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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

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### ***THEORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY***

ZSOLT CSUTAK

<b>NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY: LOST IN TRANSITION?</b> .....	5
--	---

### ***GEOPOLITICS***

TIBOR JÁNOS BARABÁS

<b>ADDITIONAL NOTES ON ROMANIAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND ITS HUNGARIAN ASPECTS</b> .....	18
---	----

ZSOLT KERÉKGYÁRTÓ

<b>EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MALI, BASED ON EXPERIENCES OF THE EUTM MALI HUNGARIAN MILITARY INSTRUCTORS</b> .....	29
--	----

BERK CAN KOZAN

<b>REMEMBERING THE ETHNIC TERROR: ASALA</b> .....	42
---	----

ESMERALDA KADĚNA

<b>ALBANIA: EARTHQUAKE SHOCK OF THE 26<sup>TH</sup> NOVEMBER 2019</b> .....	54
---	----

ATTILA VIRÁG

<b>BIG PICTURE BEFORE THE PANDEMIC: SUPPLY SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS SECTOR</b> .....	73
---	----

PÉTER FÁBIÁN PhD

<b>CHANGES IN THE INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORKS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITIES</b> .....	87
---	----

TIBOR SZILVÁGYI, PhD

<b>SERBIA'S MILITARY NEUTRALITY AND WHAT IS BEHIND IT</b> ...	100
---	-----

FAISAL WARIKAT

<b>SURVIVAL OF TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS</b> .....	129
--	-----

ABDOUSS MOHAMED	
<b>NATIONAL SECURITY OF MOROCCO TOWARDS MIGRATION: A WEAK GOVERNANCE OF A TRANSIT DESTINATION PAR EXCELLENCE.....</b>	<b>148</b>
 <i><b>INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY</b></i>	
ATTILA MÁTÉ KOVÁCS	
<b>STRANGER THINGS – THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES RELATED TO THE INTERNET OF THINGS .....</b>	<b>165</b>
 <i><b>AUTHORS OF THIS ISSUE.....</b></i>	 <b>178</b>
<i><b>EDITORS OF THIS ISSUE .....</b></i>	<b>179</b>
<i><b>CONDITIONS OF PUBLICATIONS .....</b></i>	<b>180</b>

ZSOLT CSUTAK

**NORTH ATLANTIC SECURITY COOPERATION IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY:  
LOST IN TRANSITION?<sup>1</sup>**

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*Abstract*

The United States and the North Atlantic security cooperation have arrived at a crossroads concerning their future orientation and strategies to be adopted in the context of the continuing global transformation of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This study aims to focus on the strategic shifts as well as on the geopolitical and other challenges the US and its NATO Allies are facing, particularly in Europe. Palpable domestic clashes of ideas and interests within the Alliance foster political dissonance and challenge unified power projection capabilities, especially when facing a revisionist expansionist Russia, a rising China and a fermenting Middle East in the neighborhood. The new asymmetric threats and challenges coming from the cyber domain, the advancement of artificial intelligence or even the global issues of climate change supplement the framework of classic geopolitical security and foreign political concerns. The US and its more vulnerable European allies seem to be in a phase of transition, in terms of security and their global position among other great power blocs. Among the controversially optimistic proclamations, there are also several skeptical and more realistic viewpoints regarding the present and future of the most successful and efficient security cooperation in history.

**Keywords:** NATO, EU, great power politics, security strategies, global challenges, clash of ideas and geography.

**I. Old new rifts and challenges in the transatlantic region**

Throughout 2019, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) celebrated its 70th anniversary, but serious inner disputes and dark clouds overshadowed the festive mood of the Heads of State meetings of the North Atlantic Council. While taking a distant and retrospective glimpse into the rather glorious past of the Alliance, many pundits and decision-makers underscored the undeniable fact that NATO has been the most successful and efficient military alliance and security cooperation arrangement in modern human history. As the Washington-based American think-tank, the Brookings Institution's research survey also highlighted, most of the security alliances in the history of the last half millennium lasted for less than 15 years<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>1</sup> This paper has been elaborated with the support of ÚNKP-19-3-1/ NKE-72 program.

<sup>2</sup> Emmanuel ASMAH – Laurence CHANDY – Daniel KAUFMANN – Johannes F. LINN – John MUTENYO – Veronika PENCIAKOVA: Around the Halls: The U.N.'s Millennium Development Goals; Brookings 2010 <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2010/09/16/around-the-halls-the-u-n-s-millennium-development-goals/> (downloaded 12 November 2019)

Nevertheless, as a respected British military analyst professor Michael Clarke put it, aptly ironically darkening the festive atmosphere, the alliance used to be the strongest, when it had only half as many member states as today, in the beginning of the Cold War era.<sup>3</sup> Theoretically speaking, it is a commonly shared security perception that the bipolar world of the Cold War with two almost equivalent global players (US-NATO v. Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact) proved to be more stable and balanced in the international arena, than the current competing global (USA, China, Russia, UK) and regional powers (Turkey, Iran, Israel, India, Brazil). Today, there are many more players with quite diverse power projection capabilities and heterogeneous webs of interests. Consequently, there are considerably more grounds for clashes and conflicts of all kinds, and penetration potentials among the actors on the world stage.<sup>4</sup> In such a patchwork of diversified global political factors in a challenging strategic environment, NATO and its members must find a way to represent and protect their interests both individually (nationally) and organizationally (internationally) alike. The Alliance, stretching from Alaska through the central Balkan peninsula to the Turkish-Iranian border in the Middle East, covers a considerable landmass and maritime area in the Northern hemisphere, supervising the safety and security of its 29 member states, with almost 800 million inhabitants. With the 30<sup>th</sup> potential member state of North Macedonia awaiting full accession to the Alliance, the geopolitical core of NATO has gradually shifted from the initial North Atlantic area towards the East European region, and even closer to the war-torn Middle East. Seemingly paradoxically in terms of strategic advantage and military might, the Alliance has become weaker and more tormented with diverse heterogeneous interests, stemming from the domestic and regional political culture of its new member states.

Would it seem feasible and realistic that some small, globally insignificant countries could drag great powers and NATO into conflicts with potential escalation, into a major war? In the multi-polar world of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, many realistic experts do not exclude this scenario unfolding in the future at all, from the Estonian borderland, through the ever-fermenting Balkan region, to the more strategic Eastern Mediterranean, and Middle Eastern region.<sup>5</sup> As the experts of the latest NATO Strategic Concept of 2010 remarked wittily, “past achievements and great accomplishments of the Alliance provide no guarantee for the future,” especially in such a transformed and changing global theater.<sup>6</sup>

In the following pages I shall provide a brief though tentatively comprehensive analysis of the recent strategic and political changes perceptible within the so-called Western world that are primarily related to the complex power triangle of NATO, European Union and the only global superpower, the United States. Considering the clash between the various approaches and principles of major schools of international

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<sup>3</sup> Marcus JONATHAN: Troubled NATO at 70; BBC report: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50604857> (downloaded 10 January 2020)

<sup>4</sup> MEARSHEIMER, J.J.: The tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton, 2001. pp. 138-141.

<sup>5</sup> ALLEN, John R. et alia: NATO at 70: more than a military alliance. Brookings Institution podcast, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/podcast-episode/nato-at-70-more-than-a-military-alliance/> (downloaded 12 November 2019);

O'HANLON, Michael: The Senkaku Paradox, Brookings Institution Press, 2019.

<sup>6</sup> NATO: NATO 2020: Assured security; Dynamic engagement. Lisbon-Bruxelles, 2010. p. 5.

relations and security studies (from the offensive and defensive realist schools and classic geo-strategists, through liberal institutionalists and European constructivists, to American neoconservatives, etc.), I will be focusing on the primary geostrategic concepts and imminent interests of the parties involved, as well as on their special spheres of interest, concerning their controversial relationships with neighboring rival great powers, like Russia, China and those emerging in the Middle East.

As will be revealed in the pages that follow, the importance of ideas and intellectual history cannot be neglected, particularly when discussing and interpreting the events of the over-ideologized 20<sup>th</sup> century, as Robert D. Kaplan also proclaimed as the revenge of geopolitics and the new dawn of geo-strategy, through the alleged primacy of physical terrain in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>7</sup> The global security hazards and challenges – posed by the undeniable phenomena of climate change and the overt struggle for fresh water resources, arable land, and minerals – have significantly supplemented the increasing security risks of the cyber domain in the international arena. In the post-postmodern world of the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennia, it might seem to us that parallel worlds confront each other at the same time. On the one hand, one can experience the national and regional struggle for water and land with kinetic force (boots on the ground), as it had also happened in ancient times. On the other hand, there is the overt strife for global electronic dominance in the cyber domain, with the applied features of artificial intelligence.

Taken from the vantage point of the more organizational, institution-centric (liberal) theoretical paradigm, the North Atlantic and European region appears to be well organized, properly functioning and even harmonious. It is a well-known fact that the security (NATO) and political alliance (EU) of the greater bulk of European states do overlap on the commonly shared fundamental democratic values and strategic interests, providing extra cohesive potential for the Alliance, particularly during difficult times. Nevertheless, after its peak performance and importance at the end of Cold war, NATO – in its phase 4 of its existence<sup>8</sup> in the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennia – seems to be less potent and compelling than three decades earlier, when faced with the red peril from the Soviet Union. All the same, from a neo-realistic standpoint, after seven decades of successful security cooperation and collective defense, many NATO member states, the EU and even the most important super-power, the US, seem to be penetrated by covert domestic (protectionist nationalistic) intentions concealed by under the veil of the “greater good” and mission of the Alliance. According to a comprehensive research study carried out with many NATO member states in 2019 by Pew Research<sup>9</sup>, the Alliance seems to be generally popular and favorable (53%) among nations. However, the trust in mutual defense and support (directives of Article 5) and especially the trust in a possible American intervention against an external attack is less than 45%. Many Central and East European NATO member states tend to be rather suspicious and skeptical about their neighbors’ commitment and willingness to help, in the case of an imminent threat. Consequently, they would primarily turn for intervention to the superpower United States.

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<sup>7</sup> KAPLAN, Robert D.: *The Revenge of Geography*. New York: Random House, 2012.

<sup>8</sup> According to the generation-based topology of NATO history by Lawrence S. KAPLAN: *NATO United, NATO Divided*. London: Praeger 2004, p. 64

<sup>9</sup> Pew Research <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/02/09/nato-seen-favorably-across-member-states/> (downloaded 25 January 2020)

These trends and traits tend to harmonize with the anarchic feature of competing nation-states on the stage of global affairs, which altogether tend to manifest a counter-productive trajectory for another 70 years of successful operation. Moreover, this kind of dissonance along with the ill-fated NATO summit in London, December 4, 2019 – which was overshadowed by the open row between the West-European Heads of State and the American President Trump – altogether spectacularly counterbalance the rather pompously optimistic view of the newly-elect, very first East European Deputy Secretary General of NATO, Mircea Geoana<sup>10</sup>. Namely, the former socialist minister of foreign affairs of Romania deliberately prophesized about 500 years more of mutual military defense and security cooperation under the Alliance, suggesting that the Alliance seems to be more popular and highly valued among the new East European member states than by the West European counterparts, not to mention the deliberately NATO-sceptic 45<sup>th</sup> president of the United States.

The 21<sup>st</sup> century has also introduced new types of non-conventional, asymmetric, hybrid security challenges, which swiftly, but unexpectedly, have raised increased concerns, particularly among the more rigid, institutionalized state actors of the global arena. The overgrown and rather obsolete organizational structure of the North Atlantic alliance – not to mention the even more bureaucratic and clumsier European Union – seems to be capable of providing only partially satisfactory and efficient strategic responses to the new challenges, from its repository of existing response strategies. As John R. Allen, a retired 4-star American general and former NATO commander in Afghanistan asserted; NATO is much more vulnerable and faces serious adaptation challenges at its 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary more than it used to be at its 60<sup>th</sup> or even its 50<sup>th</sup> birthday, at the end of the Cold War.<sup>11</sup>

## **II. Europe in the clash of ideas and geography**

The 20<sup>th</sup> century was considered to be the era as well as the victim of various -isms within the paradigm of controversial and murky political theories, and even utopian dreams, which altogether aimed to alter and ultimately transform reality into the wishful framework of their idealistic concepts. This included liberal democracy, social and Christian democracy versus communism, socialism, along with atheism, cultural relativist secularism, versus conservative, traditionalist, nationalistic theism, deism and so on. Add to these ideologies their various intermingled schisms and distorted state-building projects from Stalinist Albania through the odd modernist Yugoslavia of general Tito, or the communistic nationalism of Ceausescu's Romania to the softer and mesmerizing “goulash communism” of Kádár in Hungary.

The Iron Curtain descended on Europe and divided the old continent along a deep political, ideological trench, for a half century, defined and driven by Soviet-style, state-run socialism among the countries of the Warsaw Pact, opposing the free market capitalism adopted by the Western states under the American security umbrella. No wonder, from hindsight, the difference between the lifestyle, state

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<sup>10</sup> GEOANA, Mircea: Speech of NATO Deputy Secretary General; NATO Press, 2019. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions\\_171551.htm?selectedLocale=uk](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_171551.htm?selectedLocale=uk) (downloaded 10 December 2019)

<sup>11</sup> ALLEN (2019) op. cit.

administration and power structures of the countries of the two opposing blocs proved to be incomparable and incompatible in almost all the aspects of social, cultural and political life. The old wisdom says that to change a political regime, you might need six months or a revolution, to alter the economy maybe six years, but to change a society and its culture you would need at least sixty years.<sup>12</sup> From this standpoint, the transformation of the former communist countries of Central and East Europe is still well underway, basically it is only at its half-time, with all the natural difficulties and drawbacks of a vast social transformation process.

Ideas have always constituted important political and civilizational milestones along human history, since the creation of the core concept of self-governance in ancient Athens. Moreover, ever since the ideologically overburdened French Revolution of 1789, modern European history has been tormented by the clashes of utopian (Marxism, racist national socialism) and reactionary (Royalist conservatism, nationalistic fascism) ideas, which, at first, were shared mostly by intellectual lobby groups, and later, by whole societies, also supplementing the traditional geopolitical strife for dominance and regional hegemony among rival European powers. History demonstrates that the inspiring and electrifying impact of words or ideas merged with military (kinetic) force often results in lethal combination of powers, strikingly efficient both for a handful of revolutionaries as well as for nation states.

During the Cold War era, ground forces of the Central and East European communist countries led by the Soviet army proved to be numerically superior and arguably more powerful than those facing them across the Iron Curtain. The security organization known as Western Union set up in a haste in 1948 in Brussels (later becoming the Western European Union in 1954) proved to be less than sufficient and powerful enough to protect the fragile Western European (especially the Benelux) democracies, against a potential communist ground invasion of 12 million Soviet-led troops. A more deterring and powerful organization had to be established in Europe, with the capability of containment against an imminent Soviet threat against Europe. That led to the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in April, 1949, with the USA weighing in to counterbalance the Soviet Union.

Though the classic *bon mot* of Lord Ismay is still practically valid about the primary mission of NATO “to keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in and the Germans down” in Europe,<sup>13</sup> the political-economic settings have transformed quite significantly, during the course of the turn of the 3<sup>rd</sup> millennia. Since the collapse of the Soviet “evil empire” (as labelled by President Reagan<sup>14</sup>), successive American Presidential Administrations have seemed to be increasingly more reluctant to strengthen and finance the costs of defending the economically gigantic, yet militarily dwarf, Europe. At least, they appear to be of two minds about it, in contrast to the rising importance and challenges of the Indo-Pacific region to the US. The economically protectionist and rather neo-isolationist American Republican decision-makers and strategy-makers seem to trust more in the rather obsolete idea of the two-ocean shield, which characterized the 20<sup>th</sup> century geopolitical strategy. This ignores

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<sup>12</sup> KEEN, F. Mike – MUCHA, Janusz (Ed.): Eastern Europe in Transformation. The impact on Sociology; Greenwood Press, London, 1994. pp. 45-47.

<sup>13</sup> Lord Ismay 1949. [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified\\_137930.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_137930.htm) (downloaded 20 December 2019)

<sup>14</sup> In his speech of 1983 in front of the National Association of Evangelicals.

the era of cyber warfare, global trade routes and strategic distribution lines and hubs, which are all located in or along the Eurasian supercontinent.

The post-communist East European border countries are located on the periphery of NATO as well as of the American sphere of influence and Western civilization, basically the new American *frontier border-line*, facing Russia and the East. Fortunately for the small states of the periphery – stuck between the dangerous proximity of a reviving Russia and the remote safe haven of the US – many American foreign political experts and geopolitical strategists do share and recognize the outstanding importance of this region for the stability of Europe as well as for the USA. As the successor and heir of the Soviet Union, President Putin's Russia has manifested overtly new ambitions to control its near neighborhood countries and area of influence, from the Baltic to the Black sea (the idea of *okraina*<sup>15</sup>), and even beyond into the East Mediterranean basin, as it had done before the collapse of the Soviet Union. Furthermore, and alarmingly enough, the most powerful economic factor in Europe – a reunified Germany – could not protect itself militarily against any serious external threat for more than a couple of days, without the significant support of almost 50 thousand-strong American military forces, still stationing in Europe.

A quite alarming 2017 study by an American defense strategy think-tank, the Rand Corporation – on the rather gloomy Narva scenario<sup>16</sup> – warned of the considerable ground force deficiencies of the NATO Eastern flank, against a possible Russian land force assault. According to a realistic war game scenario, the dozens of advancing Russian battalions against Central and Eastern European countries could be contained only as far as Berlin, weeks later after the first assault. Thus, it should be no surprise that the biggest American military drill and war game in the last quarter century on European soil will take place in the spring of 2020, stretching from the Bay of Finland down to the Black Sea region. The spectacular American military show of rapid deployment reaction forces in bulk, dubbed “Defender 2020”, will employ as many as 20 thousand American troops, deployed from the US and 17 thousand European Allied forces from NATO and non-alliance Finnish forces, as well, at a cost of no less than \$340 million for the Pentagon expenses alone.<sup>17</sup> As mostly American and Polish army divisions will be involved in the major drill, their leaders affirmed that this major military exercise intends to drill a little bit of everything, from sudden crisis management, through cyber and conventional attacks, to live fire-drills, since we're now living in a complex security environment.<sup>18</sup> The obvious presumption is that it will be a power and skills demonstration against the revisionist ambitions of neighboring Russia. Last year's NATO drill, Trident Juncture, in the rigid Norwegian arctic terrain, proved to be one of the biggest and most overwhelming NATO drills for decades, responding to the even bigger scale monstrous Russian war games of 2017 and 2018, in the Western Russian military district of the Baltic region.

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<sup>15</sup> APPLEBAUM, Anne: *Between East and West*; New York, Anchor Books, 2017.

<sup>16</sup> Christopher S. CHIVVIS et alia: *NATO's Northeastern Flank*, RAND Corp., Santa Monica, CA, 2017, pp. 137-140.

<sup>17</sup> McLeary, Paul (2020): *From the Baltic to Black Sea*;  
<https://breakingdefense.com/2019/12/from-the-baltic-to-black-seas-defender-exercise-goes-big-with-a-big-price-tag/> (downloaded 25 January 2020)

<sup>18</sup> Ibid

The well-known political scientist from the University of Chicago, John Mearsheimer, noted the commonly held geopolitical view that the United States and the United Kingdom are insular great powers<sup>19</sup>, less vulnerable – except sea –, so they have much less to fear from land invasion than their continental European allies. Military history of the last two centuries provides a considerable repository of outstanding examples of European continental great powers with numerous ground forces and well trained armies, appearing to be much more aggressive, expansionist and willing to initiate wars at the expense of their neighbors, as Germany, France or Russia did dozens of times. This historical retrospection might be interesting and thoughtful even nowadays, when revanchist and expansionist Russia poses a quite perceptible threat to the East European NATO member states, along the Western periphery as the Rand study also notes. Military experts and strategists claim that sophisticated air, cyber and even space forces may also be very potent with cutting-edge weaponry and arsenals of various tools. Yet, at the end of the day, these military assets ultimately serve as supplementary forces, besides the crucial land-based armies with real soldiers and armored battalions, capable of occupying and controlling vast territories of landmass.<sup>20</sup> NATO countries are predominantly continental, small and medium-sized European states, which are not capable of employing any significant deterrent force against a ground-based threat manifested by their mighty Eastern neighbor, Russia.

### III. Russia: sunset or sunrise for an empire

Russia's joining forces with China as natural rivals and challengers of American regional hegemony, through various economic and political strategic cooperation mechanisms, may gain the capability to rule the Heartland and the Eurasian landmass. Acquiring this unparalleled strategic advantage was feared by the British Empire of Halford Mackinder, as well as by many American governments. It was even stated in the National Security Strategy of the George H.W. Bush Administration back in 1989, as well as in a Department of Defense strategy paper from 1993. It is a commonly held view that the strategic objectives of American security and foreign policies, in most cases, tend to coincide and overlap with NATO strategies.

Given this important affirmation from the above mentioned Pentagon paper, the American geostrategic standpoint can be expressed by asserting that *“Our first objective is to prevent the reemergence of a rival that poses a threat on the territory of the former Soviet Union. This is a dominant consideration..., and requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region, whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power...Our strategy must now refocus on precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor.”*<sup>21</sup> The old/new post-Cold War strategy of the US and NATO seems to be quite clear-cut in this regard.

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<sup>19</sup> MEARSHEIMER (2001) op. cit.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid

<sup>21</sup> OLCOTT, B. Martha: The Caspian's False Promise; Foreign Policy, 1998. No.111. pp. 94-113.

On this strategically important geopolitical matter, neither the Democrat Clinton and Obama nor the Republican George W. Bush and Trump Administrations demonstrated a different viewpoint from the realist strategy President Bush highlighted above. This Eurasian strategic concern of the US has not changed since the disintegration of the Soviet bloc. No wonder, both the US and its allies are keen to hinder any regional great power's ambitions to reestablish the overwhelming might and global influence of the former Soviet Union; stretching from the Arctic Karelian peninsula southward through the Baltic states and Ukraine to the Black sea, from the Caucasian-Caspian frozen conflict-zones to the Turkish-Iranian border region.

Obviously, the deepening Sino-Russian approach, and the political, economic as well as security cooperation within various framework organizations and agreements, developed between Moscow and Beijing in recent years, altogether prove to be deliberately harmful and contrary to Western and especially American geostrategic efforts and political interests. In this geopolitical context, the Ukrainian, Georgian, and Caucasian wars, or even the Moldavian-Transnistrian frozen conflict, along the vast Russian border region make utmost sense, especially from an offensive realistic Russian strategic standpoint. Similarly, according to the premises of geopolitical realism as a counter-measure to Russian expansionism, American interference and gradual NATO expansion also appear to be a part of a clearly reasonable "containment" paradigm, by a gradual encirclement of the Russian motherland (the "pivot" of Mackinder), systematically hindering Russian global great power aspirations to become a post-Soviet continental hegemon in Eurasia. Evidently, the alliance proves to be considerably popular among many former Soviet satellite states (in Lithuania, Ukraine, Georgia to the extent of 70%),<sup>22</sup> which wish their state to reside near or besides – and not within – the shadow of Russian dominance. Consequently, there is no real alternative for them to either join the Western political and security umbrella organizations or perish as independent sovereign states, reintegrating into the satellite periphery of the old-new regional hegemon. No surprise, the favorable view of NATO among the Russian population in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century fluctuates between 10-16%,<sup>23</sup> implying that the Alliance seems to be almost as unpopular as it used to be during the Cold War era.

#### IV. NATO ME?

By 2020, President Trump managed to systematically stir up NATO Allies from their apparent inertia. First, he did so through his rhetorical whipping and harsh NATO-skeptical remarks on defense spending deficits of the European Allies. Then he turned the strategic chessboard upside down with the shock and awe-like targeted killing of top Iranian military leader, General Qassem Soleimani in January, 2020, with no previous security consultation with any Allied decision-maker. According to professor Fawaz R. Gerges international relations researcher's assessment at the London School of Economics,<sup>24</sup> NATO has come to a "transition period", particularly amplified by the unpredictable acts and ideas of President Trump, notwithstanding his

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<sup>22</sup> Pew Research (2019) op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> STOLTON, Samuel: Is NATO about to become 'more involved' in the Middle East?; AlJazeera, 2020. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/nato-involved-middle-east-200113212641341.html> (downloaded 20 January 2020)

latest, quite unique and stunning idea expressed to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to expand NATO into the Middle East and get the “Alliance more involved” in crisis management and conflict resolution in that fermenting region.<sup>25</sup> This most likely raised eyebrows among the Allied heads of state, although there has been no reaction to this proposal, yet. Trump, obviously did not name any specific state, although there is at least one really feasible and realistic option to be considered for NATO membership in the Middle East: the highly militarized Zionist state of Israel.

Considering the unlikely scenario of Israeli membership in NATO, the Alliance would gain considerable military strength, yet it would also inherit significant strategic and political handicaps and vulnerabilities, given that almost the entire Muslim and Arabic world would become a hostile power bloc against Israel and the Alliance. A highly possible conflict between Israel and its traditional regional adversaries would, with the implementation of Article 5 directives on NATO collective defense and support, suddenly become a global conflict, with unforeseeable consequences and developments.

Turkey, a geopolitically highly important NATO member state with the second mightiest military (ground forces) in the Alliance, under the autocratic reign of President Erdogan, has gradually become more Islam-oriented as well as nationalistic than the secular Kemalist state used to be for more than a half century. President Erdogan’s Turkey, as Asia Minor, the traditional bridge between Asia and Europe, also seems to be reinstating its heritage, becoming a rising regional power with significant Ottoman imperial nostalgia. Turkey, where public opinion of NATO (and of the US) plummeted to all time low (21%)<sup>26</sup> in 2019, is positioning itself between the West (the EU and the US), Russia and the Islamic world. At the same time, Turkey is not losing sight of its key national interests and long-term ambitions, namely to preserve and strengthen its position as an indispensable regional great power actor in the Middle East (besides Israel and Iran)<sup>27</sup>, and covertly to assume an influential position as the successor state of the Ottoman Empire in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

Today it can be argued that there are competing counter-interests, centrifugal forces and coherent, mutually advantageous centripetal ones, operating in the Turkish-Western (NATO) relationship. This is not an ideal basis for trust going forward. Primarily, the existing geopolitical strategy, along with a benign American attitude, continues to maintain this fractured political cohesion and keeps Turkey within the framework of the Alliance for the time being<sup>28</sup>, as it has continued to do so since 1952, when the country, together with Greece, was basically saved from a looming palpable threat of Soviet dominance over the strategically sensitive region.

Recalling the importance of geography and physical terrain in world affairs, keenly observed by much revered experts of geopolitics, such as Mackinder,

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<sup>25</sup> HERSZENHORN, David: President Trump on NATO in the Middle East; Politico, 2020. <https://www.politico.eu/article/us-president-donald-trump-asks-for-nato-help-in-middle-east/> (downloaded 25 January 2020)

<sup>26</sup> Pew Research 2019 op. cit.

<sup>27</sup> OKTAV, Özlan T. (Ed.): Turkey in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. London: Ashgate Publishing, 2011.

<sup>28</sup> Rachel ELLEHUUS: Turkey and NATO; <https://www.csis.org/analysis/turkey-and-nato-relationship-worth-saving> (downloaded 30 January 2020)

Spykman, Kaplan and many others; within this context, it is a commonly held assumption that the power(s) which control the so-called peripheries of the Heartland, particularly the strategic land-bridge between Asia and Europe, namely Turkey and Greece, might as well control the great bulk of the supercontinent or the Heartland (“the great pivot”) region of Europe and Central Asia.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, with this enormous strategic potential at hand, any power actor would be capable of reaching out and acquiring control over the warm seas of the East Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf. Well-known as it is, this strife has also been a centuries old aspiration of Russia as discussed above; namely, acquiring maritime access to the warm waters of the world oceans, which for the last 100 years has been practically controlled by the omnipresent navies of the United States and its allies.

## V. Conclusion

As revealed by the arguments presented above, the majority of decision-makers and pundits of global security issues and international relations keep reaffirming that NATO is still relevant, viable and popular, as the biggest and most powerful protective shield and defense organization in the world, with more member states, population and economic output as ever before. Nevertheless, as we could also note among the lesser aspects of the Alliance, it also seems to be performing less cohesively and efficiently. Moreover, in terms of military resilience, it is clumsier and less agile than it used to be a few decades ago. NATO faces multiple domestic factious political interests as well as very diverse external threats and security challenges, stemming from the classic geopolitical concerns and the new types of asymmetric threats, penetrating all dimensions, especially the cyber domain.

Nowadays, it is a commonly shared experience that common end-users as well as states and multinational organizations must cope with new technological achievements at such a pace, manner and volume that had never been witnessed before, which poses quite a considerable challenge in itself. However, from a philosophical perspective, in spite of these rather unfathomable scientific and technological innovations, the human race – as many scholars bitterly highlighted – has not managed to change, or more precisely, has not significantly improved morally and developed psychologically, since the ancient times of the Peloponnesian wars.<sup>30</sup> The rules of international affairs seemingly have not changed much either. Probably the much cited German philosopher Hegel was ultimately right when he compared modern European civilization with its intellectual achievements, as a mere footnote to the ancient Greeks.<sup>31</sup> According to the paradigm of rather conservative realist thinkers, in the context of political philosophy and national strategies, we humans (states and organizations) belonging to the Western civilization seem to be maneuvering in the same paradigm and on the same level as our great ancestors, whose normal social-political status was to prepare for the inevitable wars, during the brief peaceful periods of construction and contemplation.

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<sup>29</sup> MACKINDER, H. J.: *The Geographical Pivot of History; Democratic Ideals and Reality*. Norton and Company. New York, U.S.A, 1962. p. 241.

<sup>30</sup> See HART, B. H. LIDDELL: *Why don't we learn from History?* London, Sophron, 2012. p. 27

<sup>31</sup> HEGEL, G.W.H.: *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Manuscripts of the Introduction vol.1.*; Clarendon Press, Oxford 2011. p. 42

Moreover, as far as the nationwide social-psychology, the military strategy, the warfare and even the global affairs are concerned, we can conclude that virtually all man-made formations, such as societies, multi-national organizations or nation states behave according to the inherent rules of nature, so well described by philosophers like Aristotle, Rousseau, or Thomas Hobbes. Namely, people in general (mass societies, nation states as well) are driven by three major factors: (1) by the covert fear of being subjugated, oppressed or killed by others, (2) by their egoistic selfishness for survival and (3) ultimately, by their lust for dominance to achieve all their vital goals in life.<sup>32</sup> Furthermore, the various political philosophical concepts and sophisticated strategies – that people have elaborated over the centuries – tend merely to supplement this imminent rather instinctive framework for survival. Naturally, the joining of forces and resources proves to be the most developed and efficient tool for achieving this objective for individual states. History tells us that alliances, especially protective military ones, stand for nothing other than the ultimate goal: to cherish, preserve, and protect whatever they have managed to accomplish against external threats.

NATO in its 4.0 stage seems to be stuck in a phase of transition, as it is looking for new goals and strategies in the new century or just revising its old roadmap, which primarily depends on the trajectory of national interests of major components of the Alliance, such as the United States or the dubious Turkey.

Paraphrasing the wisdom of George Santayana, the study of history helps us learn from past mistakes, or we are doomed to repeat them. For the North Atlantic Alliance this might as well imply either a cheerful and bright scenario with peace, prosperity and mutual value and interest-based cooperation and protection for a few decades more, or a gloomier one, with imminent total or partial disintegration, along regional great power interests and small state ethnic skirmishes, within and along its periphery, as it had also happened before and during the two devastating world wars.

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<sup>32</sup> MEARSHEIMER (2001) op. cit. pp. 12-15.

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TIBOR JÁNOS BARABÁS

**ADDITIONAL NOTES ON ROMANIAN POLITICAL CULTURE AND ITS HUNGARIAN ASPECTS**

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*Abstract*

In my analysis, I explore the recent past and future prospects of Hungarian-Romanian relations by studying the characteristics of Romanian power and analyzing specific case studies. The three case studies presented in the analysis confirm the view frequently found in Romanian media that before 1990 there is continuity in power techniques and leadership, with the ruling elite inseparably intertwined with politics, business and secret services, and with only the top tier leadership co-opting members. The narrower power group in Romania, chaired by the president's National Security Council (CSAT – Consiliul Suprem de Aparare a Țării – Supreme Council of State Defense). The National Defense Strategy, created by the Romanian Presidency, identifies ethnic separatism kindled from abroad as the main security challenge. The analysis shows that Bucharest no longer responds directly to the challenge of Hungarian political and economic influence by direct means in the 1990s, but uses more complex methods. The contemporary methods inspired by the hybrid warfare of this day and age include influencing the public mainly through the media, organizing minor provocations (Uz Valley cemetery incident), tax and other regulatory measures, the use of litigation, political propaganda. Of course, it should be in the interest of all of us that good neighborliness and mutual assistance in modernization take precedence over the latter. The political and economic challenges of our time are rapidly changing and increasingly complex and cross-border in nature. It is clear from the case studies that the Romanian and Hungarian sides were basically interested in good co-operation, and the ways of this were often found even in the tense 90s. It may be a lesson for us not to be biased against each other, because it is our neighbors and not our distant partners that are most interested in our success.

