developed Romanian industry to be able to produce everything, including nuclear devices and even nuclear weapons. You are interfering in Romania's internal affairs to confront our people with the party leadership.*”²¹ This was a statement that the Hungarian leadership noticed and raised the issue several times in public and at the negotiations in the following period.

At a Romanian-initiated meeting between Ceausescu and Rezső Nyers, chairman of the MSZMP, on the side-lines of the meeting of the Political Advisory Board of the Warsaw Pact in Bucharest on 8 July 1989, the Hungarian side also discussed Romanian statements containing the military threat.²² Following the meeting, Foreign Minister Gyula Horn told reporters that military threats had been made on the part of Romania in previous months, as if Bucharest was consciously trying to incite hostility. According to Horn, if a neighbouring country declares that it is capable of producing nuclear weapons and will see to the production of medium-range missiles, it will affect Hungary's security.²³

It is in this context that the Hungarian embassy in Bonn credited Der Spiegel's news in May 1989 that Romania, through Arab countries, had obtained technology from the FRG for the production of medium-range missiles. The authenticity is supported by the fact that Spiegel obtained its information in part from persons who had previously been involved in the technology transfer business of the Messerschmidt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) in Munich. According to the embassy, the German government is also investigating the matter, although there has been no reaction from the German official to contact the embassy.²⁴

Based on the German press, the MTI also reported on the subject on 8 May 1989: Using technology from the West, Romania is building a huge assembly hall to assemble missiles with medium-range nuclear warheads. Various sources (technical experts, Bonn government officials, business papers) suggest that MBB has developed so-called Condor missiles for Argentina since 1979. However, these plans landed in Romania via Egypt and Iraq. However, a spokesman for the Federal Ministry of

²¹ SZÜRÖS, Mátyás: Szűk volt a mundér. Egy magyar diplomata emlékezései és emlékeztetése (1959-2013) / The uniform was tight. Memories and Reminders of a Hungarian Diplomat (1959-2013); Püski, Budapest, 2013. p. 164

²² FÖLDES, György: Magyarország, Románia és a nemzeti kérdés 1956-1989. / Hungary, Romania and the National Question 1956-1989; Napvilág Kiadó 2007. p. 469

²³ HASZÁN; Zoltán: Ha nincs a forradalom, háborúzunk Romániával? / : If there was no revolution, would have we gone to war with Romania?
https://index.hu/belfold/1989/2009/12/21/ha_nincs_a_forradalom_haboruzunk_romaniaval/ (downloaded 26 April 2022)

²⁴ Information on the participation of the FRG in the production of medium-range missiles in Romania, cryptographic letter from the Embassy of Hungary in Bonn, 169 / RT, (KÜM: 002403), 12 May 1989, Hungarian National Archives XIX-J-1-j.

Economic Affairs in Bonn denied that he had such information; in any case Bonn would not grant permission for such transactions. According to American opinions, Condor missiles can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. The range of the rocket was originally a thousand kilometres, but this distance can be increased to two thousand kilometres.²⁵ Reacting to the missile acquisition, Gyula Horn stated that “*one of the opponents of the perestroika, a Stalinist tyrant, is threatening the new Hungary*”, although the foreign minister ruled out an armed conflict between the two countries.²⁶

The Hungarian embassy in Bucharest also reported on the issue in June: several Western ambassadors said the news that Romania had acquired medium-range missile manufacturing technology could be credible. Preparations for the production are taking place at the Ghimbav aircraft factory near Brasov, “*but they have not yet reached production, the primary condition being a practical test of the destination, which cannot be hidden from the satellites...*” However, Western diplomats in Bucharest did not worry that Romania is buying missile technology, but rather because it can pass it on to North Korea or Pakistan. The fact of procurement in the FRG was also indirectly confirmed by an Algerian diplomat for the Hungarian Embassy, saying the Arab countries are planning to build an “important arms factory” in Romania because the Arabian Peninsula is not suitable for it. For the Arab countries, “Romania has always been a reliable partner in this respect.” On the basis of the above reports, on 23 June, the Regional Department recommended that the information be handed over to the Soviet Embassy in Budapest and to Israeli authorities in “confidential form”.²⁷

In addition to the probable acquisition of launcher technology, news emerged in 1989 that Romania had taken steps that could have made it capable of producing nuclear weapons, although Ceausescu had strongly opposed nuclear weapons in public. Romania purchased 54.4 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from the United States for a research reactor, of which 16.4 kilograms were still awaiting shipment at the end of 1989. Despite official permits, the U.S. refused to release the remaining uranium on 12 December, citing the unreliability of the Ceausescu system and the risk that Romanians could even pass on uranium that could be used as a nuclear bomb. On the American side, Romania was already in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which bought 12.5 tonnes of heavy water from Norway in 1986 and is suspected of selling it in secret. According to the daily operational report of the Hungarian state security authorities dated on 9 September 1989, according to unchecked information from the International Atomic Energy Agency, Romania is forwarding heavy water to Israel, which has not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in exchange for high-purity uranium and plutonium ore.²⁸

²⁵ <https://rendszeraltas.mti.hu/Pages/News.aspx?date=19890508&ni=145208&ty=1>
(downloaded 26 April 2022)

²⁶ FÖLDES op. cit. p. 470

²⁷ Transfer of medium-range missile production technology to Romania. Cryptographic Telegram of the Embassy of Bucharest, 142 / RT, (KüM: 002403/1), June 21, 1989, Hungarian National Archives XIX-J-1-j. According to another material from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the head of the 1st Regional Department informed the Soviets about the information that had come to the attention of the Hungarians. (Visit of the Soviet Councilor Gusev, No. 002403/2, June 30, 1989)

²⁸ HASZÁN: If there was no revolution, would have we gone to war with Romania? op. cit.

In the absence of reliable news sources, the reports show a high degree of uncertainty about Romania's nuclear ambitions. Apart from the repetition of press reports and the assumptions circulating in diplomatic circles, the reports did not contain any new information. However, as the news seemed to confirm Ceausescu's Romanian nuclear capacity-building efforts, the issue was on the table in Hungary, although no real threat could be read from official statements or internal materials. At the same time, for Budapest, voicing Romania's nuclear aspirations was another means and opportunity to discredit its neighbour in front of its Western partners and raise fears about Romania's role in illegal nuclear proliferation.

Apart from the potential nuclear threat, the possibility of a traditional military conflict between Hungary and Romania in the last weeks of the Ceausescu dictatorship could not be completely ruled out. In 1989, more or less reliable news arrived to the Hungarian leadership about the troop movements in the eastern border of Romania. At the same time, a significant number of reservists were called up everywhere.²⁹ According to another report, "*the Romanian military leadership is planning a military offensive against Hungary by the autumn of this year (October-November). They are said to be convinced to be able to reach the river Tisza line quickly, without encountering significant obstacles, before the Hungarian army could mobilize its Transdanubian units.*"³⁰ In a report issued in June 1989, the Ministry of the Interior drew the attention of the Board of the Hungarian Socialist People's Party to the preparations for a military action against Hungary, but the Austrian press also reported in Budapest that Romania was preparing a military action against Hungary in the autumn of 1989.³¹

A report from the embassy in Bucharest in June reports on a demonstration of a Romanian military fortress near the border. At the border, the Romanian side stopped the construction of the barbed wire fence in several places and began to demolish it on the Nagykároly section. At the same time, Romanian military units were placed in a higher state of readiness in the districts of Szatmárnémeti, Nagyszentmiklós, Belényes, Lugos, Karánsebes, and infantry and artillery units were informed about the Hungarian threat. The commanders explained to the personnel that the mobilization is due to the "threat from the Hungarian side".³²

In an atmosphere of mutual mistrust in 1989, the initiative of General Ilie Ceausescu on 3 May is to be commended as a Romanian military diplomatic chess draw (or an attempt to do so).³³ The Deputy Minister of Defence called on the Hungarian military attaché in Bucharest and called for the development of co-operation between the armies. He said that he would like to use his current invitation

²⁹ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Titkosszolgálati és diplomáciai információk Bukarestből Budapestre 1989 végén / Secret Service and Diplomatic Information from Bucharest to Budapest at the End of 1989; Ünnepi kötet Dr. Bodnár László egyetemi tanár 70. születésnapjára. Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- és Jogtudományi Kar 2014. pp. 445-456, p. 448.

³⁰ RÉVÉSZ op. cit. p. 447

³¹ RÉVÉSZ op. cit. p. 448.

³² Demonstration of Romanian military forces near the border. St. Cryptography of the Embassy of Bucharest, 158 / RT, 30.06.1989. (KüM: 003029), Hungarian National Archives XIX-J-1-j.

³³ Initiative of the Romanian Minister of Defense, 100 / RT / 05391, (KüM: 002276), 8 May 1989, MOL KÜM XIX-J-1-j.

in Hungary, but he was afraid that his personal security could not be guaranteed there. Anyway, it would be hard to face those who had been infected for a long time with the lies about Romania. Therefore, it would be better to meet his Hungarian partner, Major General Krasznai, in Romania first. The embassy commented on the initiative: Ilie Ceausescu is a member of the Ceausescu family, so he must have agreed on this proposal with his brother, the party secretary general. The Romanian initiative is surprising, as Romania seeks to freeze relations in all areas except trade and behaves in a hostile way anyway. The international isolation of the Ceausescu family is increasing, with Western countries boycotting Romania at all levels, so it is understandable that they need all the contacts they can exploit for propaganda purposes. Such a step would be Ilie Ceausescu's visit to Hungary or a trip to Romania by a high-ranking Hungarian military delegation, which would also give the impression that everything is fine in bilateral relations. According to the embassy's proposal to the Centre, it should be considered whether it is in Hungary's interest to help strengthen the legitimacy of the Ceausescu family. Relations between the armies should be preserved, but this should not be linked to Ceausescu's name. The reception of Ilie Ceausescu in Hungary is undesirable from the point of view of both domestic politics and the international message.³⁴

From Hungary's point of view, the strengthening of Romanian revisionism also posed a latent security threat. The introductory part of the Foreign Ministry's presentation also covers Romania's traditional aspirations. This Romanian aspiration is, in essence, independent of the current Romanian system of power, and in practice it means the meticulously planned and consistently assimilated assimilation of nationalities, above all the Hungarians. Some Romanian circles look even further; in some manifestations of Romanian politics, the idea of Greater Romania, from the Tisza to the Transnistria, is recurring. According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Romanian goal is twofold: to preserve the acquired territories through the assimilation of the Hungarians, and the possible occupation of other territories, to the detriment of Hungary, among others.

In the Ceausescu era, voices demanding the restoration of Greater Romania between the two world wars or the extension of Romanian border to the River Tisza seemed to be silenced. That the system was tolerated (or perhaps secretly supported) is evidenced by the report of the Embassy in Bucharest on the meeting of the Romanian National Committee of the World Congress of Historians – Comparative Church History. In a presentation by an orthodox priest, Bessarabia's historical affiliation was also raised, with 65% of the Moldovan SSR's population being Romanian, so "historiography is an important task in treating Bessarabia as part of a united Romania." Another researcher stressed that "Romanian history science should address not only the history of present-day Romania, but in a unified form the history of all areas that historically belonged to Romania from the River Dniester to the River Tisza". The embassy's assessment indicates that "*in the minds of Romanian historians, the issue is clearly present.*"³⁵

³⁴ Proposal submitted to the Council of Ministers on the management of Hungarian-Romanian relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, II. Territetti Főo., No. 00122/14, 10.11.1989, MOL KÜM XIX-J-1-j.

³⁵ Meeting of Romanian Church Historians, 138 / Szt / 1989 (KüM: 00694), January 30, 1989, Hungarian National Archives XIX-J-1-j.

Another example of this is a report in Budapest on a meeting between a staff member of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a councillor at the Romanian Embassy in January 1989. At the meeting, the Hungarian diplomat objected to an article in the Romanian military history magazine, which was published in a special issue entitled “*On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the annexation of Transylvania to Romania*”. According to the Hungarian diplomat, there are “*statements in the journal that can be interpreted as essentially Romanian territorial claims against the Hungarian People’s Republic. We find that in addition to this specific example, there have been a proliferation of similar references in the Romanian media*”. In addition, the Hungarian diplomat expressed incomprehension about the Romanian linking the disarmament of chemical and nuclear weapons to the Hungarian issue. Budapest does not consider the timing of these two topics to be a coincidence and evaluates them as anti-Hungarian action.³⁶

In addition to the covert military threats and territorial demands, the tools of Romanian politics did not lack the establishment of a historically rooted alliance against Hungary: The Association of Romanian Writers’ magazine “Luceafarul” in its 9 September 1989 issue contained a review on a book published in Bratislava. According to this, “*the policy pursued by the Hungarian state with the perseverance of Draco, which oppressed nations and applied national discrimination, often brought together oppressed nationalities, Romanians, Slavs and Serbs under the same banner. The Romanians and Slovaks mutually supported each other morally in the press, mutually providing each other with protection*”. According to the article, this coalition already included the germs of the later Little Entente, and then concludes that “*while some revanchist, revisionist and irredentist circles revive [...], it seems that a new Little Entente will be outlined on the horizon of the present.*” According to the embassy’s assessment, “*the new element of the publication is that Romania goes beyond its national framework with anti-Hungarianism and openly demands ‘international’ co-operation and action against Hungary, which was once established for a similar purpose in history.*”³⁷ This was another tool in Ceausescu’s hands to turn hard-line communist regimes (especially the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia) against Hungary and put pressure on Hungarian leaders.

The role of the Hungarian People’s Army during the revolution

In the days of the revolution, significant aid was sent from Hungary to Romania in the form of food, medicine, clothing and other necessary things. The Ministry of Defence also played a significant role in the assistance operations: on 25 December, the army delivered 81 tonnes of food and a refrigerated truck of blood and plasma products to Arad, on its own transport vehicles. However, the Romanian General Staff insisted that Romanian soldiers ensure that the convoy and the Hungarian soldiers did not carry weapons. In addition to the above, the Hungarian army sent six tons of food, medicine and medical supplies to Bucharest by plane, and 94 tons of food to Cluj-

³⁶ The mentioning of the Romanian press can be interpreted as a territorial demand. Note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the meeting of Councilor Ernő Rudas and Chira I.

³⁷ Romanian publication calling for the revival of little Entente. Cryptographic Telegram of the Embassy of Bucharest, 174 / Szt, (KüM: 003638), September 21, 1989, XIX-J-1-j of the Hungarian National Archives.

Napoca by rail. In addition to food and medicine, the Romanian military leadership primarily sought political support, and refused medical assistance.³⁸

It is obvious that the Romanian side, even in the most difficult and confusing situation, was careful not to accept anything from the Hungarian offerings that would give even the appearance of renouncing certain elements of sovereignty. The Romanians checked the Hungarian aid shipments, made sure that armed Hungarian soldiers did not enter the territory of the country and that no Hungarian weapons or ammunition entered. On the one hand, this had a political dimension (the revolution should not win with the help of Hungarian weapons), and on the other hand, the deep-rooted mistrust of the “hidden intentions of the Hungarians” was present.