**Keywords:** Romania, deep state, centralized state, Hungary

**Introduction**

In my analysis, I use three case studies to examine some of the basic features of Romanian political culture and its main features that are of interest to us Hungarians. The Romanian leading elite have traditionally sought to maintain power and operate the state through centralization, ethnic homogenization, and the establishment of a regional power position of security and energy policy. In my view, these characteristics of the Romanian elite limit the opportunities for modernization of the country. It is less open to the region economically, and the politics and economy of closed networks cannot be competitive in the long term in a highly decentralized IT based economy or in the EU, either.

## The concept of deep state, parallel state

The three case studies described below confirm the view often found in the Romanian media that before 1990 there is continuity in power techniques and leadership, with the ruling elite inseparably intertwined with politics, business and the secret services, and it is rather through co-optation that new members are admitted to the top tier of leadership. The narrower power group in Romania is most prominent in the National Security Council chaired by the head of state (CSAT – Consiliul Suprem de Aparare – Țarii – Supreme Council for State Defense). Representatives of the military, interior and foreign affairs, and secret services are present in the CSAT and are responsible, in accordance with the principles set out in the constitution, for formulating the State's security and foreign affairs strategy. The CSAT has been firmly Atlanticist since the right-wing Traian Basescu presidency from 2004-2014, and accordingly the modernization of the country is conceived as a benefit of regional military power with US IT and energy investments. The influence of the power group linked to CSAT in recent years mainly lay in the fact that the civilian secret service, the SRI's (Serviciul Roman de Informatii – Romanian Information Service) cooperation agreement<sup>1</sup> is with the DNA Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (Directia Nationala de Anticoruptie – National Anti-Corruption Office) and can initiate prosecutions against politicians. People close to CSAT are present in larger companies and in the media. The case of the formation of the November 2019 government by Ludovic Orban, National Liberal Party Chairman (PNL, Partidul National Liberal). The parliamentary vote in the government was initially denied by the also right-liberal Save Romania Party (USR, Uniunea Salvati Romania), but media close to CSAT<sup>2</sup>, in an attack against Dan Barna, was quick to air the fact that as a former EU project manager he abused his powers, awarding members of his own family high-paying positions, failed to implement the project and forged documents. Giving in to pressure, Dan Barna, the party's chairman and his party, still voted for the government of Ludovic Orban, the favorite of the presidential office and a person close to CSAT.

Events like the latter are often commented on in the Romanian public as the existence of a deep/parallel state. However, in my view, this does not so much mean the existence of alternative power structures favored by the Romanian press, but rather that the ruling elite in Romania consider the status of their country economically, culturally and ethnically too divergent, and since independence since the 1860s. with the help of the enforcement agencies, a highly centralized state was controlled behind the scenes. At the same time, the highly centralized Romania has some peculiarities of a deep/parallel state, which I will discuss below in my conclusions. In this state established on the French model in the 19th century, the parliament and government are influenced by a narrower supreme power group. On closer inspection, we are talking about a narrow, highly centralized power rather than several power centers. The case studies show that enforcement agencies coordinated by the Office of the

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<sup>1</sup> Romania Insider: Secret Service Declassifies Cooperation Protocol with Prosecutors; 2018. <https://www.romania-insider.com/romanian-intelligence-service-protocol-prosecutors-declassified> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

<sup>2</sup> Portret de candidat Dan Barna (Portrait of Dan Barna); <http://www.ziare.com/dan-barna/stiri-dan-barna/portret-de-candidat-dan-barna-cand- cariera-politica-e-ca-o-1584075> Loterie (downloaded 13 December 2019)

President are present in parliamentary parties, in business, in the media, and there is no sharp boundary between interest groups.

Examining specific cases may reveal details that may clarify the style and nature of governance. It is worthwhile first to clarify the concept of deep / parallel state.

The deep or parallel state<sup>3</sup>, also known as a state within a state, is defined by a Harvard University publication as a form of secret government that consists of hidden power networks that operate independently of the political leadership of the state to achieve its own agenda and goals. These include, for example, certain interest groups in government agencies, the armed forces or agencies (intelligence agencies, police, secret police, administrative agencies and government bureaucracy). In a deep state, there may be civil servants who do not act in a conspiratorial way to promote their own interests. The purpose of the Deep State can include the continuity of the State itself, the security of employment for its members, increased power, and the pursuit and achievement of ideological goals. It may work against elected officials' agendas, obstructing, resisting, and undermining their policies, conditions and directives. It may also exist in the form of state-owned companies or private companies that act independently of regulatory or governmental control.

John Deutsch, former Director of the CIA, explains in an article published in 2018<sup>4</sup> that there are many historical examples of secret groups working with or against legitimate governments. Perhaps the most notorious example of an effective deep state is the Serbian Black Hand organization known before World War I. The former Serbian intelligence chief, Colonel “Apis” organized in Sarajevo in 1914, the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand, which led to the outbreak of the World War I. According to Deutsch, there are clearly groups in the United States and elsewhere that seek to covertly influence governmental action, either for ideological purposes or for money. Such groups use tools such as lobbying and campaign – contributions but increasingly propagate their message through traditional and social media. At the same time, it is an exaggeration to talk about a deep state in the United States, because legislation, publicity, and state institutions can successfully defend against these attempts to influence, and opinion-forming, even at group level, is a forte, not a weakness of democracy in the US.

In my assessment, the debate on the deep/parallel state is not unfounded; in the case of eavesdropping scandals, but by examining specific cases, the actual political situation may become clearer.

### **Case studies of the group of investigative journalists called Rise Project**

The main source of the three case studies described below is the web portal of the internationally renowned Rise Project, a group of Romanian investigative

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<sup>3</sup> M. J. GLENNON: The National Security and Double Government; 2014; Harvard National Security Journal, <https://web.archive.org/web/20170301095223/http://harvardnsj.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Glennon-Final.pdf> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

<sup>4</sup> John DEUTCH: The Deep State is a distraction; 2018. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-deep-state-distraction-24454> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

journalists, as well as data and ratings from the Romanian public. The Rise Project is an associate member of the Global Investigative Journalism Network, an American NGO sponsored by the US Congress in Washington, D.C.

The first Hungary-related case study of the Rise Project I examined below makes the features, centralization and operation of the Romanian power operating in networks behind the scenes more understandable.

### **1. The Tel Drum case brought to light the affairs of a group of officers and businessmen serving as diplomats in Budapest<sup>5</sup>**

The Romanian construction company Tel Drum has been under investigation by the Romanian anti-corruption DNA Prosecutor's Office for years, and information leaked to the press reveals that the firm's partners include a group of Romanian intelligence officers who served in Budapest and are deeply embedded in Romanian politics and significantly influenced Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations in the 1990s. For a brief analysis of the phenomenon, see the evaluation section below.

Liviu Dragnea, President of Partidul Social Democrat, the ruling Romanian Social Democratic Party until October 2019<sup>6</sup> a construction company owned by Tel- Drum, which owns a stake in Teleorman County, initially carried out road repairs and construction work, then progressively expanded its activities throughout the country in the time of the socialist governments and became one of the main financiers of the party. The Rise Project, an investigative journalist portal, has proved through official documents, testimonies and disclosure of stakeholder correspondence that Tel Drum has sought to enter the market in Libya and the Republic of Moldova through the intervention of several former intelligence officers. An investigative article said in a \$ 500 million Libyan deal brokered by a retired brigadier general, Mircea Has, in 2012, the business shut down after President Gaddafi's elimination.

The career of General Has is instructive for us. He joined the Romanian secret service in 1972 and became a member of the elite DIE (Directia de Informatii Externe – Foreign Information Department) intelligence officer. The DIE, the dictator Nicolae Ceausescu, personally oversaw the DIE, which, since moving away from the Soviet Union, was used as a major tool to make Romania one of the leaders of non-aligned states. In addition to the classic DIE task of intelligence exchange gain was complicating and foreign businesses. After the defection of DIE deputy director, Ion Mircea Pacepa to the US in 1978, the organization was "cleansed" and renamed CIE (Centru de Informatii Externe – International Information Center).

Has survived staff exchanges and became a diplomat and head of the operational team, in line with new priorities for diplomacy and technical-economic espionage. In 1990, Ion Iliescu the Head of State created the SIE (Serviciul de Informatii Externe - Foreign Information Service) from the CIE, which is now one of the major

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<sup>5</sup> Rise Project: Un spion pentru baron (A spy for the baron) <https://www.riseproject.ro/articol/un-spion-pentru-baron/> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

<sup>6</sup> Libertatea newspaper 17.03.2018, DNA extinde urmarirea penal pentru Tel Drum (the prosecution begins the investigation of Tel Drum) <https://www.libertatea.ro/stiri/dna-extinde-urmarirea-penala-pentru-tel-drum-2110918> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

professional institutions of the state, an important part of the Romanian National Security Council (CSAT).

The first Director of SIE after 1990, Mikhail Caraman<sup>7</sup> operated a successful network as a DIE officer in the 1960s and 1970s, mainly working in France and primarily against NATO. After 1990, the United States and France expressed behind the scenes the resentment to the then Bucharest government over Caraman's position as Director of SAM, who was accused of Russian relations. In fact, before 1990, the DIE / CIE had a cooperation protocol with the KGB.

It was the confidential part of the case that was more interesting in that the West wanted to see new leaders at the head of Romanian services for Romania's Euro-Atlantic integration. Under the leadership of Caraman between 1990-92, who was accused of maintaining Russian relations the SIU was not seen as a credible partner in the West, this situation, in my assessment, could emerge because the Ceausescu - regime was overthrown in December 1989 with Soviet assistance and the Romanian top leadership team after 1990 was still under Russian influence.

Mircea Has, a prospective broker of foreign business deals for Tel Drum, spent this turbulent period in Budapest, and was a diplomat at the Romanian Embassy there from 1990-93. This period was critical in the Romanian-Hungarian bilateral relations and was marked by the ethnic unrest in Târgu Mureş in March 1990. After the Black March in Târgu Mureş, the Romanian civilian secret service, the Serviciul Roman de Informatii (Romanian Information Service), was set up mainly from members of the former Securitate (the almighty communist secret police).

So has worked for SIE in Budapest as a diplomat, and established close contacts with his SIE officer-diplomat colleague, also in Budapest, Teodor Dorobantu, and journalist Marius Stoian (Dorobantu's son-in-law), the Budapest correspondent of Evenimentul Bucharest. Together with former or active SIE officers, the latter created several companies after Romania's accession to NATO and the EU in 2007. Thus, members of the Budapest Circle set up ELITE INTELLIGENCE CONSULTING, which advised property developers and several parliamentary parties, for example, on election campaigns.

The journalist Stoian represented the INTACT media company managed by Dan Voiculescu, a former DIE/CIE officer in the Republic of Moldova since 1998. INTACT owns the largest Romanian media company, the ANTENA TV group, whose Moldovan media have been losing money but preaching great Romanian ideas - for which the Bucharest government has repeatedly renounced collection of INTACT's tax arrears. The Budapest Circle (Dorobantu, Stoian, Has) was also involved in the unimplemented project of the Dracula Park entertainment center in Segesvár (Sighisoara), which, according to the press, was a real estate racket, as it allowed the designers to obtain valuable municipal land. In the latter business circle, ENVERA CONSULTING and TRADE is currently advising the Austrian logging company Holzindustrie Schweighoffer.

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<sup>7</sup> Marius OPREA: Armageddonul spionilor 7/2/2005 (An Armageddon of Spies )  
<https://www.9am.ro/stiri-revista-presei/2005-02-07/armageddonul-spionilor-reteaua-caraman.html> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

In my assessment, it was typical in the 1990s that businessmen supported by the Romanian authorities were operating between the two countries. Thus, Senator Attila Verestóy of the RMDSZ had chemical and real estate interests in Hungary, but Ion Tiriac bank owner, the Dedeman trading group, and PETROM oil company also invested in us – to the satisfaction of both states. In the same way, businessmen of Hungarian citizenship or descent (Sándor Demján, Peter Munk) close to Peter Meggyesi, then Prime Minister of Hungary, were able to do business in Romania in the shopping centers and hotel industry.

I have good reason to believe that the aforementioned Budapest circle was involved in the formation of bilateral relations at that time. The fact that the circle came together in Budapest may be a coincidence, it is their role in bilateral relations that is relevant to us. The essence of the power technique they represent is the closely controlled economy, the formation of political relations through smaller provocations (mainly in the media, but also in other ways, such as the Black March in Tirgu Mures in 1990). All of these techniques were typical of the pre-1990 era.

Having learned about General Has's career, it becomes clear that Romanian intelligence has priority areas, both geographically and functionally, in which, not surprisingly, Hungary is included. After Budapest, has became a diplomat in Tripoli, then Tehran, retired from SIE in the rank of Brigadier General in 2007 and became a businessman. His cooperation with Tel Drum was funded by two Romanian private banks, UNICREDIT and BRD. Among the leaders and owners of the latter were also intelligence officers. All this shows that networks of service officers were established already in the 1990s, which were based on acquaintances and these networks soon became incorporated in the power structure. (e.g. see the political career of former intelligence officer Theodor Melescanu).

Their activities covered all sectors sensitive to national security: energy policy, foreign trade, media. They are present in key areas of politics and economics, as well as in regional Romanian national politics. It is striking that the Budapest group under investigation, after the accession of Romania to NATO and the EU in 2007, created several companies, which for me may mean that we can witness centrally planned activities.

In the following case study, after the economic relations of the 1990s and the 2000s, we look ahead to 2010 in time and gain insights into the Romanian perception and response of Hungarian national politics.

## **2. The nightmare of Hungarian extremism and the Hungarian-Russian alliance<sup>8</sup>**

The Romanian media regularly publishes articles about "Hungarian extremist nationalism" and the nightmare of a possible "Russian-Hungarian anti-Romanian cooperation". Several Rise Project reports fit into this line. For example, in connection with an international money laundering scandal known as the Russian Laundromat,

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<sup>8</sup> Rise Project: Laundromat 2017.03.21: <https://www.riseproject.ro/articol/banii-negri-ai-rusiei/> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

the Polish authorities arrested their compatriot Mateusz Piskorski, head of the ECGA political science institute, in 2017 on charges of spying for the Russians. Electoral monitoring missions were organized by Piskorski on behalf of Russia in the post-Soviet region, and in 2011 he invited Gyula György Zagyva a Hungarian MP of Jobbik to observe local elections in secessionist Abkhazia. He is also alleged to have been involved in Russian money laundering operations through his relationship with a London-based travel agency, which has transferred money and placed orders for Romanian entrepreneurs. Piskorski was also in contact with a number of Russian organizations that supported separatist movements in Europe (e.g. Alexei Kochetkov's CIS-EMO Institute for Social Sciences in Moscow). Zagyva was the Transylvanian organizer of the openly revisionist 64 Counties Youth Movement (HVIM). One member of HVIM, Barna Csibi, said in a press release in 2016<sup>9</sup> that "Russia supports the self-determination aspirations of the Szeklerland". According to the report, the Transylvanian HVIM organization received money from the Jobbik Foundation.

In my view, Hungarian extremist and radical organizations are a real threat to the democratic order of our countries, but the extent of this challenge is greatly exaggerated by the Romanian side. On the Hungarian real or perceived extremists and the illegal nature of their activities in Romania hardly any evidence is provided by the Romanian party, there are only vague references like "preparing for sabotage" such as in connection with the Beke case (charges of preparing to set off firecrackers) in Kézdivásárhely. The reality is that in the last Hungarian parliamentary elections only 4-5% of voters in Romania voted for Jobbik, so HVIM has no mass base in Transylvania. The followers of HVIM in Szeklerland rather present operetta nationalism with confusing rhetoric. In my opinion, the Romanian overreaction has other considerations than just suppressing HVIM. It is too risky to openly attack Hungarian minority institutions and their legal claims in the open societies of our time and in the EU environment, therefore they are using anti-Hungarian campaigns to exploit and build upon the mistakes of some Hungarian parties. These campaigns fit into the genre of information offensives.

The last Hungarian case studies of the Rise Project, described below, will help you gain insight into the power techniques of the present day.

### **3. Stories about occult networks with Hungarian participation<sup>10</sup>**

The largest internet service provider in Romania and Central Europe and one of the major media groups is RCS-RDS/DIGI, a company the majority of whose shares is owned by Zoltán Teszári, a Romanian entrepreneur.<sup>11</sup> According to the Rise Project, the company's operations in Romania are not transparent, mainly because it is operated through offshore companies. According to the report quoted, an American

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<sup>9</sup> Rise Project: Autonomie si petarde (Autonomy and firecrackers), 2016. 09. 27. <https://www.riseproject.ro/documentar-autonomie-si-petarde/> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

<sup>10</sup> Rise Project: Furnizorul de internet RCS-RDS (RCS-RDS Internet Service Provider), 10. 05. 2017. <https://www.riseproject.ro/furnizorul-de-internet-rcs-rds-actionat-in-INSTANTA-in-statele-Unit/> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

<sup>11</sup> DIGI Company Portal: <https://www.digiromania.ro/>

entrepreneur sued RCDS-RDS in 2017 for allegedly acquiring its Hungarian interests through allegedly unlawful pressure. The Teszari- owned company has also been linked to the football corruption case hallmarked by Mitica Dragomir.

According to another report from the Rise Project,<sup>12</sup> Peter Imre, Hungarian-Romanian entrepreneur is the representative in Romania of Cambridge Analytica, a British company, which became infamous through the Facebook surveillance scandal; Peter Imre did favors to the Romanian parliamentary party ALDE (Partidul Alianta Democratilor si Liberalilor - Romanian Party of Liberals and Democrats) led by Ion P. Tariceanu, among others he organized lobbying activities in the US. Peter Imre is often portrayed in the report as well as in the Romanian media as representing foreign interests. The ALDE party, known for its Hungarian-friendly relations, is also attacked through Imre.

In my view, these issues appear in Romanian media reporting as obscure machinations of Hungarian entrepreneurs with unknown purposes that could be dangerous to Romania. It is noteworthy that the recent Hungarian cases are already in international economic and IT context.

## Findings

In Romania in the 1990s, the former communist elite created a new leadership layer, which is not surprising, since before 1990 there was an extremist Stalinist dictatorship and no organized political opposition or social, cultural or trade union organization that would have been independent of government and able to play a leading role in the new world. In this respect, Romania is separate from the states of the current Visegrad Group.

Continuity of power based primarily on individuals and networks was therefore inevitable for our neighbor. In the democratic Romania that emerged after the December 1989 revolution and coup, power structures were created by the former communist elite and, in particular, some groups were very active, including former intelligence officers. This is not surprising, as this group had highly qualified foreign contacts. Partially similar processes have taken place in other post-socialist states. Intelligence officers managed foreign trade during communist times, and had access to information, contacts, and capital through state-owned off- shore companies written on their name in 1990. There were other groups associated with the former county nomenclature or with the domestic secret police and the central state apparatus. There were significant pathways between these groups, and I personally attribute this in part to the fact that Romanian politicians often change sides to this day.

The career of the intelligence group which came into existence during the communist era, described in case study No. 1 above, can be considered as typical of the Romanian elite. Most of the members of the group were still in their professional careers in the 1990s, but after the accession to NATO in 2007 they established private companies. As it transpires from case study No. 1, these companies often collaborated

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<sup>12</sup> Rise Project: SCL Cambridge Analytica , 06/01/2020: <https://www.riseproject.ro/scl-cambridge-analytica-culisele-manipularii-politice-in-romania/> (downloaded)

with leading Romanian politicians on construction, trade, energy, media, and banking insurance issues abroad. Of course, groups of officers were constantly changing in composition, introducing external members (such as journalists), and collaborating with those who had graduated from the Secret Service Academy after 1990. In 2018, retired General Florian Coldea<sup>13</sup>, SRI (Director of Civil Intelligence) Operations Director, even the above-mentioned company, also visited in Budapest, had a wide network of contacts and was a member of many companies.

These groups, marked by officers, were accompanied by governmental benevolence, tax evasion, government orders, but in return, they pursued Romanian interests in the Republic of Moldova (media companies). The members of the Budapest group were later, as private entrepreneurs, partnered with a number of companies (Unicredit, BRD banks, Petrom) with whom they had relationships during their stay in Hungary.

It was also responsible for overseeing and securing foreign partners for these former officer-led groups, as was the case in Romanian-Hungarian economic relations in the 1990s. Case study No. 1 shows that a group of officers who visited Budapest also brokered safe deals between Romania and Hungary and were satisfied with their work as they continued their professional careers after the year 2000.

Compared to the 1990s, 2000s, the nature of economic relations between our states has changed significantly by 2020. Our economies have gradually been integrated into the international business world, the culture of large companies. After 2010, the Hungarian government and the Parliament in Budapest emphasized the support of Hungarians across the border, with the guiding principle of not tolerating the destruction of cross-border communities. Due to the economic integration and the new Hungarian national policy, the Romanian government can less and less control the development of bilateral relations through groups of officers and businessmen, and secure for example the Hungarian state aid coming to Romania according to their own interpretation of national security.

A valid national defense strategy established by the Romanian Presidency<sup>14</sup> identifies ethnic separatism from abroad as a major security challenge. The lesson of recent years is that Bucharest no longer responds to the challenge of Hungarian political and economic influence with the tools of the 1990s, but uses more complex methods. The contemporary methods inspired by hybrid warfare include public influence mainly through the media, organizing minor provocations (Uz Valley cemetery cases), tax and other regulatory measures, the use of litigation, international relations, political propaganda.

At the same time, in my judgment, good politics is planning in the long run, as major state reforms and economic projects are built beyond government cycles. The long-term challenges shared by the two countries are common: the protracted EU

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<sup>13</sup> Flux24, Afaceri Florian Coldea (Coldea Florian's Businesses), 2018.  
<https://flux24.ro/tag/afaceri-florian-coldea/> (downloaded 13 December 2019)

<sup>14</sup> Strategia Nationala de Aparare the Tarii (National Defense Strategy), Office of the President of Romania, 2015.  
[https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia\\_Nationala\\_de\\_Aparare\\_a\\_Tarii\\_1.pdf](https://www.presidency.ro/files/userfiles/Strategia_Nationala_de_Aparare_a_Tarii_1.pdf)  
(downloaded 13 December 2019)

crisis, Atlantic security weaknesses in the Balkans and Eastern Europe, aging and emigration, the need to fill labor shortages abroad, climate-environmental problems, the introduction of the information economy and many more. Budapest and Bucharest should resolve their tensions in their relationship so that we can meet the challenges of the future more effectively.

In my assessment, inter-governmental confidence-building, which is primarily the task of political leaders, would be needed to resolve tensions in bilateral relations. It would also be a step forward if the parties could define and treat Transylvanian Hungarians, and in particular the Szeklerland, as a factor that strengthens and does not weaken Romania. That is, a Hungarian minority, economically supported and retained in its culture and traditions (including a partial self-determination, e.g. in education and rural development), could strengthen Romania's internal security and economic and political efficiency. Unfortunately, I see no opportunity in the medium term to enforce the latter principle in cooperation. One reason for this is that power in personal relationships, behind the scenes networks, is less capable of reforming itself. This is the idea behind case studies No. 2 and 3: artificially maintained enemy images, fashion of conspiracy theories, political manipulation, information warfare. Of course, it should be in all our interests that good neighborliness and mutual assistance in modernization should prevail over the latter. It also follows from the above that the political and economic challenges of our age are changing rapidly and are increasingly complex and cross-border. It is clear from the case studies that the Romanian and Hungarian sides were basically interested in good co-operation, and this was often found even in the tense 90s. It may be a lesson for us not to approach each other with bias and prejudice, as there is one elite in each country and no more, and our neighbors are most interested in our success, not our distant partners.

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**EVOLUTION OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN MALI, BASED ON EXPERIENCES OF THE EUTM MALI HUNGARIAN MILITARY INSTRUCTORS**

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*Abstract*

Mali can be considered as a region of ever-boiling turmoil; however, our scope somehow fails to recognize the importance of that area; that is why this topic keeps evading from the focus of our everyday lives. The aim of the author is to highlight the change of the security situation in Mali and describe the several on-going conflicts in the country, giving a general overview and summarization of recent years' problems. This focus is going to be based on the economic problems, the corruption, the food crisis and the experiences from the increasing numbers of the Hungarian soldiers, who served in the EUTM Mali, between 2017 and 2019. Thus, these years brought a huge change in the number of Hungarian soldiers serving in the country; and the multi-level conflict is on the rise again.

**Keywords:** Mali, Africa, Jihadists, Fulani, Dogon, al-Qaeda, Touaregs, terrorism.

**Foreword**

Mali has a history full of wars and conflicts, just like any other country in the world. However, this country failed and is failing currently to be on the path of stabilization. One can easily be familiarized with the history of Mali from the numerous internet sites; however, it is rather difficult to find any current written or virtual source, which deals with the present of that war-ravaged region. Nevertheless, the Global Conflict Tracker<sup>1</sup> can draw a relatively thorough picture of all the past and present crises. It says that the situation is worsening and it is almost impossible to bring peace to the country, mostly because these conflicts have roots back to the colonial times. In Mali, the forces of the UN appeared around 2012 in the MINUSMA<sup>2</sup> mission, and in 2013 the EUTM<sup>3</sup> Mali mission, as well as the French army started their Operation Serval in 2013, then the Operation Barkhane in 2014. The author describes; how the Hungarians joined to the effort to stabilize the region and what were and are their perspectives in the conflicts and in the current security situation?

In his essay, he will summarize the on-going multi-level conflicts and their connection to the different missions that exist in the region. He will also present the Hungarian participation in the joint effort of the EUTM Mali and the point of view of the Hungarian soldiers, who had been serving in this mission between 2017 and 2019.

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<sup>1</sup> Global Conflict Tracker. <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/destabilization-mali> (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>2</sup> United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali.

<sup>3</sup> European Union Training Mission.

At the last part, he will try to draw a conclusion and a prediction about the future, based on the given data.

### **The on-going crisis in Mali in the past and the present**

Instable economy, malnutrition, desertification, corruption, ethnic clashes and terrorism; these factors hit harshly the war-ravaged country that achieved independence not so long ago, in 1960.<sup>4</sup> About the perspective of the economy, the odi.org wrote the following in 2014: *"Mali's positive economic growth in aggregate terms translates into slow per capita growth rates and Mali continues to rank as one of the world's poorest countries."*<sup>5</sup> According to an IMF<sup>6</sup> article in 2019, *"Mali faces an intense security crisis dating back to 2012, which has long-lasting economic and humanitarian impacts"*, because "Mali is a fragile, low-income country, facing a difficult security situation".<sup>7</sup> As one can observe, there was not much change in the economic situation between 2014 and 2019. Naturally, these problems did not start in 2014, we can date back the root of the problems into the colonial times; however, our scope only deals with the present years.

The problems of the economy affect the whole country. Mali faces widespread corruption; one can easily find studies on this topic even from the EU<sup>8</sup> that can hinder the growth and stabilization of the country and even the region. The studies say that these factors, the economic instability and the web of corruption are among the most harmful factors, which cause and make the crisis longer. In 2016, corruption was playing one of the top roles among the problems, cited by the ganintegrity.org.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, as we can track, it is not something that will be solved in a few years. This statement is still true in 2020, as the Chart 1 shows the position of Mali, among the countries in connection with their public sector's corruption:

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<sup>4</sup> Independent Mali. <https://www.britannica.com/place/Mali/Independent-Mali> (downloaded 05 March 2020)


<sup>5</sup> Francesca BASTAGLI and Camilla TOURMIN: Economic factors behind the crisis. March 2014. <https://www.odi.org/publications/8318-mali-economic-factors-behind-crisis> (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>6</sup> International Monetary Fund.

<sup>7</sup> IMF Country Focus: Mali: Supporting Growth in the Face of Security Challenges. 05. 09. 2019. <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/09/03/NA090319-mali-supporting-growth-in-the-face-of-security-challenges> (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>8</sup> Francesca BASTAGLI and Camilla TOULMIN: Mali: Economic factors behind the crisis. European Parliament, Directorate General of External Policies, 2014. [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/433754/EXPO-DEVE\\_ET\(2014\)433754\\_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2014/433754/EXPO-DEVE_ET(2014)433754_EN.pdf) (downloaded 05 March 2020) ISBN: 978-92-823-5280-9.

<sup>9</sup> Mali corruption report. March 2016. GAN Integrity. <https://www.ganintegrity.com/portal/country-profiles/mali/> (downloaded 05 March 2020)



**Figure 1: Mali corruption rank<sup>10</sup>**

According to the chart, Mali reached its highest point of corruption in 2019, though the average statistics from 2010 to 2019 are not of a great promise either.

Besides the economic failure and high corruption rate of the country, there are different food programmes that have the goal to ease the food crisis in Mali. It is not by chance that malnutrition is also a huge problem for the civilians, when we take the previous statistics into consideration. As the WFP<sup>11</sup> points out, in 2020, poverty strikes nearly half of the population (44.9%), 34% of infant death is in relation with under-nutrition, land degradation and harvest-losses are all in connection with the widespread food crisis.<sup>12</sup> In 2018, UNICEF also highlighted the next data: "This year, 1.6 million children are expected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition, which is a 50 percent increase from 2012, the Sahel's last major nutrition crisis."<sup>13</sup>

As these were not enough, different insurgent and terrorist groups tries to grab power and set a foothold in the country, terrorizing the civilian population and causing losses to the peacekeeper European nations, too. The attacks against France, against the soldiers of EUTM Mali mission and the MINUSMA by the Jihadists are not a new phenomenon. As I have already mentioned above, the Europeans started their work as peacekeepers and trainers in 2012 and 2013. In 2016, there was an attack against peacekeepers, where one soldier died and four other injured. The France Diplomatie made a statement about the attack<sup>14</sup> that appeared on the Global Conflict Tracker, as

<sup>10</sup> Trading Economics: Mali Corruption Rank - 2003-2019 Data. <https://tradingeconomics.com/mali/corruption-rank> (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>11</sup> World Food Programme.

<sup>12</sup> World Food Programme: Mali. <https://www.wfp.org/countries/mali> (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>13</sup> Nutrition Crisis in Mali. Unicef. 18. 07. 2018. <https://www.unicef.org/wca/stories/nutrition-crisis-mali> (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>14</sup> Mali – Attack against the European Union's training and advisory mission for the Malian Armed Forces - EUTM Mali (March 21, 2016). France Diplomatie. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/mali/news/article/mali-attack-against-the-european-union-s-training-and-advisory-mission-for-the> (downloaded 04 March 2020)

well.<sup>15</sup> However, this was only the beginning. Year 2016 was a rather violent one, as there were several other attacks too. There was one terrorist attack in Gao town against civilians<sup>16</sup> and one attack against the camp MINUSMA, in October at the Aguelhok village.<sup>17</sup> Of course, this list cannot be complete, as numerous of these conflicts and fights have not been disclosed. The conflict continued in 2018, and one can read about the ongoing conflict in 2019 and in 2020 as well. Some of the best sources you can find are in French language. In 2018, the Jihadists targeted Touareg civilians.<sup>18</sup> In that year, the French army intervened more than one occasion in the country, in order to decrease the Jihadist groups' influence.<sup>19</sup>

When I served in the EUTM Mali in 2018, we faced a problem even more serious than the "normal" Jihadist attacks. We were aware of the insurgent Jihadists and the ongoing conflict between the Dogon and Fulani ethnicities. However, we were not ready to face a conflict between the FAMA<sup>20</sup> forces and the civilians. The „mass graves“<sup>21</sup> had such a huge affect on the whole region and the EUTM that the commanders immediately started a Human Rights project for the FAMA forces. I have a first-hand experience from this, because I was a member of the advisor team, which consisted of two lawyers and two soldiers, who pursued this Human Rights project to the FAMA. Our task was to help the lawyers to bring some military perspectives into their presentation, to let the average soldiers be aware of the consequences of their actions. The mass graves were found around Mopti, in the central region of the country, where allegedly FAMA forces killed dozens of civilians around the villages, stating that they had been terrorists. At that time, this was one of the biggest concerns of the EU.

The year of 2019 did not bring a ceasefire as the attacks continued. According to AP, there was an attack in Bamako against the EUTM in February, though no soldier was injured.<sup>22</sup> The GlobalSecurity website highlighted the seriousness of the

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<sup>15</sup> Destabilization of Mali. Global Conflict Tracker. <https://www.cfr.org/interactive/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/destabilization-mali> (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>16</sup> Mali – Attaques à Gao (31 mai 2016). France Diplomatie. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/mali/evenements/article/mali-attaques-a-gao-31-06-16> (downloaded 03 March 2020)

<sup>17</sup> Mali – Attaque contre la MINUSMA (Aguelhok, 23 janvier 2017). France Diplomatie. <https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/mali/evenements/article/mali-attaque-contre-la-minusma-23-01-17> (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>18</sup> Au Mali, des dizaines de civils touareg tués par des djihadistes présumés. 13. 12. 2018. Le Monde. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/12/13/au-mali-des-dizaines-de-civils-touareg-tues-par-des-djihadistes-presumes\\_5396976\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/12/13/au-mali-des-dizaines-de-civils-touareg-tues-par-des-djihadistes-presumes_5396976_3212.html) (downloaded: 04 March 2020)

<sup>19</sup> Au Mali, intervention de la force «Barkhane» lors de combats entre l'armée et des djihadistes. 18. 10. 2018. Le Monde. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/10/18/au-mali-intervention-de-la-force-barkhane-lors-de-combats-entre-l-armee-et-des-djihadistes\\_5371408\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2018/10/18/au-mali-intervention-de-la-force-barkhane-lors-de-combats-entre-l-armee-et-des-djihadistes_5371408_3212.html) (downloaded 04 March 2020)

<sup>20</sup> Forces Armées Malienne.