The Hungarian military leadership did not rule out the possibility that Ceausescu would take provocative action against Hungary at the last minute, in order to preserve his power, so it constantly gained information about the state and movement of the Romanian army and had accurate knowledge of it from the summer of 1989. A significant part of the Romanian army's land and air forces and the most modern units were located close to the Hungarian border, and the Securitate had modern armaments. Minister of Defence Ferenc Kárpáti personally inquired about the events in Timisoara with his Romanian partner, Minister Vasile Milea. During a morning telephone conversation on 17 December, Milea stressed emphatically and repeatedly that the army had not been deployed and would not be deployed against the people in Timisoara. Milea asked whether “the news is true that certain Hungarian organizations are recruiting Hungarians in Hungary to help the people of Timisoara.” He asked for this to be prevented, as Romania's sovereignty would be protected in any case. The next day, Kárpáti learned that Milea *“had been the victim of an assassination, because he was opposed to the decision to use the army to crush the insurgents.”*³⁹

Milea either deliberately misled Kárpáti about what the army was up to in Timisoara, or he did not foresee the events himself, but in any case, the Romanian army was actively involved in the bloody repression of the Timisoara movements from the evening of 17 December.⁴⁰ The army relocated after Ceausescu escaped on 22 December. Milea's other suggestion (and this seems to be the main message) is the recruiting in Hungary for the assistance of the revolutionaries in Timisoara (Milea apparently meant armed men). It is questionable whether this was based on real information, or rather there was a rumour, perhaps a conscious misinformation in the background, or even more it was a tentative remark to assess the Hungarian reaction. In any case, Kárpáti took it seriously and asked Prime Minister Miklós Németh to take steps to prevent the recruitments (if any), due to the unforeseeable consequences.⁴¹ Milea's double speech is striking here: after an open conversation with Kárpáti in the morning and a reference to the old acquaintance, Milea already spreads at home on the afternoon of 17 December that Hungary is preparing for aggression, while it is clear to him that this is not the case. It is conceivable, however, that he, too, just

³⁸ KÁRPÁTI, Ferenc: The Romanian Revolution and Hungary, 1989. Memory of a former minister; History 2000/4.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolu%C8%9Bia_Rom%C3%A2n%C4%83_din_1989#Timi%C8%99oara:_Radu_cel_Frumos

⁴¹ KÁRPÁTI op. cit.

wanted to meet the expectation that the external danger should be magnified and presented as imminent.

In the confusing situation, in the absence of information to be substantiated from other sources, it was understandable that Kárpáti treated as a fact that Milea was killed on Ceausescu's orders. However, this is an issue that has not been fully clarified so far, and in any case, there are several circumstances in which he could have committed suicide.⁴² Vasile Milea's role in the revolution is still controversial: Some see him as a hero, but eyewitnesses said he personally directed actions against revolutionaries in Bucharest on 21-22 December.⁴³

From the beginning of the events in Timisoara, the Hungarian Ministry of Defence was in constant contact with the Romanian army General Staff, which was essential for making the right decisions. It was reassuring to the Romanian side that a higher degree of combat readiness was ordered only for those Hungarian troops that were in dire need of it, and more than half of the conscripts were allowed on leave for the year-end holidays.

Low flying helicopters of the Securitate troops posed the greatest threat to the Hungarian border guards, but measuring them with locators caused serious problems in the foggy weather. Romanian helicopters violated Hungarian airspace five times. The Hungarian fighter jets would have been able to destroy the targets after three to four minutes of flight time, but the helicopters left Hungarian airspace within a short time on each occasions.⁴⁴

The liquidation of Securitate's forces was helped by the redeployment of some of the Hungarian People's Army's special radio measuring units near the Romanian border, making it possible to measure Securitate's radio stations. According to Romanian sources, Securitate's radio-electronic jamming activities were intended to support the appearance of an external intervention with the aim of causing confusion and persuading the Romanian military to respond with air defence weapons against the (fictitious) air targets created by Securitate. By escalating the conflict, Securitate was trying to give the impression of a total war against an unidentified enemy. The fact-finding following the revolution clearly proved that the radio-electronic jamming originated from Romania.

⁴² https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasile_Milea. Interestingly, a 2009 recollection on Milea of General Victor Stanculescu, later Minister of Defence: „*I'll even tell you the fact that Milea was a sentimental, emotion-driven type: if someone was in trouble, he helped, but as soon as he got an order from Ceausescu, he panicked and was very rude at the time.*”

⁴³ „*Your father, Milea, will show you what a tank means*” jurnalul.ro, 04/12/2009.
<https://jurnalul.ro/stire-decembrie-89/va-arata-tata-milea-ce-inseamna-un-tanc-529348.html> (downloaded 26 April 2022)

⁴⁴ KÁRPÁTI op. cit.
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From 25 December onwards, there was an increasing weakening of Securitate signals activity, and of the 31 radio centres detected by locators of the Hungarian People's Army 5 remained actively broadcasting on 26 December.⁴⁵

Debate in the Hungarian internal politics about the military assistance

At the time of the revolution, the opposition forces, which were already playing an active role and preparing to take power from the governing MSZP, also took the initiative and made proposals to the government to help the revolutionary forces. There was a consensus among Hungarian political actors that the victory of the revolution should be helped even with ammunition and equipment, although there was some confusion as to whether there was a real need for this on the part of the Romanian side. Another question – which has become the subject of a heated debate between the government and MDF – was whether the fight against Ceausescu should be supported by external (Hungarian, international) troops. Here is a comparison of how the actors recalled the issue of Hungarian military support and the related debate on arms / ammunition and troop deployment.

According to Gyula Horn's recollections,⁴⁶ on 23 December, the Romanian ambassador in Budapest announced by telephone "the army had run out of ammunition and there was no connection between its units." In response, the Foreign Minister assured the ambassador that Hungary would provide all possible support to the insurgents, "because the Securitate units loyal to the hiding couple of Ceausescu will endure to the end, and there was a real danger that the uprising would be crushed". Horn discussed the matter with the army chief of staff, who immediately offered all the help, and in the evening, the Hungarian side informed the insurgents that it was ready to send ammunition and weapons. The new Romanian leadership (Horn mentioned Dumitru Mazilu, Adrian Sirbu and Ion Iliescu by name⁴⁷) thanked for the military support offered and asked that "in order to deter the Securitate men, the Hungarian mass media should say that all humanitarian forces in Hungary are ready

⁴⁵ URSU – HODOR – THOMASSON op. cit. p. 153. In the last sentence, the authors cite the statement of 26 December by spokesman of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence György Keleti. In an interview on December 28, György Keleti confirms what had been said by Kárpáti and adds that Lt. Gen. Eftimescu, Deputy Chief of Staff, assured Kárpáti by telephone that the Romanian army would not attack Hungary and had no negative intentions. Kárpáti refers to the good relations previously established with the Romanian military leaders, which could be capitalised on during the revolution. In: CSEH; Éva – HOLLAUER, Tibor – NEJ, György: A condinator végnapjai – România 1989 decembere / The Last Days of the Conducator - Romania December 1989; Idegenforgalmi Propaganda és Kiadó Vállalat, Budapest 1990. p. 230-231.

⁴⁶ HORN, Gyula: Cölöpök / Piles; Zenit Könyvek, Móra Ferenc Ifjúsági Könyvkiadó, Budapest 1991. pp. 271-272

⁴⁷ Dumitru Mazilu (1934-) is a diplomat, politician, dissident in the last years of the Ceausescu era, and vice-chairman of the Council of the National Salvation Front. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dumitru_Mazilu

Adrian Sirbu (1955-) film director, businessman. In the days of the revolution, he made recordings from the building of the Communist Party of Romania Central Committee. [https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adrian_S%C3%A2rbu_\(om_de_afaceri\)](https://ro.wikipedia.org/wiki/Adrian_S%C3%A2rbu_(om_de_afaceri))

Ion Iliescu (1930-) politicians. President of the NMFT until 1992, then President of Romania from 1992-1996 to 2000-2004. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ion_Iliescu

to provide unlimited assistance to the Romanian Revolution” and to encourage Hungarians to encourage the Romanians through the TV and radio to support the new Romanian powers.

Opposed to this, Prime Minister Miklós Németh in his recollections states that the Romanian side thanked him, but rejected the Hungarian offer to supply arms and ammunition.⁴⁸ Ferenc Kárpáti writes that the Romanian leadership has firmly refused such offers. The Minister of Defence, in response to a letter from József Antall dated 24 December, in which the President of MDF called for “*immediate support for the Romanian army fighting for the freedom of the country [...] with ammunition and equipment*”, notes that “*it reflected a great incompetence, as the Romanian army had large stockpiles of ammunition.*”⁴⁹

From the above, it can be concluded that in the days of the revolution, a number of contradictory news circulated in government circles, due to the opacity of the situation in Romania. We have no reason to doubt that the Romanian ambassador in Budapest did ask Horn for help, but it is questionable on whose authority he did so. However, the new Romanian political and military leadership had consistently refrained from accepting Hungarian weapons and ammunition.

Let's now look at the debate on sending a team. In a letter to Horn on 19 December, József Antall requested that the MDF statement be forwarded to the UN Secretary-General and the President of the EP. According to the statement, the events in Timisoara “justify the extraordinary convening of the UN Security Council and even, if necessary, the UN General Assembly” – as there was a danger that the Romanian dictator would try to stabilize his own situation with a military attack on Hungary, citing Hungarian provocations. On 22 December, Sándor Tóth, the driver of an MDF aid consignment, was shot dead near Arad, so on 23 December, MDF urged the Prime Minister once again to initiate the immediate convening of the UN Security Council. According to Antall and Jeszenszky, “as the struggle for freedom of the peoples of Romania is being tried to be quelled with the help of foreign mercenaries [...], it is entirely justified to call for a UN intervention, the deployment of peacekeeping troops and anti-terrorist commandos.”⁵⁰

There were also two incidents in connection with the deployment of troops on 23 and 24 December, which were later remembered differently by MDF and socialist

⁴⁸ OPLATKA, András: Németh Miklós, "Mert ez az ország érdeke" / "Because it is in the interest of the country", Helikon kiadó 2014. p. 308. The recollection also covers the role of General Victor Stanculescu, through whom the Hungarian military leadership kept in touch with and informed the Romanian partner about the Securitate movement during the revolution.

⁴⁹ KÁRPÁTI op. cit.

⁵⁰ JESZENSKY; Géza: Kísérlet a trianoni trauma orvoslására. Magyarország szomszédsági politikája a rendszerváltozás éveiben / An attempt to cure Trianon trauma. Hungary's neighborhood policy in the years of regime change; Osiris Kiadó, Budapest 2016. pp. 41-47. Jeszenszky also quotes a similar initiative by the SZDSZ to deploy UN-led international military forces to assist the Romanian Council of National Salvage Front and the Romanian army. According to the SZDSZ, in the event of such a scenario, Hungary, whether or not participating in the operation, must once again formally declare that it respects the territorial integrity of Romania.

government. Gyula Horn writes about this on 24 December:⁵¹ “.... *they called on TV that they had received a letter sent to the Hungarian government with the signature of József Antall and Géza Jeszenszky so that the TV had to inform the audience. The MDF letter stated, among other things: ... “We call on the Hungarian government to contact the already recognized National Rescue Council of Romania and offer to send a goodwill mission of the Republic of Hungary (!) to assist the organization of the deployment of international anti-terrorist forces under Romanian command. With Romania's consent, some members of the Warsaw Pact and NATO could be asked to send specially trained counter-terrorism forces ...”* . “I got embarrassed, and when after long search by telephoning I found him, I cried at him that they have broken our agreement and their proposal is a complete nonsense. He got confused and kept repeating that he had no authority to withdraw the letter. I was forced to go into the TV studio where I protested against the claim in the letter read in the TV before. It made no sense to involve the two federal blocs, as we have to think about the future, too and if we involved NATO and the Warsaw Pact, later nobody could deny of the General Staff of the Romanian Council of National Salvage Front that they have overthrown a ‘legitimate’ regime with outside help. Ammunition and weapons may be sent, but soldiers may not be sent under any circumstances.” The previous agreement that Horn said the MDF executives had violated was that they ought to have consulted with Horn before making any statement on the events in Romania. Jeszenszky, on the other hand, refutes what Horn described, according to him, he did not have a telephone conversation with Gyula Horn, when Mr. Horn would have yelled at him and would have described the MDF's proposal as insane.⁵²

This interlude was preceded on 23 December by another one, which pointed out even more sharply the differences of opinion between the government and MDF, but also the division lines within the MDF. Members of the MDF presidency György Szabad, Lajos Für and Zoltán Bíró, initiated a meeting with Kárpáti at the “Rock”, alas the Operations Centre of the Hungarian People’s Army, where the military spokesman, György Keleti, was also present. The Minister of Defence describes that György Szabad – in a “shocking tone” – reproached that the Hungarian leadership was looking at the Timisoara genocide with his arms folded, doing nothing. The MDF delegation presented its proposal to initiate the deployment of Warsaw Pact and NATO anti-terrorist units. According to Kárpáti, this could still have been supportable, although it was known that neither the Warsaw Pact nor the NATO member states were willing to do so. However, MDF leaders also suggested that “the Hungarian military leadership should facilitate the arming and sending of volunteers to Romania.” As he writes, the minister was in dire need for self-discipline at the meeting, in which he firmly rejected “*the accusations made in an offensive tone and their astonishing suggestion.*” According to the minister, the purpose of the visit may have been for the MDF delegation to feel out “*the attitude of the Hungarian military leadership towards such a hair-raising idea.*”⁵³

The case also appears in Miklós Németh's recollections: “*If we think about the emotions that could be mobilized in Târgu Mureş (and in Romanian society in general) in March 1990, it is better not to imagine what would have happened if we*

⁵¹ HORN op. cit. pp. 273-274

⁵² JESZENSKY op. cit. p. 46

⁵³ KÁRPÁTI op. cit.

*had taken radical steps on the Hungarian side in December 1989. Because when bloody clashes took place in Timisoara, some hot-headed MDF functionaries suggested that we organize 'free troops' to take action against the Securitate in Romania. Some have even added that this is now a historic moment to invade Transylvania. Then I was accused of missing the big opportunity. It was an irresponsible and baseless accusation. [...] The intention to classify the Hungarians as scapegoats was hanging in the air. The bullyboys and accusers did not take into consideration that about two million Hungarians would have been hostages in the hands of the Romanians, in case of any Hungarian military operation."*⁵⁴

Géza Jeszenszky tries to reconstruct and interpret in detail what happened at the "Rock" Army Operations Centre, although he was not present at the meeting in person. Jeszenszky cites the recollection of Lajos Für in 2003, in which the later Minister of Defence described that "during the outbreak of the Romanian Revolution, they talked with Zoltán Bíró about whether there would be room for a clever settlement of the matter at this favourable moment. But there may also be a need for effective – and not just verbal and diplomatic – assistance to the Hungarians of Transylvania in the bloody upheaval". However, as Für writes, "*Antall considers the idea itself to be crazy. No matter how Romania's internal circumstances develop, we must not intervene on a military level, even indirectly*". Antall asked György Szabad to go to the meeting with the Hungarian military leadership as well. According to Für, "*Antall and Kárpáti had probably coordinated their standpoint before their actions!*" The Hungarian military leadership refrained from any Hungarian intervention in "*the internal turmoil of another country, in an eventual civil war*". György Szabad agreed with the Army leadership's position on behalf of MDF "*and praised the prudent and wise conduct of the military leadership.*"

Jeszenszky also refers to György Szabad's recollection of 2000, in order to clarify the issue: "*above all, I spoke about the unquiet public mood, quoting extensively from sober and justified and naive and angry statements made during and outside the meetings. It is possible that the Minister, who had arrived in the meantime, not knowing this, considered the opinions and questions I have recalled to originate from me [...]. Only this can save him from classifying the 'tone' I use as 'shocking' and 'offensive' in his recollection. [...] Our delegation did not come up with 'amazing proposals'*⁵⁵

According to the above, Für and Bíró would have considered a stronger Hungarian action possible (necessary?), including sending Hungarian free troops to Romania, against which Antall and Szabad followed a cautious line. It seems as if Antall had asked Szabad to be part of the delegation as a "counterweight". Taking it into consideration, it is surprising that Kárpáti criticizes the moderate Szabad for his "shocking tone", while according to Für, it was Szabad himself who agreed with and praised the prudence of the Hungarian military leadership. Jeszenszky claims that he himself, as the head of the MDF Foreign Affairs Committee, did not hear a word at that time about sending Hungarian free troops and volunteers. Lajos Für and other members of the leadership certainly "*must have talked about what to do with the situation [...], but the MDF leadership did not authorize anyone to mention the*

⁵⁴ NÉMETH op. cit. p. 308

⁵⁵ JESZENSKY op. cit. pp. 43-44

sending of free troops,” and only the Warsaw Pact and NATO were to be called for joint action, in order to prevent genocide and in order to stop terrorist acts, and these units would have operated under Romanian command. Jeszenszky notes, that “in the event of a worsening situation in Romania, it was a more realistic and better proposal to send NATO and Warsaw Pact troops than a regular or voluntary Hungarian armed force. Greater international attention and presence would have benefited Romania’s majority and minority populations, and perhaps could have prevented the anti-Hungarian atrocities in Târgu Mureş in March.”⁵⁶

Conclusion

The revolution that unfolded on 17 December hit Romania and Hungary unexpectedly. As the then Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Armed Forces László Borsits said in an interview, “*a series of unforeseen events has become very important, among them the Romanian Revolution that began on 16 December 1989.*”⁵⁷ In Romania, looking at the events, the ambiguity was clear, otherwise it is difficult to explain why on 15 and 16 December the “*political police did not disband the small sympathy protest organized to support Pastor László Tőkés. It is precisely due to the insecurity of power that encouraged Hungarian and Romanian believers, and later the city's population*”. This also suggests that there were no external intervention plans, because the all-encompassing Securitate would have been aware of them and would have prepared in advance for suppressing any eventual movement. Ceausescu did not take the warnings seriously either, as he, too, knew that there were no such plans, and he only voiced the existence of an external threat to divert public attention from the internal problems. This is also supported by the fact that the party secretary left for Iran on 18 December without further ado, when already bloody events were taking place in Timisoara. The theory of alleged external intervention has been repeatedly refuted by historians and Romanian military leaders involved in the events; yet, the theory of Soviet-Hungarian diversion lives on and remains so in Romania as long as there is a political interest in maintaining distrust with Hungary and Russia.