<sup>21</sup> Mali says some soldiers implicated after mass graves found. 19. 06. 2018. Reuters. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mali-security/mali-says-some-soldiers-implicated-after-mass-graves-found-idUSKBN1JF22K> (downloaded 04 March 2020)

<sup>22</sup> EU training mission comes under attack in Mali. 24. 02. 2019. AP. <https://apnews.com/c375c2a0628b43d286c71ef06f5fb89f> (downloaded 04 March 2020)

above-mentioned Dogon-Fulani conflict, which reached its height in 2019. According to the website, there were at least 488 deaths among the Dogon and Fulani ethnicities, in 2018 and 2019.<sup>23</sup> It is also an ongoing problem that both of these two ethnicities try to control natural resources. The Dogon farmers and Fulani herders have a century-old conflict between each other, over the land and the water. However, they do not try to make an agreement, instead they try to solve their conflict through war and weapons. This problem is becoming more serious as the climate is changing and there are more and more droughts. Nothing seems to change in 2020 too, as there was an IED<sup>24</sup> attack against the EUTM, near the area of Gao.<sup>25</sup>

All of these reports, studies, articles and personal experiences give us the impression that there are so many levels and layers of these problems that it seems almost impossible to have a solution accepted by all of them. Democracy is a new<sup>26</sup> phenomenon for the whole region; they have to go through a similar process as we have done in Europe. This is not going to be easy, but as one can observe, several programmes and organizations, as I mentioned above, try to help to find the right way out of the tunnel.

### **The EUTM Mali and the Hungarian participation**

The last occasion, when Mali got a scientific focus from the field of defence forces and security issues was in 2014, when two articles<sup>26, 27</sup> were published on the topic of the EUTM Mali and the Hungarians who served there. At the same time, also other international studies appeared in 2014 that focused on the EUTM<sup>28</sup>. However, after this year, one could only get to know something about the up-to-date information mainly through the press. The whole EUTM started in 2012 and 2013, when Diancounda Traoré asked UN to help in the stabilization of the country, after several rebellions and power take-over by al-Qaeda affiliated groups like the MNLA.<sup>29</sup> Although the al-Qaeda was and is present in Mali, there is a deep scar among the

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<sup>23</sup> Fulani-Dogon Conflict. GlobalSecurity.  
<https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/fulani-dogon.htm> (downloaded 04 March 2020)

<sup>24</sup> Improvised Explosive Device.

<sup>25</sup> Fergus KELLY: Three Irish soldiers injured in IED blast east of Gao in Mali. 25. 02. 2020.  
<https://www.thedefensepost.com/2020/02/25/mali-3-irish-soldiers-injured-ied-gao-minusma/> (downloaded 04 April 2020)

<sup>26</sup> Mariann VECSEY: The EUTM Mali and the role of hungary in the mission. In: Tradecraft Review, 2014/2 Special Issue. pp. 112-122.  
[https://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/szsz/2014\\_2\\_spec.pdf](https://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/szsz/2014_2_spec.pdf) (downloaded 04 April 2020)  
HU ISSN 2063-2908

<sup>27</sup> Ltc. János BESENYŐ: Hungarian soldiers in EUTM Mali. In: Tradecraft Review, 2014/2 Special Issue. pp. 5-18. [https://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/szsz/2014\\_2\\_spec.pdf](https://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/szsz/2014_2_spec.pdf) (downloaded 04 April 2020) HU ISSN 2063-2908

<sup>28</sup> Jan-Uwe PETTKE: European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali) as an example of the European Union's Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Management. In: Europa-Kolleg Hambur, Institut for European Integration, Study Paper No 03/14. <https://europa-kolleg-hamburg.de> (downloaded 04 March 2020)

<sup>29</sup> Tiemoko DIALLO – David LEWIS: Mali rebels push south to open third front-sources. 26. 01. 2012. <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-mali-fighting/mali-rebels-push-south-to-open-third-front-idUKTRE80P1WT20120126> (downloaded 04 March 2020)

Fulani and Dogon ethnicities, as well as the returning Touaregs that also created several conflict zones, as this topic was discussed by Márton Varga in his article.<sup>30</sup> After these years, there was a huge change in our numbers in the EUTM Mali, and the problems continued to exist. Even the Hungarian press released an article on the increasing number of Hungarians in the EUTM.<sup>31</sup>

Since the beginning of the mission, the number of our soldiers in the EUTM has risen significantly. Until 2017, two Hungarian sniper instructors served in the EUTM Mali. However, according to Lt. Col. Besenyő's article, at the beginning, there was some medical personnel from Hungary as well, but this was a short-lived role for the Hungarians.<sup>32</sup> According to one of the instructors who served between October 2017 and April 2018, based on a personal interview, the general security situation was already bad; the country was ravaged by several problems. There was a huge need for mobile training teams and military instructors. These mobile training teams, aka CMATTs,<sup>33</sup> carried out training for FAMA soldiers in different cities. My colleagues trained snipers in the city of Sikasso that is located in the most southern part of the country. After 2018 April, my colleagues and I served there; however, our number was risen from two to six, and our tasks were changed too. According to the EU and the leadership of Mali, there was an extensive urge to train „normal” infantrymen, so we got the role of basic infantry instructors. During my presence at the EUTM, we had to carry out five training sessions. One of us was based near our camp in Koulikoro, one served in the airport military personnel near Bamako, one in Segou and our last one was in Kayes.

The soldiers who served in the next contingent started their half-year session with a CMATT, in Timbuktu. Their number was raised from six persons in 2019 to nineteen, and now there are twenty Hungarian soldiers in Mali. It means that between 2017 and 2020, the personnel were raised from two sniper instructors to twenty infantry instructors and force protection personnel. Our Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs Péter Szijjártó announced the increase of the Hungarian contingent's personnel in 2019.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Márton VARGA: A tuaregek – lázadástól a polgárháborúig. In: *Hadtudományi szemle* 2019/2 pp. 63-78. [http://real.mtak.hu/103289/1/HSZ\\_2019\\_2\\_5\\_Varga.pdf](http://real.mtak.hu/103289/1/HSZ_2019_2_5_Varga.pdf) (downloaded 04 April 2020) HU ISSN 2060-0437

<sup>31</sup> Mali sürgős segítséget kért az ENSZ-től. 11. 01. 2013. MTI. [https://index.hu/kulfold/2013/01/11/mali\\_surgos\\_segitseget\\_kert\\_az\\_ensz-tol/](https://index.hu/kulfold/2013/01/11/mali_surgos_segitseget_kert_az_ensz-tol/) (downloaded 04 March 2020)

<sup>32</sup> Ltc. János BESENYŐ: Hungarian soldiers in EUTM Mali.

<sup>33</sup> Combined Mobile Advisory and Training Team.

<sup>34</sup> SZIJJÁRTÓ Péter: Magyarország megduplázza a Maliban és a Száhel-övezetben szolgáló katonáinak számát. 26. 09. 2019. MTI/honvedelem.hu. <https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/szijjarto-peter-magyarorszag-megduplazza-a-maliban-es-a-szahel-ovezetben-szolgalo-katonainak-szamat/> (downloaded 04 March 2020)



Figure2: Locations mentioned in this article are pinpointed with red dots<sup>35</sup>

The EUTM was active mostly in the southern and central regions of the country. Timbuktu was the nordest city where the CMATT pursued its activity. Those regions of the country that were and are hit by terrorists are supervised mostly by French soldiers. During these two years, numerous training courses were organized for the soldiers of FAMA, with more or less success, and even a “Train-the-trainer” project started.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, the goal of the EU is not to make a never-ending training for the soldiers, but to train a number of capable NCOs and officers, in order to pass the knowledge and experience, and make the FAMA personnel able to train their own troops in the future.

In my opinion, the ideal case and scenario would be to let them train their own army and not to let the EU to do all the work instead of the FAMA. In the end, they should deal with the region’s security with their own well trained and capable forces. Though to achieve this level, the EUTM should continue its work to train the infantrymen and the trainers. There is a huge progress and we can hope that one day the FAMA will bring peace to their country. Interestingly, there are also case studies that would like to deal with the Malian crisis, while implying that the security of the region has a global importance.<sup>37,38</sup>

<sup>35</sup> This map is edited by the author based on the map taken from [www.mapquest.com](http://www.mapquest.com).

<sup>36</sup> Train the trainers. EUTM Mali. <https://www.eutmmali.eu/train-the-trainers> (downloaded 03 March 2020)

<sup>37</sup> Morten BØÅS et. al.: The EU, security sector reform and border management in Mali. 31. 01. 2018. EUNPACK. <http://www.eunpack.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2018-01-31%20D7.4%20Working%20paper%20on%20implementation%20of%20EU%20crisis%20response%20in%20Mali.pdf> (downloaded 03 March 2020)

<sup>38</sup> Ingo PETERS et. al.: European Union’s Crisis Response in the Extended Neighbourhood: Comparing the EU’s Output Effectiveness in the Cases of Afghanistan, Iraq and Mali. 10. 03. 2018. EUNPACK.

## Personal experiences of soldiers who served in the EUTM Mali

I collected and processed the following data, by using face-to-face interviews and a questionnaire. The starting year was 2017, one shift before my duty time, when only two Hungarian soldiers were serving in the EUTM Mali as sniper instructors. According to one of the instructors, they did not have any conflicts and problems with the Jihadists; however, they heard from others that earlier there had been an attack on the EUTM personnel in Bamako, when they were visiting a hotel. As far as my colleagues were concerned, they only had to deal with the instruction of the snipers; the situation in their region was like the overall average. After the handover-takeover of duty, our contingent began to do trainings. Around the summer months, we started to get to know about the already mentioned „mass-graves” and we heard also the news of the continuous conflicts between the Dogon and Fulani. There were also news from the northern regions on hard fights between FAMA forces and Jihadists, in the region of Gao city.

The overall security situation of the EUTM began worsening late 2018, after my contingent had left the country. At that time, there was an attack against the EUTM Camp, located in Koulikoro. Fortunately, no European soldier was injured, but there was an overall increase of awareness from that point. The personnel of that Hungarian contingent visited Timbuktu for a CMATT, where they had a hard time, due to the harsh weather conditions. There was no attack against the EUTM personnel. However, as we can observe from the above-mentioned articles and reports, there were continuous attacks against the French soldiers and the MINUSMA. Of course, the EUTM was aware of that and raised its level of security. In 2019, there were rumours among the soldiers that the French soldiers might withdraw some of their forces from the north, but these were not true, and the Operation Barkhane is still the largest French military operation outside of France<sup>39</sup>, and they still fight against the Jihadist forces.<sup>40</sup>

The personnel of the contingent that are serving from 2019 to 2020 shared similar information with me, regarding the conflicts. As far as they are concerned, the locals respect the EUTM forces and their work is continuous. However, IEDs still represent a general threat. From the perspective of the local ethnicities, the Dogon-Fulani conflict still exists and continues to increase the death toll. Around the region of Mopti, there are atrocities against the forces of FAMA, and in the region of the Operation Barkhane some conflicts occur, as well. According to Hungarian soldiers on the spot, the Barkhane forces still try to pacify the area, though their presence resulted in more conflicts than they can solve. On the following map, I made a signal with a red circle around the areas, where there were and are conflicts, based on the experience of the Hungarian soldiers.

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[http://www.eunpack.eu/sites/default/files/publications/WP%207%20Comparative%20for%207.1.\\_final%20version%2010.03.18.pdf](http://www.eunpack.eu/sites/default/files/publications/WP%207%20Comparative%20for%207.1._final%20version%2010.03.18.pdf) (downloaded: 05 March 2020)

<sup>39</sup> Morgane LE CAM: Au Mali, l'opération «Barkhane» ensablée en terre oubliée. 04. 05. 2019. [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/05/04/barkhane-l-ensablement-en-terre-oubliee\\_5458125\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/05/04/barkhane-l-ensablement-en-terre-oubliee_5458125_3212.html) (downloaded 05 March 2020)

<sup>40</sup> Fergus KELLY: France and Sahel partner forces conduct 'unprecedented' operation in Burkina Faso and Mali. 18. 11. 2019. The Defence Post. <https://thedefensepost.com/2019/11/18/joint-operation-burkina-faso-mali-barkhane-bourgou-iv-sahel/> (downloaded 05 March 2020)




Figure 3: Some conflict zones in Mali<sup>41</sup>

According to Hungarian soldiers, who served in EUTM Mali between 2017 and 2019, there is no change at all in the security situation. When the two sniper instructors handed over their shift to us, we still had to face the same problems, and the same areas were stricken by the problems. The northern regions are still a source of conflict between the EU forces and the Jihadists, while the central region “hosts” the never-ending resource-war between the Dogon and Fulani tribes. The issue of „mass graves” that we had to deal with in 2018 ceased to exist now, but there is no sign that it will never happen again in the future. I hope that the Human Rights project that we started is working, and the FAMA forces are now more aware of their decisions and actions, in order prevent these atrocities from happening again.

## Conclusions

It is not by chance that the readers and those who have experience in the region have different feelings on this topic. How is it possible that despite many joint programmes by Europe, the MINUSMA, the EUTM Mali, the WFP, the IMF and others, which all would like to help in stabilizing the country, there has not been real result? Mali is still ranked among the most corrupted countries, there are still ethnic clashes and Jihadist attacks against the French soldiers, and numerous civilians have been killed in the near past. It is almost impossible to have a full understanding of all the problems we have experienced in this area, because our culture, history, values and identity are very different. However, we can observe several efforts that have already brought some such changes that have put Mali on the track leading towards a functioning state and society. Of course, we must understand that this will not be a fast and easy process; this is a country that has inherited many problems from the colonial times and gained their independence not too long ago.

<sup>41</sup> This map is edited by the author based on the map taken from <https://www.google.hu/maps>.

However, it is worth considering what the Malians – the average civilians, state men and leaders – can do, in order to move their own country forward, towards peace and growth. The work of the French army, the EUTM and the MINUSMA should not cease in the short term, the EU should continue its work, systematically going forward; and one day – with a joint effort – there may be peace in Mali too. For this hope to come true, first, a stable economy should be built, and a lawful democracy – with much lower corruption – should be established. After these prerequisites will have been ensured, the state and their army would be able to mediate peace between the Fulani and Dogon. At the same time, a stable economy can ease the current food and resource crisis as well. After the conflicts will have been eliminated, the state will be able to turn more efforts to the northern regions near Gao, in order to strike down the Jihadists. However, despite everyone knows that this would be the best and ideal scenario, the reality may be quite a different one.

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*Abstract*

This article has been researched and compiled in such a way as to shed light upon the emergence and activities of the ASALA terrorist organisation, which has carried out the most terrible terrorist attacks against Turkish diplomacy, families and civilians in 21 countries and which has been on the list of the most notorious terrorist organisations for years. Of note is its continual attempts at challenging the very existence of the Republic of Turkey. Terror, terrorism or using ethnic elements in terrorist actions are therefore contextually touched upon throughout this text. The main purpose of the article is to answer the question, 'how and why did the ASALA terrorist organisation come into being?' Also covered are the questions, 'Who' and 'where was' ASALA founded, as well as its aspirations, ideology and international connections from which it receives logistical, financial and educational assistance. The relationship between another ethnic terrorist group in Turkey and the ASALA terrorist organisation, along with their joint acts of terrorism, are also discussed. The article is concluded with comments on the process of the disintegration of ASALA.

**Keywords:** Asala, Terror, Terrorism, Turkey

**1. Introduction**

Terror is a global problem. The most significant features of terror are violence and the use of violence to weaken the public, create an environment of panic and spread fear. The aim of terror is to reach evil objectives through creating a sense of mistrust of legal authority (the state), to break down society and cause a disturbance of the peace.

The root of the word *terror* comes from Latin. According to Alex. F. Chamberlain, "the word terror (French *terreur*, Latin *terror*), goes back to the same root which gave birth to the Latin *terrere* (older form, *ter-sere*), 'to dread, to be afraid' and, originally, 'to tremble'".<sup>1</sup> In conjunction with this, the concept of terror can be defined as, "*violence that evokes a visceral, psychological response in order to coerce compliance*".<sup>2</sup> Starting from this, terrorism can be defined as, "*the premeditated use or threat to use violence by individuals or sub-national groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the*

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<sup>1</sup> CHAMBERLAIN, A. F.: On the Words for "Fear" in Certain Languages. A Study in Linguistic Psychology. The American Journal of Psychology, 1899. Jan, 10(2), p. 302.

<sup>2</sup> ENGLUND, S. – STOHL, M.: Constructions of Terrorism. Perspectives on Terrorism, June, 2016. 10(3), p. 33.

*immediate victims*".<sup>3</sup> Therefore, terror is subordinated with terrorism. Hence, terrorism aims to draw the attention of the people where fear by the public is its ultimate aim.

Nowadays, terrorism might be evaluated as the biggest threat to international security. After the Cold War, terrorism reached its peak and became one of the biggest threats in the international relations area. At present, terrorism presents itself as different types and varieties which change according to which method is deemed appropriate for its instigators. Moreover, terrorism no longer means only guns; there is now state terrorism, domestic terrorism, cyber terrorism, ethnic terrorism, etc.

At present, terrorism is not a question of country or region; at the very worst, it can be seen in every part of the world and becomes a sour reality on earth but it would not be wrong to describe ethnic terrorism as the worst enemy of nation-states and the most destructive type of terrorism. Generally, ethnic terrorism is grounded on ideological thoughts; however, on occasion, it can occur based on political, social, religious or ethnic questions or problems.

Different to other types of terrorism, "*ethnic terrorism can be defined as deliberate violence by a sub-national ethnic group to advance its cause*".<sup>4</sup> Ethnic terror, as a grim reality, is in close relation with minorities and aims to deraign sub-ethnic groups through the use of facultative violence. This type of terror movement demands to establish a sovereign state or have a unique status, even though it's known that it is not possible to found a sovereign state because their actions only consider political purposes, interests or goals. As Daniel Byman states, "*ethnic violence can also undermine an incipient democracy, which might otherwise bring multi-ethnic societies together. Violence reduces confidence that the winner of an election will respect minority rights or allow its former rivals a voice in decision-making*".<sup>5</sup>

In particular, ethnic terrorism started to be seen after the 1900s and has steadily increased ever since. Although ethnic terrorism can be compared to other types of terrorism, it can be seen that the violent level of ethnic terrorism is more propounded than others, especially since the 1970s when a wave of ethnic terrorism took off in the world.

Moreover, some terrorist groups have become some states' pawns to be used as a political tool; this perhaps being why ethnic terror groups have become widespread. As an example, Tamil in Sri Lanka, the IRA in Northern Ireland, ETA in Spain and ASALA and PKK in Turkey. Just like the others, Turkey has been severely affected. For Turkey, the previously mentioned terrorist group has carried out bloody terrorist attacks inside the country as well as outside it. For a better understanding, having a gist of the background would be beneficial.

The First World War brought empires to an end. As a part of the old-world order, the Ottoman Empire shared the same destiny as the others. Therefore, after a long and

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<sup>3</sup> SANDLER, T.: Terrorism and Policy: Introduction. The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2010. 54(2), p. 205.

<sup>4</sup> BYMAN, D.: The logic of ethnic terrorism Daniel Byman. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 1998. 21(2), p. 151

<sup>5</sup> Ibid p. 158.

peerless national struggle against colonial powers, the young Republic of Turkey declared her independence in 1923. Turkey's proprietorship certificate, Lausanne, was signed on July 24, 1923. It obscured the Sevres Agreement which was intended to take down the Ottoman Empire's land, re-allocate it for the establishment of new states and most importantly dispose of Turkey's right to live. The young Republic of Turkey was not the continuation of the Ottoman Empire; she has continued her way on a different path peacefully in line with modernism, democracy and secularism. Authority was not Sultan anymore.

On the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, Atatürk uttered, "How happy is the one who says I am a Turk". It was a crystal-clear message that without any ethnic prejudice and discrepancy, whoever lives under the state of Turkey is together in happiness and sorrow, free and independent as one nation. Atatürk revealed that the aspiration of the young Republic of Turkey is consolidative and a gatherer of all the nations who live on her soil.

The most prominent characteristic of Turkey is the societies and their cultures. This variety of multi-identities is a mosaic of Turkey. However, in a short time, Turkey has seen insurrection against her presence. Whenever Turkey has progressed in the matter of states, the foreign forces who wanted to use the multicultural and multi-ethnic structure of Turkey against her made them the primary materials of insurgency and terror in an attempt to weaken the Turkish state. Whether they were supported by outsourcers or not, insurgents were not unable to control the anger and vindication. The reason was most likely the founder of the Turkish Republic's victory over colonial powers resulting in being disallowed to maintain the territorial integrity of Turkey.

Turkey patiently endures difficulties because of ethnic terrorism. The Armenian terrorist organisation ASALA was also on the stage of history due to the reasons mentioned above. ASALA was established in Beirut and finished in Athens. They aimed to force Turkey to recognise its responsibility for the 1915–16 so-called Armenian genocide, to persuade the Turkish state to accept the massacres, offer reparations and establish an Armenian state. To this end, they attacked high-level Turkish bureaucrats and held more than one hundred-armed terrorist attacks in 21 different countries. As a result of these bloody actions, 41 Turkish diplomats and 46 civilians lost their lives, including almost three hundred people being injured.

The aim of this paper is to analyse ASALA, which was spurred on by a significant grudge against and hatred over the so-called Armenian genocide which sparked the use of ethnic terror against Turkish bureaucracy.

The reason that this organisation has been chosen is to show how it supported the destruction of sovereignty, unitary state structure and land-grabs from Turkey with the support of many foreign countries and other terrorist organisations, geopolitically, that consider foreign and domestic threats and the terrorist attrition of Turkey as the basis of their policies, with the aim of keeping alive the Armenian question and the so-called Armenian genocide.

## 2. ASALA

*“ASALA tried to rewrite history with the bomb and the gun, but succeeded only in adding a new bloody chapter to it. Later, Armenian nationalists used Western parliaments in an absurd attempt to rewrite history by legislative process.”*

*Andrew Mango<sup>6</sup>*

Terror and terrorism are the concepts that have been most discussed, studied and worked on. Although so much research has already been done on them, there are no solid definitions of these concepts; the descriptions of terror and terrorism vary from country to country due to the political systems of the states.

There is no doubt that the reason behind efforts to define terrorism is to bring it under control. There is unanimity on the definition's legibility and the strategy of terrorist acts is well known by its violence against innocent people for the purpose of political expediency. The main problem with identification stems from the fact that terrorism is a political issue, much like ASALA is.

The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) was founded in 1975 in Beirut, Lebanon, by Hagop Hagopian.<sup>7</sup> This terrorist organisation's founding aim was: the recognition of the 1915 “so-called Armenian genocide”; reparations from Turkey for the “so-called genocide” and the recovery of ancestral homelands to establish a state on that territory (Today: Eastern Turkey, Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan's Nakhichevan and the Georgian Javakheti region). ASALA has several times stated that the Republic of Turkey and its allies are the arch-enemies of this terrorist organisation so have had their mindset on strong armed resistance against Turkey.

During the foundation phase, Marxist-Leninist radical left ASALA received considerable logistical and educational support from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, led by George Habbash. Besides this, Hagop Hagopyan acquired much of his expertise, formed several informal connections with Palestinian officials and started to imitate Wadi Haddad's operational and military strategies.<sup>8</sup>

For the very first time, ASALA hit the headlines with a bombing attack on the World Council of Churches in January, 1975.<sup>9</sup> In the late 1970s and early 1980s, ASALA carried out a campaign of assassinations on Turkish officials around the globe. Afterwards, the first terrorist actions against Turkey began with the murder of the Turkish ambassador to Austria, Daniş Tunaligil, in Vienna on 22 October, 1975.

Members of this Armenian terrorist organisation carried out more than 100 attacks in 38 cities in 21 countries, including 39 armed attacks, 70 bombings and one in the form of occupation. In these terrorist attacks, 42 Turkish diplomats were

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<sup>6</sup> MANGO, A.: Turkey and the War on Terror. For Forty Years We Fought Alone., New York-London, Routledge, 2005. p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Central Intelligence Agency: The Armenian Secret Army for the liberation of Armeni: A Continuing International Threat, s.l.: Directorate of Intelligence, 1984.

<sup>8</sup> GUNTER, M. M.: Armenian Terrorism: A Reappraisal. Journal of Conflict Studies, 2007. 27(2), p. 112

<sup>9</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 1984

martyred and four foreign nationals were killed. 15 Turkish and 66 foreign nationals were also injured. More often than not, though, ASALA attacked Turkish agencies. Its first terrorist attack in Turkey was the bombing on 7 August, 1982 at Ankara Esenboga Airport. The attack also left nine people dead and dozens injured.<sup>10</sup> Although the Armenian terrorist organisation targeted Turkey, it was unable to provide militia support in Turkey so was only able to carry out 2 attacks (Esenboga and Grand Bazaar) within Turkey.

### ***2.1. Financial Sources***

Every terrorist organisation needs finance for maintenance and support of their so-called agenda. To do this, donations and charities are essential. Typically, terrorist organisations are formed according to the conditions of each country where they take action. Observations of financial sources demonstrate that illegal profit is usually through high rates of drug trafficking or arms smuggling.<sup>11</sup> Like all terrorist groups or organisations, it is not possible to exclude ASALA from these developments.

In this way ASALA, at the phase of its foundation overcame financial difficulties through the support of Armenian communities, some states and some organisations.<sup>12</sup> However, ASALA needed reliable economic and financial resources in order to deal with other illegal activities like fake passports and IDs, propaganda, as well as arms and ammunition. Hence, the terrorist organisation turned to illegal underground businesses.<sup>13</sup> Claims that ASALA participated in the illegal drug trade to collect funds appear less reliable than the above donation reports, bribery, 'robberies' and non-monetary party and state funding.<sup>14</sup>

In brief, ASALA continued its terrorist attacks against the Turks and Turkey's allies and maintained its pace in carrying out illegal activities - like terrorists often do - and became a puppet of some other terrorists' groups, some states even becoming hessian to them.<sup>15</sup>

### ***2.2. Importance of Turkey's Geopolitics and Relations with Foreign Governments***

In line with goals and national interests, hegemon powers in the world generate threats against target countries in accordance with their ideological and ethnic sensitivities, regardless of the target country's integrity, internal security, sovereignty and domestic peace. As long as hegemon powers want to maintain their status quo, they always use similar threats as long as these power centres exist. The threats that

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<sup>10</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Armenian Claims And Historical Facts Questions And Answers, Ankara: Center for Strategic Research, 2005.

<sup>11</sup> FATF/OECD (2008): Terrorist Financing. <https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/FATF%20Terrorist%20Financing%20Typologies%20Report.pdf> (downloaded 10 March 2020). p. 15.

<sup>12</sup> HYLAND, F. P.: Armenian terrorism : the past, the present, the prospects. Oxford: Westview Press, Inc. 1991. p. 32.

<sup>13</sup> GUNTER (2007) op. cit. pp. 120-121

<sup>14</sup> HYLAND (1991) op. cit.

<sup>15</sup> GUNTER (2007) op. cit. p. 121

arise on different grounds are shaped according to the geopolitical importance of countries, regardless of their ideology.

Which is why the advantages arising from its geographical location makes Turkey a target of hegemon powers. Turkey has a critical geographical position in which there are continuous and multifaceted conflicts of interest and power which are affecting the balance between the world and hegemon powers in her geographical region. Turkey is one of the countries with the most political options both at global and regional level due to the features of its geographical location and the opportunities given by today's geopolitical conditions. According to Serdar Öztürk, the damage Turkey suffered from terrorism, directly or indirectly, cost 300 billion dollars.<sup>16</sup>

A terrorist organisation cannot live even one day without outsourcing assistance. The establishment and actions of ASALA reveal that it had relations and cooperation with many countries and organisations and so it is essential to highlight ASALA's links with foreign countries and to see the other side of the coin.

### 2.2.1. *The Link with the USSR*

The Soviet Union chose to pursue a delicate policy of separating Turkey from NATO. It has been observed that the Soviets used ASALA as their proxy/intermediary to achieve this goal.<sup>17</sup> It is also possible that the Soviet Union used every opportunity to create confusion in the region and in Turkey, primarily through its agents who committed significant terrorist acts in the 1970s, known as the *detente* period. The fact that the Soviets also helped the Armenian terrorist organisations gave Turkey a hard time. Thus, ASALA made a clear distinction between Turkey, its allies and the Soviet Union, characterising the USSR as a "*friendly country*."<sup>18</sup>

### 2.2.2. *The Link with Iran*

After Lebanon was invaded by Israel in 1982, Armenian terrorists went to Tehran, the capital of Iran, where around 200-250 thousand Armenians lived. Also, during the Iran-Iraq War, ASALA sent a significant amount of money to Iran. It is also claimed that Iran has provided other financial resources to ASALA. Even before the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Iranian authorities had apparently persuaded ASALA to move to their country, offering them bases and barracks at the Turkish borders and [providing] instructors in the use of different weapons. Israeli aggression forced ASALA to transfer additional elements into Iran. ASALA published the first Communiqués from Tehran in July and August, 1983.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> ÖZTÜRK, S. – ÇELİK, K., n.d.: Terörizmin Türkiye Ekonomisi Üzerine Etkileri. <https://www.acarindex.com/dosyalar/makale/acarindex-1423869164.pdf> (downloaded 10 March 2020).

<sup>17</sup> GUNTER, M. M.: Transnational Sources of Support for Armenian Terrorism. *Conflict Quarterly*, 1985. 5(4), p. 37

<sup>18</sup> HYLAND (1991) op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> GUNTER (1985) op. cit. p. 47

### 2.2.3. *The Link with Syria*

ASALA is known to have received logistical and military militant support from the Syrian state at the time of its actions.<sup>20</sup> ASALA obtained equipment, arms and fake papers from Syria, acknowledging Syrian involvement in the preparation of ASALA attacks in exchange. As Gunter states, in the summer of 1983, it was recorded that Syria had "*apparently succeeded in co-opting the pro-Soviet middle-eastern portion [Hagopian grouping] of... ASALA... Syria is now collaborating with ASALA on training, logistics preparation and weapons procurement and fake documents.*" Included are Kamishli on the Turkish frontier, a position near the ancient city of Homs and Camp Tadmur As-Sahra near Damascus; unique training sites for the terrorists on Syrian soil, ASALA bases in Syrian-controlled Lebanon were based in the village of Anjar in the Bekaa Valley and in Tripoli in the north.<sup>21</sup>

### 2.2.4. *The Link with France*

The support provided to Armenian militants and their sympathisers in France by French officials is clear.<sup>22</sup> France has always been sympathetic to anti-Turkish terrorist organisations such as ASALA because of its domestic political interests. France had previously been hesitant to move vigorously towards ASALA.<sup>23</sup> Although they are terrorists, they have remained under the influence of the statements of these organisations against Turkey, turned a blind eye to their activities and provided all kinds of support.<sup>24</sup> For many years, ASALA has harboured the organisation in France and France has been a partner to the so-called Armenian genocide fallacy through its laws.

### 2.2.5. *The Link with the Southern Part of Cyprus and Greece*

Learning of the situation a week before Israel invaded Lebanon in June, 1982, ASALA left Beirut and settled in Cyprus and Athens.<sup>25</sup> The Greek Cypriots have also made material and spiritual contributions to ASALA and similar terrorist organisations since their establishment in the hope of regaining the prestige they lost in Cyprus after 20 July, 1974. The Greek Cypriots sought to put Turkey in an even more difficult position by taking advantage of the world's reaction to Turkey and the embargo.

A large file regarding this suspected Greek-Cypriot link has been collected by Turkish officials. The prosecution is ostensibly confirmed by leaflets and press clippings of comments provided by Armenians and Greek Cypriots. For example, in August, 1977, Archbishop Makarios assured the Armenian Patriarch Koren that, "*We would offer every material and moral help to the Armenians in an attempt to internationalise the Armenian problem.*" The current Greek Cypriot president, Spyros

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<sup>20</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 1984

<sup>21</sup> GUNTER (1985) op. cit. p. 46

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 42

<sup>23</sup> E. J. DIONNE Jr. (1983): Armenian Terror: Tangle Of Motives.

<https://www.nytimes.com/1983/08/01/world/armenian-terror-tangle-of-motives.html>  
(downloaded: 10 March 2020).

<sup>24</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 1984, p. 7

<sup>25</sup> GUNTER (1985) op. cit. p. 44

Kyprianou, "was the winner of Koren's largest Armenian prize for his 'services to the Armenian cause'."<sup>26</sup> Several Greeks displayed overt support for Armenian extremism arising from the Turks' 'typical Hellenic hostility'. At the requiem, the Greek Orthodox Church's Reverend, Spiros Tsakalos, gave a eulogy in which he declared: "*The Turkish authoritarian government knows only the vocabulary of violent resistance waged by ASALA*"<sup>27</sup>

*"Moreover, a CIA report has proven that foreign terrorist groups are also active in Greece and several of them are believed to be developing support infrastructures such as for ASALA. Furthermore, the Greek government has made no move to restrict the activities of these groups and (the government) has a 'touch' understanding of these groups, even though ASALA has an office in Athens and there are reports that ASALA has a secret presence in Athens."*<sup>28</sup>

#### 2.2.6. PKK and ASALA

The international intelligence branch of the United States, the CIA, declassified papers revealing the collaboration between ASALA and PKK. In the records, which were released to internet users, the reports indicate ASALA and PKK collaboration in the 1980s.<sup>29</sup> Another document mentions that during the 1960s, the Soviet Union had formed two commando armies, one infiltrated by Kurdish leaders and the other by Armenian representatives. Reports extracted from the CIA indicate that training commando army groups took place in the Agri Mountains and Yerevan.<sup>30</sup>

In the chapter, 'The Kurdish Ally', by Francis P. Hyland, it is reported that ASALA and PKK leaders revealed intentions to begin offensive actions against the Turkish authorities in a joint press release. Because ASALA had no leadership in Turkey, they wanted assistance from PKK in Turkey, whereas PKK wanted preparation support from ASALA. Even after 1980, Hyland's book reported such cases. On November 11, there was an attack in Rome on the Turkish tourist office. This and all later attacks were carried out through collaboration between ASALA and PKK. A fire took place at the Turkish Consulate of Toronto in Canada on 14 January, 1982 and was also coordinated through their collaboration. After that, in March, 1982, leader of the ASALA, Hagop Hagopyan, announced that they were "*servicing side by side with the Kurdish rebels.*"<sup>31</sup>

The declassification of CIA records about collaboration with militant agendas between Armenian and Kurdish parties uncovered shocking and fascinating pieces of knowledge. The advent of these records also helped to track a collaboration which had always occurred. In this regard, the declassification of such records is of considerable significance. The fact that there were no differences between ASALA and the PKK except for ethnic differences gave weight to claims that the PKK was a continuation of ASALA; the overlap of the downfall period of ASALA and the exit period of the

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid. p. 44

<sup>27</sup> GUNTER (2007) op. cit. p. 123

<sup>28</sup> Central Intelligence Agency: Counterterrorism Warning And Forecast Report, Washington: National Intelligence Council, 1987.

<sup>29</sup> Central Intelligence Agency, 1984

<sup>30</sup> CIA: Kurdish And Armenian Commando Armies, s.l.: s.n. 1961.

<sup>31</sup> HYLAND (1991) op. cit.

PKK, combined with the fact that the external focus behind both of them was the same, strengthened this supposition.

#### 2.2.7. *How did ASALA end?*

The primary purpose of terrorism is to draw attention to a cause or political dispute. This is done through fear created in society so as to push people to take sides. This damages the unity and integrity of the community.

Therefore, the ultimate goal is to damage the established social and political order. Terrorism tries to accomplish this through the chaos it creates. In the face of action taken without regard to specific targets for the masses, people are made to worry about their lives and remain unresponsive to developments. This results in distrust between state and society.

In order to achieve these goals, the basic weapon is ideological elements. Ideology is the movement point of terrorist organisations. Therefore, terrorism must have an ideological infrastructure. Organisations determine strategies based on the ideologies they identify with.

ASALA's terror ended in the mid-1980s; or rather, its influence vanished. The murder of the founder of the organisation, Hagop Hagopian, in Athens in 1988 by unknown persons, led to a decline in the activities of this terrorist organisation. In fact, a lack of the foundation and shallow ideological elements that gave rise to ASALA, as well as deviations from established aims, caused them to lose their influence due to a kind of infertility in their political views. The methods they chose then lead to further struggles, causing them to dissipate over time.

Above all, ASALA's brutal acts of terrorism against civilian targets, especially after the attack on Orly Airport in Paris on 15 July, 1983, wherein sixty people were wounded (twenty-eight of them Turkish) and eight people were killed (two of them were Turkish, four were French, one was American, one was Swedish), led to criticism in Western countries (especially France) against ASALA. After this terrorist attack, discontent increased in ASALA and within the Armenian communities all around the world.<sup>32</sup>

Moreover, the result of these terrorist attacks caused disagreements within organisations and a competition for leadership. Therefore, the Armenian terrorist organisations began to lose power and leadership. 1983 was a year in which there was a severe split in the terrorist organisation. Prominent founding members left and decried a new organisation. It was one of the critical factors for bringing ASALA to an end.<sup>33</sup>

Once and for all, according to some beliefs, this was a success for the Republic of Turkey. However, it might be said that numerous factors, internal and external,

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<sup>32</sup> DUGAN, L. – HUANG, J. Y. – LAFREE, G. – MCCAULEY, C.: *The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia and the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide. Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict*, 2008. 1(3) p. 237.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

played a role in the slowdown and decline of ASALA's bloody terror. Professedly, one of the essential factors for the end of ASALA is the claim that Turkey took secret action against this murderous terrorist organisation. After the Orly massacre, the terrorists from ASALA, which lost support in Europe and Turkey were allegedly eliminated from the group under a scheme following a decision by its government.

### **3. Conclusion**

In this study, the concept of terrorism, which has caused multiple inhumane acts throughout history, has been examined in general alongside the existence of the ASALA terrorist organisation within the framework of ethnic terrorism. Actions aimed at breaking down the integrity of a country by bringing ethnic identity to the fore, has been discussed. Notably, between 1973-1985, ethnic terrorism was used by ASALA as part of their terrorist actions against Turkey and the Turks. In order to realise the idea of Greater Armenia, ASALA exploited a relocation which occurred in 1915 and introduced it to the international public as a massacre. Thus, to realise their aim, ASALA demanded recognition of the so-called genocide, reparations and part of Turkey's land.

Furthermore, ASALA constantly claimed that genocide was committed; on the other hand, they aimed to grab territory from Turkey with their rhetoric and terrorist actions. In line with these goals, they aimed to engage and create groups with other terrorist organisations and even took action together.

The fact that a terrorist organisation claims that a nation which has been subjected to genocide and oppression and then claims a territory and rights via terrorism is an indication of the stupidity and lack of realism of ASALA's claims. This bloody terrorist organisation, which was consciously founded to exploit unreal facts, caused many innocent people to lose their lives while thinking only of its political aims. When the activities of ASALA are examined carefully, it can confidently be concluded that a combination of their choice of objectives, the number of actions taken and the realisation of these actions proves that ASALA was an organisation with professional support and guidance.

It is impossible to think that a terrorist organisation can carry out terrorist attacks in such a manner yet were portrayed as lacking such support and stable leadership. The reason for support given to terrorist organisations is that the hegemon powers do not want a stable Turkey for fear that their interests in the Middle East, which are of high strategic importance, will be blocked.

For this reason, Turkey is continually dealing with the terrorist problem and various allegations involving concessions, even if its sources are different and it is prevented from gaining strength and stability.

Turkey has been subjected to terrorist attacks having been actioned by radical organisations such as ASALA and the PKK. Moreover, Turkey has been under siege from the Armenian and Kurdish question. It is already clear the hegemon powers intended to hold Turkey responsible; that is why these events took place before the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.

Nevertheless, the truth is that no rights can or should be sought by violence, oppression, terrorism or terrorist acts. Those who resort to violence to achieve such goals are doomed to perish in the dusty pages of history. On the other hand, countries that tolerate terrorism feel a need to end terrorism only when they understand the gravity of the situation; when the attacks begin to harm their citizens. This in itself is the wrong idea: terrorism is now a problem for everyone and a phenomenon that requires joint action on behalf of humanity.

Meddling in the internal affairs of countries is a clear violation of the prohibition on interference in Internal Affairs, which is the most fundamental principle of international law. Worse is to do so by supporting terrorist organisations. ASALA was a terrorist organisation created artificially to interfere in the internal affairs of the Turkish state. Although they claim the same territory, the fact that the PKK and ASALA were in terrorist cooperation within the borders of Turkey is the greatest proof of this.

ASALA has been confined to the history pages. The directly affected states, which saw the weapon of terror returning to them and causing harm, suddenly withdrew their support. The message that needs to be received here is that violence, war and terror are terrible acts that do nothing and can win nothing but harm. Ethnic terrorism, in particular, affects entire minority groups and as a result, causes inclusiveness within societies.

One of the main lessons learnt from Turkey's struggle is that it cannot be successful in the fight against terrorism without establishing concrete cooperation at the international level. Again, the importance of Atatürk's philosophy of 'peace at home, peace in the world' should be well emphasised once again: it is the most reasonable and peaceful way to resolve relations between neighbours at the international level, with the principle of mutual respect and not to interfere in each other's internal affairs.

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*Abstract*

This paper investigates the case of the latest natural disaster event that occurred on 26th November 2019, in Albania. The Northwestern part of this Balkan country was hit by a 6.3 magnitude earthquake. In terms of magnitude, it has been considered as the strongest one in more than 40 years in the country. In this work, it is introduced at first country profile regarding natural disasters. Secondly, it shields light on the most significant earthquake events over the years. Thirdly, it brings in focus the shock of 26th November by emphasizing causes and consequences. Then, actions and measures that have been taken are represented and discussed.

**Keywords:** Albania, Adriatic region, earthquake, Balkans, civil protection, disasters

**1. Introduction**

Balkan countries continue to grow, and at the same time, it is shown their exposure to natural disasters' risk by putting vulnerable communities in jeopardy<sup>1</sup>. Natural disasters in these countries result from the region's geography and human factors<sup>2</sup>. Climate change is affecting the frequency, unpredictability, and severity of hydro-meteorological hazards<sup>3</sup>. The most common natural disasters in Balkans are earthquakes, landslides, floods, droughts, heatwaves, and wildfires, as well as human-made ones<sup>4</sup>.

Here, the focus on the country of Albania located on the Balkan Peninsula in South and Southeast of Europe on the Adriatic and the Ionian Sea, part of the Mediterranean Sea, and defined in an area of 28,748 km<sup>2</sup><sup>5</sup>. Its land borders are shared as follows:

- To the northwest with Montenegro;
- To the northeast with Kosovo;

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<sup>1</sup> It is Time for Action on Climate Risk in the Balkans. <https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/opinion/2018/09/17/it-is-time-for-action-on-climate-risk-in-the-balkans> (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>2</sup> UNDP: Risk-Proof ing the Western Balkans: Empowering People to Prevent Disasters; 2016.

<sup>3</sup> IPCC: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation: Special Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change; New York, 2012. [https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SREX\\_Full\\_Report-1.pdf](https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/SREX_Full_Report-1.pdf) (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>4</sup> UNDP (2016) op. cit.

<sup>5</sup> Republica e Shqiperise Keshilli i Ministrave <http://arkiva.km.gov.al/?fq=brenda&r=&gj=gj1&kid=54>. (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

- To the east with North Macedonia;
- To the south with Greece;
- To the west with Italy.

Albania is highly exposed to natural disasters by natural (geological, hydrological, atmospheric, biophysical), anthropogenic (floods caused because of dams break, intentional fires), ecological and human-made causes<sup>6</sup>. In geographical terms, the country shows diverse climatic, geological, hydrological, and morphological conditions<sup>7</sup>. The most critical hazards that cause loss of life, injury, and (or) other health issues, damage on properties, loss of livelihood, social and economic disruption, and change on the environment, are earthquakes, floods, and fires.

The threat from disaster in Albania is high, but not all regions are exposed to the same risk.

Over the years, the country has been affected by natural and anthropogenic hazards. According to the World Risk Report for 2017, it was ranked 39<sup>th</sup> out of 171 countries in the study, indicating that the potential for being affected by natural disasters is high, and it was considered as the most threatened country in Europe<sup>8</sup>. From 1851 to 2013, more than 4000 disaster events were registered and studied in a report from the CIMA research foundation<sup>9</sup>. In Figure 1, it is shown that metrological events were the most commons (33%) followed by climatological (22%), hydrological (21%), and landlines events (14%)<sup>10</sup>. Only 10% of the total number of events were geophysical, biological, and technological.

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<sup>6</sup> The World Bank: ALBANIA – Disaster Risk Management and Adaptation Project; 2014. <http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/313781468193510916/pdf/ICR29910P110840C0disclosed050210140.pdf> (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>7</sup> R. EFTIMI: Some consideratons on sea water-freshwater relationship in Albanina coastal area; [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327406315\\_SOME\\_CONSIDERATIONS\\_ON\\_SEAWATER-FRESHWATER\\_RELATIONSHIP\\_IN\\_ALBANIAN\\_COASTAL\\_AREA](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327406315_SOME_CONSIDERATIONS_ON_SEAWATER-FRESHWATER_RELATIONSHIP_IN_ALBANIAN_COASTAL_AREA) (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>8</sup> CIMA Research Foundation: Historical collection of diaster loss data in Albania, 2014. [https://www.cimafoundation.org/docs/reports/Historical\\_collection\\_of\\_Disaster\\_Loss\\_Data\\_In\\_Albania.pdf](https://www.cimafoundation.org/docs/reports/Historical_collection_of_Disaster_Loss_Data_In_Albania.pdf) (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.




Figure 1: Distribution of 4305 events for different categories (1851-2013)<sup>11</sup>

One of the significant impacts on people's lives is disaster and damage to houses. Figure 2 indicates the most significant events for the 1851-2013 period, that affected mainly houses, are the geophysical ones (68%), followed by hydrological with 27 % and meteorological events with 3%<sup>12</sup>.




Figure 2: Distribution of houses destroyed and damaged by disasters (1851-2013)<sup>13</sup>

The picture below (Figure 3) shows the effect of shocks on provinces' GDPs as percentages of their annual average GDPs affected.<sup>14</sup> Higher values are represented with greater color saturation, and the horizontal lines across the bars indicate the yearly average of GDP affected by earthquakes. To summarize, World Bank findings show that an earthquake of significant magnitude will occur on an average of once

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

<sup>14</sup> The World Bank: ALBANIA; 2015.

<https://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/Albania-Snapshot.pdf> (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

every 100 years. Nonetheless, there are possibilities of any return in the same period of time or to occur in the next years or not to happen at all after a long period of time. In accordance with this report of The World Bank (2015), the annual average affected GDP is about \$700 million.




Figure 3: The impact of earthquakes on provinces' GDPs<sup>15</sup>

## 2. Earthquakes in Albania

Actually, there is a lack on the data and information regarding earthquakes in Albania. Nonetheless, it has been reported that approximately, every year can occur 4-5 earthquakes with a magnitude of 6.0 and once in every 25 years, an earthquake with about 9.0 magnitude<sup>16</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> The World Bank (2015) op. cit.

<sup>16</sup> 10 tërmetet më të fuqishme në historinë e Shqipërisë - Shqiptarja.com. <https://shqiptarja.com/lajm/10-termetet-me-te-fuqishme-ne-historine-e-shqiperise> (downloaded: 25 February 2020)

From the geological and seismological points of view, Albania is a very complicated country<sup>17</sup>. Earthquakes can generally occur in the Adriatic-Ionian coast, Peshkopi-Korçë bend, and Elbasan-Dibër-Tetovo transversal belt. According to the country tectonic regime and by considering the Albanian neotectonic that comprises the southwestern part of the Euro-Asian plate and converges with the Adriatic plate, it is divided into 2 zones.

- The external zone with the oppressive regime that includes the coastal parts in Pre-Adria, Sazan, Ionian and Kruja tectonic zone. The outer zone is dominated by the north- northwest tectonic slips and folds.
- The internal zone with an extensive regime that includes tectonic areas to the East and North-East of Kruja. This zone is dominated by regular tectonic slips extending northward.




Figure 4: Adria plate and its rotation (by Slejko)<sup>18</sup>

The country is located on the border between two tectonic plates, the Euro-Asian and the Adria (Figure 4). As a result of the collision of these two plates, an active seismogenic band has been created and can lead to catastrophic earthquakes. Thus, Albania can be characterized by high seismic activity.

In ancient times, the most devastating events are those of Apollonia in the year 217; Durrës in the years 334, 506, and 1273 as well; Butrint in 1153 and Kruja in 1617. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Albania has experienced around 77 earthquakes with a magnitude of 7.0. The severest events dating from 1851 until now, are listed as follows<sup>19</sup>:

<sup>17</sup> A. SERANAJ: Reagimi i strukturave prej betoni të armuar pa trarë dhe strukturave me trarë me lartësi të vogël, në rajonet me sizmicitet të mesëm dhe të lartë; Polytechnic University of Tirana, 2016.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> 10 tërmetet më të fuqishme në historinë e Shqipërisë - Shqiptarja.com.

*17<sup>th</sup> October 1851:* A powerful earthquake hit the region of Berat. No relevant data are found regarding the magnitude. It caused more than 400 deaths, and various buildings were destroyed. In addition, it caused landslides and dust of sulfur as well.

*July – August 1855:* In that time, an earthquake caused the destruction of some areas nearby Shkodra city such as Bushat, Juban, Kozmac, Vau i Dejës, Karma, Dushan, Toplanë, and Bruc. Landslides and cracks were present.

*22<sup>nd</sup> December 1919:* A 6.1 magnitude Richter Scale earthquake was felt in Leskovik-Konica. Many houses and buildings were destroyed in Albanian-Greek borders. Almost the whole region and Greek villages were ruined. Unfortunately, there are no data related to the number of fatalities.

*1920:* The earthquake of that year on 26<sup>th</sup> November was considered as one of the strongest ones in history. It occurred in the city of Tepelena (southern part) with a magnitude of 6.2, where 200 people lost their lives, and about 15.000 remained homeless<sup>20,21</sup>. In addition, a tsunami followed the earthquake and caused about 600 fatalities. Moreover, during the same year on 18<sup>th</sup> December, the country experienced another hit in Elbasan city. 173 houses were destroyed, 300 people were injured, and it caused 14 fatalities.

*27<sup>th</sup> August 1948:* A 5.5 magnitude earthquake occurred in the town of Shkodra that caused severe damages to the city and the Buna river. The most affected area was Trush with 1 fatality and 27 injured people.<sup>22</sup>

*1<sup>st</sup> September 1959:* Cities of Lushnjë, Fier, Rrogozhinë, Peqin, Kuçovë, and Berat, significantly suffered consequences of a 20 km depth earthquake with 6.2 magnitude. Around 944 buildings were destroyed mainly near the epicenter (Karbunarë, Lushnjë), and only 2 people died.<sup>23</sup>

*30<sup>th</sup> November 1967:* A 6.6 magnitude earthquake with epicenter Librazhd-Dibër<sup>24</sup>, caused considerable damages to 13 localities and 177 villages that were part of North Macedonia. In total, the number of destroyed buildings was more than 6000 and the costs \$20.000. The number of fatalities reached 18, and more than 150 people were injured.

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<sup>20</sup> T. UTSU: 42 A list of deadly earthquakes in the world: 1500-2000; International Geophysics, vol. 81, Academic Press, 2002.

<sup>21</sup> The World Bank (2015) op. cit.

<sup>22</sup> Quali sono stati i terremoti più potenti che hanno colpito l'Albania? <https://www.albanianews.it/notizie/albania/storico-terremoti> (downloaded: 28 February 2020)

<sup>23</sup> 6.2 magnitude earthquake near Lushnjë, Fier, Albania and Sofia, Sofia-Capital, Bulgaria : 01st September, 1959 11:37. <https://earthquaketrack.com/quakes/1959-09-01-11-37-45-utc-6-2-20>. (downloaded: 25 February 2020)

<sup>24</sup> Significant Earthquake; [https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/results?eq\\_0=4417&t=101650&s=13&d=22,26,13,12&nd=display](https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/nndc/struts/results?eq_0=4417&t=101650&s=13&d=22,26,13,12&nd=display) (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

*15<sup>th</sup> April 1979:* Albania experienced another earthquake with a 6.9 magnitude<sup>25,26</sup>. The epicenter was Montenegro, Bar-Shkodër, Lezhë. Many cities in Montenegro and the northern part of Albania were destroyed. In total, 136 people died from the which 101 in Montenegro and 35 in Albania while 1000 others were injured.

*June 2019:* 13 km south-southwest of Korça city, in Floq village, a 5.2 magnitude earthquake<sup>27</sup> damaged 100 houses. According to the news, five people suffered injuries while their homes collapsed<sup>28</sup>.

Lastly, on 21<sup>st</sup> September 2019, an earthquake occurred in Durrës, 3 km west southwest of Shijak, with a magnitude of 5.6<sup>29</sup>. The number of injured people reached 108, and more than 120 buildings were damaged<sup>30</sup>. Only two months later (26<sup>th</sup> November 2019), it was followed by the most substantial hit in 30 years in Durrës city, 16 km west-northwest of Mamurras<sup>31</sup>. The 6.3 magnitude earthquake caused significant damages. Many buildings collapsed, and others were severely damaged, trapping people under the rubble. There was a considerable number of fatalities, and many people were injured<sup>32</sup>.

### 3. 26<sup>th</sup> November 2019 event: consequences and causes

According to the Albanian Institute of Geophysics, Water and Energy, on 26<sup>th</sup> November 2019, at 03:54 CET (UTC+1), Albania was hit by the strongest earthquake for the last 40 years, with a 6.3 magnitude on the Richter scale<sup>33</sup>. The epicenter of the quake was in the Adriatic Sea, 7 km west of Hamallaj, 16 km north of Durrës city, and 35 km northwest of Tirana.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Zemljotres od 15. aprila 1979. godine; <https://web.archive.org/web/20100704151456/http://seismo.co.me/1979.html> (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>26</sup> Significant Earthquake

<sup>27</sup> M 5.2 – 12km SSW of Korce, Albania; <https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us70003u1a/executive>; (downloaded: 28 February 2020)

<sup>28</sup> Earthquake Rattles Albania, Injuring 4, Damaging Dozens of Homes/The Weather Channel; <https://weather.com/news/news/2019-06-01-earthquake-albania-damage-injuries>. (downloaded: 28 February 2020)

<sup>29</sup> M 5.6 – 3km WSW of Shijak, Albania; <https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us600051rf/executive>. (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>30</sup> 108 injured as earthquakes rattle Albanian capital and coast - Republika English; <https://english.republika.mk/news/balkans/108-injured-as-earthquakes-rattle-albanian-capital-and-coast/>. (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>31</sup> E. LEKKAS – S. MAVROULIS – D. PAPA – P. CARYDIS: The 26th November, 2019 Mw 6.4 Durrës (Albania) earthquake; *Newsl. Environ. Disaster Cris. Manag. Strateg.*, 2019. no. 15, pp. 1–80.

<sup>32</sup> Shkon në 52 numri i viktimave nga tërmeti; Lajmi.net, <https://lajmi.net/shkon-ne-52-numri-i-viktimave-nga-termeti/>. (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>33</sup> Buletini Mujor I Sizmologjisë; Universiteti Politeknik i Tiranës, Insituti i Gjeoshkencave Energjisë Ujit dhe Mjedisit, Tirana, 2019.

<sup>34</sup> M 6.4 – 15km WSW of Mamurras, Albania; <https://earthquake.usgs.gov/earthquakes/eventpage/us70006d0m/executive>. (downloaded: 01 March 2020)

### 3.1. Characteristics and consequences

During November 2019, 420 earthquakes, ranging from 0.7-6.3 (Richter Scale), occurred<sup>35</sup>. In total, 11 municipalities were affected. The central-western part of Albania was damaged the most, respectively, Durrës city (30 km west from Tirana) and the town of Thumanë (25 km northwest of Tirana). Damages were also present and significant in towns of Laç, Fushë-Krujë, Kamëz, and in the capital city, Tirana (Figure 5).




Figure 5: Epicentral map for located seismicity within Albania and surrounding during November 2019<sup>36</sup>

<sup>35</sup> Buletini Mujor I Sizmologjisë

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

The average number of earthquakes was 14/day and 92 earthquakes, or around 22% of the total of the month was recorded only on 26th November. The main shock was felt with intensity<sup>37</sup>:

- IX degrees [EMS-98], within 13 km from the epicenter in Hamallaj, Jubë, Rrushkull;
- VIII-IX in Durrës city and towns of Sukth and Kuratë;
- VIII degree in Shijak, Golem, Vora, Thumanë, Mamurras towns;
- VII degree in Tirana city and Velipojë, Rrogozhinë and Milot towns;
- VI degree in Fier, Librazhd, Shkodër, Bulqizë, and Pukë.

The number of events per level of magnitude during that month is represented in figure 6. The strongest one was the event of 26<sup>th</sup> November followed by 4 others with magnitude  $\geq 5.0$  Richter Scale, 30 events with magnitudes more than 4.0, and 139 others with magnitudes more than 3.0 Richter. The highest number of events (292 earthquakes) were in the range of 2.0-4.0 magnitude.




Figure 6: Number of events per magnitude level<sup>38</sup>

According to the November 2019 bulletin of the Institute of Geosciences, Water and Energy<sup>39</sup>, 51 people lost their lives: 25 in Durrës, 24 in Thumanë, Lezhë 1 victim and Tirana 1 victim. In Durrës city, 47 people were recovered from the ruins. Serious damages in the buildings were in Durrës: 123 dwellings and 38 palaces became uninhabited, while 143 dwellings and 173 palaces had slighter damages. Tirana and Kruja cities suffered major damages in buildings as well. It was reported that the

<sup>37</sup> Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid.

number of injured people reached 3000<sup>40</sup>, and around 14.000 families suffered the consequences, and thousands of people remained homeless<sup>41</sup>.

The latest assessment shows that the total loss of 11 municipalities amounts to € 985.1 million, of which € 843.9 million indicates the value of destroyed physical assets, and the rest refer to losses<sup>42</sup>.

Sectors	Sub-sectors	Damages	Losses	Total
In million EUR				
<b>Health</b>		<b>8.02</b>	<b>1.91</b>	<b>9.93</b>
<b>Education</b>		<b>63.59</b>	<b>8.76</b>	<b>72.35</b>
<b>Housing</b>		<b>662.30</b>	<b>34.00</b>	<b>696.30</b>
<b>Productive</b>		<b>70.82</b>	<b>79.66</b>	<b>150.48</b>
	Business and Employment	47.48	5.47	52.95
	Tourism	16.71	73.53	90.24
	Cultural Heritage	5.31	0.44	5.75
	Agriculture	1.32	0.22	1.54
<b>Infrastructure</b>		<b>30.41</b>	<b>3.01</b>	<b>33.42</b>
	Community Infrastructure	6.06	0.16	6.22
	Roads	4.83	0.43	5.26
	Water and Sanitation	0.35	0.00	0.35
	Communication	0.92	0.16	1.08
	Public Buildings	10.07	2.26	12.33
	Energy	8.18	0.00	8.18
<b>Social Protection</b>		<b>-</b>	<b>0.62</b>	<b>0.62</b>
<b>Civil Protection and DRR</b>		<b>8.75</b>	<b>13.22</b>	<b>21.97</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>843.89</b>	<b>141.17</b>	<b>985.06</b>

*Table 1: Damages and losses, sector and sub-sector specific<sup>43</sup>*

Regarding, the geographic distribution of damage and loss, Durrës was affected the most with € 303.8 million (32.4% of the total) followed by Tirana and Kruja with respectively € 284.3 million (30%) and € 84.2 million (9%). See Table 2.

<sup>40</sup> Shkon në 52 numri i viktimave nga tërmeti; Lajmi.net

<sup>41</sup> Pasojat e tërmetit në Tiranë, familjet e ish-konviktit të komunales në mes të rrugës - Porta Vendore; <https://portavendore.al/2020/02/16/pasojat-e-termetit-ne-tirane-familjet-e-ish-konviktit-te-komunales-ne-mes-te-rruges/>. (downloaded: 01 March 2020)

<sup>42</sup> Albania Post-Disaster Needs Assessment; Government of Albania, EU, UN Agencies, and World Bank, Tirana, 2020.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

Losses	Education	Health	Housing	Infrastructure	Productive	Social protection	Civil Protection and DRR
Durres	9.75	1.50	220.78	8.95	65.15	0.06	4.00
Shijak	2.40	0.11	52.91	1.84	5.36	0.06	2.30
Kruja	5.04	0.34	73.01	0.53	5.67	0.06	1.50
Lezha	2.91	0.27	22.18	1.38	6.83	0.06	2.00
Mirdita	-	-	4.42	0.80	0.75	0.06	0.70
Kurbin	4.00	5.56	25.39	2.32	0.05	0.06	2.40
Tirana	46.06	2.13	214.33	15.56	21.91	0.06	3.40
Kamza	0.06	-	14.49	0.49	1.25	0.06	1.82
Vora	1.18	0.02	40.16	1.00	5.59	0.06	1.80
Kavaja	0.93	-	28.62	0.50	37.79	0.06	1.30
Rrogozhina	-	-	-	0.05	0.14	0.02	0.75
<b>Total in million EUR</b>	<b>72.35</b>	<b>9.93</b>	<b>696.30</b>	<b>33.42</b>	<b>150.48</b>	<b>0.62</b>	<b>21.97</b>

*Table 2: Damage and losses by municipality<sup>44</sup>*

### 3.2. Causes

According to the study conducted by Lekkas et al., the most affected type of buildings were unreinforced structures with loadbearing masonry walls and those with a reinforced concrete framing system and infill baked clay and/or concrete walls<sup>45</sup>. Furthermore, mixed types of buildings were also observed, and the majority of them were built in accordance with the Albanian Technical Codes (KPT) of the year 1989. Since that year, it has not been updated and does not include any rule for the buildings more than five floors<sup>46</sup>. The buildings that suffered most were the unreinforced ones with loadbearing masonry walls. The reasons were: old building age, the quality of construction and workmanship were poor, people intervention in contraction, the design, and planning code of the time if it was applied, and lack of maintenance after the previous seismic events.

Veikkolainen, a seismologist from the University of Helsinki, stated that the main reason why Albania is posed to earthquakes' risk is its location to the boundary of Eurasian and Adriatic tectonic plates<sup>47</sup>. Moreover, other Balkan countries such as Northern Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece, and as well as Turkey and Italy are at risk. He explained that the occurrence of an earthquake happens when the energy is suddenly released into the earth's lithosphere. Then the energy releases after being accumulated

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> LEKKAS – MAVROULIS – PAPA – CARYDIS op. cit.

<sup>46</sup> Inxhinieret, përmirësimi i Kodit të Ndërtimit emergjencë |Revista Monitor; <https://www.monitor.al/inxhinieret-permiresimi-i-kodit-te-ndertimit-emergjence-2/>. (downloaded: 29 February 2020)

<sup>47</sup> Sizmologu Finlandez/ Shqipëria dhe rreziku i tërmetejeve - Top Channel; <http://top-channel.tv/2019/11/28/sizmologu-finlandez-shqiperia-dhe-rreziku-i-termetejeve/>. (downloaded: 25 February 2020)

there. This has more probability of occurring near the plates' boundary than in the center of the tectonic plates. Besides, he assures that earthquakes cannot be predicted, unlike volcanos cases for which there do exist special devices to measure volcanic gases. According to Veikkolainen, the only thing that can be done after an earthquake to take action in order to prevent further damages to people.

A distinguished Albanian engineer stated that earthquakes could not be predicted by date and time, but studies related to their prediction can be conducted. Bozo explained and analyzed the factors that led to significant damages<sup>48</sup>. The country is in the periphery of the Euro-Atlantic area, and it is on the edge of the rift that divides the Euro-Asian plate with Africa. As a result of nuclear reactions, the internal energy is created into the tectonic rift. The territory is divided into 3 seismic map areas: 40% with 7.0 magnitude, 40% with 8.0 magnitude, and 20% with a magnitude of 9.0. The earthquake is "released energy" therefore, the country can be posed to such risks. She explained that the phenomena could not be controlled, but the predictions can be made by considering the history of these events. The event happened precisely 40 years after the significant one in 1979.

Bozo addresses the shock consequences to not proper construction's considerations. The important thing is that the country should have the information and adequate examination should be made regarding the areas which are in danger the most. As for now, Albania has 3 zones considered in danger. The first starts in Montenegro and ends in Greece; the second is from Skopje, Dibër e Madhe, Fier and Tepelena; and the third begins in Ohrid Lake and ends in Greece. All these areas have marshes, and the criteria for constructions cannot be avoided. The wetland of Durrës city was forbidden for building. There could be built on a maximum of two floors. The criteria and seismic project of the year 1989 were still in power, and it did not modify. The specialists of economy, planners and construction entities should have contributed in revising and updating the criteria in accordance with the new constructing conditions and technology advancements for better safety. She found that:

- The number of buildings in the beach area of Durrës was huge and not correctly constructed. When an earthquake occurs, the ground turns into sludge, and the such structures will be destroyed entirely.
- The buildings of Thumanë were voluntarily donated and given to residents working in that area. According to inspections, the masonry was built without any rules on joints, anti-seismic band, and so on. So, where were the specialists? No one can design and build without having a construction background.

A significant reason is the human factor, as well. The population movements from rural to urban areas that are exposed to quakes events, such as in Durrës region, are increasing. Moreover, how risk is perceived by the public has a significant influence. According to the traditions and inherited mentality, the level of their reaction is low, and the discussions appear after an event takes place. Thus, we can

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<sup>48</sup> 3 pikat me rrezikshmëri të lartë – inxhinierja Luljeta Bozo: Mungon kolaudimi i objekteve; <https://dosja.al/video-3-pikat-me-rrezikshmeri-te-larte-inxhinierja-luljeta-bozo-mungon-kolaudimi-i-objekteve/> (downloaded: 29 February 2020)

think that there is still a lack of public pressure to higher instances regarding issues that affect them directly or indirectly.