The Hungarian political and military leaders did their best in the days of the revolution. They reacted quickly, contacted the forces against Ceausescu, and actively helped them with all available means, making sure to stay within the framework set by the Romanian side. There is no indication that any offensive preparations would have taken place on the Hungarian side. Despite the distrust of the Romanian side, the Hungarians have insisted on a policy of unconditional military and humanitarian support, and on the avoidance of a possible Hungarian-Romanian military conflict. All this happened despite the fact that during 1989, there was a growing threat from Romania, which did not take concrete form, but was strongly present in practice and verbally. Despite the troop movements near the Romanian border and the border

⁵⁶ JESZENSKY op. cit. pp. 44-46.

⁵⁷ NÉMETH, József Dr.: Irányított interjú Borsits László ny. vezérezredessel / Directed interview General (ret.) László Borsits; Hadtudományi Szemle, Budapest, 2014/2. http://real.mtak.hu/16669/1/2014_2_f_nemethj.pdf (downloaded 26 April 2022).

Borsits says that in order to coordinate and conduct tasks related to the revolution, they set up an operational group at the General Staff, which monitored the events in Romania.

violations (due to the persecution of refugees), despite the news on nuclear armament and the historical demand for border change or the cooperation with the Little Entente countries, the Hungarian leadership insisted on a sober, prudent policy, and hoped for a turnaround as soon as possible and for the normalization of bilateral relations. This was the objective of Gyula Horn's visit to Bucharest on 29 December, at the head of a delegation that also included Chief of Staff László Borsits, who personally discussed the possible support to be given to the Romanian army, as well as other issues of cooperation.

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RÓBERT VENDRICZKI¹

THE REPATRIATION OF HUNGARIAN POWS FROM VIETNAM (1951-1955)

Abstract

A large number of men who emigrated from Hungary to Western Europe between 1944 and 1948 joined the legion in the recruitment offices of the French Foreign Legion located in these countries, and took part in the First Indochina War. In the fights in North Vietnam, some of them were captured or deserted voluntarily, while others started to fight against the French colonial forces, after joining the Vietnamese People's Army. In 1950, the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, including Hungary, officially recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. North Vietnam established bilateral diplomatic relations with each country, within the framework of which, prisoners of war or former legionnaires were repatriated. These people returned home from Vietnam via China and the Soviet Union and at home were often used for propaganda purposes.

Keywords: North Vietnam, Soviet Union, China and the Hungarian People's Republic, Foreign Legion, First Indochina War, captivity or transition, bilateral diplomatic relations, Socialist countries, repatriation

Introduction

Although numerous scientific works have been written about the first Indochina war, in most cases we can find only slight references to the soldiers of Hungarian citizenship or Hungarian origin, who fought in the legion and then were captured or deserted voluntarily to Vietnam, or about the process of their repatriation. The archival sources relating to them have not yet been fully processed. My aim is to draw conclusions from the previously published works, and use the results of my research on prisoners of war (POWs), based primarily on archival research,² including also the unpublished archival sources. In this study I present the daily lives of legionnaires captured, or those who deserted in Vietnam, as well as the circumstances of their repatriation and their route home, referring to the related and actual political situation. In addition, I enclose a table in my study, containing the most important information on Hungarian prisoners of war, also based on archival research.³ It is clear from the table that during the fighting in the autumn of 1950, on the front line from Lao Cai to

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² I carried out the major part of my research in the National Archives of Hungary (Magyar Országos Levéltár; MOL.) in Budapest. I supplemented this with a web search interface for the '*Mémoire des Hommes*', database of those who died for France in the Indochina War.

³ In the table I found the names of 105 Hungarian citizens or persons of origin in various documents of the MOL, I indicated "no data", which I did not find in the Hungarian and French archival sources.

Lang Son,⁴ and in 1954, in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu,⁵ many soldiers voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese or were captured in large numbers by the Vietnamese People's Army.

During the First Indochina War of 1946–1954, quite many Hungarian citizens serving in the foreign legion fought on the territory of Vietnam as soldiers of the French colonial army, officially called Far Eastern French Expeditionary Corps (French abbreviation: CEFEO).⁶ Although the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs was aware of the fact that Hungarians were also fighting in CEFEO, it did not pay any attention to it until 01 July 1949, when an interesting article on the international unit fighting in Vietnam appeared in a publication issued by the Vietnam Information Office: “*The formation of international units of the third zone has begun, after a short ceremony held in North Vietnam, 30 km from Hanoi. This group consists of young soldiers of different nationalities: Germans, Africans, Hungarians, Portuguese, French, etc. All of them have come from the ranks of the French Foreign Legion, after being persuaded to fight against a nation whose sole purpose is to achieve national independence.*”⁷ (Translated by Róbert Vendriczki)

This writing drew attention to the Hungarian soldiers taking part in the fighting in Vietnam, be it a converted, a prisoner of war or an enemy soldier, fighting in the ranks of the Foreign Legion. Earlier that year, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) issued an amnesty decree on prisoners of war. Based on this decree, agreements were concluded with the Hungarian People's Republic, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) on the repatriation of prisoners of war.⁸ Furthermore, in 1949, the socialist Hungarian government did not rule out the possibility that the legionnaires can request to return home voluntarily.⁹

⁴ KIS, Tibor: Megtépázott „Grandeur.” Dien Bien Phu, 1954. (Battered "Grandeur." Dien Bien Phu, 1954. Translated by Robert Vendriczki) http://acta.bibl.u-szeged.hu/5104/1/belvedere_2007_003_004_011-031.pdf. (downloaded 05 May 2022)

⁵ WINDROW, Martin: The Last Valley. Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam; Cassell, London, 2005.; ONDRÉK, József: Francia műszaki csapatok a Dien Bien Phu-i ütközetben (French Engineering Corps at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu) http://epa.oszk.hu/02400/02463/00042/pdf/EPA02463_hadtudomanyi_szemle_2019_ksz_209-222.pdf (downloaded 05 May 2022); and SALGÓ, László: „Viszontlátásra tábornokom” – A Dien Bien Phu-i csata. („Goodbye, General”- Battle of Dien Bien Phu. Translated by Robert Vendriczki) Kossuth Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 1983.

⁶ French name, Corps Expéditionnaire Français en Extrême-Orient (CEFEO).

⁷ Subject: Hungarians in the Vietnamese army, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 1/7296/1949, XIX-J-1-k. “SUBJECT: Summary of the DRV’s Foreign Policy [in 1961],” 1 February 1962, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Top Secret, Box 3, 002180/1/1962, XIX-J-1-j, p. 6.

⁸ Ho Chi Minh announced the formation of the DRV on 2 September 1945. Although it was recognized as an independent state by the Soviet Union and its allied Socialist countries in 1950, I also use the term DRV for North Vietnam in the spirit of unification for the period before 1950.

⁹ Hungarian foreign affairs wanted to keep the World Federation of Hungarians (WFH) away from those who had been transferred or taken prisoner. According to József Balogh, the then Secretary General of the WFH, in the ranks of the foreign legion approx. There may be 70 Hungarian soldiers and there are some of them with whom they also corresponded. Subject: Hungarians in the Vietnamese army, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 2/5149/1949. XIX-J-1-k.

The issue of the POWs

From Hungarian archival sources, it can be clearly seen that the communist forces in North Vietnam, led by Ho Chi Minh, have made a determined effort since 1949 to stabilize those territories that they had already taken with various economic and domestic and foreign policy measures. Their further goal was to develop a government there, in line with their aspirations, a government which is also recognized internationally.¹⁰ Therefore, the DRV had several reasons for “getting rid” of prisoners of war and volunteer legionnaires.

From the economic point of view, the feeding of prisoners was rather strenuous for the Vietnamese, as in 1949 and 1950 rice production fell short of the multi-year average.¹¹ Moreover, they themselves had destroyed substantial rice-producing areas, so that they did not fall into the hands of the French colonial forces. Due to the lack of medication and poor hygiene, there were many prisoners in the detention camps, who suffered from beriberi, malaria, eczema, or other illnesses. Medication for prisoners of war could only be solved by receiving supplies of medicine from the host countries, including Hungary. Thus, they were able to start medical treatments in Vietnam, which was carried out by the camp patient caregiver.¹² The shipments of medicines were sent to the Vietnamese prison camps with the help of the Chinese

¹⁰ As a first step, the Chinese Communist leadership led by Mao Tse-tung recognized Viet Minh led by Ho Chi Minh. After that, the United States no longer saw the Indochina War as a colonial war, but as its struggle against the Communists. KEMÉNY, János: A vietnami kudarc hatása az amerikai felkelésellenes elméletre / The Impact of the Failure in Vietnam on the Development of US Counterinsurgency Theory http://www.nemzetesbiztonsag.hu/cikkek/nb_2016_5_11_kemeny_janos_a_vietnami_kudarc_hatasa_az_amerikai_felkelésellenes_elmeletre.pdf (downloaded 28 October 2021) In his study, the author highlights that the Maoist model used by the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese War and also described by Mao Tse-tung was taken over and applied by the Vietnamese during the war against the French. The Chinese/Vietnamese model consisted of three parts: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive. Ibid. Archival sources show that by 1949 the DRV was in the phase of strategic defense. Subject: Recent events and current status of the Vietnam War of Liberation. (Summary), 18 October 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 3, u.n. XIX-J-1-k. This is nothing but "the primary task of the insurgent force is to mobilize politically, gain foreign supporters, gain military experience and reduce disparities over the counter-insurgency force." Kemény. 122. This was followed by a strategic stalemate, which meant the continuation of the guerrilla fighting style, but was also complemented by the traditional warfare of the Vietnamese People's Army, which attacked the enemy's weak points. Ibid. Balázs Forgács also briefly describes this Chinese tactic in his study entitled “Mao Tse-tung” FORGACS, Balázs: Mao Ce-tung. (Mao Tse-tung); pp. 4-5. http://real.mtak.hu/63247/7/196_Forgacs_nke_204_6_2017_allam_es_katona.original.pdf (downloaded 05 May 2022)

¹¹ The Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, Market and Economic Research Department prepared a study on the DRV., in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7. XIX-J-1-k. p. 12. The main food of the prisoners of war was rice. WINDROW op. cit. p 639.

¹² Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam, 27 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00896/1921/1952. XIX-J-1-j. Sources do not reveal exactly what percentage of these medicine shipments actually reached the detention camps.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Hungarian party even requested the Vietnamese side to indicate what medicines were needed.¹³ Despite language difficulties and differences, a serious political education activity was arranged among the prisoners, which was considered successful.¹⁴ The basis for the strong Vietnamese propaganda in the POW camps was the political and educational program with prisoners of war determined by Ho Chi Minh. However, with their political education, the Vietnamese were unable to bring about profound change in the case of many prisoners. What is more, there were prisoners who tried/wanted to mislead the political officer in the prison camp with “*demagogic voices*”, by using what they had learned.¹⁵ Concerning these people, it was generally thought that they should not be released home immediately, but neither was considered expedient the Czechs procedure, according to which none of the former legionnaires who had returned home since 1950 were not yet released.¹⁶ There were also Hungarian prisoners of war, whose political re-education proved to be successful. An example of them was József Üveges, who under the influence of political retraining, took part in a course on land reform in Vietnam at the beginning of 1954. It was thought that in a few years he could become a member of the Communist Hungarian Workers' Party.¹⁷ In addition to the prisoners coming from friendly countries, the political re-education of prisoners from France or other “capitalist” countries was also a priority, and this was particularly true for Bao Dai troops, who were sent back to the French. The successfully brainwashed POWs could have deteriorated the morals of the French troops, for this reason the French forces tried to isolate these prisoners.¹⁸ The Vietnamese emphasized that – according to their knowledge and information – quite many prisoners assisted in the work of anti-Indochina war movements after returning to France. Meanwhile the Hungarians, with the help of Vietnam, also started using the prisoners of war for propaganda purposes. An example of this was, for example, the following letter written by Hungarian

¹³ This was necessary because Vietnam was only asking for medicine. To this, the Hungarian embassy in Beijing indicated that “*we could send medicines to Vietnam again, but we do not know enough about the conditions there to decide what and how much they need.*” (Translated by Róbert vendriczki) Compare it, subject: Vietnamese medicine shipment. 27 August 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00407/4/1953 XIX-J-1-j and ibid, 1745/12/1953.

¹⁴ Particular emphasis was placed on those who had a proven far-right mindset, and quite a few people were considered politically completely backward.

¹⁵ For the most part, political education was used for relaxation, however, when the possibility of returning to the world flashed before them, they embraced socialist thoughts out of interest because they would have been liberated from Vietnam. NAGY, György Lajos: Idegenlégiós emlékeim; Dávid Könyvkiadó, Szeged, 1997. p. 151 and pp. 175-176.

¹⁶ Subject: Dinner with Vietnamese comrades. Beijing, 9 February 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5/Annex 3, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j. p. 3.

¹⁷ Subject: Transfer of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 11 September 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/1/1954, XIX-J-1-j.

¹⁸ According to the Vietnamese, the French tried to take the beginning of the transition by portraying the atrocities committed by the legionnaires and the troops of Emperor Bai Dai (also called gray partisans) fighting with them as similar atrocities of the Vietnamese. Also, after the fighting, the corpses of legions killed or mutilated by Vietnamese forces were used for their propaganda (the report said it had been proven in several cases that the mutilations were carried out by the French themselves). Subject: Dinner with Vietnamese comrades. Beijing, 9 February 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5/Annex 3, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j. p. 3.

prisoners of war camp No. 2 (on the territory of North Vietnam) to the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic:

01868/1/1952

"A letter from the prisoners of war of POW Camp No. 2 in Vietnam to the Democratic Government of Hungary.

We, the prisoners of war, living in one of the prisons without bars in the free Vietnam, are addressing the Democratic Government of Hungary, in order to talk about what our lives are like and what hopes we have.

Vietnam, the young democratic republic, which we fought against in the ranks of the French reactionary army as ignorant and unconscious mercenaries, has made our eyes open. From the first day of our captivity among the people of the fiery and brave Vietnamese nation, filled with the noble idea of freedom and independence, we have understood – without the slightest physical or moral coercion – those striking realities that we never noticed while we were only narrow-minded legionaries, obscured by the propaganda of lies. We have understood and learned to admire the Vietnamese cause. We have understood that we participated as attackers in a war led by imperialists and colonizers. We have understood that we were the pawns of international imperialists, who wanted to force the most hateful servitude over a nation, under the pretext of colonization, which can only benefit the exploiters and can bring ruins, blood, tears and mourning to the country.