Additionally, Hoti and Axhemi state that the country does not have proper warning and prognosis systems<sup>49</sup>. A long-term plan of management is missing; instruments related to the risk management of natural disasters seem not to be very efficient<sup>50</sup>.

#### 4. After-shock actions

As the main reasons for the consequences aftershock were related to the construction issues, some measures have been taken<sup>51</sup>. The Durrës court of Appeal arrested eight people on suspicion of murder and power over the buildings' collapse<sup>52</sup>.

On 27<sup>th</sup> November, the Government decreed the State of Emergency for Durrës and Tirana cities and one day after for Lezha city. An Inter-Ministerial Committee of Civil Emergency was established, and a detailed action program was prepared<sup>53</sup>. Thereupon, the firefighters, civil protection, medical emergency personnel, the Armed Forces and State Reserve were deployed. Since the initial phase, volunteers and specially trained Army Urban Search and Rescue personnel showed their contribution.

The armed forces were fully dedicated, and immediately around 2000 Special Forces and Commando ones assisted in rescue's operations. Also, about 1900 effective of the State Policy, together with firefighters' teams of municipalities, were on duty by showing their readiness to the affected territories<sup>54</sup>. The mobilization of special forces Renea, Rapid Intervention Forces of Tirana, Fier and Shkodra, Durrës Police<sup>55</sup>, International Federation of Red Cross, etc., was very significant by responding to the needs of affected people. People that lost their homes and those who were in danger because their places became inhabited were accommodated temporarily in other places.

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<sup>49</sup> M. HOTI – S. AXHEMI: *Natural Risks in Albania and the Role of Related Warning Systems; Early Warning Systems for Natural Disaster Reduction*, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2003, pp. 103-105.

<sup>50</sup> E. POJANI: *The risk of natural disasters in Albanian economy; Third International Risk Conference*, 2011.

<sup>51</sup> EMRAT/ U arrestuan për pasojat pas tërmetit të 26 nëntorit, Gjykata e Apelit jep masat e sigurisë për të akuzuarit - Balkanweb.com - News24; <https://www.balkanweb.com/emrat-u-arrestuan-per-pasojat-pas-termetit-te-26-nentorit-gjykata-e-durresit-jep-masat-e-sigurise-per-te-akuzuarit/>. (downloaded: 25 February 2020)

<sup>52</sup> Albania earthquake: Arrests over deaths in collapsed buildings; BBC News <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-50797831>. (downloaded: 01 March 2020)

<sup>53</sup> Albania Post-Disaster Needs Assessment

<sup>54</sup> Forcat e Armatosura, angazhim maksimal në ndihmë të popullsisë së prekur nga tërmeti; <https://aaf.mil.al/te-fundit/5370-forcat-e-armatosura-angazhim-maksimal-ne-ndihme-te-popullsisë-se-prekur-nga-termeti>. (downloaded: 27 March 2020)

<sup>55</sup> Mbi 2400 policë të angazhuar për kërkimet nën rrënoja - Lajmet e Fundit; <https://www.njeshi.com/index.php/2019/11/27/mbi-2400-police-te-angazhuar-per-kerkimet-nen-rrenoja/>. (downloaded: 01 March 2020)

Kosovo sent its army forces and Turkey the National Rescue Team the day after<sup>56</sup>. Many countries (EU and non-EU) showed assistance and readiness. To request international support, the Government used a procedure that activated the European Civil Protection Mechanism, and the deploying of an EU Civil Protection Team as well<sup>57</sup>.

The Albanian Red Cross (ARC) deployed many doctors, first aiders, and volunteers working at hospitals but also at a tent camp placed to the Durrës stadium<sup>58</sup>. To provide first aid, medical care, psychological help, other basic needs (food, water, household items, etc.) and to Restore Family Links, the readiness of ARC, was immediate<sup>59</sup>.

The number of Red Cross Red Crescent Movement partners was immense, and their involvement in the emergency operation was very supportive<sup>60</sup>:

- Croatian Red Cross provided a large truckload of humanitarian goods, including blankets and quilts.
- Hellenic Red Cross assisted with three shipments of various relief goods (10 trucks).
- Italian Red Cross (deployment with Italian CP), besides of their help, considered medium-term bilateral support in PSS capacity building.
- Red Cross of The Republic of North Macedonia provided household items, food, and hygiene parcels.
- Montenegro Red Cross assisted with relief goods (clothing).
- Turkish Red Crescent provided and distributed a variety of humanitarian goods, making some available to ARC for use in distributions, gradually demobilizing their in-country personnel since week two after the earthquake.
- Red Cross Society of United Arab Emirates has provided tents and other relief goods to Albanian Government authority requests.

National and international donations have been essential. The Government approved by Law a fund of 106.6 million EUR<sup>61</sup>. Due to the other government accounts, the amount of donations reached 15.2 million EUR.

Regarding buildings and peoples' life after the devastating earthquake, the help of private businesses and civil society have been very essential (check for more the database)<sup>62</sup>. A large number of volunteers contributed via two main foundations in

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid.

<sup>57</sup> Albania Post-Disaster Needs Assessment

<sup>58</sup> MEDIA ADVISORY: Albania - Red Cross teams providing urgent medical assistance, food and water for earthquake survivors; International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, <https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/press-release/albania-red-cross-teams-providing-urgent-medical-assistance-food-water-earthquake-survivors/>. (downloaded: 01 March 2020)

<sup>59</sup> International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, "Albania: Earthquake Emergency appeal n MDRAL008; 2019.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid

<sup>61</sup> Albania Post-Disaster Needs Assessment

<sup>62</sup> Top 50 Donors per Country - Catalyst Balkans; <https://catalystbalkans.org/en/report/top-50-donors-per-country>. (downloaded: 01 March 2020)

Albania<sup>63,64</sup>. In total, around \$ 1.7 million have been donated through one of them and \$ 6.7 million through the other one. It was declared per their purpose, that they would be used for the construction and reconstruction of the damaged houses.

Lastly, the Albanian Government, the EU, the UN, and the World Bank prepared a joint Post-Disaster Needs Assessment report to mobilize the community of donors<sup>65</sup>. Therefore, about 100 delegations from the European Union, its Member States, and partners, including international organizations and civil society, were gathered in Brussels at the International Donors' Conference<sup>66</sup>. In total, EU and international donors pledge €1.15 billion as support for reconstructions in Albania. The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, stated that a group of experts would be present in the country to monitor and support the reconstructions<sup>67</sup>. Furthermore, to guide the rebuilding, the Albanian Government, the EU Commission, the Council of Europe Development Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the World Bank have affirmed a set key of principles.

## 5. Conclusions

Albania is vulnerable to a vast number of natural disaster events. They have had devastating effects on the population, economy, and growth prospects. The main factors are related to geophysical, hydrological, and meteorological conditions. The latest earthquake event hit 11 municipalities by leading to severe damages to buildings and 51 fatalities. Thousands of people were displaced due to the loss of their houses. Aftershock measures have been taken; the involvement and solidarization of civil society, corporates, Government, non-profit organizations, EU member states and partners, have had great importance.

It was shown that besides the country's location, there are reasons related to building and planning technical code. During the transition from communism to capitalism, there has been a boom in building construction where the safety standards and rules were omitted. Moreover, the lack of expertise from the field is one of the prominent issues. The human factor - public mentality and behavior – have worsened the situation as well. The responsible entities for disaster risks, planning, and implementation of buildings should update and reformulate the existing programs. A long-term risk management plan must be considered. For better safety, the specialists of economy, planners, and construction entities should contribute to revising and

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<sup>63</sup> Two months after the earthquake, 'Different Weekend' begins construction of destroyed houses – Fundjave Ndryshe; <https://ffn.al/en/two-months-after-the-earthquake-different-weekend-begins-construction-of-destroyed-houses/>. (downloaded: 01 March 2020)

<sup>64</sup> Publikohet vëndi dhe data për nisjen e rindërtimit në Thumanë ! - Firdëus; <http://www.firdeus.al/2020/02/06/publikohet-vendi-dhe-data-per-nisjen-e-rindertimit-ne-thumane/>. (downloaded: 01 March 2020)

<sup>65</sup> Albania Post-Disaster Needs Assessment

<sup>66</sup> European Commission: EU and international donors pledge € 1 .15 billion for reconstruction after the earthquake in Albania; 2020.

<sup>67</sup> International Donors' Conference 'Together for Albania'; [https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP\\_20\\_249](https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_20_249). (downloaded: 01 March 2020.

updating the criteria following the new constructing conditions and technological advancements.

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**BIG PICTURE BEFORE THE PANDEMIC: SUPPLY SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE EUROPEAN NATURAL GAS SECTOR**

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*Abstract*

Due to the competitive price and wide-spread industrial and household consumption of natural gas, its production is one of the most rapidly expanding industries in the energy sector. All these attributes raise peculiar concerns related to the security of natural gas supply and they often go beyond the basic economic principles applicable to international division of labour. The purpose of this study is to give an overview of the quandaries related to the security of supply and arising from the specific features of natural gas in light of the changes seen in the past fifteen years.

**Keywords:** natural gas, pipelines, LNG, energy security, security of supply

**1. Introduction**

Due to the competitive price and wide-spread industrial and household consumption of natural gas, its production is one of the most rapidly expanding industries in the energy sector. One of the advantages of natural gas is that it can be directly consumed, without any major technological transformations, and moreover, it is environmentally considerably less harmful than coal or mineral oil. At the same time, the calorific value of natural gas remains considerably below that of mineral oil, and its transmission and storage costs are extremely high due to the technological complexity of the infrastructure that connects production with the end user.

All these attributes raise peculiar concerns related to the security of natural gas supply and they often go beyond the basic economic principles applicable to international division of labour. For this reason, in the first decade of the 21st century, discourse on energy security was given new impetus and the topic has remained in the focus of public and academic interest to date. This is well illustrated by the fact that five times the number of articles were written on energy security in 2011 than in 2005, and the median for the publication date of studies on this topic between 1948 and 2014 is 2008<sup>1</sup>. An increasing number of authors discuss cases of securitizing energy security<sup>2</sup>. This is especially true in the natural gas sector in the context of Central and

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<sup>1</sup> KIRIYAMA, E. – KAJIKAWA, Y.: A multilayered Analysis of Energy Security Research and the Energy Supply Process; *Applied Energy*, 2014. pp. 123, 415-423.

<sup>2</sup> PERCIVAL, B. R.: The Risk of Energy Securitization on the Eurasian Continent. Clingendael International Energy Programme. Breafing Papers, 2008. [https://www.clingendaelenergy.com/inc/upload/files/The\\_risk\\_of\\_energy\\_securitization\\_Eurasia.pdf](https://www.clingendaelenergy.com/inc/upload/files/The_risk_of_energy_securitization_Eurasia.pdf), (downloaded: 14 January 2020)  
ROMANOVA, T.: Normative Power Europe: A Russian View; In: Normative Power Europe

Eastern Europe, where energy security has been invoked on numerous occasions as a point of reference to justify actions that would not have necessarily been acceptable under ordinary political and market conditions<sup>3</sup>.

The purpose of this study is to give an overview of the quandaries related to the security of supply and arising from the specific features of natural gas in light of the changes seen in the past fifteen years.

## 2. Security of Supply

In order to provide a professional discussion of the quandaries related to energy security in the natural gas sector, clarification of the term is indispensable. To start with, it should be noted that there is no internationally accepted uniform definition for the concept of security in relation to energy generation.

There are several possible approaches to the concept of energy security from traditional survival-based definitions<sup>4</sup> to various explanations relying on the security of supply and emphasizing two<sup>5</sup> or more dimensions<sup>6</sup>. (For further details on all these<sup>7</sup>). The diversity of definitions is well illustrated by a detailed collection by Sovacool<sup>8</sup>, listing 45 different academic or policy definitions for energy security.

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in a Changing World: A Discussion, Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 2009. pp. 91, 51-67.

- <sup>3</sup> VIRÁG, A.: Elgázolt szuverenitás: A "Nabucco vs. Déli Áramlat" vita magyarországi vizsgálata a nemzetállami szuverenitás, az európai integráció és az orosz birodalmi törekvések tükrében; Budapest, Geopen Könyvkiadó, 2014.  
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- <sup>4</sup> BUZAN, B. – WAEVER O. – DE WILDE, J.: Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
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- <sup>6</sup> WICKS, M.: Energy security: A national challenge in a changing world; 2009.  
[http://130.88.20.21/uknuclear/pdfs/Energy\\_Security\\_Wicks\\_Review\\_August\\_2009.pdf](http://130.88.20.21/uknuclear/pdfs/Energy_Security_Wicks_Review_August_2009.pdf), (downloaded: 19 July 2019)
- <sup>7</sup> See: WEINER, Cs.: Energiaellátás-biztonság és gázdiverzifikáció Magyarországon, Elmélet és gyakorlat; Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences – Institute of World Economics, Műhelytanulmányok 121., 2017.  
[http://real.mtak.hu/72294/1/MT\\_121\\_Weiner.pdf](http://real.mtak.hu/72294/1/MT_121_Weiner.pdf), (downloaded: 14 January 2020)
- <sup>8</sup> SOVACOO, B. K.: The Routledge Handbook of Energy Security. New York: Routledge, 2011.

The commencement of international discourses on energy security relate to the start of the oil age<sup>9</sup>, however, in addition to mineral oil, by now quandaries related to natural gas have also become increasingly significant, especially in Europe. The reason is that after the oil crises of the 1970's, in recent years the question arose how far the uneven geographic distribution of natural gas reservoirs contributes to the diversity of approaches to energy security.

Similarly to the high significance of management with focus on stakeholders in the economy<sup>10</sup>, the analysis of the system of regional and global stakeholder interests is also essential in respect of energy strategies<sup>11</sup>.

The, primarily Western, experts mentioned in the relevant energy policy literature base their attempts at a definition of energy security on the security and provision of energy supply to the particular economic and political region. In this traditional perception, devised as a result from oil crises, energy security means secure and stable access to energy at an affordable price based on market operation<sup>12</sup>.

In this sense, the purpose of energy strategy is to secure continuous energy supply using various political means and economic implements. This strategy primarily characterises regions not having or having very small amount of energy-generating products and hydrocarbon reserves. Thus the energy strategy of importer countries is determined by the compulsion to import. Thus, net importers tend to consider energy security as if it was synonymous with the security of supply despite the fact that the explanation focusing on supply is only one of the possible energy strategy versions, which does not take account of exporter considerations.

In countries with large amounts of mineral oil and/or natural gas, which are thus very likely to act as exporters, the above described strategy based on a supply security approach does not have any explanatory force. This is because in this case energy security focuses on securing demand and on the use of revenues earned from the secured supply for various political and/or business purposes.

Thus in this approach, instead of assigning implements to the security of energy supply as an objective, the incomes earned from the security of energy supply (energy export) are assigned to various political and/or economic objectives. These objectives frequently do not relate to the energy industry, but are, in most cases, economic or geopolitical in nature.

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<sup>9</sup> FARKAS (2019) op. cit. pp. 140-141.

<sup>10</sup> BLASKOVICS, B.: The impact of project manager on project success: The case of ICT sector; *Society and Economy*, 2016. 38(2), pp. 261-281.

<sup>11</sup> DEUTSCH, N.: Decentralizált települési energiarendszerek potenciális közösségi hatásai. In: SOMOGYVÁRI, M. – KISS T. (Eds.): *Via Futuri: Irányváltás? PTE KTK Pécs*, 2013. pp. 121-136.

<sup>12</sup> PARAG, Y. (2014). From Energy Security to the Security of Energy Services: Shortcomings of Traditional Supply-Oriented Approaches and the Contribution of a Socio-Technical and User-Oriented Perspectives. *Science & Technology Studies*, 27(1), pp. 97-108.

### 3. Production

As described in the chapter on energy security, the geopolitical distribution of conventional natural gas reservoirs is uneven: certain areas are net exporters, while others are net importers. In the first half of the 20th century, natural gas was a significant source of energy nearly exclusively in the United States. In 1950, the US extracted 178 billion of the global 191 cubic meters of natural gas produced in the world; Canada, Mexico and Venezuela shared 4.6 billion, while in all other parts of the world only the Soviet Union (5.8 billion) and Romania (3.2 billion) produced in a magnitude reaching billions of cubic metres (Szemerényi, 2007, 259). Later on, however, natural gas production also accelerated in the Soviet Union, and in 1983 they surpassed the US: their production was 184.7, 406 and 760.4 billion cubic metres in 1970, 1980 and 1990, respectively.

The household and industrial consumption of natural gas started to spread several decades after the consumption of mineral oil, from the 1950's in the western part of Europe. The natural gas sector's rapid development is hallmarked by the fact that in terms of both consumption and production, natural gas has exceeded coal since the second half of the 1990's. The turning point was reached in 1997 in consumption and in 1999 in production<sup>13</sup>. It can be established that by now, in the case of primary energy sources, natural gas has the second largest share on the old continent next to mineral oil. All this was part of the fast change in energy-generating products that resulted in the replacement of the coal-based economy of the region by an economy based on hydrocarbons, i.e. mineral oil and natural gas.

Thus the largest European consumers of natural gas include those that are poor in or have decreasing amounts of fossil fuels, in other words, their economies highly depend on natural gas import, and so they are exposed to significant supply security risk, especially as a significant part of the conventional natural gas fields are located on the territories of unstable and/or authoritarian states. Based on all this, energy import is assessed as a political risk in many countries and efforts are made at the diversification of their sources and/or purchase routes with the help of a balanced, multiple portfolio.

In contrast, for the group of exporters the factor of primary significance is to earn stable incomes, however, they depend on secure demand. Thus, for them the most important consideration is to have stable market outlets, especially if the incomes earned from exports contribute significantly to the budget. All this increases the significance of diversification also for exporters in terms of their markets and their access routes.

It is important to note that producer countries may encounter the so-called resource curse phenomenon as an additional problem. This is because conflicts of interest concerning fuel extraction may generate serious internal political tensions, may increase the risk of corruption and may weaken the state's performance, ultimately running into a one-way development.

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<sup>13</sup> BP: Statistical Review of World Energy, 2002.  
<https://www.griequity.com/resources/industryandissues/Energy/bp2002statisticalreview.pdf>, (downloaded: 21 January 2020)

Similarly, fuel extraction frequently becomes the means or target of political or military conflicts. The presence of valuable substances increases the likelihood of the outburst of conflicts and may exacerbate them through the aggravation and prolonging of fights by presenting them as strategic goals or tactical means, (as a topical example, see the conflicts affecting areas rich in coal and natural gas in Eastern Ukraine or the Islam State's regular attacks against natural gas and oil wells, Farkas, 2019, 150-151). Conflicts are in general suitable for interrupting production for varying periods, thus increasing price volatility, triggering supply problems, and regionally or globally reducing importer countries' confidence in the source countries.

One of the most important changes in the energy market is the soaring extraction of the so-called unconventional hydrocarbon reservoirs in the United States. The extraction of the hydrocarbons usually called shale oil and shale gas requires a special procedure. The history of hydraulic fracturing, applied for the first time in the 1940's, and horizontal drilling, developed in the 1980's, is given in Yergin, 2019, 274-277, while the technical background to this technology is described in Gandossi and Von Estorff, 2013.

Upswing in this technology was seen in the second half of the 2000's, during Barack Obama's two terms, and it gained additional impetus during Donald Trump's presidency. The technology that enables the extraction of hydrocarbon locked in a geologically unconventional environment and the regulatory environment conducive to the former had turned the US from a net importer to a net exporter of natural gas by 2017 (BP, 2019). Due to their speed and size, and to their effects on the markets, the events seen in the 2010's, and coined by many as a shale revolution, have become the most significant innovation in the history of the 21st century<sup>14</sup>, and entail the re-consideration of the role undertaken by the US in the Middle East as well as the role of LNG in North America.

It is important to note that increase in the significance of shale gas also generates environmental debates including sustainability and relevant security policy considerations. The related discourse is focused on the security of drinking water resources and on the regulation of drilling closely related to the former<sup>15</sup>.

#### **4. Shipment and trade**

Most frequently, natural gas security considerations emerge in relation to transmission between extractors and end users, as the anomalies related to transmission routes may cause instant and significant supply problems. For this very reason, reducing transit risks is a priority economic and political consideration. Transport may be interrupted by technical errors, physical (terrorist or cyber) attacks or political decisions.

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<sup>14</sup> YERGIN, D.: A küldetés. Energia, biztonság és a modern világ újraalkotása. Budapest: Antall József Tudásközpont, 2019. p. 278.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid. pp. 278-279.

## *Piping*

The most widespread method of shipping natural gas is transmission through pipe networks. This also entails that the creation of an efficient market is not a simple task. The network required for the transmission of natural gas is a natural monopoly, which results in a high route dependence. Due to the track-bound nature of the infrastructure, the networks built may determine trade routes over the long term. The business costs of building an alternative network may also be increased by pipelines on a track along a previous, unutilised transmission route, and this also means that previous investments may determine the situation for decades, as the replacement of the existing infrastructure and built networks is a long and costly procedure. In addition, due to the high investment and operating costs, it is worth operating the pipes at full capacity, and so the producers are also interested in the ownership of the pipelines. (If a pipeline of 51 mm in diameter is operated at a 50% capacity, the cost per unit doubles.)

For transit countries, crossed by the given natural gas pipeline, transmission represents a considerable source of income from transit charges, and primarily due to the mentioned inflexible pipeline infrastructure, the opportunity to be able to halt or limit transmissions in transit also gives them a significant political influence. As a good example, the 2006 and 2009 gas debates between Russia and Ukraine may be quoted.<sup>16</sup> Despite significant costs, over time, the “gatekeeper” role may lead to the building of alternative routes, in other words, misfit transit regions may encourage producers and/or consumers to diversify routes by building or expanding interconnectors to neighbouring countries, or even implementing larger networks.

Making reference to the transit risks related to Ukraine and to cost efficiency considerations, in 2015, Gazprom and several large European companies initiated the building of two new pipelines with a transmission capacity of 55 billion cubic metres under the name Northern Stream 2, parallel with the Northern Stream that has been operative since 2012. In a Russian perspective, a major benefit of this more than 1220 km long network is that it directly connects Russia with Germany along a route that leads under the Baltic Sea. Thus there is no gatekeeper country between the Russian Viborg and the German Greifswald to impede network operation. Moreover, this route is 2000 km less than the one that currently supplies Russian natural gas to some of the Member States of the European Union through Ukraine.

In relation the pipe infrastructure, it can also be established that in the interest of uninterrupted supply, in numerous cases the parties conclude the natural gas transmission contracts for the long term. Thus importers guarantee the acceptance and exporters guarantee the transmission of fossil fuel. The former is ensured by “take or pay,” while the latter by the “ship or pay” clauses.

For example, in the case of long-term Russian contracts, prices are determined on the basis of a price formula tied to the quoted price (in certain cases, of coal), with a 6- to 9-month moving average. The countries beyond Russia settle accounts with one another in euro and US dollar. The details of the bilateral agreements are not public.

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<sup>16</sup> For further cases, see SHAFFER, B.: *Natural Gas Supply Stability and Foreign Policy. Energy Policy*, 2013. pp. 56, 114-125.

This price formula system was elaborated in the 1960's in the Netherlands. However, nowadays it is increasingly difficult to justify the validity of this system.

For these reasons, the key characteristic of pipeline gas is the regional nature of the market, in other words, the specific political agreements concluded by the extractor, the transmitter and the buyer highly influence the current consumer price. The fuel and diesel oil prices applied in the given region are at most guiding prices. Regarding security of supply, due to the several thousands of kilometres of distance between the producer and the end user, in addition to geographical, technological and, through the transit countries, serious political obstacles must be reckoned with in the calculations.

In the case of regional natural gas contracts, these factors have shaded the picture with further political features and justified the need for the conclusion of these contracts for the long term (perhaps even for decades). One of the peculiar examples of this is the natural gas agreement between the European Union and Russia, shown by numerous researchers to imply underlying interdependence.

### *LNG*

The global and increasingly significant LNG business line relies on a single physical phenomenon. Namely that the compressed substance cooled to a temperature of 160°C below zero occupies six hundred times less in a liquid form as in gaseous state. The liquid can then be transported by special tankers to great distances for sale, and once it is re-gassed, it can be pumped into pipelines and transmitted to consumers<sup>17</sup>.

The opportunity to transmit natural gas in a liquefied form has been available since the end of the 1950's. The very first consignment of liquefied gas arrived to the United Kingdom from Louisiana, USA in 1957. In the mid-1960's this shipment method seemed to gain increasing ground in Europe, however, the breakthrough did not take place.

The wide spread of this technology was impeded by its high costs. In addition, the shipment of liquefied gas was delayed when several significant natural gas fields were found in the region: In 1959, the largest natural gas field known in the world at that time was found in Groningen, in the northern part of the Netherlands, and then in 1965, significant reservoirs were discovered in the North Sea, in an area controlled by the United Kingdom, while Norwegian and Russian pipeline gas also competed against the LNG. Thus, initially, this technology spread in the Far East, primarily in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.

In the natural gas sector, a major change in shipment took place with the appearance of new extractors. Among them special mention should be made of Qatar, as after the 1971 discovery of its reservoirs in the Persian Gulf, at around the turn of the millennium it became an unavoidable stakeholder in the global natural gas market. In possession of the third largest conventional reserves (only Russia and Iran precede it, the latter having the Southern Pars field with a structure similar to the fields of

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<sup>17</sup> YERGIN (2019) op. cit. pp. 264-265.

Qatar), the emirate has become capable of shipping LNG to any significant market. In addition, as Qatar has abandoned traditional long-term contracts, now it can boast of being the largest LNG exporter of the world<sup>18</sup>.

The number of countries producing LNG is on the increase. Although on routes less than 3000 km shipment by tankers is less efficient than transmission by pipes, transport by sea can be considered more flexible. The LNG tankers may choose any shipping route, and may even be re-directed, if required, in transit to a different port, and any of the re-gassing terminals may be supplied from any liquefying terminal<sup>19</sup>. It is no accident that the ratio of liquefied gas to the total natural gas consumption increased from 0.3 per cent in 1971 to 7.3 per cent in 2006, translating to a rise from 6.2 to 24.8 per cent in trade in the same period.<sup>20</sup>

The past few years suggest that due to the unconventional natural gas extraction, the US may partly re-draw the world map of energy-generating products. Prior to the above described “shale revolution”, the experts thought that the US might become one of the most important LNG markets as its domestic extractions was on the decline. In contrast, due to its unconventional natural gas reservoirs, the country has become a major LNG exporter.

The recent years have seen the implementation of the transport networks (natural gas pipelines and LNG terminals) enabling US companies to sell considerable amounts of natural gas abroad. Targets also include well-paying European markets. Between 2016 and 2018, the total US export of liquefied natural gas increased more than sevenfold (from 4 billion to 28.4 billion cubic metres), and of this, the 2018 export to Europe was equal to its total 2016 LNG export.

As this considerably interferes with the Russian energy interests in continental Europe, in addition to the liberalisation and increase in the flexibility of the natural gas market, the potential implied in the US natural gas export has triggered new kinds of conflicts in Europe with focus on the Russian-inspired Northern Stream 2 project.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019. <https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf>, (downloaded: 21 January 2020)

<sup>19</sup> FARKAS (2019) op. cit. p. 153.

<sup>20</sup> IEA (2008). Natural Gas Market Review 2008. Opositing investments and ensuring security in a high-priced environment; IEA, Paris

<sup>21</sup> For further details on the debate, see:

GOLDTHAU, A.: Assessing Nord Stream 2: Regulation, Geopolitics Energy Security in the EU, Central Eastern Europe & the UK; European Centre for Energy and Resource Security, 2016. [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306013591\\_Assessing\\_Nord\\_Stream\\_2\\_regulation\\_geopolitics\\_energy\\_security\\_in\\_the\\_EU\\_Central\\_Eastern\\_Europe\\_and\\_the\\_UK](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306013591_Assessing_Nord_Stream_2_regulation_geopolitics_energy_security_in_the_EU_Central_Eastern_Europe_and_the_UK), (downloaded: 18 January 2020);

KOTEK, P. – SELEI, A. – TAKÁCSNÉ TÓTH, B.: The Impact of the Construction of the Nord Stream 2 Gas Pipeline on Gas Prices and Competition; Regionális Energiagazdasági Kutatóközpont, 2017. [https://rekk.hu/downloads/academic\\_publications/NordStream2\\_REKK.pdf](https://rekk.hu/downloads/academic_publications/NordStream2_REKK.pdf), (downloaded: 18 January 2020);

RILEY, A.: Nord Stream 2: A legal and Policy Analysis; Center for European Policy Studies, 2016. <https://www.ceps.eu/download/publication/?id=9688&pdf=SR151AR%20Nordstream2.pdf>, (downloaded: 18 January 2020);

At the moment, the liquefied gas received in Europe from the US is not cheaper than its competitors (the North-African LNG, or the Norwegian, Dutch or Russian pipeline gas), but the more flexible US regulation and the penalties to Russia have enabled the US management to gradually moderate its disadvantage, primarily to Moscow.

Finally, it should be noted that shipping by tankers does not eliminate security policy risks. A significant part of maritime trade is transacted through natural narrow passages, called choke points, typically straits or channels, where pirate attacks are to be expected and the regional conflicts may also have an impact on the security of traffic. The most well-known bottleneck is the Strait of Hormuz that connects the Persian Gulf with the Indian Ocean. An important site is the Malaka Strait, stretching between the Indian Ocean and the South-Chinese Sea next to Singapore, Malaysia and the island of Sumatra. In the event of a political conflict, the states controlling the particular territory may threaten with the military block of the straits.

## **5. Storage**

Due to widespread household consumption, the consumption of natural gas shows high seasonal fluctuation. In addition, its storage represents a special technological challenge, as it is only possible in expensive facilities specifically made for this purpose. Filling natural gas tanks commences after the heating season has stopped. During the heating season, supply is rendered more difficult by the fact that only the pre-determined amount of gas can be extracted from the tanks per day, irrespective of the total amount available. Thus in the event of a crisis, system capacity is limited. Strategic and commercial natural gas tanks are used to eliminate the effects of short-term outages and price volatility.

As in contrast to the oil market, the natural gas market is not international, it is fundamentally regulated by states or (in the EU) regions. At some places the state has ownership of a tank, while at others, the natural gas distributor or trader companies are required to fill commercial tanks for storage<sup>22</sup>.

## **6. Consumption**

Due to the extensive industrial and household consumption of natural gas, the security of supply is classified among high priority political areas. In addition to industrial consumers, the service sector may also be affected by long-term outages or even fluctuating energy supply. These may cause losses of client confidence and consequently a serious competitive disadvantage. In addition, the welfare and security of households are also highly dependent on the security of natural gas supply. In the case of this product, households' propensity to pay is demonstrably high. Numerous

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LANG, K.-O. – WESTPHAL, K.: Nord Stream 2 – A Political and Economic Contextualisation; Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik 2017. [https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research\\_papers/2017RP03\\_lng\\_wep.pdf](https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2017RP03_lng_wep.pdf). (downloaded: 18 January 2020)

<sup>22</sup> FARKAS (2019) op. cit. p. 152.

indications suggest that *“the social recognition of the security of energy supply increases parallel with economic development”*.<sup>23</sup>

As mentioned above on several occasions, in the case of the natural gas sector, one of the most characteristic problems is excessive market concentration, i.e. when the market is focused in the hands of a single or a couple of stakeholders, who may thus abuse their dominant position and set and more unfavourable conditions and higher prices. Although this makes consumers vulnerable and energy supply is infringed upon, end user markets frequently operate in this structure, typically with the participation of state-owned companies. In relation to Europe, such a predominant stakeholder is the Kremlin-controlled Gazprom, holding the export monopoly of Russian pipeline gas, who supply more than one-third of the EU’s annual natural gas demand.

In 2018 nearly 87% of Russian piped natural gas was sold to Europe, securing more than 35% of the continent’s total natural gas consumption (549 billion cubic meters per annum) (BP, 2019). A country breakdown reveals that the dependence of the eastern Member States of the European Union on Moscow for natural gas is considered definitely high: Latvia, Slovakia, Finland and Estonia are 100%; the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Lithuania 80% and Greece, Austria and Hungary 60% dependent on Russia for natural gas<sup>24</sup>. Moreover, due to decrease in production in the EU, the competitive price of Russian natural gas and the pipeline infrastructure already built or currently under construction, the ratio is highly likely to remain at the current level, which involves considerable risks to supply and offers an opportunity for abuses.

In a five-year competition proceeding closed in the spring of 2017, the European Commission revealed significant market abuses in the case of Gazprom. (The European Union opened the procedure on the complaints of five Central and Eastern European countries. According to the bill of indictment, the Russians have abused their competitive advantage and exported natural gas at a price considerably higher than the market price.) Based on the investigation it was found that the Russian company had infringed upon the European Union’s antitrust regulations by following a comprehensive strategy for the division of gas markets according to the national state boundaries in eight countries: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia, enabling them to charge higher prices in five countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.

Overall it was established that Gazprom had restricted the development of the natural gas market in the European Union and the intensification of competition<sup>25</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> VARRÓ, L.: Az energiaellátás biztonsága és a magyar külpolitika; *Külügyi Szemle*, 2007. Spring, p. 64.

<sup>24</sup> MARSHALL, T.: *Prisoners of Geography. Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need To Know About Global Politics*; Elliott and Thompson Limited, London, 2016.