We welcome and appreciate the political information provided by Vietnam to the prisoners, who have recognized their mistakes. Now that our eyes have been opened, we ask the democratic institutions and the People's Government of Hungary to give us the opportunity of repatriation, so that we can continue our fight we have joined in, walking alongside of the sons of our country.

We are fighting to avert a third world conflict that the American imperialists are trying to launch against the Soviet Union and the democratic countries, in order to overcome the democratic ideology they fear of very much.

We are fighting for world peace in the north of Vietnam.

*Signed by: József Babai, Sándor Csontos (Csontos), Gyula Hrubos, Anton Polyvasz, Gábor Rátz, József Papp, Zoltán Stveretzhý, Pál Sípos, József Ság and Péter Vörös.*¹⁹
(Translated by Róbert Vendriczki)

The prisoners coming from the friendly and capitalist countries were segregated, and then the prisoners from socialist countries were taken to a “*return facilitating camp*”. In the camps, prisoners had to do physical work, including repairing roads damaged by bombings, and maintaining irrigation canals, or participating in any other work. Several Hungarians were duly recognized and lauded for their honest and good work. At the same time, the Vietnamese confessed that in the initial period, some violence had to be used against legionnaires captured. Later, the situation and the relationship returned to relatively normal.

¹⁹ Subject: Visit of Vietnamese Secretary Nguyen. Beijing, 27 December 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 7, 01868/1,4/1952, XIX-J-1-k. The report also points out that the exact date of its creation is not known, but it is probable by 10 October 1951.

Camp life was not limited to life inside the camp, because the prisoners were allowed to move around freely and some people were able to take up jobs in the area.²⁰ Their work was especially needed because Vietnam had received large quantities of machine tools from China. They were scattered in various village houses or worked in the rainforest. The electricity for the villages was developed with small generators, and the prisoners of war helped a lot to put the system in operation. The Vietnamese themselves claimed they did not suffer from a shortage of munitions, due to the fact that they could produce them.²¹ For this reason, the work of prisoners of war was badly needed, because besides other things, such as caring for rice fields, building irrigation systems and repairing roads, they were also involved in this military-industrial background activity. According to the report, those living in the camp received their pay mostly in rice, a part of which they sold for cash, and they were provided with clothing as well.²² The camps themselves were built by the Vietnamese in villages abandoned during the fightings. These villages were also attacked by the French troops.²³ This is why the Vietnamese, among other things, regularly signaled to the Hungarian embassy in Beijing that the number of the actual staff they gave was always flexible, because there were unforeseen deaths, due to diseases and attacks.²⁴

No distinction was made between the prisoners and the voluntarily deserted legionnaires, because the Vietnamese found that there were prisoners who proved to be much better both at work and behavior, than certain converted persons. One was considered to be a prisoner in case he had surrendered and showed no further resistance, consequently that person was kept alive. However, the soldiers who resisted were killed, because the main goal of the Vietnamese fighting style was to inflict as a great loss as possible on the enemy, both in terms of human resources and in terms of supply. The phenomenon of legionnaires switching to the North side was deduced from three reasons. Committing a very serious crime or disciplinary offense that would result in blatant and severe retaliation even in the French Expeditionary Army was considered to be the most important argument. Homesickness was considered to be another reason.²⁵ Finally, it was also mentioned that the legionnaires' transition could be the result/consequence of Vietnamese agitation. They maintain that there were legionnaires who left the French army and switched to the Vietnamese side

²⁰ They were also under surveillance during their stay outside the camp. Escape from the POW camp was also very risky because in the jungle you had to worry about possible attacks by wild animals, or if the Vietnamese peasants had found them, they would have been killed. In addition, the boots were taken from the prisoners and they were abused, including Lajos György Nagy, when they were taken prisoner. NAGY op. cit. Despite all this, however, there were some who tried to escape several times, such as Sergeants Szeged and Kemencei. Of course, they were also abused as multiple relapses. WINDROW op. cit. pp. 641-642.

²¹ Subject: Dinner with Vietnamese comrades. Beijing, 9 February 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 065/1953 and 0034/8/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

²² Subject: The case of prisoners of war. Hanoi, 24 January 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004102/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

²³ Louis. György N. p. 125.

²⁴ Miklós Lénárt, Péter Fendler (Feudler), Zoltán Stveretzhý and József Mihály Sági (Ságy) also died in the Vietnamese prison camps.

²⁵ Subject: The case of prisoners of war. Hanoi, 24 January 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004102/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

specifically for this reason.²⁶ Another reason that they did not make a difference between prisoners and deserted soldiers was that, in their view, during the fighting, all of them allegedly harmed the Vietnamese people in some way. It was believed that there were soldiers among them who brutalized the civilians during the so-called “*Carte Blanche*” cleansing operations, though they denied it later, during their interrogations in Vietnam. However, in terms of propaganda, a certain distinction was made, because the deserted people facilitated the processes of further desertion and thus, they were able to disintegrate the French forces. Both before and after 1950, the deserted people were given the opportunity to fight the French, but after the organization of a regular Vietnamese People’s Army and the expansion of the partisan movement nationwide, the Vietnamese considered it unnecessary to use them in combat any more. So they were basically used for propaganda work, or if they had some technical knowledge, they could be used in this field as well.²⁷ There were also individuals who deserved the rank of officer for their standing in battles, but they were not considered “persons reborn in their beliefs”, either. According to the iron logic of their military way of thinking, a former mercenary would/could never become a person who would fight with death-defying courage for their cause, as they were thought to be unaware of the significance of the struggle of the Vietnamese people. The Vietnamese also believed that among the deserted persons, there were people who tried to gain only an advantage by joining the Vietnamese forces. Several Hungarians also switched to Vietnamese side for this reason. The Vietnamese authorities also emphasized that the repatriation of deserted or captured legionnaires was important and desirable, because they were in danger of losing their patience or they would have tried to return to CEFEO,²⁸ which could have been used for propaganda purposes by the French and for gaining valuable information from them regarding the Vietnamese forces.²⁹

The logistics of repatriation

The repatriation of prisoners of war also became important in foreign policy terms, as a kind of diplomatic gesture to the Soviet Union and socialist states, in return for their officially recognizing the DRV in 1950. Hungary officially recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 3 February 1950, and on 21 December 1954 relations were established at ambassadorial level.³⁰ Later – besides the Soviet Union – the Hungarian People's Republic became one of the most dedicated supporters of

²⁶ Subject: Repatriation of Vietnamese prisoners. Beijing, 20 March 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7,403329/1951.XIX-J-1-k.

²⁷ In 1949, the Vietnam People's Army (formerly the Vietnam Liberation Army) formed its first regular unit, the 308th Infantry Division, in which Paul Hákfelner also fought against CEFEO in several battles. Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 19 February 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 6, 11/1/1955.XIX-J-1-j.

²⁸ There were prisoner-of-war camps where Vietnamese camp inspectors also held a “Who Knows What” competition to resolve tensions. NAGY op.cit. pp. 167-168.

²⁹ Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 19 February 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 6, 11/1/1955.XIX-J-1-j.

³⁰ Subject: Relations of the Hungarian People's Republic with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam [in 1957], in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, 00031/14/1957. M-KS. 288f32 p. 1; and Subject: Open Telegram, 3 February 1950, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 1, 0540Vi3-2/Táj /478. XIX-J-1-k Vietnam(1945-1964).

North Vietnam. This treaty also helped in strengthening the system of relations between the state defense and the law enforcement agencies. However, the relationship between the friendly countries and the VDK was always controlled by the Moscow leadership; for example, the correspondence between the Hungarian and DRV leaders. In 1951, Mátyás Rákosi and Ho Chi Minh travelled to the Soviet Union.³¹

The repatriation of prisoners of war was also a challenge, as the logistics of transporting them from Vietnam – through China and the Soviet Union – to Hungary had to be coordinated. This was done by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the Hungarian Embassy in Beijing. On 1 July 1950, Huen Uen Hvan, the Chinese government's envoy to the Vietnamese government,³² visited the Hungarian embassy in Beijing to discuss the repatriation of Hungarian prisoners of war, who had been transferred to or imprisoned by the Vietnamese People's Army, because there were those who would have remained in Vietnam.³³ For the latter, the Chinese commissioner asked if the Hungarian government would object to those who wanted to stay in Vietnam helping with the construction. The envoy ambassador indicated that he would ask the government for this, but in his own opinion, he would find nothing in it to charge. If Hungarian prisoners of war want to stay voluntarily, they can also help Vietnamese. The question of "*repatriation*" itself is quite interesting from the point of view of the former legionnaires, as several of them wanted to return to the French,³⁴ but the current foreign policy and the war situation did not allow it.³⁵ This situation is very well reflected in the recollection of György Lajos Nagy (L. GY. N.). *"As strange as it may sound: it might have been easier to get to Hungary, many, many thousands of kilometers away, than to the French, barely a hundred kilometers*

³¹ Subject: Vietnamese letters. Budapest, 9 May 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 05330/1951. XIX-J-1-k.

³² In the early 1950's embassies deployed by the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) represented the Democratic Republic of Vietnam upon request. Such was the case with the Chinese Embassy in Moscow. In Beijing, however, Vietnam was represented by Huen Uen Hvan and an interpreter named No Dien, who was in Hungary in 1949 as a participant in the Vietnamese youth delegation at the Youth Festival held in Budapest that year. Compare it, subject: the repatriation of Vietnamese prisoners of war. Beijing, 8 July 1950, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 4, 024426/1950 and 359/biz. -1950. XIX-J-1-k.

³³ Subject: Repatriation of Vietnamese prisoners of war. Beijing, 7 July 1950, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 4, 024426/1950. XIX-J-1-k.

³⁴ Béla Márton was the first to ask himself to the French, but later he changed his mind and chose to return to Hungary. Compare it. Subjects: Return of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 11 March 1955, and the return of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 28 March 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 001110/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

³⁵ Most of the captured or converted legionaries left the country in 1944 or fled to the west, and a smaller proportion dissociated after the "liberation" (1946-48). According to the Vietnamese report, the reason for joining the Legion was unemployment in the vast majority of their confessions, but there were those who, fleeing adventure or conscription, cut into legion life. These 22 Hungarian prisoners were questioned by the Vietnamese army on 22 July 1952, but were reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 21 November 1952. Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 8 October 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/11/1952.I. XIX-J-1-j.

*away.*³⁶ I think that the possibility of “escaping” abroad (west) again may have played a role in their decision, as this could have been easier from Hungary than from Vietnam. However, if we examine the possibility of returning from a spiritual point of view, they may also have been influenced by homesickness and the possibility of meeting their family. The latter is also illustrated by L. Gy. N. in a letter sent to his mother.³⁷

“Far East”, 25 August 1950

(Before imprisonment)

TO MY MOTHER

I'm writing a letter to you today, my mother,

Look at my handwriting, your child is still alive.

My soul goes home in quiet nights.

I'm always home with a Bright Star,

Whicht shines so beautifully over you too.

I know you weren't forgotten at home, even though you were buried in thought.

Don be afraid.

I'm not dead.

And when the time comes,

I'll be home again.

In my farewell letter I write this to my Mother,

Your love, light, I all took them with me,

God bless you forever my Good Mother.

However, I hope to see you again,

Please God, He will help me trustingly...

I'm closing my lines with lots and lots of kisses, Mom.

Your son is far from Vietnam, Lala.” (Translated by Róbert Vendriczki)

The return of the former legionnaires was arranged by the Department of Democratic Countries of the Far East in China, which was in constant consultations with the Department of Citizenship of the Ministry of the Interior.³⁸ However, due to the peace system that ended the First World War, the issue of Hungarian citizenship was not always clear, and sometimes it was even coupled with political and diplomatic content. Such was the issue of prisoners of war living in Yugoslavia and belonging to the Hungarian minority. During this period, there was no diplomatic relationship between Vietnam and Yugoslavia, and there was a political conflict of interest between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, therefore, the former soldiers of Yugoslav citizenship, but of Hungarian descent wanted to return to Hungary.³⁹ In the case of Vietnamese prisoners of war of dubious nationality, the Citizenship Department of

³⁶ NAGY op. cit. p. 177.

³⁷ Ibid. pp.120-121.

³⁸ Margit Gárdonyi was who dealt with the repatriated persons. Subject: The Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 7 October 1952, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 4, 7/1877/A-IV. XIX-J-1-k.

³⁹ It was József Csikvári, Lajos Urmankovich and Pál Aradi (Aladi) who asked for their return to Hungary. Subject: The case of József Csikvári. Hanoi, 5 May 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004121/1955. XIX-J-1-j. The latter person also had two different surnames within a record. Subject: The case of legionnaires. Hanoi, 29 August 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004143/5/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

the Ministry of Interior initially decided on the basis of the information available, initially received from the Beijing Embassy.⁴⁰ This was later changed because, at the request of the Hungarian ambassador (Safránkó Emánuel 1890–1965, Minister to Beijing between 1949–1950, Ambassador 1950–1953 to Beijing),⁴¹ the citizenship of their relatives was also examined, in order to make a clearer decision on the issue of citizenship.⁴² In such cases, according to the new changes, the father of the prisoner of war was considered to be of Hungarian origin, so he was born in Hungary. But even he was considered a Hungarian citizen who was born not on the territory of the current Hungary,⁴³ but on the territory annexed by the Treaty of Trianon before 26 July 1921, and already lived in Hungary on 1 January 1948.⁴⁴ Regardless, there was also a person like János Pokorný, who was initially considered a Czechoslovak prisoner, but was handed over to the Hungarian authorities in the summer of 1953.⁴⁵ Just to make it easier to establish citizenship, the Hungarian embassy in Beijing asked the Vietnamese for photo material of the prisoners to be repatriated. Legionnaires' personnel were received from the USSR and Southeast Europe Division of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 18 November 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/8/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

⁴¹ Safránkó Emánuel 1890–1965, Minister to Beijing between 1949–1950, Ambassador 1950–1953).

⁴² Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 24 October 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/4/szig.biz./I./1952. XIX-J-1-j.

⁴³ Therefore, Ákos Alajos Buzáth and László Kulacs were considered Hungarian citizens by the Citizenship Department of the Ministry of the Interior, but János Pokorný, Sándor Szabó and Péter Fendler could not comment on his Hungarian citizenship in his absence. The reason was that they were born abroad, but were later classified as Hungarian citizens. In addition to them, József Lösinger, László Koncz and Zsigmond Domé were considered to be of dubious citizenship. Compare it. Subject: Citizenship of László Koncz and Zsigmond Domé, prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 1 October 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/2/1952; Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 1 October 1952, Box 5, 001684/2 / szig.biz. I./1952. Moreover, subject: Citizenship of Hungarian Prisoners of War in Vietnam. Budapest, 9 October 1952. Box 5, 01124/3/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

⁴⁴ Compare it. Subject: Visit of Vietnamese Secretary Nguyen, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 01868/1,4/1952; in MOL, Top Secret, Box 7, 0384/5/1952 and 0384/6/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

⁴⁵ As he was born in Breznóbánya in 1916, he was a Hungarian citizen, but due to the territorial annexations of Trianon (then it belonged to Czechoslovakia), it was not clear to either the Hungarian or the Czechoslovak side, but they managed to agree on their affiliation. Compare it. Subjects: the case of János Pokorný, a Hungarian prisoner of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 27 February 1953., Oral note. Budapest, 7 July 1953, and the case of the Hungarian prisoner of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 28 May 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 7, 0034/11/1953; 0034/14/1953 and 0034/15/1953. XIX-J-1-k.; and subject: The case of Vietnamese prisoners of war. Budapest, 21 March 1953, Box 5, 0034/10/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁴⁶ In addition to the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Balkan Department of the MID (Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Foreign Minister Slang in Encrypted Telegram.) Was also interested in the personal materials of the former legionaries. Subject: Vietnamese prisoners of war. Moscow, on 27 November 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/1952. XIX-J-1-k.




Figure 1: Minutes of the interrogation recorded by the Vietnamese
Source: Hungarian National Archives. Photo by Róbert Vendriczki

During his visit to the Hungarian Embassy in Beijing, Hoang Nguyen, Second Secretary of Vietnam, said that obtaining the documents requested by Hungarians was quite cumbersome and difficult in connection with the repatriation of prisoners of war. In order to repatriate the prisoners as quickly as possible, he noted that "*the Germans (GDR) and the Czechs repatriated everyone and thus relieved the Vietnamese comrades.*"⁴⁷

Repatriation through the People's Republic of China

Once they had established their Hungarian citizenship, it was up to the ambassador to decide to what extent they could use them for propaganda when they returned home. For this reason, the embassy had to send a detailed report on the returnees. The repatriation of Hungarian prisoners of war began in 1951, although the signing of the convention in Geneva on 20 July 1954, ended the 8-year war in Vietnam, which ended in heavy losses on both sides,⁴⁸ and in 1955 a repatriated legionnaire was sent home. The return journey itself was organized on the basis of separate consultations with Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union, as the designated route itself was encrypted. The costs of the Hungarian prisoners of war wishing to return home through the Chinese border were borne by the Vietnamese government.

⁴⁷ Subject: Visit of Vietnamese Secretary Nguyen. Beijing, 27 December 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 01868 /1,4/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

⁴⁸ Compare it. Subject: Vietnam armistice. Beijing, 25 July 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 3, 08058/1954. XIX-J-1-k.; and subject: Summary Report on the Implementation of the Geneva Ceasefire Convention. Hanoi. 14 February 1956, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 003056/3/1956. XIX-J-1-j.

The costs of the trip from Beijing to Budapest were borne by the Hungarian government, all from the "aid for Hungarians abroad" fund.⁴⁹ Transporting prisoners to the Vietnam-China border can take up to three months,⁵⁰ because Vietnam started collecting the returnees only when the Chinese embassy of the member state where the prisoner comes from has stated that they will take them over. There were also people in these camps who had lived there for three to four or five years. The foreign ministries of the host countries were asked to send embassy workers to the camp. This was also the case on 21 January 1955, when the embassies of the friendly states (Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the GDR) visited the Vietnamese "*return camp*" set up 65-70 km from Hanoi. The purpose of the visit was to reassure people, who had been living in the camp for several years that they sooner or later can return home.⁵¹ In terms of cost-effectiveness, they waited until a sufficient number of legionaries "*wanted to return home*" and then began collecting only the prisoners who had to walk to the Chinese border,⁵² Pingxiang.⁵³ Furthermore, the Chinese authorities had to wait for the host country's promise that they bring home the prisoners of war from China as soon as possible. Therefore, the issue of the Soviet visa and the logistics of transportation through the Soviet Union must be clarified before the prisoners of war arrived at the territory of the country.⁵⁴ The Hungarian embassy applied for the visa from the Soviet Embassy in Beijing.⁵⁵ The Vietnamese were tasked with transporting the prisoners from the prison camp to Nanning,⁵⁶ but the Chinese soldiers had already joined the escort from the border post as they were gathered where they were housed in a barracks.⁵⁷ They lived in this concentration camp for 3-4 weeks, because they were malnourished and some prisoners also had the disease. Therefore, they were allowed to leave when they had recovered from their illness and became strong enough to withstand the vicissitudes of their journey home and received the necessary vaccinations. The prisoners were granted a photo visa without a photo and their military books were confiscated. For prisoners under the Hungarian-Chinese

⁴⁹ Subject: Repatriation of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 1 December 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 4, 01127/1951. XIX-J-1-k.

⁵⁰ Compare it. Subjects: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam, 27 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00896/1952.; and Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 13 June 1952, 00896 / sec.biz.1952 / I. XIX-J-1-j.

⁵¹ Members of the embassies found the camp as satisfactory as possible. Subject: The case of prisoners of war. Hanoi, 24 January 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6. 004102/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

⁵² Ibid. Subjects: The case of former legions. Hanoi, 8 February 1955, 004143/4/1955; and communication from the Ministry of the Interior. Budapest, 14 June, 1955, 001110/2/1955.

⁵³ The town is located in the southwestern part of the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region in China and is connected to Nanning by a railway line. Read more at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Pingxiang-Guangxi-China>. /Downloaded: 15 June 2021./

⁵⁴ Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 7 June 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00896/sec.biz.1952. I. XIX-J-1-j.

⁵⁵ Ibid. Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 11 November 1952. 001684/7/1952.

⁵⁶ On the Vietnamese side, some shipments were also named, such as "*Peace to Vietnam*".

⁵⁷ The city of Nanning is located in southern China, near the Vietnamese border.

Treaty II. Class 1 the prisoners were provided with food,⁵⁸ and the Hungarian embassy also provided the prisoners with seasonal clothing and appropriate medical care.⁵⁹ All costs were borne by the embassy, which was always settled in arrears by the Hungarian embassy in Beijing, still from the "Assistance for Hungarians Abroad" program.⁶⁰

Transit costs in China			
Date	Yuan or Ruble	Number of persons (repatriated)	Name of service
14.03.1951.	20000 ruble	14	Food, transportation, health care, toiletries and clothing.
28.10.1952.	88000-110000 yuan	22	Ibid.
23.03.1953.	33322.300 yuan	17	Ibid
31.07.1953.	6000 yuan	3	Ibid.
20.10.1954.	7068.800 yuan	no data (n.d.)	Ibid
Summary (ruble)	20000	-	-
Summary (yuan)	134391.1-	-	-
	156391.1		

*Figure 2: Transit costs in China
(Author's own edition)*

The Chinese Foreign Ministry had indicated to the Beijing embassy that at the same time as the prisoners of war arrive in Nanning, they should also expect a foreign politician to take over them and inform them that they will be used for political propaganda.⁶¹ Therefore, the Hungarian embassy asked the Vietnamese for an accurate biography of the prisoners of war. Upon arrival in Nanning, they were received by a representative of the Chinese Foreign Office and Le Van, who was the Vietnamese leader of the prisoner shipment.⁶² An impromptu discussion was also held here, where it was agreed that in order to contact the prisoners, it was better for the foreign politician to travel in the same wagon with them, and thus the secrecy of the consignment was better resolved.⁶³

⁵⁸ In the winter they waded cotton clothes, boots, a change of underwear, a cap, towels and soap, while in the summer they received summer clothes and two orders of inferior sex.

⁵⁹ The Chinese did not admit the seriously ill, but if someone got sick there, they took care of them.

⁶⁰ Compare it. Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 23 March 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/12/1953; 0034/17/1953; and Travel of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 10 September 1953, 0034/22/1953, XIX-J-1-j.

⁶¹ This person was mostly Károly Csatorday (1926–1972). Ibid. Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 18 November 1952, 001684/8/1952. From 1951–55 he served in Beijing and then from 1955–56 in Hanoi. Read more, <https://www.arcanum.com/en/online-kiadvanyok/Lexikonok-magyar-eletrajzi-lexikon-7428D/c-cs-74E9A/csatorda-karoly-74F62/>. (downloaded 5 May 2022)

⁶² He described his reports on the basis of personal conversations with prisoners of war. Ibid. Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 4 November 1952, 001684/4/1952.

⁶³ They only deviated from this once, when, under an agreement with the Czechoslovak embassy in Beijing, one of the employees of this embassy accompanied the repatriated prisoners of war to the Soviet-Chinese border. Subject: The case of Vietnamese prisoners of war. Budapest, 15 June 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004143/2/1955, XIX-J-1-j.



Figure 3: Map of China⁶⁴

Repatriation through the Soviet Union

During the trip, the returnees could get acquainted with the propaganda materials of the Hungarian People's Republic and the Soviet Union.⁶⁵ From Pingxiang and later from Nanning, touching Tianjin and Beijing to Manchuria, they went by rail through the city of Manzhouli to Otpor (now Zabaykalsk) to the Soviet border crossing, where they were already waiting for the Soviet law enforcement officers and the representative of the Hungarian embassy, who took over the prisoners.⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Source: <http://kinaterkepeknet>. (downloaded 7 July 2021) The route was marked by the Author.

⁶⁵ Subject: A trip to Nanning, Beijing, 7 February 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 5, 063/1953.XIX-J-1-j. Occasionally, things taken on the road, such as talking to prisoners, were not allowed by Vietnamese or Chinese guards either. This was reported by the embassy to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, who acknowledged the mistake. They made sure that this did not happen later. Subject: Transfer of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 11 November 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/1/1954.XIX-J-1-j.

⁶⁶ Compare it. Subjects: Vietnamese prisoners of war. 12 February 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/6/1953; and Hungarian Prisoners of War in Vietnam. Budapest, 13 January 1953; 0034/1/1953/I XIX-J-1-j. Furthermore, subject Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 20 January 1953. /Speaker: Károly Csatorday./ in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 058Szig. Biz 1953.XIX-J-1-k; and subject: Vietnamese prisoners of war. Moscow, 27 November 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/1952.XIX-J-1-k.

The Soviet authorities considered it necessary to send the Hungarian envoy to the border.⁶⁷ The number of Soviet escorts was also made dependent on this, as the Soviet authorities also provided escorts in military and civilian clothes to the returnees,⁶⁸ but it was resolved in such a conspiratorial way that the posted foreign politician did not know that person either. As well as the meals in Soviet territory were handled through a Soviet travel agency, "Intourist", together with a train ticket and cigarettes. These were billed by the Soviet Foreign Ministry. The following costs were incurred in connection with the repatriation of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam.⁶⁹

Transit costs in the Soviet Union, in 1953.		
lot number	cost (rubles)	name
229.	994.40	Railway ticket Chop-Budapest and purchase of cigarettes.
564.	19375.42	railway ticket Otpor-Chop and purchase of cigarettes.
564.	211	Meals in Otpor
Inturist travel agency costs	1218.50	Meals Moscow-Tap
Summary (rubles)	21799.32	-
Summary (Hungarian Forint)	64456	-

*Figure 4: Transit costs in the Soviet Union in 1953
(Author's own edition)*

The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that it must be notified of the date of arrival of the prisoners, ten days before their arrival at the Soviet-Chinese border. This was later changed to seven to eight days.⁷⁰ At the Soviet border, the staff of the GDR diplomatic mission was represented in the largest numbers at the reception of the prisoners, because in addition to the employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior, a doctor was also present.⁷¹ His job was to

⁶⁷ In addition, the MID (Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Foreign Minister Slang in Encrypted Telegram.) Balkan Department was also interested in the personnel materials of the former legions. Subject: Vietnamese prisoners of war. Moscow, 27 November 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

⁶⁸ Ibid. Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 10 November 1952 001684/9/1952.

⁶⁹ Subject: Costs related to Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Moscow, 19 May 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/16/1953. XIX-J-1-k.; and subjects: The return of the former legionnaires. Hanoi, 17 December 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 9, 00437/1956. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷⁰ Subjects: The Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 13 December 1952, 0034/4/1953 and Hungarian Prisoners of War in Vietnam. Budapest, 13 January 1953., in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/1/1953/I. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷¹ Hungarians were always represented by only one person at the reception of the prisoners.
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treat the German returnees who had fallen ill in the meantime, but he also cared not only for them but also for the Hungarian prisoners of war, although also the Soviets assigned an accompanying doctor.⁷²



Figure 5: Map of administrative divisions of the Soviet Union⁷³

The returnees were taken from Otpor through the city of Chita to Moscow, where they spent several days, but there was a turn when they were in a Soviet prison during this period,⁷⁴ and from there they were transported to Chop to the Soviet-Hungarian border.

Return to Hungary

They deviated from this in one case, when in 1953, the Soviet authorities separated two Hungarian prisoners from the other prisoners and detained them in Chita. For this reason, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not receive a reply

⁷² Sándor Somodári also survived his illness in this way. After the German group separated from the rest of the group, the doctor left a larger amount of medicine than the Hungarian group, because the former medical student Ákos Buzáth was able to treat them if necessary. It was also needed because Buz Rudolf, on 15 February 1953, became ill on the Moscow-Chop line, but his injections improved his condition. Ibid. Subject: Transit of Hungarian Vietnamese prisoners of war through the Soviet Union. Moscow, 23. February 1953, 0034/86/1953. in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷³ <https://www.alamy.com/map-of-administrative-divisions-of-the-soviet-union-1974-image454755671.html> (downloaded 02 July 2021) The route was marked by Author.

⁷⁴ NAGY op. cit. p. 193.

from the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. The Hungarian Ministry made it probable that during the return journey, the Hungarian returnees did travel via Moscow, but they reached Chop from Novosibirsk toward Kharkov.⁷⁵

From Chop, the prisoners of war were brought to Záhony, Hungary, where the State Defense Authority (Hungarian abbreviation: ÁVH) was waiting for them.⁷⁶ The embassy informed the law enforcement authorities of the date of their return, and the authorities had taken other security measures related to their return until then. After returning home, they were detained by the SDA for a week and then placed in a common accommodation for a few days.⁷⁷ SDA also used them for propaganda purposes, and with a strong influence they also wrote "*letters formulated by them*" to Mátyás Rákosi and Ho Chi Minh.⁷⁸

'Mátyás Rákosi, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic and Secretary General of the Hungarian Workers' Party.

We are 14 former Hungarian Foreign Legionary Prisoners of War, we thank you for the great human love that allowed us to return to our country, which we left unfaithfully after the liberation.

We have committed the sin of taking up arms for the sake of the French and American imperialists and fighting the Vietnamese people, who are fighting with indefinite enthusiasm, with deadly contemptuous courage, against the French colonizers at the mercy of the American imperialists. With this act, we have seriously sinned not only against the Vietnamese, but also against the Hungarian people. We later realized that the imperialists had deceitfully deceived us. When we were captured, Ho Chi Minh, the hero leader of the people of Vietnam and his freedom fighters, did not take revenge on us for our sins, but on the contrary released us and allowed us to see our country, our family, again before the end of the fighting.

You have shown us the great and sincere love that all members of the Hungarian people feel. We promise you that we will do our utmost to help the great cause of peace, to build socialism in our country, so that we can make amends for what we have done against our people. We ask you to allow us to do our full part in this great work. Budapest, April 1951.' (Translated by Róbert Vendriczki)

After they left the SDA, they were placed by the Citizenship Department of the Ministry of the Interior, but this did not always happen, because the prisoners of war who returned home in April 1951 were placed by the World Federation of Hungarians,

⁷⁵ Subject: Travel of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 10 September 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/22/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷⁶ NAGY op. cit. p. 194.

⁷⁷ Prisoners taken over in 1951 were placed in the Mária Street Home (Budapest, Mária Street 56) after the examinations. Subject: Summary report on the release of former prisoners of war of Hungarian origin in Vietnam, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 001684/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

⁷⁸ However, there were also those who did not sign the letter as prisoners of war because they voluntarily switched to Vietnam. The report also revealed that they had stood up for themselves and objected to the way they were cared for. Therefore, some turned to the World Federation of Hungarians and took up their cause. One of them was even interviewed by the "Szabadnép" newspaper, according to the report. Ibid.

and they also received clothes from them.⁷⁹ Returning to the country to make it easier, some complained or reported the other's legionary actions. Such was also the case of István Fánci, who told information about Jenő Éltető that he lied many times, took advantage of József Sándor during the trip home, and then he cheered Miklós Horthy several times when he returned home. He also noted that Zoltán Gruber had fled to Germany in 1952.⁸⁰ Precisely because of the possibility of emigration, the VDK indicated that they had requested information on the further fate and behavior of the repatriated prisoners for fear of fleeing to the West and sharing information with the French military about the Vietnamese People's Army and the country's internal life. German prisoners of war also found that there were built-in agents among those who converted or were taken prisoner. It was also possible that they wanted to go to the West, more precisely to France, because their salaries for their time in the Foreign Legion were placed in the banks.⁸¹ After returning home, several were imprisoned with the intent to discipline them, or because they had a prison sentence to be served from before.⁸² The research results of Béla Nóbé also confirm this, when he described in his doctoral dissertation.⁸³ *"Some of those who returned home from Vietnam were also relatively 'luckier' who escaped with a few months of internment or agency recruitment, but were also sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison for espionage and / or war crimes, most of whom were released during the revolution. But all this remained the "internal affair" of the ÁVH and the Hungarian courts, for which no further assistance from the Far East or the Soviet secret service was required. "* (Translated by Róbert Vendriczki) However, there were legionnaires who did not flee the country, but took an active part in the Hungarian Revolution of 1956,⁸⁴ and of course there were those who remained inactive and did not take their share of the fight but tried to focus on their private lives.