<sup>25</sup> FARKAS (2019) op. cit. p. 154;

STERN, J. P. – YAFIMAVA, K.: *The EU Competition Investigation of Gazprom’s Sales in Central and Eastern Europe: A Detailed Analysis of the Commitments and the Way Forward*. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2017.

[https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c8d9353b-e9bd-4018-937b-](https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c8d9353b-e9bd-4018-937b-363e897eb9a5/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=The-EU-Competition-)

[363e897eb9a5/download\\_file?file\\_format=pdf&safe\\_filename=The-EU-Competition-](https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:c8d9353b-e9bd-4018-937b-363e897eb9a5/download_file?file_format=pdf&safe_filename=The-EU-Competition-)

The European Commission has set requirements that will considerably alter the operation of the service provider Gazprom in the Central and Eastern European natural gas markets.

In addition, it can be established that Gazprom's market dominance has decreased significantly in recent years. The regulations of the European Union (especially the Third Energy Package), the construction of LNG terminals and interconnectors, the spread of renewable energy as against fossil power plants, and decrease in the natural gas consumption in the European Union after 2009 compelled Gazprom to increasingly comply with the competition rules. It is no accident that the Russian company is making efforts at accessing alternative export markets, especially China.

## 7. Conclusion

Although it may have appeared that with the termination of the bipolar political system, energy would lose its security policy significance and would gradually become a traditional economic matter, due to the dependence that evolved in the Cold War period, the need to undertake a predominant political role within the energy industry has not essentially changed in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. There is no indication that this field, also of key significance for the sovereignty of nation states, has or may have been brought under the exclusive control of market mechanisms. This particularly applies to the natural gas sector.

Natural gas as a natural, primary source of energy has several features exclusively characterising this particular energy-generating product. As due to its need of special infrastructure, it is by nature a regional energy-generating product; its conventional reservoirs have a concentrated geographical distribution, and it is widely consumed by households as well as the industry, similarly to mineral oil, this hydrocarbon, which is gaseous at room temperature, can develop serious political dependence.

The construction and maintenance of production sites, LNG terminals and pipeline networks may require items that cost several tens of billions of USD over 50 to 100 years, or on an even longer horizon, and they are not always possible if the energy security considerations are disregarded. International transit is exposed to the most diverse political, international legal, technical and weather-related risks. The complexity of the situation is illustrated by the fact that the geographical unevenness of hydrocarbons is coupled with the diversity of energy strategies.

Based on all these it is easy to realise that the political exposure of the natural gas sector remains significant. Policy decisions are typically politicised; energy companies are frequently in state ownership or under government supervision; energy prices are recurrently turned into political issues; determination of the weight of

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natural gas in the energy mix is a political strategic matter and the regulation of market failures requires constant state intervention.

*In my opinion, the natural gas sector as a special field in the energy industry should be considered as a peculiar interface between politics and the economy, and the various related foreign and security policy considerations should be given an increasing share in research in this field.* Considering the current extraction data, the available natural gas reservoir is sufficient for 50 to 150 years; and with the improvement of the technology, the extractable amounts can be further increased. In addition to the conventional reservoirs, the so-called unconventional sources have also become accessible. All this means that the analysis of the above mentioned security policy quandaries should not be taken off the agenda for a long time to come.

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**Abstract**

Terrorist activity is one of the most serious crimes, “*its hazard lies in its suddenness, unpredictability and quick and mobile strike force*”.<sup>1</sup> The definition of the terrorism appeared in the 18th century during the French Revolution. During the coup of June 1793, the Jacobins seized power and instituted terror that basically served pacification and maintenance of order—with their own particular interpretation.<sup>2</sup> In the 19th century, terrorism worked as the tool of anarchist nationalism, while in the 20th century, it had increasingly put emphasis on the mass media’s communication function. However on 11 September 2001, it served as a caesura: the new type of terrorism appeared that is much more efficient than the terrorism of earlier ages concerning both its organisational background and its financial basis.<sup>3</sup>

**Keywords:** terrorism, transformation of terrorism

**1. Attempts to define terrorism**

The most essential element of terrorism is the creation of terror by breaking the illusion that the world we live in is a safe place. Basically, it does not matter if the terrorist kills for political, ideological purposes or without any rational purpose. “*The people terrorists kill are not the targets; they are collateral damage. And blowing up planes, trains, markets, or buses is not the goal; those are just tactics. The real targets of terrorism are the rest of us: the billions of us who are not killed but are terrorized because of the killing. The real point of terrorism is not the act itself, but our reaction to the act.*”<sup>4</sup>

The phenomenon of terrorism is basically as old as human society, but the origin of terrorism in the modern sense can be traced back to the late 18th century. After the French Revolution, the Jacobin government executed at least 17 thousand suspects in 1793 and 1794. During that time, however, the “*revolutionary terror*” (*régime de la terreur*) was used as an instrument to establish order, and it was designed to consolidate central power by intimidating the “*enemies of the people*” – counterrevolutionaries and conspirator. Robespierre firmly believed that virtue was

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<sup>1</sup> GÁL, István László: A pénzmosás és a terrorizmus finanszírozása az új magyar büntetőjogban; *Belügyi Szemle* 61. évf. 2013/6. p. 26.

<sup>2</sup> HOFFMAN, Bruce: A terrorizmus belülről; In: TÁLAS Péter (szerk.): *A terrorizmus anatómiája*; Budapest, Zrínyi, 2006. pp. 44-45.

<sup>3</sup> GÁL, István László: A XXI. század új bűncselekménytípusa: a terrorizmus finanszírozása; *Rendészeti Szemle* 57. évf. 2009/6. pp. 63-64.

<sup>4</sup> SCHNEIER, Bruce (2010): *Schneier a biztonságról*; HVG, Budapest, 2010. p. 2.

the mainspring of a popular government at peace, but that during the time of revolution virtue must be allied with terror in order for democracy to triumph. He proclaimed that *“terror is nothing but justice, prompt, severe and inflexible; it is therefore an emanation of virtue.”*<sup>5</sup> Founder of the modern British conservative policy Edmund Burke, was among the first who thought the murderous excesses of the Jacobin state was a perfect example of state terrorism.<sup>6</sup> Within a year from Robespierre’s demise, Burke evaluated the last days of the glorious French Revolution, saying: *“Thou-sands of those Hell hounds called Terrorists ... let loose on the people.”*<sup>7</sup>

According to David C. Rapoport’s approach, four eras of modern terrorism are distinguished. These four eras are the following:

- 1) the anarchist wave began in 1879 and lasted until the end of the First World War,
- 2) the subsequent anti-colonial wave collapsed at the end of the late 1960s,
- 3) the new left, anarchist wave based on Marxist ideology lasted from the second half of the 1960s to 1979,
- 4) the religious wave began in 1979, and it basically persists to this day.<sup>8</sup>

On the other hand, other sources suggest that this categorisation is purely theoretical, and none of them can be claimed to be clearly left-wing or clearly motivated by religion. However, Rapoport’s classification certainly draws the attention to the fact that terrorism is an extremely complex phenomenon that can be interpreted in different ways.<sup>9</sup>

This is also proved by Schmidt and Jongman. In their book, *Political Terrorism* they analysed 109 – to a greater or lesser extent – different definitions of terrorism. They revealed that in 83.5% of the definitions, “violence” was the key definitional element, in 65% it was political, while in 51%, fear was emphasised. On the other hand, only 21% of the definitions implies that terrorism is arbitrary, impersonal, and only 17.5% of them emphasised that innocent civilians are injured or killed in terrorist attacks. Schmid and Jongman realised that although the definitions in use are more or less similar, none of them can define the common concept of terrorism.<sup>10</sup>

## 2. Political science approaches

Academic writers like to cite the aphorism “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”, suggesting that to call someone a terrorist is to say no more than that one opposes their motivating cause.<sup>11</sup> The delegates of countries

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<sup>5</sup> HOFFMAN op. cit. p. 45.

<sup>6</sup> BARKER, Jonathan: *A terrorizmusról*; Budapest, HVG, 2003, p. 10.

<sup>7</sup> HOFFMAN op. cit. p. 46.

<sup>8</sup> RAPOPORT, David C.: *The International World As Some Terrorists Have Seen It: A Look at a Century of Memoires*. In: RAPOPORT, David C. (szerk.): *Inside Terrorist Organizations*; Frank Cass, London–Portland, Oregon, 2001. p. 48.

<sup>9</sup> HORVÁTH L. Attila: *A terrorizmus csapdájában*; Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó, 2013. pp. 11–12.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid* p. 12.

<sup>11</sup> BARKER op. cit. p. 26.

participating in the United Nations Legal Committee's 29<sup>th</sup> meeting in November 2000 tried to define the concept of terrorism.

For example, the Israeli delegate complained that some countries did not consider bombing raid as a terrorist attack if it had been committed to protect national independence. The spokesperson of the former Soviet republics also pointed out that the terrorists' fair, morally acceptable goal shall not justify any violent means. The delegate of Syria, however, criticised that in many cases, the targets of Israeli military attacks were not military but of symbolic nature. These examples also show that the different interests of each country do not facilitate the definition of terrorism either.<sup>12</sup> Furthermore, the versatility of terrorism makes it harder to create a common concept. We could hardly say for example that IRA and the Islamic State have very much in common—except for one thing which is the use of violent means and methods.<sup>13</sup> Even without in-depth investigation, we can determine that one of the crucial elements of terrorism is aggression, a dramatic act of violence. The other necessary tool is the intention to cause fear because it is important to terrorists to make their acts widely-known.<sup>14</sup> Terrorists intend to generate the persistent feeling of being under threat; they want to weaken the citizens' sense of security and to undermine their trust in state agencies and the government.<sup>15</sup> The acts of terrorists can be of political and/or of a religious nature, but they do not care who will be their victims. Terrorists are trying to achieve constant insecurity and threat. According to Bruce Schneier, "*the real point of terrorism is not the act itself, but our reaction to the act.*"<sup>16</sup>

Terrorism can also be interpreted as warfare, and under this approach, a distinction should be drawn between terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Terrorists very often define themselves as a national liberation movement, and the legitimacy of their action is confirmed by the fact that they are against social and religious oppression. George Bush – as vice president – stated as follows: "*The difference between terrorists and freedom fighters is sometimes clouded. Some would say one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist. I reject this notion. The philosophical differences are stark and fundamental.*"<sup>17</sup> It is a fact that guerrillas also conduct attacks, bombing raids, often intentionally against civilians. However, guerrillas are more commonly considered as an armed military unit defining itself as a national liberation movement that occupies and keeps territories under its control.<sup>18</sup> It may be that their people also consider terrorists as heroes, freedom fighters, but we must remember one substantial difference: terrorists do not care about the international rules of war, but it is very important to them that innocent people die during their actions.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> BARTKÓ Róbert: A terrorizmus elleni küzdelem kriminálpolitikai kérdései; Győr, Universitas-Győr Nonprofit Kft., 2003. p. 29.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid p.20.

<sup>14</sup> HOFFMAN op. cit. pp. 70-71.

<sup>15</sup> BARKER op. cit. p. 26.

<sup>16</sup> SCHNEIER op. cit.

<sup>17</sup> George BUSH: Introduction to Terrorist Group Profiles. Washington DC, 1988, US GPO, 1988.; quoted by MERARI, Ariel: A terrorizmus, mint a lázadás stratégiája; In: TÁLAS Péter (szerk.): A terrorizmus anatómiája, Zrínyi, Budapest, 2006. ISBN: 9633274125, pp. 89-91.

<sup>18</sup> HOFFMAN op. cit. pp. 68-69.

<sup>19</sup> MERARI op. cit. p. 94.

As Bruce Hoffman explains, “terrorism is as much about the threat of violence as the violent act itself and, accordingly, is deliberately conceived to have far-reaching psychological repercussions beyond the actual target of the act among a wider, watching, ‘target’ audience.”<sup>20</sup>

United States Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) focuses on the psychological effect of terrorism; it is about a violent and illegal action against people or financial assets, and whose aim is “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives”.<sup>21</sup>

Due to the difficulties in the search of definition, it seems more fruitful if we try to define the essence of terrorism on the basis of the main criteria. Boaz Ganor stresses three such criteria according to which “terrorism is the intentional use of or threat to use violence against civilians or against civilian targets, in order to attain political aims”.<sup>22</sup> Jonathan Barker points out that such interpretation of terrorism appears to be applicable to both individual and state terror.

The latter means situations when dictatorial states are engaged in practices that endangers its own citizens’ safety of life and property, but it also includes cases when governments – directly or indirectly – support terrorist organisations or commit terrorist acts.<sup>23</sup>

Róbert Bartkó also stresses the complexity of terrorism which he believes can mainly be attributed to the fact that terrorist organisations base their legitimacy on the most diverse ideologies. Depending on the origin of this legitimacy, academic writers distinguish three types of terrorism. The “repressive” terrorism comes alive in an ideal environment where everybody is entitled to the fundamental political and economic rights, but in practice, this is not fulfilled because some social groups try to maintain inequality with repressive methods.

This kind of terrorism does not cover the entire country; it can only be experienced in areas inhabited by large numbers of the victims of acts of violence. Klu Klux Klan that operated in the southern states of the US can be mentioned as an example.<sup>24</sup>

The “rebellious” terrorism is specific to extreme separatist groups. For them, it is completely irrelevant if the mainstream society consider their activity legitimate or illegitimate. Their aim is to make themselves known by acts of violence (typically by bombing incidents). There is usually some kind of historical reason, cultural particularity, spiritual communion resulting from their mother tongue behind their ideology. IRA from the Northern Ireland, the basque separatist group, ETA, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and Chechens belong to this category. The third type of terrorism is “social revolutionary” terrorism.

Organisations included here have Marxist views and their members believe that social class distinctions can be eliminated by a proletarian revolution, and thus, communism

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<sup>20</sup> HOFFMAN op. cit. p. 67.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 66.

<sup>22</sup> BARKER op. cit. p. 26.

<sup>23</sup> JÓZSA László (2002): Globális terrorizmus – fogalmi kérdések; In: TÁLAS Péter (szerk.): Válaszok a terrorizmusra, avagy van-e út az afganisztáni „vadászattól” a fenntartható globalizációig; Stratégiai Védelmi Kutató Hivatal, HM – ChartaPress Kft, Budapest, 2002. pp. 85-104.

<sup>24</sup> BARTKÓ op. cit. p. 21.

can be achieved. The German Baader-Meinhof Gang or the Italian Red Brigades can be mentioned here as an example.<sup>25</sup>

### 3. Transformation of terrorism

The terrorism of the 1960s had developed from revolutionary and resistance movements. The most frequently used method was bombing, then bombing with letter bombs. Later, assassination became increasingly popular, and by the end of the 1960s, the number of aircraft hijackings had raised. The shift is linked to 1972: on 30 May, three members of the Japanese Red Army – recruited by the Palestinian group called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-External Operations – founded in Lebanon committed an attack with machine guns and hand grenades at Lod Airport of Tel Aviv, killing 26 people and injuring 80 others. After this, in September, the Black September Organisation also related to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine took 11 Israeli Olympic athletes hostages at the Munich Olympics, demanded the release of 200 Palestinians, then killed all the hostages.

Five hostage-takers were killed by the German police. Academic writers usually refer to this type of event as a “barricade-and-hostage” event.<sup>26</sup> Therefore, 1972 can be considered a watershed concerning the methods, however, terrorists of that era have not had a common ideology yet. If they had specific objectives, they had confined to demanding the release of the imprisoned comrades, but they mainly wanted to provoke governments hoping that they would “overreact” the case, and thus provide an excuse for a new attack.<sup>27</sup>

From the second half of 1970s, bomb attacks on aircrafts became more frequent; the aim was to cause as much damage as possible. In 1985, a bomb exploded on an Air India flight, killing 329 people. In 1998, 270 persons were killed in the sabotage of a PanAm flight.

At the end of the decade, an increasing number of bombings were committed in railway stations. As regards the execution of terrorist acts, a qualitative change took place: it happened more often that terrorist groups coordinated their actions. For example in 1995, an attack was prepared during which 12 US airliners would have exploded on the same day, killing thousands of passengers. In the end, the action failed. Extreme religious terrorists appeared in the second half of the 1990s.

In 1996, Islamist fanatics drove into a US barrack by a car equipped with a bomb, killing 19 people and injuring at least 300. In 1998, Al-Qaeda has already operated actively, in this year for example, they carried out a terrorist attack with a truck bomb against the buildings of the United States embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.<sup>28</sup>

### 4. The new type of terrorism

The last years of the 20th century have witnessed another change: terrorist attacks have become increasingly spectacular with more blood and victims. According

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid p. 22.

<sup>26</sup> JENKINS, Brian Michael: Amerika válasza a terrorizmusra és ennek hatása a transzatlanti viszonyokra; In: TÁLAS Péter (szerk.): A terrorizmus anatómiája; Budapest, Zrínyi, 2006. p 132.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. p. 133.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. pp.134-135.

to academic writers, the time of “new terrorism” has come. Terrorists now armed with firm ideology fight for their God or for a sacred cause to please God, and they are driven by religious fanaticism. The first and most shocking stage of this process was the attacks of 11 September 2001 in which 3,000 people died, and it is certain that terrorists planned even greater destruction: since at least 25,000 people could escape from the collapsing twin towers.<sup>29</sup>

The novelty of the new terrorism mostly lies in the fact that regarding both its means and its targets, it is fighting a total war without any limitations. As László Korinek summarises, its particular threat is manifested in the following:

- its operation is similar to that of franchises, each unit is organised into a single network, but at the same time, they keep their independence;
- their goals are political and ideological goals; they fight globally;
- their media policy is extremely modern; they use new technologies and the World Wide Web;
- they hit new targets that were previously considered illegitimate;
- its methods are the methods of total war;
- it has become independent in a material sense, it does not (or not necessarily) need state resources.<sup>30</sup>

From the above mentioned characteristics, we have to specifically emphasise that the new type of terrorists draw benefits from media publicity. On the one hand, they effectively use the Internet, community platforms for propaganda, recruitment, transfer of knowledge or even for the the organisation of attacks. According to a 2012 report, almost 8,000 websites existed that contained and shared terrorist information with visitors. The jihadist website called Inspire specifically targeted lone terrorist candidates with articles titled “*How to fight alone*” or “*How to establish a terrorist cell*”.<sup>31</sup> Chatrooms and forums made direct communication available. However, these platforms have proven to be vulnerable, and due to the operation of detection and response services – especially after September 2001 – the majority of them were deleted causing a massive disruption in the life of terrorist organisations. Terrorist organisations, however, keep up with the times, and now Youtube, Instagram and even Twitter (or the regional counterparts) serve their communication goals. Another example of how well ISIL adapted social media for its own purposes: On 14 June 2014, pictures of massacre committed by soldiers of the Islamic State were also added to the data traffic – containing 600,000 messages per minute – of people following the 2014 FIFA World Cup events on Twitter in Arabic language. For example, under #Worldcup and #WorldCup2014, a picture of an Iraqi officer’s severed head was posted on Twitter with the following caption: “*This is our ball. It is made of skin.*”<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> JENKINS op. cit. p. 136.

<sup>30</sup> KORINEK László: *Kriminológia II.*; Budapest, Magyar Közlöny lap- és Könyvkiadó, 2010. p. 412.

<sup>31</sup> HANKISS Ágnes: *Kihívások és ellentmondások a terrorizmus elleni harcban*; In: *A terrorizmus Rubik-kockája, avagy a fenyegetések komplex megközelítése. Nemzetközi tudományos-szakmai konferencia, Duna-palota 2013. szeptember 30-október 1. Budapest, BM Oktatási, Képzési és Tudományszervezési Főigazgatóság.* 2014. p. 99.

<sup>32</sup> BESENYŐ János – PRANTNER Zoltán – SPEIDL Bianka – VOGEL Dávid: *Az Iszlám Állam Terrorizmus 2.0. Történet, ideológia, propaganda*; Budapest, Honvéd Vezérkar Tudományos Kutatóhely, Kossuth Kiadó, 2016. p. 159.

Hence, we can see that today's terrorists apply new methods and new means. However, the novelty also manifests itself in something else. The targets of terrorists attacks are more frequently concerts, outdoor events, events considered as tourist attractions which have one common feature: they attract many people and it is difficult to protect them.

"*Terrorists live among us*", says Péter Tálas, and his statement is also supported by practice: the press more often reports that even family members and neighbours did not suspect what the person was up to.<sup>33</sup> After many terrorist attacks, the press reports that even the immediate family members of the offender did not notice what their relative was preparing for.<sup>34</sup>

József Kis-Benedek points out that terrorist organisations are extremely resourceful and innovative; they can adapt their tactics to certain situations. The European methods differ from those applied in the Middle East: Since in Europe, the number of bombings has decreased since 2016, and attacks committed by cars are getting more popular among terrorists. However, it cannot be claimed that attacks on aircraft are pushed into the background, only that they are considered to be more typical outside Europe. It also counts as a new trend that the connection between organised crime and terrorism seems to strengthen.

In theory, the possibility of cyberterrorism should also be foreseen but according to experts, its chance is minimal – at least for now – since terrorist organisations has not yet possess the technology and knowledge required for this.<sup>35</sup>

Regarding the targets, three types of attacks can be distinguished:

- the aim is the indiscriminate killing; the typical method of this approach is driving into a crowd by a motor vehicle;
- attacks against police officers or other control officers;
- attacks specifically committed against the Western lifestyle; typical targets are young people having fun at a concert (such as the attack on the Bataclan concert hall in Paris).<sup>36</sup>

## 5. Criminological interpretation of terrorism

The criminological study of terrorism also begins with the difficulties of finding a definition. According to the generally accepted interpretation, there is terrorist behaviour when the so called terrorist goals are not set for financial gain but in order to achieve political and ideological aspirations in the future, and during this, the

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<sup>33</sup> TÁLAS Péter: Kelet-Közép-Európa és az új típusú terrorizmus; In: TÁLAS Péter (szerk.): A terrorizmus anatómiája; Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó, 2006. p. 25.

Márk HERCZEG: A New York Times szakértője szerint egyre hihetőbb, hogy Stephen Paddock az Iszlám Állam terroristája lehetett; <https://444.hu/2017/10/05/a-new-york-times-szakertoje-szerint-egyre-hipetobb-hogy-stephen-paddock-az-islam-allam-terroristaja-lehetett> (downloaded 20 February 2020)

<sup>34</sup> TÁLAS op. cit. p. 25.

<sup>35</sup> KIS-BENEDEK József: A terrorizmus új trendjei; Pécsi Határőr, Tudományos közlemények, 20. [köt.] A XXI. század biztonsági kihívásai; 2018. pp. 16-17. [http://pecshor.hu/periodika/XX/kis\\_benedek.pdf](http://pecshor.hu/periodika/XX/kis_benedek.pdf).[http://pecshor.hu/periodika/XX/kis\\_benedek.pdf](http://pecshor.hu/periodika/XX/kis_benedek.pdf), (downloaded 20 February 2020)

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. p.18.

democratic and legitimate state is attacked. A terrorist goal can be, for example, destabilisation, provoking retaliation, disturbance, enforcement of political concessions, intimidation of civilians or “advertising”, promotion of a given case.<sup>37</sup> Similar to defining the concept of terrorism, grouping of terrorists by type is not a simple task either. One of the new types of terrorists is undoubtedly the “lone wolf”; this denomination became a household term in the 1990s when two extremist terrorist claiming to be “*freelance terrorists*”, Tom Metzger and Alex Curtis encouraged their sympathiser to always commit their act of violence without partners.<sup>38</sup> In his work titled “Call to Global Islamic Resistance” published on the Internet, Abu Musab al-Suri terrorist, mastermind behind the July 2015 London bombings, explained that attacks should be committed against the “far enemy” (the United States, European countries, etc.) in such a way as to avoid the need for established apparatus and organisational background. The concept of “individual jihad” was completely embraced by al Qaeda.<sup>39</sup>

Several terrorist acts occurred recently whose perpetrator the public opinion prone to consider lone wolf. However, as Ágnes Hankiss pointed out, there is a good chance that most of the terrorists operating alone – such as Breivik from Norway – suffer from some kind of mental illness. And the elimination of such perpetrators is extremely challenging for national security services.<sup>40</sup>

In addition, it turns out in many cases that terrorists considering themselves as lone wolves are not completely on their own: they acquire inspiration, the ideological and religious background and technical support for their act via the Internet, and/or they are members of a radical organisation, or have close connection with that.<sup>41</sup> Many of them arrive to the country as migrants, are members of or at least ideologically connected to a terrorist organisation (usually the Islamic State), they are followers of an extremist branch of Islam (Wahhabi, Salafi), well-trained in military tactics, they are not afraid of a suicide mission either and they immediately attack on command.<sup>42</sup> Those who are second or third-generation citizens but are not able and do not want to integrate into the mainstream society because of some kind of offence can also be considered as individual terrorist cells. Most of them have already been imprisoned for minor crime that might have been the reason why they suddenly started to sympathise with Islam, and later even contact the Islamic State. They will not receive formal training, but they are easy to be controlled and can be provided with tactical advice.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> KORINEK op. cit. p. 408.

<sup>38</sup> HANKISS op. cit. pp. 98-99.

<sup>39</sup> STEWART, Scott: Cutting Through the Lone-Wolf Hype; Sep 22, 2011. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/cutting-through-lone-wolf-hype> (downloaded 20 February 2020)  
Peter NESSER: Individual Jihadist Operations in Europe: Patterns and Challenges; CTC Sentinel, January 18, 2012, <https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2012/01/Vol5-Iss13.pdf>. (downloaded 20 February 2020)

<sup>40</sup> HANKISS op. cit. pp. 98-99.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid p. 99.

<sup>42</sup> BÖRÖCZ, Miklós: Az új típusú terrorista: a magányos elkövető; Belügyi Szemle 63. évf. 2015/7-8. p. 153.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. pp. 153-155.

The experience of the past half or one decade shows that terrorism has been changed: new types of perpetrators and new methods have appeared for committing terrorist. *“Terrorists live among us, ordinary people as sleeper agents”*, Róbert Bartók explains.<sup>44</sup>

Today's terrorists live a law-abiding life, or at least they try to avoid conflict with the law, then they suddenly become radicalised. This creates serious difficulties for the investigating authorities and national security services since it is very hard to identify such individuals.

Although, some terrorist suspects can be identified, this will not lead to the elimination of terrorist groups or terrorist organisations.

Terrorist organisations are not set up by following a pyramid-like structure anymore but consist of cells: even if one man or cell is out of the picture, it will not take authorities closer to the uncover of the complete organisation. Moreover, if they manage to arrest a leader, it will not undermine the further operation of the group because the leader can be immediately replaced, and it is not his personality that bonds the community but the simplistic ideology that is meaningful for every follower.<sup>45</sup>

Finally, we must also understand not only that terrorism is a complex phenomenon, but also that the fight against the new type of terrorism is also like that. Merely by means of criminal law, it is not possible to take effective action against it, in particular since the “cheap and simple” terrorism has been created: its commission does not require complicated, lengthy preparations. The terrorist straps a bomb to his chest and activates the explosive device in a crowded place. Or he steals a vehicle and drives into the crowd. On the other hand, terrorism has now become global, therefore, the fight against terrorism should take the form of a global “world-scale war”, and it should apply law enforcement, legal, military and national security tools simultaneously.<sup>46</sup>

Some authors believe that there is a sort of “terrorist personality”, namely that personality traits that make individuals susceptible to such extremely aggressive acts can be defined. This thought is also alarming because if it is really true, it will be highly questionable how effective the criminal action is against today’s typical terrorist, the lone wolf.<sup>47</sup>

### **5.1. Biological theories**

The biological theories of terrorism focus on the physiological processes behind terrorist activities. Several researches came to the conclusion that the reason for the aggressive behaviour is usually the increased testosterone level.

If the testosterone level is persistently high, the willingness to become socially integrated and cooperate will reduce which will cut back the social relations of the individual, and it will make him lonely and indifferent to community values. Other researchers (Eysenk – Eysenck 1969) found that the brain waves of violent offenders slowed down, it was difficult for their nervous system to respond to stimuli, they did not really have a sense of fear which was why these people were constantly looking for dangerous situations. American researchers noticed that a significantly great

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<sup>44</sup> BARTKÓ op. cit. p. 19.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. p. 22.

<sup>47</sup> KORINEK op. cit. p. 11.

proportion of violent offenders suffered from brain injury, especially frontal lobe injury. Furthermore, suffering from various addictions (drug addiction, etc.) is also common among offenders (Fishbein 1990).<sup>48</sup>

The actions of terrorist offenders are defined by the same physiological processes that can also be observed in the actions of serial offenders. David Hubbard (1983) is noted for the study of the biological factors affecting terrorist behaviour. According to Hubbard, various neurochemical and hormonal factors have impact on terrorist behaviour; noradrenaline, acetylcholine and endorphin predominate in their body. Noradrenaline narrows the arteries, thus increases blood pressure. Acetylcholine transmits the information resulting from a heightened state of arousal between nerves and muscles. While endorphin not only helps ease the pain, but also increases the feeling of happiness.<sup>49</sup>

## 5.2. *Psychological theories*

The psychological theories of terrorism describe terrorist as a deformed personality. Freud and the representatives of the school of instinct theory believed that aggression is a desire for death to the outside world which is an instinctive, congenital property of the person exhibiting such drive. Konrad Lorenz says that aggression is the natural expression of fighting instinct; while according to the instinct theory of aggression, people perform acts of violence because these acts give them satisfaction. In the frustration–aggression theory, the aggressive behaviour appears as a compensation that is intended to counterbalance individual failures.

The key word is frustration: aggression is always produced by frustration, and frustration always produces aggression. However, frustration can also come from hostile or perceived hostile environment (Berkowitz 1989).<sup>50</sup>

According to social learning theory, aggression is not a general human instinct but a learnt behaviour just like the terrorist behaviour (Oots – Wiegele 1985). According to the cognitive theory of aggression, a healthy person gains information about the world, he is able to choose the seemingly most expedient behaviour in the given situation based on his experience. An aggressive person, however – due to perceptual and cognitive deficits – is unable to do this, and has an extreme reaction even to neutral environmental stimuli. Thus terrorists act without considering the objective facts, “*the actions of terrorists are [rather] based on a subjective interpretation of the world*” (Crenshaw 1988).<sup>51</sup>

In the 1990s, several researches were conducted that by analysing statistical data, and tried to find an answer to the question: how similar is the personality, family and social environment of a terrorist and persons engaging in other aggressive behaviour (such as perpetrators of domestic violence or child abusers). Overall, they were only able to establish that the characteristics of these two criminal groups cannot be conflated, since the risk factors and motivations of terrorist violence and violence in general are fundamentally different (Borum 2004).

Among psychological theories specifically focusing on terrorists, the earliest ones assumed that the reason for terrorism was a spiritual defect, while the theory of generational conflicts suspected that child abuse was the direct reason for terrorist

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<sup>48</sup> PÓCZIK Szilveszter: A terrorizmus biológiai és pszichológiai elméletei; Világosság 2007/5. pp. 26-27.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. p. 27.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid p. 28.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid pp. 28-29.

behaviour. According to another school, terrorist, without exception, grew up in highly authoritarian families where child abuse was common (Post 1990). The theory of narcissism attributes terrorist urge to low self-esteem (Crayton 1983). A narcissist is an extremely vulnerable person who tries to heal himself by stop being a victim, and starts to act as an aggressor (Morf 1970; Akhtar 1999; McCormick 2003).<sup>52</sup>

The above mentioned schools basically assumed the existence of a universal terrorist personality. On the other hand, some researchers (such as Post 1984) pointed out that since several forms of terrorism could be distinguished, terrorists were not all the same either. Hacker is noted for a typology that has now become a general reference: according to this, a distinction should be made between crusaders fighting for a greater cause and self-serving criminal terrorists as well as delusional psychotic or mentally ill people (Hacker 1976). One of the CIA analysts created two categories: the anarchist was abused by his parents in his childhood, and he wants to retaliate these as an adult, just not against his family but against the state. On the other hand, the nationalist rebel wants to avenge the damage and injustices his parents had to suffer. Therefore, one terrorist type is the parents' fault, while the other terrorist type turns against the society because of the crimes committed against the parents (Post 1984).<sup>53</sup>

Researchers analysing the background of terrorism now use the holistic approach, and they believe that the terrorist behaviour cannot be narrowed down to one single reason; as a result, in addition to psychological and biological factors, political, religious, historical, cultural, economic, etc. factors need to be studied (Fried 1980). Nevertheless, it cannot be said that psychology would be unauthorised in the understanding of terrorism – especially not today, in the era of “lone wolves” and suicide terrorists.<sup>54</sup>

In 1998, an American researcher concluded that although terrorist had many characteristics of a damaged person, in the clinical sense, they could not be considered mentally ill (Silke 1998). A 2003 study showed that none of the survived suicide terrorists were depressed or suicidal. Suicide terrorists consider themselves martyrs who are willing to sacrifice their life for a larger purpose in hope of some kind of metaphysical reward (glory, glorification) (Salib 2003). It makes the assessment of the situation more complicating that not every terrorist is a religious fanatic, in fact, some of them are not even religious (Silke 2003).