Conclusion

During the Franco-Indochina War, many Hungarian citizens or legionnaires of Hungarian descent fought in CEFEO, on the territory of North Vietnam. Several of them were taken prisoner or voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese for objective reasons. From the latter, there were those who fought against their former

⁷⁹ Subject: The Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 7 October 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 4, 1877/A-IV. XIX-J-1-k.; and subject: It is a matter of returning from Vietnam. Budapest, 31 January 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 7, 011845/1954. XIX-J-1-k.

⁸⁰ Subject: The Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 21 October 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5. 001792/1. XIX-J-1-j.

⁸¹ Later, several emigrated west again. Subjects: Transfer of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 11 September 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/1/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

⁸² József Gyula Zimancsik/Zemancsik, as he had an unserved prison sentence, was taken back to the "Csillag prison" in Szeged. Subject: He had returned from Vietnam in April 1951 as a legionnaire. Budapest, 15 February, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

⁸³ NÓBÉ, Béla: «PATRIA NOSTRA» '56-os menekült kamaszok a Francia Idegenlégióban; <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/73977733.pdf>. (downloaded 5 May 2022)

⁸⁴ Ibid. pp. 90-92.

breadwinner. But when the Soviet Union took the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under its "wings" in 1950, and the socialist states, including Hungary, recognized the DRV, they sent home the prisoners of war and displaced persons, in return for establishing bilateral diplomatic relations. The newly established relations were strictly controlled and managed by Moscow and the Kremlin. The return of the prisoners of war was arranged by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, more precisely by the Hungarian Embassy in Beijing, just as they paid for the expenses incurred on the road leading home, from the "*Assistance for Hungarians Abroad*" fund. There were not only political, but also economic and other reasons for getting rid of the legionnaires. Among other things, diplomatic relations established and strengthened through prisoner exchanges, helped North Vietnam and Soviet Union to gain advantages in Southeast Asia, offsetting China's influence in the Indochina region.

As a result, prisoners from the capitalist and socialist countries were separated from each other. The latter were taken into a "return facilitation camp", where they also received political education and continued to do so until their arrival in Hungary. During their return, an employee of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs traveled continuously from the Chinese concentration camp to the Hungarian border, keeping an eye on them. At Záhony, the State Defense Authority was waiting for the former prisoners of war, who were used after their return home for propaganda purposes, among other things. In this way, helping the Soviet Union's struggle against the "imperialist" West, Mátyás Rákosi also expressed his loyalty to the new post-Stalinist leadership in Moscow, because the Hungarian treatment of legionnaires and the behavior of the Hungarian People's Republic were not determined by humanitarian but ideological considerations. Thus, it can be stated that the "general positive tone" both in the archival sources and the recollections reflect primarily the influence of the political culture of the period, and it is much less justified by the raw facts revealed in the present dissertation.

In summary, further research is needed to better understand the pre- and post-lives of legionnaires, and what happened to them in the camp of prisoner-of-war and during the trip home.

Prisoners of war of Hungarian citizenship and origin in Vietnam between 1948-1954								
Serial number	Name	Date of birth and Place of birth	Position, registration number ¹ , name of military unit	Date and place of arrival in Vietnam	Prisoner of war ² or voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese ³ or desertion	Time and place of captivity or transfer	Comment	After-life
1.	Aradi (Aladi) Pál	13.06.1919. Ófutak (nowadays Futak) Yugoslavia	no data	April 1947 no data	voluntarily switched	April 1948 no data	In May 1944, after the German occupation, he was sent to work in Germany, and in 1945 he was taken prisoner of war by the United States. He enlisted in the French Foreign Legion in December 1946. He was commanded in Indochina in 1947, where in 1948 he switched to the side of the Vietnamese. ⁴	no data
2.	Babai József	no data	legionary (private) no data 3. REI ⁵	no data	pow	no data	no data	no data

¹ Abbreviated: r.n.

² Abbreviated: pow.

³ Abbreviated: voluntarily switched.

⁴ Subject: The case of legionnaires. Hanoi, 29 August 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004143/5/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁵ 3. REI: 3rd Foreign Infantry Regiment (in French: 3. Regiment Etrangere d'Infanterie). Today, in terms of the dislocation of this regiment, it is serving in French Guiana. Read more, <http://foreignlegion.info/units/3rd-foreign-infantry-regiment/> (downloaded: 17 April 2021)

3.	Benik László ⁶	22.05.1925. Galgahévíz	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	no data	no data
4.	Borbás (Barabás) Armand	29.10.1925. Budapest	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	195.08.04. no data	He moved to Austria in 1945, where he sustained himself from dubious shops when he could already prove more to escape. He joined the French Foreign Legion in 1948. He switched in 1950, then worked in the woods of Camau as a logger. He later also worked as an electrician. ⁷	no data
5.	Bognár István ⁸	no data	corporal r.n.37324 3/13 DBLE ⁹	no data	pow	04.04.1954 . Dien Bien Phu ¹⁰	no data	no data
6.	Buz Rudolf	27.07.1926. Nagykőrös	legionary (private) r.n.62820 1/5. REI ¹¹	02.07.1949 Haiphong	voluntarily switched	29.11.1949 Hoa Binh	He fled to Germany in February 1947, with his wife Portangel Elfrida and a son, Rudolf. On 10.01.1949, he joined the French Foreign Legion in	no data

⁶ Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 9 May 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004143/1/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷ Ibid. Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 19 February 1955, 11/1/1955.

⁸ Ibid. Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, 00947/2/1954.

⁹ 13.DBLE: 13th Demi-Brigade of the Foreign Legion (in French: 13e Demi-Brigade de Légion Étrangère). Read more, <http://foreignlegion.info/units/13th-demi-brigade-of-the-foreign-legion/> (downloaded: 17 April 2021)

¹⁰ Abbreviated: DBP.

¹¹ 5. REI: 5th Foreign Infantry Regiment (In French: 5.e Régiment Étranger d'Infanterie), their nickname was the “Tonkin Regiment”. Read more, <http://foreignlegion.info/units/5th-foreign-regiment/> (downloaded: 17 April 2021)

							Villingen. He took part in the fighting in Hoa Binh in Vietnam and was also taken prisoner there. After switched, he took part in political work on the side of the Vietnamese. He shouted with a microphone in his hand to the enemy side and called them to surrender. He also distributed this in the form of a leaflet. ¹² He was first offered to return home in 1950, but he did not accept it because he wanted to repay it to the Vietnamese, but he had already accepted the 1951 request. He suffered from swamp fever in the POW camp.		
7.	Buzáth Alajos	Akos	18.12.1924. Erfurt (Germany)	corporal r.n.50261 3. REI	06.07.1949 Saigon	pow	23.09.1950 Dong Khe	Before 1947, he left the country for Romania and from there went to Germany. He joined the French Foreign Legion in Villingen (Germany) on 08 September 1947. He worked for the Vietnamese army as a camp nurse. According to the report, he was misbehaving and often stole drugs to sell. ¹³	no data

¹² Subject: untitled. In MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

¹³ Ibid.

8.	Csantos (Csontos) Sándor¹⁴	13.02.1928. Kiskunhalas.	legionary (private) r.n.55222 1.BEP ¹⁵	no data.	pow	07.10.1950 Dong Khe	no data.	no data
9.	Csibra Tibor	02. 02.1928. Budapest	legionary (private) r.n.51899 1.BEP	20. 10.1949. Haiphong	pow	08.10.1950 Lung Phai	In 1947 he went to Austria and worked as a miner. On 11 December 1947, he joined the French Foreign Legion in Vienna. He took part in the fighting in Vietnam and then took part in roadworks during his captivity. According to the camp description, he was well behaved and had knowledge of communist ideals as well. He was also involved in the French cleansing operations, the "Carte Blanche". ¹⁶	no data.
10	Csikvári József¹⁷	no data.	no data.	no data.	pow	no data.	The Vietnamese could not extradite József Csikvári to Yugoslavia because there was no diplomatic	no data.

¹⁴ Although in the 1951 letter the prisoner of POW camp No. 2 is written to Sándor Csantos and according to legionary sources who fell in battle or died in POW camps in Indochina, the name of the person who fell at Dong Khe on 07 October 1950 is Sándor Csontos. I believe that on this day he did not die but was taken prisoner and may have used the name Bone in the Legion or a spelling was made in his name. Both names denote the same unit. What's different is that the website says Class 1 Legionnaire has a letter that says Class 2 Legionnaire. Subject: Visit of Vietnamese Secretary Nguyen. Beijing, 27 December 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 7, 01868/1,4/1952. XIX-J-1-k.; and <https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/en/ark:/40699/m00523>. (downloaded 17 April 2021.)

¹⁵ 1. BEP:1st Foreign Parachute Battalion. Later, it became the 1st REP, the 1st Foreign Parachute Regiment (In French: 1 Bataillon Etrangere Parachutiste), which was disbanded after the Algerian coup. Read more, <http://foreignlegion.info/units/1st-foreign-parachute-regiment/> (downloaded 17 April 2021)

¹⁶ Subject: untitled. In MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

¹⁷ Subject: The case of József Csikvári. Hanoi, May 05, 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 004121/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

							relationship between the two countries at that time, and there was a political conflict of interest between the Soviet Union and the latter state.	
11	Csiszár László (Saszlo) ¹⁸	no data.	corporal r.n.60768 1/13.DB LE	no data.	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data.	no data.
12	Debreceni Ferenc (Francois) ¹⁹	no data.	sergeant r.n.60306 2.BEP ²⁰	no data.	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data.	no data.
13	Dobai József ²¹	15.01.1930. Nyírmada	legionary (private) r.n.76981 2. REI ²²	1951.05.19 Saigon	pow	29.12.1951 Ba Vi	He fled to Germany in 1949 and joined the French Foreign Legion on 15 September 1950. His first services took place in Bizerte, Tunisia, and he was later transferred to Vietnam, where he took part in the fighting in Phu Tai in December 1951 before being captured. He suffered from swamp fever in the POW camp.	no data.

¹⁸ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j. doboz.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ 2.BEP: The 2nd Foreign Parachute Regiment (In French: 2e Régiment étranger de parachutistes). Read more, <http://foreignlegion.info/history/2rep/2nd-foreign-parachute-battalion/>. (downloaded: 17 April 2021)

²¹ Subject: Summary report on the release of former prisoners of war of Hungarian origin in Vietnam, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 001684/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

²² 2.REI: The 2nd Foreign Infantry Regiment (Francia: 2^e Régiment Étranger d'Infanterie). Read more, <http://foreignlegion.info/units/2nd-foreign-infantry-regiment/>. (downloaded: 17 April 2021)

14	Dombai István	23.12.1928. Gyula	no data.	1948, April 1953 and May 1954.	voluntarily switched	02.08.1954	He escaped to Germany in 1945 and from there went to Austria, then joined the French Foreign Legion on 26 June 1948. Back in that year he was commanded to Indochina and from there to North Africa and in 1953 he again served in Vietnam. He was disarmed on 26 July this year, but the following year he had re-entered the Foreign Legion and called on Indochina to serve again and then switched to the side of the Vietnamese. According to the report, it worked well but was politically uninteresting. ²³	no data.
15	Domé Zsigmond	07.11.1928. Temesvár (nowadays Timisoara) (Romania)	no data	no data	pow	no data	He left for Germany in 1945. After joining the French Foreign Legion and being commanded in Vietnam and captured there. There was a difficulty in repatriating him due to his place of birth and he was not classified as a Hungarian citizen according to the described rules. ²⁴	no data

²³ Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 19 February 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 6, 11/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

²⁴ Subject: Citizenship of László Koncz and Zsigmond Domé, prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 01 October 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/2/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

16	Dukai János	27. 11. 1930. Kecskemét	legionary (private) r.n.51906 13. DBLE	22.09.1948 Cap St. Jacques	pow and desertion	17.01.1950 Cam Ranh	In 1947 he fled to Austria. The reason for his trip was his desire for adventure. On 10 November 1947, he joined the French Foreign Legion in Klagenfurt. He took part in the fighting in Nambo in Vietnam. After his capture, he deserted and continued to fight. He served in the Vietnamese Army in February 1951 in the 803rd Regiment as a group leader. During his captivity, he learned the Vietnamese well and was therefore able to come into contact with the population. And the political education work proved successful for him, because after that he also did it among the prisoners. " <i>Carte Blanche</i> " took part in the cleansing operations against the Vietnamese. ²⁵ He suffered from swamp fever in the POW camp.	no data
17	Engelhardt Adám	1929 Almáskamarás	no data	1953	voluntarily switched	18.02.1954 no data	He left Hungary in 1949 for a serious crime. He joined the Legion in 1953 and entered Indochina immediately and in 1954 switched to the side of the Vietnamese. The camp headquarters reported that	no data

²⁵ Ibid. 0034/8-9/1953.

							he was disciplined and politically correct. ²⁶	
18	Eltető Jenő	05.11.1914. Marosoroszfa lu	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	On 27 December 1944, he was sent to Germany with the 25th Waffen Grenadier Division of the SS "Hunyadi", where he was captured by the French army and then joined the legion. In 1948 he was commanded to the territory of Vietnam, where he was a member of the Vietnamese People's Army from 4 July 1948. ²⁷	He was in the state economy of Pusztabanréve as a payroll accountant. He later asked for the publication of his military book, in which his old military ranks were recognized, and he even asked the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for his Vietnamese papers. He also applied to the Communist Party, but was rejected, after which the AVH visited him twice and fired him. It was located in a mine. In March 1952, he got a job as a cubist at the Road Construction

²⁶ Subject: The case of prisoners of war. Hanoi, 24 January 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004102/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

²⁷ During his repatriation, his documents were taken from him and his returnees, even in Tianjin, and he was then promised to return, but this was not done until August 1951. With this, he could have proved that he had also fought in the Vietnam People's Army. Subject: Letter from Jenő Éltető dated 27 August 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7. XIX-J-1-k.

								Company in Szolnok. ²⁸
19	Gergely Zoltán²⁹	no data	sergeant r.n.44715 3.REI	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
20	Faczan Lajos³⁰	no data	legionary (private) r.n.41634 3/13.DB LE	no data	pow	13.03.1954 DBP	no data	no data
21	Fánczi (Fanczi) István	21.01.1927. Budapest	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	In 1948 he went to France voluntarily. According to him, he did not know that he would be taken to Vietnam, where he served two and a half months before switching. He was the liaison between the Legionnaires and the French Command.	After his return, he did not undergo medical treatment like the other legionaries and then went to work for a building company. ³¹
22	Farkas Géza	28.01.1924. Mezőhegyes	legionary (private) r.n.37108 1. BEP	09.02.1949 Saigon	pow	06.10.1950 Lung Phai	On 26 December 1944, he left the country in the Hungarian army. On 18 March 1946, he joined the Legion in Landau. During his captivity, he took part in road works between March and August 1951.	no data

²⁸ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15.02.1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.; and subjects: Jenő Éltető's letter of 31 December 1951 to the World Association of Hungarians and Jenő Éltető's letter of 09 March 1952 to the World Association of Hungarians, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7. XIX-J-1-k.

²⁹ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

							He reportedly behaved well and was very politically receptive. ³² He was also involved in French cleansing military operations.	
23	Farkas (Parkas) József³³	no data	corporal no data 3/3.REI	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
24	Fendler (Feudler) Péter³⁴	27.07.1922. Temesvár (nowadays Timisoara) Romania	no data	no data	pow	October 1950.	In 1944 he joined the German army. He died in August 1953 of general weakness and a heart attack.	no data
25	Forda (Farda) Lajos	no data	no data	28.06.1948 no data	voluntarily switched	28.09.1948 no data	On 28 March 1946, he went to Czechoslovakia because he took a job there, later escaped to Germany and joined the legion. In Vietnam 19. September 1948. On the 28th he voluntarily switched.	He lived in Sárisáp and worked as a machine operator in the Dorog mine. ³⁵
26	Gácsi Miklós	03.03.1921. Budapest	no data	August 1951.	voluntarily switched	09.05.1952 no data	He dissected on 24 February 1947 and joined the Legion in France in August 1950. He arrived in Indochina in 1951 and was also involved in three military operations. In	no data

³² Ibid. 0034/8-9/1953.

³³ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

³⁴ Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/11/szig.biz.1952. I. XIX-J-1-j.

³⁵ Ibid. Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, 00451/1952.

							1952, he switched. He then stayed in various camps, according to the report, he was trustworthy. ³⁶ He also suffered from rheumatism and malaria in the POW camp.	
27	Graszkity István	05.05.1926. Baja	no data	no data	pow	no data	no data	After his return, he was a brigade leader in the foundry of the Hoffher factory. ³⁷
28	Gruber Zoltán	19.08.1927. Budapest	no data	no data	pow	no data	In 1946 went from Germany to France, where he entered the legion in the absence of papers, under duress.	He worked for a company along the Yugoslav border as a deep drill. ³⁸
29	Hakfelner Pál	27.09.1924. Budapest	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	1949	He dissociated in 1946 and enlisted in the Legion in April 1947. He fought against the Vietnamese in the south, in a swampy floodplain called the Plaine des Joncs. After joining the ranks of the Vietnamese Division 308, he took part in several battles against CEFEO. ³⁹	no data

³⁶ Subject: The case of prisoners of war. Hanoi, 24 January 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004102/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

³⁷ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 19 February 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 6, 11/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

30	Hanglar István (Stephan)⁴⁰	no data	legionary (private) r.n.84506 2/3.REI	no data	pow	01.02.1954 Muong Khoua	no data	no data
31	Holecz József	13.11.1926. Nagykanizsa	legionary (private) r.n.57494 3. REI	27.01.1949 Saigon	pow	October 1950. Lung Phai	He fled to Austria in 1948 and joined the legion on 2 May this year in Klagenfurt. During his captivity, he participated in road construction between March and August 1951. He reportedly behaved well and was very politically receptive. ⁴¹	no data
32	Homann (Homan) József	12.01.1922. Gyulaj	legionary (private) r.n.76091 2. REI	03.09.1950 Saigon	voluntarily switched	09.02.1952 Che Ben	He left the country on 10 January 1944 because of the war. He joined the Legion on 3 September 1950 in Offenburg (Germany). He took part in the battles in Haiphong and Son-Tay in Vietnam. After his transition, he did not take part in fights, but took part in the construction of the concrete forts. ⁴² He suffered from swamp fever in the POW camp.	no data
33	Horváth Ferenc⁴³	no data	legionary (private)	no data	pow	30.03.1954 DBP	no data	no data

⁴⁰ Ibid. Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, 00947/2/1954.

⁴¹ Subject: Untitled, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁴² Ibid. 0034/8-9/1953.

⁴³ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

			r.n.45262 1/13 DBLE					
34	Horváth János (Jean) ⁴⁴	no data	legionary (private) r.n.97887 2/3.REI	no data	pow	01.02.1954 Muong Khoua	no data	no data
35	Horváth József	24.10.1919. Jászapáti	corporal r.n.59622 3. REI	10.10.1949 Haiphong	pow	October 1950 Lang Son	He fled to Austria in August 1948 and then joined the Legion in Innsbruck. In Vietnam, he took part in the fighting in Poma, Phu Ly and Cao Bang. During his captivity, between March and August 1951, he took part in road works. ⁴⁵	no data
36	Hrubos Gyula	09.07.1917. Irsa	corporal r.n.56632 3. REI	no data	pow	October 1951	He died in captivity. ⁴⁶	
37	Imre Tivadar ⁴⁷	no data	corporal r.n.97449 3/13. DBLE	no data	pow	02.04.1954 DBP	no data	no data
38	Izso András ⁴⁸	no data	sergeant r.n.62368 2/3.REI	no data	pow	01.02.1954 Muong Khoua	no data	no data
39	Janoschek János (Jean) ⁴⁹	no data	legionary (private)	no data	pow	17.11.1952 Phu-Tho	no data	no data

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Subject: Untitled, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁴⁶ <https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/en/ark:/40699/m00523af651591fb> (downloaded 17 April 2021)

⁴⁷ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

			r.n.59243 2/2.REI					
40	Kakocs Sándor⁵⁰	no data	corporal. r.n.85871 3.REI	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
41	Katona László (Ladislaus)⁵¹	no data	legionary (private) r.n.91864 3/3.REI	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
42	Kerepesi László (Sanlo)⁵²	no data	legionary (private) r.n.90095 1.CMM LE ⁵³	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
43	Keresztesi (Keresztesy) János	02.12.1927. Debrecen	corporal r.n.53454 3. REI	26.04.1949 Saigon	pow	09.10.1950 Lung Phai	He fled to Germany on 2 December 1945. He joined the Legion in 1948 in France. In Vietnam, he took part in the fighting in Cao Bang in October 1950. After his imprisonment, he took part in road works and reportedly behaved appropriately. ⁵⁴ He is also mentioned in another	no data

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

⁵³ 1. CMMLE: 1st Foreign Legion Mortar Mixed Company (in French: 1. Compagnie Mixte de Mortiers de la Légion Étrangère) Read more, <http://foreignlegion.info/units/1cmmle/>. (downloaded: 17 April 2021)

⁵⁴ Subject: Untitled, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

							document as János Keresztesy. ⁵⁵	
44	Klein Jenő	21.06.1931. Bódé	legionary (private) r.n.65566 1. BEP	14.02.1950 Saigon	pow	07.10.1950 Coc Xa	He left for France on 30 October 1947. Then on 1 July 1949, he joined the legion in Paris. He took part in the fighting in Dong Khe in Vietnam. He also supported Kuomintang troops in northwestern Vietnam. After his capture, he took part in road works between March and August 1951. According to the report, he did a good job as a car mechanic and was also politically correct. ⁵⁶	no data
45	Koncz László	29.07. 1930. Léva (Czechoslovakia)	no data	no data	pow	no data	In January 1947 he went to Czechoslovakia. After joining the legion, he was commanded in Vietnam and captured there. There was a difficulty in repatriating him due to his place of birth and he was not classified as a Hungarian citizen according to the described rules. ⁵⁷	no data

⁵⁵ Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam (Annex), in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 058/Szig. Biz.-1953. XIX-J-1-k.

⁵⁶ Subject: Untitled, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁵⁷ Subject: Citizenship of László Koncz and Zsigmond Domé, prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 1 October 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/2/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

46	Kovács Elemér	10.04.1933. Pécs	no data	09.12.1952	voluntarily switched	25.02.1953	He fled to Yugoslavia in 1951, then from there to Trieste and on 4 April 1952, joined the legion. According to the camp headquarters, he acknowledged that " <i>the Legion is a mercenary army and there man is deprived of his human dignity and the Vietnamese government is humane.</i> " ⁵⁸ Regardless, their opinion of him was overwhelming. He suffered from malaria in the POW camp.	no data
47	Kovács György⁵⁹	no data	corporal r.n.97807 1.BEP	no data	pow	01.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
48	Kovács István ⁶⁰	14.08.1929. Gyöngyös	buck sergeant r.n.57976 2/2,CRE BLE ⁶¹	23.10.194 and 1953	voluntarily switched	04.01.1954 no data	He fled to Austria on 6 June 1948 and enlisted in the Legion in Vienna on the 18th of this month. After five years, he re-enlisted in the Legion for three years in 1953 and	no data

⁵⁸ Subject: Case of prisoners of war, Hanoi, 24 January 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004102/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

⁵⁹ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

⁶⁰ Deserted according to the French database, on December 30, 1953 in Hanoi. <https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/en/ark:/40699/m00523affd262968>. (Downloaded:17 April 2021)

⁶¹ 2.CREBLE: 2nd Foreign Legion Armored Vehicles Repair Company (in French : 2e compagnie de réparation d'engins blindés de la Légion étrangère), Read more, <http://foreignlegion.info/units/2nd-foreign-legion-armored-vehicles-repair-company/> (downloaded: 17 April 2021)

							switched in 1954. ⁶² He suffered from malaria in the POW camp.	
49	Kox Ferenc (Francois)⁶³	no data	legionary (private) r.n.87874 3/13 DBLE	no data	pow	13.03.1954 DBP	no data	no data
50	Kövesdi Rudolf	11.03.1926. Budapest	no data	September 1948.	voluntarily switched	26.12.1948 no data	He served with the Germans against the Yugoslav partisans led by Tito. On 6 September 1944, his unit moved to Transdanubia, where they were deployed in battles. He then moved to Germany and entered the Legion on 12 March 1946 in Mainz. In Vietnam, he surrendered voluntarily.	He had difficulties with his location because he was not found suitable for manual labor at the Hoffner factory. He was then transferred to another job and position by the Labor Management Department of the Metropolitan Council. ⁶⁴
51	Krausz István⁶⁵	no data	legionary (private) szám: 94274 1.BEP	no data	pow	1954.05.07 DBP	no data	no data

⁶² Subject: Case of Vietnamese prisoners of war, Budapest, 15 June 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004143/2/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

⁶³ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

⁶⁴ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

⁶⁵ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

52	Kulacs László	1922.02.08. Medve (Czechoslovakia)	legionary (private) r.n.58982 3.REI	27.01.1949 Saigon	pow	1950.10.10 Lung Phai	He left for Austria in 1948 and joined the Legion in Innsbruck on 4 August. In Vietnam, he also took part in the fighting in Cao Bang as well as in the "Charte Blanche" operations. ⁶⁶ After his imprisonment, he took part in road and camp work, and the report highlighted his disciplined work and interest in communism. L.K. Vietnamese also used punishment, which was not corporal punishment, but spent a few days in the buffalo stable for the purpose of raising the prisoner.	no data
53	Lantos László⁶⁷	no data	legionary (private) r.n.101153 3/13 DBLE	no data	pow	13.03.1954 DBP	no data	no data
54	Lénárt Miklós	20.04.1931. Pestscenterz ébet	no data	04.08.1950 Haiphong	he was taken pow and later desertioned.	1950.09.06 Dong Dang	In 1949 he went to France to find his brother. On 12 December 1949, he joined the Legion in Lille. He served in the Vietnamese Regiment in the Lang Son Regiment. He did not take part in the fighting in Vietnam. He left for	

⁶⁶ Subject: Untile, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁶⁷ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

							France in 1949. Miklós Lénárt died of his illness on 11 July 1952. ⁶⁸	
55	Lősinger József⁶⁹	01.01.1921. Arad (nowadays Oradea) Romania	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	27.01.1947 no data	He came to Germany as a soldier in 1944/45, and on the basis of his information, he was forced into the Foreign Legion on 10 February 1945, as a prisoner of war. On 27 January 1947, he switched sides with the Vietnamese People's Army and fought the French in 32 battles. He suffered from swamp fever in the prison camp.	no data
56	Magda János	29.04.1923. Zsadány	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	He arrived in Germany on 27 December 1944.	He moved to Békéscsaba, settled in and got married. ⁷⁰
57	Magó Gergely	1927.11.30. Kecskemét	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	He was not a soldier and left Hungary for family reasons in 1947 and then joined the Legion.	He first settled at the coal mines in Nagybátony, then in the state economy of Nyilasbesnyő, and later moved from there, so the connection between him and the World Federation of

⁶⁸ Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam (Annex), in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 058/Szig. Biz.-1953. XIX-J-1-k.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

								Hungarians was broken. ⁷¹
58	Magyar József	01.02.1931. Lajosmizse	legionary (private) r.n.76578 5. REI	16.02.1951 Saigon	voluntarily switched	04.07.1951 Che Ben	He left for France in May 1950 and joined the Legion on 7 October this year. After his capture, he did not work for the Vietnamese forces, but was immediately assigned to the group of returnees. ⁷²	no data
59	Mayer József (Joseph)⁷³	no data	sergeant r.n.44373 2.BEP	no data	pow	1954.05.07 DBP	no data	no data
60	Márton Béla⁷⁴	20. 02.1931. Pécs	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	In 1949 he lived on a casual job in Pécs, then in 1950 he worked as an assistant at the First Pécs Leather Factory. From there he moved to Budapest and also worked as an assistant at the Siemens and later the Shell oil and paraffin factory.	no data
61	Mráz József	11.06.1926. Apagy	no data	30.06.1947	voluntarily switched	no data	He was taken to Germany as a "Levente" and returned home on 28 September 1944 and 22 May 1945, but after meeting two former Arrow Cross Party's individuals who interned	He worked at Rákosi Művek as a retrainee. He got married, his wife was a member of the Communist Party, so he was a folk educator in the

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Subject: Untitle, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷³ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷⁴ Subject: Untitle, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

							him in Nyíregyháza on May 28, 1945. After spending more than a year in the internment camp, he escaped and volunteered for the Foreign Legion. After his arrival in Vietnam, he served as a legionnaire for three years before being captured.	Workers' Youth Association (Hungarian abbreviation: DISZ). ⁷⁵
62	Nagy György Lajos	02.06.1929. Budapest	buck sergeant r.n.47624 3. REI	24.09.1948 Haiphong	pow	10.10.1950 Dong Khe	In October 1944, he left Hungary in military service. Then, between 1945-47, he was a prisoner of an American internment camp in Bavaria. From there he escaped to save himself. On 10 April 1947, he joined the legion at Kehl (Germany). He was named in the legionary documents as Lajos Gábor. He was first commanded to Oran, Algeria, on 5 September 1948, and then to Vietnam, where he took part in operations in Phu Ly in May 1950 and in an operation called "Carte Blanche". He didn't really want to return home to	Shortly after his repatriation, he emigrated to the United States and published his legionary memoir there, which was also published in Hungarian in his book, " <i>My years in the French Foreign Legion</i> ", first published in English.. ⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷⁷ NAGY op. cit.