It seems to support the idea that becoming a terrorist is not the result of one single individual decisions, it is rather a slow, gradually developing socialisation process in which group dynamics are of utmost importance (McCormick 2003).<sup>55</sup>

In the process of joining, the following motifs can be identified: the alienated individual want to belong to a community, play an active role for a cause acceptable for him; the individual is aggrieved or experience injustice in his microenvironment, therefore, he feels that he needs to do something in order to restore moral order; he cannot find his place in the world, suffers from identity crisis, therefore, he would like to belong to a community with a strong identity; he is yearning for the recognition of the community and for financial reward (Crenshaw 1985; Johnson-Feldman 1992).<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Ibid. p. 30.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. p. 31.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. p. 32.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. p. 32.

In summary, it seems most likely that there is no terrorist personality type, although some personality traits certainly predispose people to terrorist acts, and in addition to characteristics, joining a terrorist group is also influenced by situational elements, the general state of society, broader circumstances.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>57</sup> Ibid. p. 33.

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*Abstract*



*Figure 1: The Republic of Serbia<sup>1</sup>*

The Republic of Serbia is the main successor of the former Yugoslavia in the Western Balkans. Its Euro-Atlantic integration process is late and probably it will not be completed in the near future, since Serbia's NATO membership is not on the agenda for the moment. Serbia is on the list of the EU-candidate countries and the state has started the accession negotiation process with the EU, too. However, this does not mean at all that Serbia is now much closer to the NATO. The Kosovo status question, the rule of law, free media and measures against organised crime are the most inconvenient topics, Serbia should cope with. Otherwise also the security environment is changing dynamically and the EU is forming in the new world order as well. In the current circumstances Serbia has chosen a kind of military neutrality, which has an effect on its security and defence policy. The country faces a plenty of political, economic and security uncertainties inherited from the past, created by the difficulties of the present and posed by the hard unpredictability of the future.

**Keywords:** Serbia, security policy, defence strategy, military neutrality, Serbian Armed Forces, defence industry, security situation and challenges

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<sup>1</sup> Map of Serbia: <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html>; (downloaded: 28 January 2020)

## Security policy of Serbia

Serbia is such a non-aligned and neutral state in the Western Balkans that sometimes has a Yugoslav communist nostalgia and time to time an exaggerated democratic openness. Serbs are the biggest nation in the Western Balkan region, which usually was and still is a great advantage for them. Now they are not integrated only into one country so they feel themselves as majority in the fatherland and as minority in the neighbouring countries. This dichotomy defines the Serb nation's destiny and sentiment.



The four Cyrillic “C” letters in the Serbia's coat of arms<sup>2</sup> refers to the sometimes contested catchword, saying that “Only the unity saves the Serbs” (in Serbian “Само слога Србина спасава”).<sup>3</sup> This patriotic statement helps us to understand a bit the national consciousness of Serbs. Because of the territorial division of the nation, Serbian politicians usually like to focus not only on their state but on the neighbouring countries as well, where Serbs live, too. They do not consider their borders according to the country's but the nation's ones. It means for the Serbs that the territory where Serb people live virtually belongs to Serbia. In this regard the Serbian Orthodox (Pravoslav) Church plays a very important role and does its best for the protection of the Serb peoples and the Serb religious heritage. This spirit is unambiguously perceptible in any place where Serbs live, but especially in Kosovo. From this point of view, it is understandable why Serbian sentiment is so difficult to understand and to predict the next Serbian steps.

Official documents often mention that Serbia has a “four-pillar foreign policy”. The four pillars are the EU, the United States of America, Russia and China. The EU is the biggest economic co-operator and political provider, which offers a Western-European perspective for Serbia, already enjoyed by the countless “Gastarbeiter” (guest workers), coming from Serbia and living for a long time in the West. The United States is committed to work together with Serbia in the security and defence sector in order to keep the safety of the Western Balkan region. Russia is interested in the energy segment where there are gaps and good opportunities in Serbia for the Russian natural resources, gas and crude oil. China is investing and taking part in the infrastructural development, partially booming and very needed in Serbia. Every foreign actor has its serious strategic interest to gain influences in Serbia, which enjoys a growing popularity and gets also some political and economic aid. This way Russia and China certainly would like to gain foothold in this part of Europe and later

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<sup>2</sup> Simboli Republike Srbije (Symbols of the Republic of Serbia); <http://www.mfa.gov.rs/sr/index.php/republika-srbija/simboli-republike-srbije?lang=lat>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>3</sup> Najpoznatija srpska krilatica – Evo kako je nastalo „Samo sloga Srbina spasava” (The most known Serb catchword – Here is the genesis of “Only the unity saves the Serbs”); <https://srbin.info/pocetna/aktuelno/najpoznatija-srpska-krilatica-evo-kako-je-nastalo-samo-sloga-srbina-spasava/?lang=lat>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

inside the EU. But it is possible as well that these great powers consider Serbia as a good platform for some anti-EU influence.<sup>4</sup>

### **Defence strategy of Serbia**

Despite the relatively poor but slowly improving economic situation of the country<sup>5</sup>, Serbia should spend huge financial resources on its defence. Thanks to its recent non-aligned status, Serbia cannot expect any help from NATO or from the EU, in the case of a potential military invasion or aggression. This is the reason why Serbia should have its own relatively developed defence industry that is partially able to provide small arms, weapon systems, ground and air vehicles and military equipment for its Armed Forces.

It is understandable that Serbia keeps a distance from NATO that bombed the country in 1999. However, the Serbian Armed Forces (SAF) surprisingly are organised according to NATO standards and principles.<sup>6</sup> The official Serbian explanation is that these standards are the best in the world and this is an optimal way to organise the Serbian military structure. Serbian soldiers often have common military training and exercises with NATO countries. They usually keep them in the frame of bilateral co-operations and not on the Alliance's level. In this way, Serbian political and military leaders can avoid harsh critics coming from anti-NATO hardliners and strong nationalists of the population. Otherwise, these co-operations are often compensated by common military exercises conducted with Russian troops. Russia is interested in security (especially the civil protection of the population and the safety of the critical infrastructure<sup>7</sup>) of Serbia as well, since it has huge investments in the Serbian energy sector.

Joining the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 2006 Serbia decided to be committed to support the Euro-Atlantic values. In October 2009 National Security Strategy and Defence Strategy documents<sup>8</sup> were released that would like to represent a Western security perception. The Defence Strategy document deals with the security environment; challenges, risks and threats of the homeland security;

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<sup>4</sup> Serbia's cooperation with China, the European Union, Russia and the United States of America; European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, Policy Department, AFET, 2017, ISBN: 978-92-846-2211-5; [http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603854/EXPO\\_STU\(2017\)603854\\_EN.pdf](http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603854/EXPO_STU(2017)603854_EN.pdf); p 11–12.; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>5</sup> The World Bank in Serbia – Overview – Recent Economic Developments; <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/serbia/overview#3>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>6</sup> NATO evaluates Serbian forces, SHAPE, NATO, 2017; <https://shape.nato.int/news-archive/2017/nato-evaluates-serbian-forces>; (downloaded: 12 January 2020)

<sup>7</sup> Paul STRONSKI – Annie HIMES: Russia's game in the Balkans, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 06 February, 2019; <https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/06/russia-s-game-in-balkans-pub-78235>; (downloaded: 11 January 2020)

<sup>8</sup> Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije (National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia) and Strategija odbrane Republike Srbije (Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia); <http://www.mod.gov.rs/lat/4350/strategije-4350>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

defence interests; defence policy; defence system; defence resources; defence planning and defence finance of the country.

The security environment chapter surveys the security situation and system around Serbia, from a global and regional perspective. The document states that although the mutual dependence of the countries could diminish the possibility of traditional military threats, still quick and hardly predictable deviations easily can lead to armed conflicts. It is unacceptable for Serbia that the practice of intervention in the internal issues of sovereign countries destroys the international legal order and it poses a serious threat to the global security. So, most states in the world prefer solving the security issues within a framework of a collective security system, which is the United Nations Organisation. This powerful establishment could mobilise the international community in case of a threat against the legal order and peace. (Author's remark: With these statements the document covertly criticises the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence against the Serb will.) In the regional security environment, NATO plays an important role that can guarantee security with collective defence, with mutual defence actions and capacities, as well as with joint human and material resources. The NATO PfP programme provides an acceptable political, security and defence co-operation for its members. Despite the efforts, stability has not been achieved in certain European regions. The biggest security challenge for Serbia is the illegal status amendment of Kosovo. A possible revision of the Dayton Peace Agreement<sup>9</sup> against the will of the concerned countries could have a negative effect on the security of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the region, too.<sup>10</sup>

The unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence has negative impacts on the regional confidence building and co-operation efforts. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries in the region are endangered by separatism, ethnic and religious tensions, terrorism, organised crime, corruption, drug and human trafficking. But regional security initiatives contribute to a better co-operation, confidence building and security among the countries. The challenges, risks and threats endangering Serbia's defence are complex on global, regional or national level. The possibility of an aggression against Serbia is relatively low, but the separatist riots aiming the change of Serbia's internationally accepted borders pose a special threat.<sup>11</sup>

Serbia's defence interests are as it follows: sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity, protection of its citizens' security, trust building, improving the regional stability and co-operation with the international security organisations.

According to the defence policy of Serbia, no one country or alliance is assessed as an enemy, and Serbia fights for ensuring international peace and security as well as for decreasing the possibility of different threats. Kosovo is an inseparable part of

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<sup>9</sup> The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), is the peace agreement reached at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States, in November 1995, and formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. These accords put an end to the 3 1/2-year-long Bosnian War, one of the armed conflicts in the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. <https://www.osce.org/bih/126173>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>10</sup> Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia; <http://www.mod.gov.rs/lat/4350/strategije-4350>; pp. 4-6.; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>11</sup> Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia; pp. 6-7.

Serbia which is declared in the Constitution of Serbia and in the 1244 United Nation's Security Council Resolution<sup>12</sup>. Serbia refuses the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence and continues the talks, in order to achieve a mutually acceptable solution, based on international law. Serbia accepts the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, the OSCE basic documents, the Vienna Document and the Dayton Agreement. The Serbian Parliament might allow a provisional stay of foreign Armed Forces in the territory of the country. The Serbian Armed Forces are allowed to stay abroad only in the framework of multinational missions, according to a UN Security Resolution, international obligations and the related decision of the Serbian Parliament, in harmony with the Serbian interests.

Among others the defence policy of Serbia would like to accomplish the interoperability with NATO PfP member states, the integration into the European and other security structures, the active participation in the NATO PfP programme, the reform of the Armed Forces, the establishment of the institutions and capabilities of the civic protection, the effective control of the defence system and the participation in international missions.<sup>13</sup>

The structural elements of the defence system consist of the legislative and executive power, the Armed Forces, the civic protection and other defence organisations.

The Serbian Armed Forces have three main missions:

- Protection of the territory and airspace of Serbia in case of an external armed aggression;
- International military co-operation and participation in multinational missions, in order to save regional and global peace;
- Support and help of the civilian authorities against security threats, terrorism, separatism, organised crime and during natural or industrial catastrophes and other accidents.<sup>14</sup>

The structure and size of the Armed Forces depend on the threat of Serbia, their missions and commitments, as well as the available resources and obligations.

Defence resources might be human and material ones that are determined in the demographic and economic potential of the country. Serbia maintains and develops its defence industry alone or in co-operation with other countries. It is inevitable that the available resources should be in harmony with the defence system's requirements. Serbian defence resources are used for the homeland defence, the prevention of crises and conflicts and the warranty of the global peace and stability.

Defence planning is based on the working-out of the strategic and doctrinal documents, the defence development plans and programs, as well as the force application plans. Planning includes the definition of the operation, activity and troops

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<sup>12</sup> United Nations Digital Library, Resolution 1244 (1999) / adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999; <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/274488>; (downloaded: 05 January 2020)

<sup>13</sup> Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia; pp. 10-13.

<sup>14</sup> Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia; p 15.

of the defence system in peace and wartime. Parts of the Serbian defence plan are perspectives created by the state, the local government, the affected business companies and other legal persons.

The defence financing is transparent and the defence budget's elaboration, adoption, enforcement, control and revision are realised, according to strict rules. Accomplishing its international obligations, the Ministry of Defence regularly creates defence financing reports for the OSCE and other international organisations.<sup>15</sup>

Analysing the Defence Strategy it can be stated that the document is captured by the Kosovo issue. The Serbian stance towards Kosovo is repeatedly mentioned many times, according to which, Kosovo is integral part of Serbia and the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence violates the international law. Serbia reiterates that unilateral political decisions threaten the regional security.

The document does not mention Serbia's possible NATO membership, but the implementation of the NATO standards and principles are among the achievable aims. With the participation in international peace support operations, Serbia would like to reconstruct its international respect. The humanitarian support provided by the Armed Forces during catastrophes shows humanism of the military and the inevitability of a civic-military co-operation. Provisional stay of the foreign Armed Forces on the territory of Serbia facilitates the opportunity of the necessary host nation support. This gesture can be a good excuse or explanation for the acceptance of the presence of foreign troops (KFOR) in Kosovo that is part of Serbia, at least according to the Constitution (Article 182).<sup>16</sup>

The Serbian government on 8 August 2019 approved drafts of the new national security and defence strategies clearly stating its military neutrality for the first time since Belgrade declared it on 26 December 2007. The government set four major objectives to preserve the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Serbia: deterrence of armed threats and effective defence; preservation of Kosovo within Serbia; improving the nation's reputation and international position; prevention and elimination of separatist activities.<sup>17</sup>

### **Defence capabilities of Serbia**

The Serbian Armed Forces (Vojska Srbije, hereinafter SAF) and its predecessors were always forced to face big challenges during the last nearly 30 years. The civic war in Yugoslavia in 1991–95, the Kosovo armed conflict in 1998–99, the NATO air campaign in 1999 and the loss of the Navy, with Montenegro's leaving the State Community in 2006 created harsh periods for the Serbian military. The last 20 years

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<sup>15</sup> Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia; pp. 15–20.

<sup>16</sup> Ustavni Sud – Ustav Republike Srbije (The Constitutional Court – Constitution of the Republic of Serbia); <http://www.ustavni.sud.rs/page/view/sr-Latn-CS/70-100028/ustav-republike-srbije#d7>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>17</sup> Serbian government approves new defence, security strategies; <https://www.janes.com/article/90584/serbian-government-approves-new-defence-security-strategies>; (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

were relatively peaceful, but challenging, too. This time was not enough for the regeneration of the SAF.



*Picture 1. Demonstration of the capabilities of the Serbian Army during the “SLOBODA 2019” show, at the Batajnica military airport<sup>18</sup>*

After a long restructuring period, conscription was suspended on the 1<sup>st</sup> of January 2011. According to the related law, young men become draftees in the calendar year, in which they turn 18 years of age. After the enlistment, a man can voluntarily serve his military service period armed or unarmed or can do civilian service, until he is transferred to reserve forces. Women are not subject to conscription and obligation to do military service period. They are however allowed to do conscription by serving in reserve forces in time of emergency or war. Military service, armed or unarmed, lasts six months. Conscription exists between 18 and 60 years of age for men and until 50 years of age for women.<sup>19</sup>

As a result of the defence system reform process, Ground Forces (Army) brigades were set up and the Air Forces were reshuffled according to NATO standards.<sup>20</sup> The modernisation of the SAF is supported by the Ohio National Guard (the mentor of the Hungarian Defence Forces) in the framework of the PfP programme. SAF focus on territorial defence, internal security and limited support to peacekeeping missions. The reform of the SAF gives priority to procurements; improving availability, maintenance and readiness levels; and bolstering air defence

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<sup>18</sup> Serbian Armed Forces show „SLOBODA 2019”; <https://www.yugoimport.com/cir/galerija/prikaz-sposobnosti-vojske-srbije-sloboda-2019>; (downloaded: 28 January 2020)

<sup>19</sup> Law on conscription, compulsory labour and requisition-official gazette, No. 88–09 as of 26 October 2009; <http://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/4349/zakoni-4349>; (downloaded: 28 January 2020)

<sup>20</sup> The Military Balance 2015; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK, London, 2019 February, ISBN 978-1-85743-766-9; p. 130.

systems. Serbia deepens co-operation with NATO through individual Partnership action Plan and maintains a close relationship with Russia. The SAF have been reduced in size over the last decade, though annual recruitment goals are not being met. There is a lack of skilled technicians and pilots. Serbia contributes to EU, OSCE and UN peacekeeping missions. Its defence industry focuses on aerospace, missile and artillery systems, small arms and ammunition production, but the country is reliant on external suppliers for major military platforms.<sup>21</sup>

The accepted defence budget of the country in 2019 was 95.06 billion RSD that represents 1.75% of the GDP.<sup>22</sup> (The exchange rate of the RSD/USD was 105.83 on the 10<sup>th</sup> of January 2020.<sup>23</sup>) This amount is nearly a 20% increase in comparison with the last year's budget. The general reason for the usually limited defence resources is the low economic performance that burdens the development of the SAF, too.

According to the Military Balance 2019, the number of troops in the SAF is 28,150. The Army has 13,250; Air and Air Defence Forces have 5,100; Training Command has 3,000; Guard has 1,600 and the Ministry of Defence has 5,200 troops. Reserve soldiers are 50,150 and they may supplement the number of professional soldiers in case of an emergency situation or in wartime.<sup>24</sup>

At strategic level, the Armed Forces are commanded and controlled by the President of the Republic, the Minister of Defence and the Chief of General Staff of the SAF. They have two services; the Army and the Air and Air Defence Forces. SAF consist of the following institutions and main units:

- General Staff (located in Belgrade);
- Army Command (Niš);
- Air and Air Defence Forces Command (Zemun);
- Training Command (Belgrade);
- Guard (Belgrade);
- Special Brigade (Pančevo).<sup>25</sup>

The Army Command's subordinated elements are located on the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia. The basic units of the Army are brigades and battalions, formed in the reorganization process from former brigades, regiments and similar size units by selecting the best personnel and the best and latest equipment. The Army consists of the following units:

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<sup>21</sup> The Military Balance 2019; The International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK, London, 2019 February, ISBN 978-1-85743-988-5; p. 142.

<sup>22</sup> Грађански водич кроз буџет Републике Србије (Citizen's Guide on the Budget of the Republic of Serbia); [https://www.mfin.gov.rs/UserFiles/File/dokumenti/2019/Gradjanski%20budzet%202019-05\\_03\\_2019.pdf](https://www.mfin.gov.rs/UserFiles/File/dokumenti/2019/Gradjanski%20budzet%202019-05_03_2019.pdf); (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>23</sup> USD/RSD; <https://www.investing.com/currencies/usd-rsd>; (downloaded: 10 January 2020)

<sup>24</sup> The Military Balance 2019; p. 142.

<sup>25</sup> Serbian Armed Forces; <http://www.vs.rs/en/units/serbian-armed-forces>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

- 1<sup>st</sup> (Novi Sad), 2<sup>nd</sup> (Kraljevo), 3<sup>rd</sup> (Niš) and 4<sup>th</sup> (Vranje) Army Brigade;
- River Flotilla (Novi Sad);
- Mixed Artillery Brigade (Niš);
- 3<sup>rd</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> Military Police Battalion (Niš and Belgrade);
- 21<sup>st</sup> Signal Battalion (Niš);
- 246<sup>th</sup> CBRN<sup>26</sup> Battalion (Kruševac);
- Multinational Operations Training Centre (Bujanovac);
- Technical Overhaul Institute (Čačak).<sup>27</sup>

The military equipment of the Serbian Army represents mainly the ones of the 1970–80 years that is not a surprise in the region. Its stock number is huge but this does not mean that all of them are combat ready. This military power poses much more a virtual deterrence force than an effective military threat towards the neighbours.

Main military equipment types of the Army:

- 212 main battle tank (199 M–84 and 13 T–72);
- 46 armoured reconnaissance vehicle (46 BRDM–2);
- 335 infantry fighting vehicle (323 M–80 and 12 Lazar–3);
- 83+ armoured personnel carrier (12 BTR–50, 32 MT–LB, 39 BOV–VP M–86 and some Lazar–3);
- 443+ artillery guns:
  - 67+ self-propelled guns (67 122 mm 2S1 Gvozdika and some 155 mm B–52 Nora);
  - 132 towed guns (78 122 mm D–30, 18 130 mm M–46, 36 152 mm M–84 Nora–A);
  - 81 multiple rocket launchers (18 128 mm M–63 Plamen, 60 128 mm M–77 Oganj and three 262 mm M–87 Orkan);
  - 163 mortars (106 82 mm M–69 and 57 120 mm M–74/M–75).
- 216 anti-tank systems:
  - 48 self-propelled BOV–1 (M–83) with 9K11 Maljutka (AT–3 Sagger);
  - 168 man-portable (99 9K11 Maljutka /AT–3 Sagger/ and 69 9K111 Fagot /AT–4 Spigot/).
- 130+ air defence systems (Surface-to-Air missiles):
  - 77 self-propelled weapon systems (77 2K12 Kub /SA–6 Gainful/);
  - 17+ point-defence weapon systems (12 9K31M Strela–1M /SA–9 Gaskin/, five 9K35M Strela–10M, some 9K32M Strela–2M /SA–7 Grail/ and some Šilo /SA–16 Gimlet/);
  - 36 towed guns (36 40 mm L–70 Bofors).<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>26</sup> CBRN stands for chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials.

<sup>27</sup> Serbian Armed Forces – The Army; <http://www.vs.rs/en/units/serbian-armed-forces/army>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>28</sup> The Military Balance 2019; pp. 142–143.

- River Flotilla:
  - Kozara (BPN–30) multi-purpose ship (command post and accommodation for 250 soldiers, armed with a three-barrel 20 mm cannon on the bow);
  - three river patrol boats (RPB–213 Kolubara, RPB–214 Morava, RPB–216 Timok);
  - river patrol craft (RPČ–111 Jadar);
  - motor patrol boat (ČMP–22, armed with a 12.7 mm Browning anti-aircraft machine gun);
  - four Nestin class multi-purpose mine warfare and mine countermeasure ships (RVB–332 Titel, RVB–335 Apatin, RVB–336 Smederevo, RVB–341 Novi Sad);
  - five landing assault ships (DB–411 Bečej, DB–412 Belegiš, DB–413 Taraš, DB–414 Begeč and DB–415 Šajkaš, armed with two single-barrel 20 mm M–71 anti-aircraft cannon and a 30 mm BP–30 grenade launcher);
  - auxiliary river ship PRB–36 Šabac (armed with two M–71/I 20 mm single-barrel cannon and a four-barrel light air defence missile system Strela–2M);
  - tanker ship (RPN–43);
  - river docking vessel (RDOK–15).<sup>29</sup>

The Air and Air Defence Forces Command is located in Zemun. Its task is to defend the airspace of the country, support the Army and conduct reconnaissance duties. Beyond its basic functions, this service provides help for the population during natural and industrial catastrophes. Its troops take part in international peacekeeping missions, too. Main subordinates are:

- 204<sup>th</sup> Air Force Brigade (Batajnica);
- 250<sup>th</sup> Air Defence Missile Brigade (Belgrade);
- 98<sup>th</sup> Air Force Brigade (Ladjevci and Niš);
- 126<sup>th</sup> ASEWG (Air Surveillance, Early Warning and Guidance) Brigade (Belgrade);
- Aeronautical Institute “Moma Stanojlović” (Batajnica);
- Aero Medical Institute (Belgrade);
- 210<sup>th</sup> Signal Battalion (Belgrade);
- 333<sup>rd</sup> Engineer Battalion (Pančevo);
- Air Control, Protection and Allocation Section.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> Riverine units; <http://www.vs.rs/en/about-saf/armament/riverine-units-assets>; (downloaded: 21 January 2020)

<sup>30</sup> Serbian Armed Forces – Air Force and Air Defence; <http://www.vs.rs/en/units/serbian-armed-forces/air-force-and-air-defence>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

Main military equipment types of the Air and Air Defence Forces:

- 94+ aircrafts (63 combat capable)
  - 13+ fighter (four+ MiG-21 and nine MiG-29 Fulcrum);
  - 17 fighter/ground attack (17 J-22 Orao);
  - 12 intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (10 IJ-22R Orao and two MiG-21R);
  - 10 light transport (one An-2 Colt, four An-26 Curl, two Do-28 Skyservant, two Jak-40 and one PA-34 Seneca V);
  - 42 training (21 G-4 Super Galeb, 11 Utva-75 and 10 Lasta-95).
- 62 helicopters
  - two attack (two Mi-24 Hind);
  - 52 multi-role (one Mi-17 Hip H, two Mi-17V-5 Hip, 49 SA-341 H and SA-342 L Gazela);
  - eight medium transport (eight Mi-8T Hip /HT-40/).
- 39+ air defence systems
  - 15 short-range (six S-125 Pechora /SA-3 Goa/ and nine 2K12 Kub /SA-6 Gainful/);
  - point-defence weapon systems (9K32 Strela-2 /SA-7 Grail/ and 9K310 Igla-1 /SA-16 Gimlet/);
  - 24 towed guns (24 40 mm L-70 Bofors);
- air-launched missiles (Air to Air R-60 /AA-8 Aphid/ and Air to Surface AGM-65 Maverick and A-77 Thunder).<sup>31</sup>

In 2016 and 2017, Serbia got promises to get six surplus MiG-29 fighters from Russia (it seems to be realised) and eight from Belarus. Russia has pledged to supply Serbia with 30 T-72S tanks and with 30 BRDM-2 vehicles. Increasing its air transport capability, Serbia ordered the first two Mi-17V-5 helicopters in August 2015. Further helicopters, BUK-M2 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system, other air defence systems and air defence radars are expected to be procured from Russia. Serbia is also interested in BUK-M1 SAM and surplus S-300 SAM systems from Belarus. In order to keep a kind of balance, it was announced in December 2016 that Serbia would like to acquire nine Airbus H-145M type helicopters.<sup>32</sup>

On 19 December 2019, Serbia began live firing tests of indigenously developed weapons on its new HForce H-145M military helicopters, at the Nikinci testing centre. The Serbian Ministry of Defence (MoD) reported on its website the same day that an S-8KOM rocket was successfully fired from a honeycomb launcher.<sup>33</sup>

Serbia ordered short-range air defence (SHORAD) systems from the MBDA Missile Systems on the first day of French President Emmanuel Macron's visit to Belgrade on 15-16 July 2019. The contract includes the acquisition of Mistral

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<sup>31</sup> The Military Balance 2019; p 143.

<sup>32</sup> The Serbian Defence Environment; European Security and Defence, June 2017, p. 36., 38.

<sup>33</sup> Serbia begins testing indigenous weapons on new H-145M attack helicopters; <https://www.janes.com/article/93491/serbia-begins-testing-indigenous-weapons-on-new-h145m-attack-helicopters>; (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

missiles, launchers, related equipment and logistics, and the provision of technical and material assistance for the integration of the Mistral missile on the Pasars vehicles of the SAF. Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić confirmed on 15 July that Serbia is purchasing 18 Mistral units with 50 missiles.<sup>34</sup>

Serbia has purchased and will soon receive the Pantsir-S1 air defence system from Russia, President Vučić has announced on 24 October 2019 at Batajnica airbase, while visiting the first Russo-Serbian air defence exercise “Slavic Shield 2019”, the second part of which was being held in Serbia on 23–29 October. “Our servicemen are going through training and I expect within a month or two will be able to show the deadly effects of the system against cruise missiles and small unmanned aerial vehicles in a military exercise in Serbia,” – Vučić said. “If Serbia possessed two S–400 battalions, nobody would dare challenge the sovereignty of its skies.” He added: “Serbia would like to have the S–400 but unless the Russians leave it behind (after the exercise), it cannot afford it”.<sup>35</sup>

According to its force development program, Serbia bought several new helicopters for its Air Force. In early December 2019, four new Russian made Mi–35 attack helicopters arrived to Batajnica military airbase “Pukovnik Milenko Pavlović”. This is the first time that Serbia has a capability of an armoured helicopter equipped with anti-tank missiles. On the 7<sup>th</sup> of December 2019, in addition to the four Mi–35 type helicopters, five new Airbus helicopters (H–145M type) and five (two were handed over in 2016 and three new) Russian made Mi–17V–5 transport helicopters were also presented for the media at the Batajnica military airbase. At the end of this Airbus procurement contingent SAF will have five H–145M helicopters and the Serbian Ministry of Interior (Police) will possess four H–145M helicopters. Serbia has ordered three H–215 type helicopters for the Ministry of Interior as well.<sup>36</sup>

In peacetime, the Training Command is intended for individual training of soldiers doing voluntary military service, candidates for professional soldiers and members of the active reserve; training of NCO (non-commissioned officer) candidates; specialization of personnel and collective training of territorial units. During wartime, the commanding officers of the Training Command make up the nucleus of the territorial forces or war units manned by members of the reserve. At the Training Command there are also possibilities for training of foreign Armed Forces’ members.<sup>37</sup>

The Guard is a brigade level unit of the SAF, which is directly subordinated to the SAF Chief of General Staff. It is responsible for safeguarding the facilities of vital

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<sup>34</sup> Serbia orders Mistral 3 SHORAD systems; <https://www.janes.com/article/89946/serbia-orders-mistral-3-shorad-systems>; (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

<sup>35</sup> Serbia buys Pantsir-S1 air defence system; <https://www.janes.com/article/92205/serbia-buys-pantsir-s1-air-defence-system>; (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

<sup>36</sup> Svi srpski helikopteri na jednom mestu: Prezentacija Mi–35, H–145M i Mi–17 u Batajnici (All Serb helicopters are in one place: Show of Mi–35, H–145M and Mi–17 helicopters in Batajnica); [https://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2019&mm=12&dd=06&nav\\_id=1627436](https://www.b92.net/biz/vesti/srbija.php?yyyy=2019&mm=12&dd=06&nav_id=1627436); (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>37</sup> Training Command; <http://www.vs.rs/en/units/serbian-armed-forces/training-command>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

importance for the defence system and giving military honours to the top foreign, state and military officials.<sup>38</sup>

The Special Brigade is a tactical unit organized in a modular way combining commando, counterterrorist and paratrooper units. Within combat operations conducted by SAF units, Special Brigade carries out commando, counterterrorist, reconnaissance and intelligence gathering activities, mainly inside the enemy combat disposition in any type of terrain and weather conditions.<sup>39</sup>

After setting up the new structure of the SAF in the middle of 2007, the defence leadership decided to focus on the modernisation and development of the Armed Forces and on the procurement of new military technology. However, the international financial and economic crisis at the end of 2008 restrained the fulfilment of these aims. In the first half of the 2010s stagnant defence budget did not allow the modernisation of the obsolete military equipment. Only small renewals and reparations were possible with the limited defence resources. This time, the MoD started to concentrate on the less expensive elements of the military reform. It included among others the formulation of the necessary legal acts and strategic documents supporting the new security and foreign policy principles. The main aim of the General Staff was to increase the level of the military training, to what the SAF usually got a tremendous support from NATO member states in the frame of the PfP programme. Some years ago, thanks to the improving economic situation, defence procurement process started again. Serbia should keep a good co-operation with Russia since its former Soviet defence systems and arms are dependent from the Russian defence industry.

Analysing the dislocation of the Serbian Armed Forces, it can be stated that the main units are present principally in the Middle and in the Southern part of the country. It is evident that the defence leadership expects the military and other security threats or risks from the South, mainly from the direction of Kosovo. The SAF might operate with significant reconnaissance, armoured, anti-tank, air defence and air support capabilities and capacities in order to fulfil their missions. Serbian soldiers serve in the military observation bases around Kosovo and patrol in the security zone; control the illegal border crossing, smuggling and armed fighters' (according to Serbian terms: terrorists) moving. Serbian subunits co-operate with the KFOR troops<sup>40</sup>.

Due to the related laws, Serbia's Parliament decides about the military engagement of the SAF in abroad. The MoD gives a kind of priority to the participation of the Serb soldiers in international (UN or EU led) humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace-support missions. The main aim of this struggle is to restore the international respect of the country and to gain international experience and knowledge in multinational operations. In order to realise these aims, Serbia collaborate with the Armed Forces of the neighbouring countries and with the great

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<sup>38</sup> SAF Guard; <http://www.vs.rs/en/units/serbian-armed-forces/guard>; 02 January, 2020

<sup>39</sup> Special Brigade; <http://www.vs.rs/en/units/serbian-armed-forces/special-brigade>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>40</sup> NATO and Serbia in 2019: Cooperation on the rise, European Western Balkans, 30. 12. 2019; <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2019/12/30/nato-and-serbia-in-2019-cooperation-on-the-rise/>; (downloaded: 11 January 2020)

powers' troops, among others with the Ohio National Guard. Every year the SAF get a huge amount of donation from abroad, from NATO- and EU countries and from China.<sup>41</sup>

Serbian soldiers take part in many UN and EU led missions. Candidate soldiers for the international missions are trained in the Multinational Operations Training Centre subordinated to the Army Command. In 2019 Serbian soldiers were participating in the following international missions:

- MONUSCO<sup>42</sup> (Democratic Republic of Congo): one soldier;
- UNFICYP<sup>43</sup> (Cyprus): 3 soldiers;
- UNIFIL<sup>44</sup> (Lebanon): 177 soldiers;
- UNTSO<sup>45</sup> (Middle East): one military observer;
- MINUSCA<sup>46</sup> (Central African Republic): 77 soldiers;
- EUTM Somalia<sup>47</sup> (Somalia): 6 soldiers;
- EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta<sup>48</sup> (Somalia): 6 soldiers;
- EUTM RCA<sup>49</sup> (Central African Republic): 7 soldiers;
- EUTM Mali<sup>50</sup> (Mali): 3 soldiers.<sup>51</sup>

Thanks to the Serbian non-aligned and neutral military status (however it is not stated in the strategic documents yet), the defence system tries to cover the whole spectrum of the military capabilities. It means that defence decision makers do not give up any branches and military capabilities that NATO- and EU-members may have put aside thanks to their "Pooling and Sharing Policy". The SAF are able to conduct limited conventional joint operations in case of an armed aggression or military attack against the country. Serb leaders expect a possible invasion of the Albanian guerrilla fighters coming from Kosovo, from South Serbia or perhaps from the northern part of North-Macedonia.