							Hungary, instead he wanted to go to Belgium. ⁷⁶	
63	Nagy József	23.09.1919. Ozora	no data	27.02.1953	voluntarily switched	1953.04.04 no data	From 1947 to 1952 he lived in West Germany and also enlisted in the Legion here. In 1954, he switched to the side of the Vietnamese. According to the POW camp headquarters report, he did not like to deal with politics and was lazy, preferring to talk about French colonizers and Americans. ⁷⁸ According to the report, he suffered from malaria in the POW camp.	no data
64	Nagy Károly ⁷⁹	no data	no data	no data	no data	no data	no data	no data
65	Nyári Elemér	17.02.1929. Enying	legionary (private) r.n.45709 3. REI	13.03.1948 Saigon	pow	15.10.1950 Lang Son	In August 1946 he fled to Austria, where he initially worked as a butcher, and then on 20 February 1947, he joined the legion in Klagenfurt. He was involved in camp and road construction in Vietnam after his capture. According to the Vietnamese report, he was	no data

⁷⁶ Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Peking, 29 August 1953, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/23/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷⁸ Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 19 February 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 6, 11/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

⁷⁹ Subject: Transfer of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 11 September 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/1/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

							lazy and stole, this happened because he refused to accept the food given by the Vietnamese and therefore stole from the other prisoners. Furthermore, political education did not mean much to him because he was uninterested in it. ⁸⁰	
66	Német(h) Jenő	30.11.1923. Szárföld	no data	1949	voluntarily switched	1950 In the territory of South Vietnam	He joined the Legion on November 7, 1947 and moved to Indochina in 1949. After switching, he was involved in building a camp there. According to the report, Borbás is a good friend of Armand. ⁸¹ He also married and had two children from this relationship and thus wanted to return home as a family. Then there was no opportunity for that.	no data
67	Oláh Vince	1931. Mátészalka	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	26.12.1948 no data	He joined the Vietnamese Army in 1949, where he worked as a propagandist for a time and then became a member of Lieu Khu III. commando. Then, after its	He returned to Hungary in June 1956 and worked in the Telephone Factory in 1958 as a grinder. ⁸³

⁸⁰ Subject: Untitle, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁸¹ Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 19 February 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 6, 11/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

⁸³ There is a discrepancy between the report and the resume because the report is about returning 1956 and not about 1957 as you mention in your resume. The date of 1956 may be appropriate because, according to the report of 13 February 1958, "there was no objection to his conduct during the Hungarian counter-revolution." Subject: Information about Vince Oláh, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 1/82/1-ig/1958. XIX-J-1-k. It is also

							dissolution, he became a trainer in Viet Bac and later was assigned a deputy section commander. He was involved in the siege of Fath Diem and Chi Ben, among others, and on a mission, he was trapped by Uga Son and captured by the French. He was then sentenced by a military court in Hanoi to five years of forced labor and taken back to France. He was released in 1955 and returned home in 1956-57. ⁸²	
68	Osoka Vincent⁸⁴	no data	sergeant r.n.91909 2.BEP	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
69	Papp József	19.03.1926. Ráksi	legionary (private) r.n.58638 3. REI	27.06.1949 Haiphong	pow	18.06.1950 Dong Khe	He left for France on 24 May 1946. He joined the Legion on 22 June 1948 in Lyon. After his capture in Vietnam, he took part in roadworks between March and August 1951. The Vietnamese described him as an uncharacteristic man because of the many thefts	no data

important to mention that he approached the State Department to verify his legionary past. The reports did not reveal whether they had been able to reinforce the Vietnamese side or whether he was legionary before his transition.

⁸² Subject: Information about Vince Oláh, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 1/82/1-ig/1958. XIX-J-1-k.

⁸⁴ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

							he committed in several prison camps. ⁸⁵	
70	Parda Lajos⁸⁶	11.07.1926. Sárisáp	no data	26.09.1948	voluntarily switched	27.06.1949 no data	A II, he was captured by the Soviets in World War II and was a prisoner of war for 18 months. On 1 September 1946, he returned home as a prisoner of war to Debrecen and from there to Budapest. He was later sentenced to 3 years in Markó Street Prison for his statement against the system in 1947. From there he escaped to Austria, then to France, and in May 1948 joined the Legion. He deserted to Vietnam on 27 June 1949, to the change side of the Vietnamese.	no data
71	Pálffy (Pálffy) Ferenc	04.05.1926. Budapest	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	27.06.1949	In 1948 he left for France.	He worked for the underground railway (M-1 Metro line), but due to his tropical illnesses he could not work for a long time and was sent to the Rusnyak clinic for medical treatment. ⁸⁷

⁸⁵ Subject: Untitle, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

72	ifj. Kálmán Petőfi	23.10.1930. Pécs	legionary (private) r.n.: na. 3. REI	28.04.1950 Haiphong	voluntarily switched and after desertion.	09.09.1950 Dong Dang	He came to France in January 1948 to recover from the deep poverty in which he had lived until then. On 6 September 1949, he joined the Legion in Paris. In September 1950, he escaped from the night guard and switched to the side of the Vietnamese People's Army. ⁸⁸ He worked in the propaganda office of the Lang Son and Viet Bat Regiments as part of the Vietnamese forces. According to the report, he suffered from beriberi in the POW camp.	no data
73	Pokorny János	20.06.1916. Breznóbánya	no data	22.09.1948 Saigon	pow	08.10.1950 no data	In 1947 he fled to Germany. According to the Vietnamese report, he worked well and was also successful in providing political education because he translated and explained in political education. ⁸⁹	no data
74	Polyvasz Anton⁹⁰	no data	buck sergeant r.n.50261 1.BEP	no data	pow	no data	no data	no data

⁸⁸ Ibid. Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 29 August 1953, 0034/23/1953.

⁸⁹ Subject: Untitled, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁹⁰ Subject: Visit of Vietnamese Secretary Nguyen. Beijing, 27 December 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 01868/1,4/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

75	Rátz Guil ⁹¹	no data	legionary (private) no data 1.BEP	no data	pow	no data	no data	no data
76	Reufer István ⁹²	no data	corporal r.n.58419 2.BEP	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
77	Rédei Kálmán ⁹³	no data	sergeant szám: 34099 1.CMM LE	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
78	Rück Mihály ⁹⁴	no data	legionary (private) r.n.92294 3/13.DB LE	no data	pow	13.03.1954 DBP	no data	no data
79	Savanyu Antal ⁹⁵	28.08.1928. Balatonkenes e	no data	no data	pow	no data	no data	no data
80	Sági (Ságy) József Mihály	27.09.1925. Rákospalota	legionary (private) szám: 55975 1.BEP	no data	pow	August, 1951. no data	He probably died in infectious disease in prison camp No. 2. ⁹⁶	

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Subject: Return of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, March 29, 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 001110/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

⁹⁶ He is listed in the letter as a Class 2 soldier, but on the website as a Class 1 soldier. <https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/en/ark:/40699/m00523b0dc4b00c4> (downloaded 17 April 2021); and subject: Visit of Vietnamese Secretary Nguyen. Beijing, 27 December 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 01868/1,4/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

81	ifj. József Sándor	09.08.1925. Kadarkút, Kökút puszta	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	He went out to France on September 8, 1947, and joined the legion in a state of emergency.	After returning home, he received several hospital treatments and as a result had a number of jobs, and eventually managed to work for the Student Nutrition Company for a longer period of time. ⁹⁷
82	Schlifter István	1929.06.21. Szombathely	legionary (private) r.n.55605 1.REI	1948.11.24 Saigon	pow	1950.10.08 Lung Phay	1948 februárjában Ausztriába távozott. A légióba 1948. március 10- én lépett be Innsbruckban (Ausztria). Vietnamban, 1949 januárjában részt vett a Cao Bang-i harkokban. Fogságba esése után útmunkákban vett részt. ⁹⁸	no data
83	Simon László (Lasilo)⁹⁹	no data	legionary (private) r.n.48866 1/2.REI		pow	1954.05.07 DBP	no data	no data
84	Sípos Pál¹⁰⁰	no data	legionary (private) no data 1.BEP	no data	pow	no data	no data	no data

⁹⁷ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

⁹⁸ Subject: Untitled, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

⁹⁹ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

¹⁰⁰ Subject: Visit of Vietnamese Secretary Nguyen. Beijing, 27 December 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 01868/1,4/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

85	Solt László¹⁰¹ (Schuck)	12.09.1926, Pilisvörösvár	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	no data	no data
86	ifj. Somodári (Somorári) Sándor	21.01.1928, Balatonalmádi	legionary (private) no data	27.01.1949 Haiphong	voluntarily switched	May 1949 Na Fac	He joined the Hungarian Communist Party in 1947, but after looting his own grandfather's cellar with his friends, they left for Austria in January 1948. He later joined the Legion in Strasbourg on 15 June 1948. From July 1949 to July 1950, he worked in the propaganda office of the Vietnamese forces, and on the radio he called on the Hungarians fighting in the legion to surrender. He fought on the side of the northern troops in northwestern Vietnam against the Kuomintang troops. He was also a member of the peace committee of the returning prisoner of war consignment from the Hungarian side. ¹⁰² He suffered from swamp fever in the prison camp. There are reports where he also appeared as Sándor Somorári. ¹⁰³	no data

¹⁰¹ Subject: The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 09 May 1955 in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004143/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

¹⁰² Subject: Untitled, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

¹⁰³ Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam, (Annex), in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 058/Szig. Biz.1953. XIX-J-1-k.

87	Stvertezhý Zoltán	25.10.1924. Budapest	sergeant r.n.53098 3.REI	no data	pow	09.09.1951 Cao Bang	He may have died of infectious disease in prison camp No. 2. ¹⁰⁴	
88	Szabó (Sabo) Sámuel¹⁰⁵	no data	legionary (private) r.n.74784 3/3.REI	no data	pow	09.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
89	Szabó Sándor	12.12.1931. Gyergyószentmiklós (nowadays Gheorgheni) Romania	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	In 1944 he was taken by the German army. He also suffered from swamp fever and tuberculosis in the POW camp. ¹⁰⁶	no data
90	Szegedi Nándor¹⁰⁷	no data	sergeant r.n.62224 2.BEP	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	He repeatedly attempted to escape from the prison camp. They also tried to escape with Sergeant Kemencei, who was in the same corps. (Sergant Kemencei was taken prisoner several times. He was captured for the first time during a battle on Colonial Highway No. 4. He then used a pseudonym and quickly escaped from	no data

¹⁰⁴ He is listed in the letter as a Class 2 soldier, but on the website as a Class 1 soldier, where he is even said to have died. <https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/en/ark:/40699/m00523b0ffcc9866> (downloaded 17 April 2021) and subject: Visit of Vietnamese Secretary Nguyen. Beijing, 27 December 1951, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Box 7, 01868/1,4/1952. XIX-J-1-k.

¹⁰⁵ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

¹⁰⁶ Subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/11/szig.biz.1952. I. XIX-J-1-j.

¹⁰⁷ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

							the prison camp. When he was taken prisoner a second time after the Battle of DBP, he feared he would be recognized, but due to an accident on his face, this did not happen.) ¹⁰⁸	
91	Szerenics/ Szerencsés László	09.04.1926. Pestszenterzs ébet	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	He escaped from the railway insurance battalion and then entered the French Foreign Legion in Vienna.	After returning home after hospital care, he received a holiday proposal for his regeneration, which, in his opinion, was not arranged for him soon enough by the Trade Union Social Insurance Center (hungarian abbreviation: SZTK). Therefore, according to the report, he staged a scandal in a clinic near him. He was arrested a few days later and taken to the hospital of the Róbert Károly boulevard military prison. ¹⁰⁹ In some reports, the name

¹⁰⁸ Windrow, Martin: The Last Valley. Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam. Cassell, London, 2005. pp. 641-642.

¹⁰⁹ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

								Serenics/Szerencsés was used. ¹¹⁰
92	Tevald Gábor ¹¹¹	no data	legionary (private) r.n.65098 1/13. DBLE	no data	pow	13.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
93	Tóth Gyula ¹¹²	no data	legionary (private) r.n.67456 1.BEP	no data	pow	19.04.1954 DBP	no data	no data
94	Tóth István	1908.08.16. Igló	no data	1947.06.01 .	voluntarily switched	1948.08.03	In January 1945, he left for Austria with a military unit, escaped from there to Germany and was taken prisoner of war by the English, and then transported to the Freiburg area. He joined the Foreign Legion in September 1946 and volunteered in Vietnam.	He lived in Budapest and worked at the First Hungarian Economic Machine Factory (Hungarian abbreviation: EMAG). ¹¹³
95	Tóth János ¹¹⁴	no data	legionary (private) r.n.:89823	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data

¹¹⁰ Subject: The case of the repatriation of Vietnamese prisoners of war, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 01126/1951. XIX-J-1-k.

¹¹¹ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

¹¹⁴ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

			1/13.DB LE					
96	Urmankovitch Lajos	18.12.1925. Irig (Yugoslavia)	no data	1948	voluntarily switched	1949 no data	He was drafted into the Croatian army in 1943, but applied to the German police, and was later captured by the Yugoslav partisans, but escaped to Hungary. He fled to Austria in 1947 and joined the French Foreign Legion there. He arrived in Indochina in 1948 and switched to Vietnam in 1949. ¹¹⁵	no data
97	Uveges József¹¹⁶	no data	no data.	no data	no data	no data	no data	no data
98	Varga Gyula¹¹⁷	no data	no data	no data	no data	no data	no data	no data
99	Varga József¹¹⁸	03.01.1923. Miskolc	legionary (private) r.n.70702 1. BEP	25.09.1950 Haiphong	voluntarily switched	15.05.1951 Son Tay	On 20 December 1944, he left Hungary as a soldier. On 1 June 1950, he joined the Legion in Nancy and took part in a battle in Vietnam, 15 km from Haiphong. After his capture, he did not work for the Vietnamese forces.	no data

¹¹⁵ Subject: The case of French Foreign Legionnaires. Hanoi, 29 August 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 004143/5/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

¹¹⁶ Transfer of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Beijing, 11 September 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/1/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Subject: Summary report on the release of former prisoners of war of Hungarian origin in Vietnam, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 001684/1952. XIX-J-1-k.; subject: Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam. Budapest, 01.10.1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 001684/2/szig.biz. /I./1952. XIX-J-1-j.

100	Vass Gyula	28.02.1927. Komarno /Albat Komárom (Czechoslovakia)	legionary (private) r.n.58650 1.REI	14.01.1949 Saigon	pow	08.10.1950 Lung Phai	He left for Austria on 23 March 1948. He joined the Legion on 10 June 1948 in Klagenfurt (Austria). In Vietnam, he took part in the fighting in Phu Ly and Cao Bang. After his captivity, he worked on the roads and camps between March and August 1951. According to the report, he did a good job and was politically correct. According to Gy. V., only 15 of the 55 prisoners of Hungarian origin known to him remained because they were in poor conditions and died of diseases. But he also saw that the Vietnamese often went to war hungry and thirsty. ¹¹⁹	na.
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¹¹⁹ Subject: Untitle, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 0034/8-9/1953. XIX-J-1-j.

101	Virág Márton	27.08.1927. Győr	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	02.08.1954	He escaped to Germany in 1942 and joined the German Armed Forces and served in the American zone until 1947, when he joined the Legion on 27 September this year. He also served in North Africa and Indochina, after five years of service a new one applied and was then reinstated in Indochina. He joined the Vietnamese after signing the ceasefire in Geneva. ¹²⁰	no data
102	Virányi Imre (Imne)¹²¹	no data	corporal r.n.64873 1/2. REI	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data
103	Vörös Péter¹²²	25.06.1927. Lajoshalma	legionary (private) r.n.62293 3.REI	no data	pow	16.08.1951 Cao Bang	He probably died of infectious disease in POW camp No. 2.	no data

¹²⁰ Subject. The return of legionnaires who voluntarily switched to the side of the Vietnamese. Hanoi, 19 February 1955, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 11/1/1955. XIX-J-1-j.

¹²¹ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

¹²² <https://www.memoiredeshommes.sga.defense.gouv.fr/en/ark:/40699/m00523b12d476987>. (downloaded 17 April 2021)

104	Zimancsik/ Zemancsik Gyula József	no data Dunaharaszti	no data	no data	voluntarily switched	no data	he escaped from the Csillag Prison in Szeged on 21 August 1946, where he served his five-year prison sentence as a soldier serving in the Waffen SS. He then volunteered for the French Legion in Klagenfurt, Austria.	He worked in Stalin's city (today Dunaújváros) as a warehouse worker. He was later arrested for an unserved prison sentence and taken to the Szeged Prison. ¹²³ It was also referred to as Zimancsik or Zemancsik in the reports. ¹²⁴
105	Zsupos Sándor¹²⁵	no data	legionary (private) r.n.60597 1/13.DB LE	no data	pow	07.05.1954 DBP	no data	no data

¹²³ Subject: Former legionnaires returned from Vietnam in April 1951. Budapest, 15 February 1952, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 5, 00451/1952. XIX-J-1-j.

¹²⁴ Subject: The case of the repatriation of Vietnamese prisoners of war, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 4, 01126/1951. XIX-J-1-k.; and és subject. Repatriation of prisoners imprisoned in Vietnam, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 7, 4/03329/1951. XIX-J-1-k.

¹²⁵ Subject: List of Hungarian prisoners of war in Vietnam handed over to the French. Budapest, 29 October 1954, in MOL, Vietnamese Relations, Foreign Ministry Documents, Top Secret, Box 6, 00947/2/1954. XIX-J-1-j.

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2. Tibor ÁCS: Military culture in the reform era. p. 34.
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4. www.globalsecurity.org/army/iraq (downloaded: 19 04 2012)

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