In the actual foreign policy environment, Serbia is not willing to take part in NATO led multinational operations. Despite this fact, the SAF are going to increase their participation in other, firstly UN and EU led missions in order to diminish anti-

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<sup>41</sup> Информатор о раду Министарства Одбране 2008 – 2019 Београд (Information about the work of the Ministry of Defence 2008 – 2019 Belgrade); [http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki\\_sadrzaj/informator/2019/decembar/Informator\\_o\\_radu\\_decembar\\_2019\\_cir.pdf](http://www.mod.gov.rs/multimedia/file/staticki_sadrzaj/informator/2019/decembar/Informator_o_radu_decembar_2019_cir.pdf); pp. 83–125. (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>42</sup> MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo

<sup>43</sup> UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

<sup>44</sup> UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

<sup>45</sup> UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization

<sup>46</sup> MINUSCA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic

<sup>47</sup> EUTM Somalia: European Union Training Mission Somalia

<sup>48</sup> EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta: European Union Naval Force (Operation Atalanta) Somalia

<sup>49</sup> EUTM RCA: European Union Military Training Mission in the Central African Republic

<sup>50</sup> EUTM Mali: European Union Training Mission Mali

<sup>51</sup> Aktuelne mirovne operacije (Current Peacekeeping Missions); [http://www.vs.rs/sr\\_lat/clanak/07A0D2B8CFFC11E5A7C800163E135070/aktuelne-mirovne-operacije](http://www.vs.rs/sr_lat/clanak/07A0D2B8CFFC11E5A7C800163E135070/aktuelne-mirovne-operacije); (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

Serbian sentiment in the international community evolved during the Yugoslavia war in the early 1990s. However, the short defence budget is a burden on the way of its fulfilment.

The SAF are the main organisation of the national defence that is dislocated on a territorial principle and is representing a wide spectrum of military capabilities. In case of a potential natural catastrophe as forest fires or floods, the Armed Forces are engaged for protecting human beings, goods and properties. The suspended compulsory military service in 2011 burdens the rapid and large-scale reaction of the troops, in order to decrease the eventual material and human losses, but reserve inventories and mobilisation plans ease the extended employment of the Serbian military.

### **The defence industry of Serbia**

The defence industry of Serbia is inherited partially from the former Yugoslavia that was collapsed and shrunk in the early 1990s. The current state-owned defence industry companies are able to provide the basically necessary arms, weapon systems and military equipment for the SAF. The majority of the Serbian defence industry has remained state-owned, in order to make a positive outcome and profit for the state-run sector. These main plants and their products are:

- Yugoimport SDPR J. P. (Beograd) is a state-owned company with a decades-long tradition in the trade of armaments, defence equipment and in transfer of technology as well as in in-house development and production of complex weapon systems<sup>52</sup>;
- Zastava oružje AD (Kragujevac): pistols, assault rifles, sniper rifles, submachine guns, light machine guns, machine guns, automatic and under-barrel grenade launchers<sup>53</sup>;
- Holding korporacija “Krušik” a.d. (Valjevo): mortar shells, aircraft rockets, programmable guided rocket, quick air target simulator, air bombs, unguided rockets for multi-tube launchers, artillery shells, antitank guided missile “Maljutka”, cartridges with cumulative and reactive-cumulative shells for anti-tank grenade weapon systems, 40 mm ammunition, hand grenades, anti-tank mine, fuzes, initial devices and powder charges<sup>54</sup>;
- Milan Blagojević – Namenska AD (Lučani): nitrocellulose, various types of powders and rocket propellants, powder charges, combustible components, celluloid and celluloid containers, nitro glycerine, wet paste, ether production and solvent recuperation<sup>55</sup>;

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<sup>52</sup> Yugoimport SDPR J. P.; <https://www.yugoimport.com/en/yugoimport-sdpr-jp/>; (downloaded: 06 January 2020)

<sup>53</sup> Zastava arms – Military program; <https://www.zastava-arms.rs/en/military-program/>; (downloaded: 06 January 2020)

<sup>54</sup> Krušik Military program; <https://www.krusik.rs/en/military-program/>; (downloaded: 06 January 2020)

<sup>55</sup> Milan BLAGOJEVIĆ NAMENSKA AD Today; <http://www.mbnamenska.com/about-us/>; (downloaded: 06 January 2020)

- Prvi partizan AD (Užice): small arms ammunition calibres for both NATO and Russian standard and artillery ammunition of various sub-calibres<sup>56</sup>;
- Kompanija Sloboda A. D. (Čačak): ammunition design and manufacturing<sup>57</sup>;
- Prva iskra namenska proizvodnja A. D. (Barič): production of high explosives, TNT, PETN, RDX, HMX, HNS, TNR as well as various composites based on these explosives<sup>58</sup>.

These plants – together with the Yugoimport SDPR (responsible for the export and import of the armament and defence equipment in Serbia) – produce mainly light weaponry, but manufacture some heavy weapon systems, too. These are the main new products (that are worth mentioning) built under the supervision of Yugoimport – SDPR and with the support of the Military Technical Institute according to NATO standards:

- Kobac training aircraft (successor of Lasta);
- Sovja and Lasta (In the next picture<sup>59</sup>) aircrafts;



- Pegaz tactical and other (Sila 750C, Vrabac; rotary-wing Stršljen) unmanned aerial vehicles;
- Sumadija 262 mm self-propelled multiple-barrel missile launcher (range: 285 km);
- Tamnava 267/122 mm modular multiple launch rocket system (range: 70/40 km, in the next picture<sup>60</sup>);

<sup>56</sup> Prvi partizan; <http://www.prvipartizan.com/defence.php>; (downloaded: 06 January 2020)

<sup>57</sup> Sloboda – Fabrika specijalnih proizvoda (Sloboda – Factory of special products); <http://www.sloboda.co.rs/fsp.htm#TOP>; (downloaded: 06 January 2020)

<sup>58</sup> Prva iskra – Explosives production; <http://www.prvaiskra-namenska.com/explosives-production/>; (downloaded: 06 January 2020)

<sup>59</sup> Lasta; <https://www.yugoimport.com/cir/proizvodi/lasta>; (downloaded: 28 January 2020)

<sup>60</sup> Tamnava 267/122 mm modular multiple launch rocket system; <https://www.yugoimport.com/en/proizvodi/tamnava-267122-mm-multiple-launch-rocket-system-mlrs>; (downloaded: 28 January 2020)



- Morava self-propelled multiple rocket launcher;
- M56/33 105 mm towed howitzer<sup>61</sup>;
- M09 105 mm self-propelled truck-mounted howitzer;
- Sora 122 mm self-propelled howitzer;
- Soko 122 mm self-propelled rapid response howitzer;
- Nora-B52 155 mm self-propelled gun-howitzer (In the next picture<sup>62</sup>);



- Aleksandar 155 mm self-propelled gun-howitzer;
- ALAS missile system (Advanced Light Attack System);
- Lazar-3 and Lazar II 8x8 multi-role armoured combat vehicle (In the next picture<sup>63</sup>);

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<sup>61</sup> Serbia's 105 mm M56 howitzer back in production;  
<https://www.janes.com/article/89628/serbia-s-105-mm-m56-howitzer-back-in-production>;  
 (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

<sup>62</sup> Nora-B52 155 mm self-propelled gun-howitzer;  
<https://www.yugoimport.com/en/proizvodi/nora-b52-155-mm-self-propelled-gun-howitzer>;  
 (downloaded: 28 January 2020)

<sup>63</sup> Lazar II 8x8 multi-role armoured combat vehicle;  
<https://www.yugoimport.com/en/proizvodi/lazar-ii-8x8-mravmrap-multi-purpose-armored-vehicle>;  
 (downloaded: 28 January 2020)



- Milosh 4x4 armoured multi-purpose combat vehicle (In the next picture<sup>64</sup>);



- Bumbar 136 mm portable anti-tank missile.<sup>65</sup>

Serbia's defence industry has completed the first example of a new remote-controlled turret (RCT), called the Dubs 20/3 mm Kerber first showed at the Partner 2019 defence exhibition in Belgrade. The all-welded-steel turret is armed with three Hispano 20 mm (Model M55) single-feed cannons that were built in large numbers in the former Yugoslavia for various applications, including towed anti-aircraft guns, air defence on ships and armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) turrets.<sup>66</sup>

<sup>64</sup> Milosh 4x4 armoured multi-purpose combat vehicle; <https://www.yugoimport.com/en/proizvodi/armoured-multi-purpose-combat-vehicle-4x4-bov-m16-milosh>; (downloaded: 28 January 2020)

<sup>65</sup> State-of-the-Art Defence Technology from Serbia; European Security and Defence, Mittler Report Verlag GmbH, Germany, Bonn, ISSN 1617-7983 June 2017; p. 37. and Yugoimport SDPR J. P. – Exhibition “Defence and Security 2019” – Bangkok, Thailand; <https://www.yugoimport.com/en/aktuelnosti/exhibition-defense-security-2019-bangkok-thailand>; and Yugoimport SDPR J.P. Products; <https://www.yugoimport.com/en/proizvodi>; (downloaded: 06 January 2020)

<sup>66</sup> Serbia develops 20 mm turret; <https://www.janes.com/article/89632/serbia-develops-20-mm-turret>; (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

The Serbian Military Technical Institute (MTI) has confirmed that the Milosh unmanned ground vehicle (UGV) has commenced trials at the Serbian Technical Test Centre and has been demonstrated to local and overseas delegations at the Nikinci Military Test Range. The UGV has been developed by the MTI in order to meet the operational requirements of the SAF. Roles envisioned for the vehicle include the support of Special Forces and reconnaissance troops, particularly in counter-terror operations in indoor and urban environments. The Milosh UGV is armed with a 7.62×54 mm M86 machine gun, equipped with a day/night sensor pack and it can be transported by trailer.<sup>67</sup>

Serbia's Srboauto has developed an upgraded Praga VS35 M19 self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (SPAAG), which has recently completed company trials. Srboauto's VS35 makes 72 improvements, many of them minor, to extend the original VS35 vehicle's operational life and bring it up to NATO standards, according to the company. The former Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) purchased a significant number of then-Czechoslovakian M53/59 twin 30 mm SPAAGs that were widely used in a direct fire ground support role. Mounted on the rear of the legacy platform is a power operated turret armed with two 30 mm gas-operated cannons, which fire 30×210 mm ammunition that is still manufactured in Serbia. Externally, the most significant improvement in the new VS35 is the replacement of the original two-door protected crew cab with a new four-door cab that is fully armoured to NATO STANAG 4569 Level 2 standard.<sup>68</sup>

Serbia welcomes the foreign investments in the defence industry as well. Some years ago, Serbia's defence sector was able to attract FDI (foreign direct investment) from the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Besides other civilian investments (as for example the Etihad's 49% stake in Air Serbia), the military co-operation between UAE and Serbia is going to involve UAE personnel training in Serbia, information and defence technology exchange and common weapon development (for example the ALAS programme) projects.<sup>69</sup>

Serbia's Srboauto and South Africa's ADG Mobility are developing a new 6x6 armoured personnel carrier (APC) called Kurjak (Black Wolf), which will initially be aimed at the export market with the first prototype expected to be completed at the end of 2020. The Kurjak APC will have a hull of all-welded steel armour with an applique passive armour package. The ballistic protection would be according to NATO STANAG 4569 Level 4, and mine protection will be STANAG 4569 Level 4a and 4b.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Serbia advances Milos UGV development; <https://www.janes.com/article/89709/serbia-advances-milos-ugv-development>; (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

<sup>68</sup> Srboauto's upgraded Praga VS35 undergoes trials; <https://www.janes.com/article/90051/srboauto-s-upgraded-praga-vs35-undergoes-trials>; (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

<sup>69</sup> The Serbian Defence Environment; European Security and Defence, June 2017; pp. 35-36.

<sup>70</sup> Serbia's Srboauto developing Kurjak 6x6 APC; <https://www.janes.com/article/89830/serbia-s-srboauto-developing-kurjak-6x6-apc>; (downloaded: 11 January 2020)

Visiting a Ministry of Interior exercise in Nikinci on 7 September 2019, President Vučić announced an increased military-technological co-operation with China on unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). He said that “Three batteries of six or nine UAVs that can be launched in different ways, including from moving vehicles, are being purchased from China...”. Vučić also added that “armed UAVs with considerable destructive power” will be delivered to Serbia within six months. He emphasised the importance of the transfer of Chinese technology to Serbia and revealed that the indigenous Pegaz (Pegasus) medium-range tactical UAV is being developed, aided by Chinese technology.<sup>71</sup>

President Vučić as Supreme Commander of the SAF worries about the security of the defence industry plants since – in his words – foreign intelligence attacks are frequent, fierce, orchestrated and organized on them. According to his assessment, certain Western countries’ interest is to destroy the independent Serbian ammunition and arms production. In his interview in November 2019, concerning a concrete case, he accused an Albanian of providing money for a Serb person for giving over production documentation from the Prvi partizan plant.<sup>72</sup> Concerning this and similar cases, it can be stated that Vučić tries to make a political benefit from such happenings, and would like to distract the attention from the real security weaknesses and safety leaks of the defence industry plants and other critical infrastructures.

The aim of the Serbian domestic defence industry is firstly to provide military equipment for the SAF and secondly to take part in the international trade of arms, in order to make export incomes. The well-known Yugoimport SDPR would like to occupy the foreign market where it is possible. Zastava’s light weapons are exported among others to the US and to Western European countries that proves their high quality. The Serbian defence industry improves the foreign trade balance with its annual several hundreds of millions USD income, in 2018 it was 897 million USD.<sup>73</sup> The main destinations of the Serbian weapons are North-Africa, the Middle-East, the Far-East and more and more the EU as well. The current capacity of the Serbian military industry is lagging behind the capacity of the former Yugoslavian defence industry but nowadays there is a great intention to get back the onetime defence competency and market in the Western Balkans, too.

### **The security situation in Serbia**

Serbia, as nearly always, faces a diverse set of security threats. With the fall of the former Yugoslavia, Serbia gradually lost its direct political and economic influence in the South-Slavic region. It became an independent state, but lost huge territories inhabited by Serbs in the neighbouring countries. This fact further poses

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<sup>71</sup> Serbia and China intensify UAV co-operation; <https://www.janes.com/article/91173/serbia-and-china-intensify-uav-co-operation>; (downloaded: 20 January 2020)

<sup>72</sup> President VUČIĆ: Attacks on our defense industry are frequent and organized; <http://www.mod.gov.rs/eng/14731/predsednik-vucic-napadi-na-nasu-namensku-industriju-su-ucestali-i-organizovani-14731>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>73</sup> Serbia reports defence industry export increase, Charles Forester, London – Jane’s Defence Industry, 09 April 2019; <https://www.janes.com/article/87806/serbia-reports-defence-industry-export-increase>; (downloaded: 11 January 2020)

frustration and security challenge among the Serbian population that is not homogenous either. Especially the unilateral declaration of Kosovo's independence hurts mostly the national consciousness of Serbia, since the Serb clerical historians teach that "the cradle" of the Serb Nation can be found in Kosovo. The idea of the contested territory change – North-Kosovo for the Preševo-valley – is not a real solution for the Pravoslav (Serb orthodox) memorials and monasteries, located in the Southern part of Kosovo that are threatened by the Kosovar Albanian extremists and hardliners. In Vojvodina, there are traditional autonomy struggles, which are even more complicated in the Raska (Sandžak) region, inhabited by the Slavic Muslim majority. These peaceful political aims seem to be serious threats in the eyes of Serb ultranationalists.

Serbia is not willing to be a member of NATO, but it is ready to accept the Alliance's help and standards. The country is building independent, non-aligned and neutral Armed Forces.<sup>74</sup> SAF should defend the country from the security challenges, without an external support. Joint military exercises with NATO member states have an aim to reach the interoperability within the PfP programme.<sup>75</sup> The EU candidate status in 2012 and the start of the accession talks in 2014 have been decisive steps towards the EU integration aims. However, the unresolved status question of Kosovo is a huge burden on this way, and nowadays the EU is not so popular in the eyes of many Serbians as well.

In 2015–2016, Serbia was extremely hit by the migration crisis in the Western Balkans. Until 2019, about 709 thousand migrants and refugees arrived in the country mostly illegally. In September 2019, about 3,400 migrants and asylum seekers were stationed in Serbia, which was not prepared for such a security challenge.<sup>76</sup> Most of the illegal migrants in Serbia do not have a legal status and stay in temporary accommodation facilities. The number of asylum-seekers, migrants and refugees is stable at around 4,400 people, with the biggest groups coming from Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. In 2018, the number of people intercepted at the border was 3,648 mainly from the same countries. Also in 2018 criminal charges were filed against 162 perpetrators of human trafficking. Some 67 individuals were convicted of illegal crossing of state borders and smuggling. Migrant trafficking networks originating from and operating in the Western Balkan countries remain active in and around migration centres and continue to smuggle illegal migrants. Serbia benefits from a programme for assisted voluntary return, run by the International Organisation for Migration. Through this assistance, 278 migrants were returned to their country of

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<sup>74</sup> VUČIĆ: *Bilo bi lepo da na Sretenje usvojimo Deklaraciju o političkoj nezavisnosti i neutralnosti* (It would be nice to accept a Declaration about the political independence and neutrality until Candlemas); <https://www.danas.rs/politika/vucic-bilo-bi-lepo-da-na-sretenje-usvojimo-deklaraciju-o-politickoj-nezavisnosti-i-neutralnosti/>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>75</sup> *Interoperability of Serbian Armed Forces: An instrument or a goal?*, European Western Balkans, 05 December, 2018; <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2018/12/05/interoperability-serbian-armed-forces-instrument-goal/>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>76</sup> CIA *The World Factbook: Serbia, 2019*; <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-factbook/geos/ri.html>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

origin in 2018.<sup>77</sup> Figures show that human trafficking is a booming criminal act and a lucrative business. Sometimes the Serbian politicians' aim is, to make a political popularity benefit from others' sufferings.

With the side effects of globalism, the EU and its member states have to face transnational challenges, among others the international organised crime. Smuggling, human trafficking and proliferation are a big security concern, in which some politicians and local authorities are deeply involved. In this case, the Western Balkans is a very vulnerable place for its geopolitical situation and historical roots. The region always was a migration route between Asia and Europe that also involves the possibility of the illegal activities in various forms. The Western Balkan countries cannot get rid of this phenomenon alone, so the regional law-enforcement co-operation and the EU support from outside are inevitably important in the future.

As a consequence of the ethnic disintegration process of the former Yugoslavia and later on in Serbia, economic and social problems have become serious. Sometimes the significantly changed ethnic situation has been misused by nationalists and hardliners. Even today, soft nationalist political statements easily can be triggers of big concerns that may especially appear as hatred, racism or antisemitism during several international sport events. Occasionally, the political hate speeches and lies evoke contra-productive phenomenon that is embodied for example in anti-government protests and recriminations. One of these events is the "1 from 5 million" regular (every week) protest against the Serbian political leadership.<sup>78</sup> The organised crime and corruption in Serbia is traditionally on a high level, because of the geographic position, the old practice of way of life, the widespread poverty, the social clan-structure, the weak state institutions and its servile employees and the lack of the control mechanisms of the country.

Parallel with the European security environment, also the EU has been changed. The enlargement euphoria has disappeared among the old members, thanks to the last candidates' behaviour and their accession process.<sup>79</sup> The EU has incurred several security, political and social problems with the latest extensions. As a consequence of the late 2008 worldwide financial and economic crisis, extreme and moderate nationalism has gained its foothold in the Western Balkans again and it has posed a big threat to the European democracy and rule of law. This phenomenon has become even stronger after the 2015 migration crisis. Today, old EU member countries (for example Spain and Germany) also face hard nationalist, extremist and xenophobic movements inside their own society, so how could decent politicians stop hatred in the Western Balkans, where this phenomenon has a much deeper and closer historical

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<sup>77</sup> Commission Staff Working Document – Serbia 2019 Report, European Commission, Brussels, 29. 05. 2019; <https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-report.pdf>; p. 39.; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>78</sup> Protesters Descend On Serbian TV Offices For Weekly Anti-Government Protest, Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, 29 December, 2019; <https://www.rferl.org/a/hundreds-descend-on-serb-tv-offices-for-weekly-antigovernment-protest/30349839.html>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

<sup>79</sup> Macron's "Non" to EU enlargement, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 22 October 2019; <https://www.ceps.eu/macrons-non-to-eu-enlargement/>; (downloaded: 02 January 2020)

nightmare. How could pro-EU thinkers expect the freedom of the media and the opinion, or the rule of law and the struggles against organised crime and corruption in the Western Balkans, if these problems seriously existed in the EU member states as well? The old EU *acquis* and achievements are endangered by the possibility that the EU gets rather closer to the Western Balkans than the Western Balkan countries are approaching nearer to the EU.

Using this regional uncertainty, Russia is trying to gain foothold and to increase its influence in the Western Balkans, with legal and sometimes with illegal activities. At least, one of the evidences is that the Russian intelligence activities are growing in this area (in Montenegro, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in North-Macedonia and especially in Serbia). Serbia was and is an important terrain for Russian politicians and businessmen, since their acceptance and popularity are better than in other places in Europe. The increasing Russian interest enforcement is supported especially by radicals, who are ready to commit to the rogue Russian endeavours.<sup>80</sup>

We can realise that the above mentioned security challenges are present outside of Europe as well. If we look at the violent incidents among others in South America, in Central Asia, in North-Korea, in Hong-Kong and in several African and Middle-East countries, we should state that probably this is the new world order. The whole world is at the edge of a security spill-over effect. In some places, international law is not accepted, global organisations are not functional and transnational players change their stances and values overnight. This makes the security situation more vulnerable, unpredictable and unacceptable in the Western Balkans, too.

From time to time, Serbia is sitting on the fence concerning about its national identity and international perspective. The country is hesitating between the past and the future. Sometimes, Serbia is smiling to the West and turning to the East in order to make a benefit from both sides' "good intentions". At the moment, the security political and economic environment is not supporting the Serbian EU-accession process at all, since the EU faces internal disputes about the further enlargement process. "Thanks to" the above mentioned facts an early EU-accession of Serbia is not expectable. The most optimistic forecasts would like to see Serbia's full EU-membership in 2025, which is an exaggeratedly ambitious idea, under the current circumstances.<sup>81</sup> Moreover, the support of Serbia's EU membership is gradually falling, according to the opinion polls among the Serbian citizens.

## **Conclusion**

Analysing the political behaviour of President Vučić (former member of the Serbian Radical Party led by Vojislav Šešelj again), it can be stated that he continuously runs a populist political campaign against the Serbian opposition parties, controls the state media and virtually enjoys a greater political power than the Serbian head of state is originally entitled to. Vučić feels that his pragmatic policy is

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<sup>80</sup> STRONSKI –HIMES op. cit.

<sup>81</sup> Serbia in the EU in 2025 – mission (im)possible, by Julija SIMIĆ, EURACTIV.rs, 05 April 2019; <https://www.euractiv.com/section/enlargement/news/serbia-in-the-eu-in-2025-mission-impossible/>; (downloaded: 11 January 2020)

legitimated by like-minded patriotic EU member state politicians, who similarly deal much more with their popularity and populism than with their legal and moral responsibilities. In addition, he gets stable political and ideological support from the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, while Serbia's declared foreign policy aim is to take over the Western standards and join the EU. This "neutral" or "turn coat" policy reminds us of the Yugoslav era under Josip Broz Tito, and later on, rather under Slobodan Milošević when the West was blackmailed by Yugoslavia with creating a nightmare or a much worse security situation in the Western Balkans, in the case of a non-tolerance of his politics.

Under the current political leadership, Serbia tries to preserve its military neutrality that is planned to be confirmed in a Parliamentary Resolution. The size and the capabilities of the SAF make it possible that the country could defend itself from any limited conventional military threat or security challenge coming from abroad. In this case, Serbia also can rely on its own defence industry and its military products, arms, weapons and equipment. However, Serbia is jammed into the trap of the Kosovo issue, which cumbers and slows down the country's EU-integration process. Insufficient measures taken against organised crime or for free media and rule of law are in focus of the EU's critics as well. Considering the above mentioned facts and assessments, it can be stated that Serbia remains an arena of different great powers' interests, in the long term. Joining the EU without NATO-membership is a real option for Serbia but this endeavour will have a plenty of burdens and new challenges in the future as well.

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***Abstract***

The main trends to analyze the survival of the terrorist organization are based upon mainly quantitative research methodologies that focused on the effects of specific measures on the overall endurance of terrorist groups, that was facilitated by the availability of databases of terrorist incidents like the global terrorist databases (GTD) led by the University of Maryland.

The second issue is the way to tackle this issue, varied with a primary initial focus on the way to end these groups, which can be called as ‘end methods’ that is predicated on several methods of counterterrorism.

This research aims to suggest another paradigm to investigate the same question, and it differs upon two main essential issues: firstly, the use of qualitative approach to explaining the survival; secondly, it explores the capability to survive which entirely differs from survival in that it explores the ability of groups to remain alive and endure existential threats.

The main characteristic of this approach is its holistic nature, to tackle the issue of survival from different circles that encircle the organization is a way similar to the Russian Matroshka.

The findings of this research are that the central circles to be analyzed for the survivability of armed groups are: Group, community, host-state, regional, international, inter-groups, and adversary calculations circle.

***Keywords:*** terrorism, survival, survivability

**1. Introduction**

This paper contends that the question of terrorist groups' endurance relates to the understanding of the environment that encircles them similar to Russian Materioshka; these circles are conducive to these groups' survival.

In a nutshell, we seek to understand why some groups who use terrorism survive for many years, while other groups last fewer than one year<sup>1</sup>. The importance of this research is that it represents an extension of the existing work in the field of security and terrorism and form an analytical framework for future studies.

This research is built upon priori assumptions, first that terrorist organizations mainly aim to recruit and to coerce their adversaries; secondly, terrorism is usually utilitarian, groups periodically reassess their tactics and strategies from time to time;

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<sup>1</sup> Josef YOUNG – Laura DOUGAN: Survival of the fittest; Perspectives of the fittest, 2014, vol. 8 issue 2

thirdly that these groups deliberately choose terrorism as one principal mean to gain political objectives<sup>2</sup>; finally, their survival is their priority.

## **2. Survivability Core**

For non-state actors (Violent Armed Groups) to survive, they usually count on different elements to sustain and keep themselves alive. The starting point is to have *raison d'être*, underlying conditions that provoke them to step up, which implies a legitimate cause that intrigues others. Besides, the cause requires having a proper enemy who stands against achieving that cause. The next element is the establishment of the organization, that demands mobilization in this field it means having resources and successful recruitment, that accounts for the essential first element for survival the second is the counterforce that fights against the organization, its positive mobilization, the final net of that struggle is their survival.

## **3. Definitions**

In this paper, the meaning of the following concepts are as follows:

### ***3.1. Survivability***

Social movements theory provides an acceptable platform to explain and understand the conditions that facilitate the emergence of some of the violent-non state actors but falls short of explaining their endurance.

The ability of the non-state actor to withstand the internal and the external pressure, remain alive in the face of external foes, and against any internal powers wish to disarm it. The survivability is the dependent variable which can be operationalized by longevity.

This concept is not necessarily linked with the conduct of terrorist actions for some time, mostly three years<sup>3</sup>, but also to the availability of pieces of evidence that the groups still practice their routines of work.

The group can withstand threats and remain alive.

### ***3.2. Adversary calculations.***

The way that the adversary perceives the threat incoming from the non-state actor and upon that perception calculates the perceived outcome before the conduct of hostilities.

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<sup>2</sup> Seth JOHNS – Martin LIBCKI: How Terrorist group end: Lessons for countering al-Qaida; RAND Corporation, 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

### **3.3. Maturity**

Older groups are wiser in their actions than new ones in aspects of conducting military operations, planning skills, actions to media.

Besides that, mature groups have regulations for operational security, which makes it harder for states to penetrate them; Maturity is a time-dependent variable, as newborn organizations tend to offend their local communities and use terrorism as a primary weapon. However, with time and the advent of more experienced commanders, positive changes are likely emerging and affect their methodologies.

### **3.4. An insurgency**

A political-military campaign by non-state actors who seek to overthrow a government or secede from the home state through the use of conventional and unconventional strategies and tactics (Guide to the analysis of insurgency, 1988)

### **3.5. Terrorist Group**

A collection of individuals belonging to a non-state entity that uses terrorism to achieve its objectives<sup>4</sup>.


## **4. Survivability Model of Analysis**

The survivability model of the violent armed non-state actors revolves around their multilayer coexistence; their existence is an equation of their surrounding context, which requires them to adapt their ways in that tumultuous environment, to take advantage from its cooperative signs while mitigates its cons.

The proposed Survivability model builds upon circles of influence, that is divided among group circles: local (group), national circle or base country, regional, international circle, adversary group, and the other groups' circle.

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid



*Figure 1: The Circles of Analysis*  
(Source: The author)

## 5. Circles of analysis

This research extends the already existing literature about armed groups from the focus on the groups as a small unit of analysis into investigating the contextual environment the groups exist within. Some non-state groups [hence will be mentioned by just groups] managed to survive in their hostile environment due to factors related to multiple layers of analysis engulfed its core and interact with it.

The first layer is the local group circle, which consists of their organizational structure, military capabilities, their economy, and their ideological adaptations.

This circle constitutes the first step of the establishment of the group, which is usually its first clandestine missions, which gives it the required self-confidence to proceed for publicizing its program normally by the issuance of a charter, without its proper buildup and force show it cannot integrate within the other circles, to appeal for recruitment.

The second layer is the national circle in which group exists; this is the base country from which it exercises influence; in this circle, the groups compete with the state and its legitimate powers for resources, most of the cases, the base country represents the first adversary of the group.

The third circle is regional, which generally have direct effects on the first circle and the second circle, in this circle, the group find its state – sponsorship and build alliances with regional powers – in addition to that, the geographic location of the region plays a role as some regions more conducive to the survivability than others.


The fourth is the international circle that contains the great powers<sup>5</sup> Superpowers, the UN, and other international organizations, the central element in this circle is the pursuit for legitimacy; the group cannot isolate itself from the influence of international circle as it looks forward to financial support, or at least gets de-facto legitimacy.

The fifth circle is the other groups that the group is interacting with, for training, and a multitude of mutual assistance programs, [henceforth will be called the groups' circle].

The sixth circle is the adversary group, which is the negative force as it plays the role of the counterforce against the survivability of the armed group; this circle can be external or internal, it uses different methods to undermine the survival of the group.

## 5. The First Circle: The Organization

The group circle is the core of the organization before integration with other circles; Barry Buzan suggested that states have the following model to build themselves:



*Figure 2: The model of the state<sup>6</sup>*

The same model is valid to explain the needed structure for the buildup of the non-state actor with slight differences. This model has to be emulated by semi-state actors aspiring to forge their existence and behave like states.

The state territory and population embody the physical base; the institutions are those that govern and control the physical base; the non-state needs an ideational base to maintain its linkage to the required supporters and to establish its authority in the minds of people.

In the physical base, also a territory in which they undermine the sovereignty of the state, sovereignty is the central driving element, which Buzan merely put as 'self-rule,' in the case of non-state actors, a territory can be outsourced to the sponsor-state, in which they can build training camps. The group requires a failed state or high level of collaboration in order to establish its physical base.


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<sup>5</sup> Regional security theory uses the term of superpower, great powers and regional powers (Buzan, Oliver.), some researchers like Haas believes that the US is no more a superpower but relegated to the position of great power.

<sup>6</sup> Source: The author based on Barry BUZAN: People, states and fear, UK, Harvester Press Group, 1982. p. 40.

The second element in the physical base is the population, which is in general divided into two main categories: the law-binding class, which are subordinated to the rules of the organization; the second class are the supporters and sympathizers in which they usually sympathize with the organization and provide monetary help. The first class contains the active regular militants, employees, and different acting personnel, while the second class can be reservists, donors, intellectuals, and different sympathizers.

In its interaction within the other circles, the group usually has elements of supporters, opponents, and bystanders (Indifferent). Supporters are also according to their activities are different categories.



*Figure 3: The population of the group*<sup>7</sup>

Azani<sup>8</sup> claims that according to social movement theories, supporters of the movement fall under one of the above circles, the first group is the group of activists who bear the responsibility of mobilizing efforts, among them emerges the charismatic leader, the second group is the adherents group who support the movement, join it in its activities, though not in its framework.

The third group is the constituency which supports the movement but without taking part in its activities. The last group is the supporters whose interest in its success, since they will benefit, but they do not actively participate or join it.

The second element is the institutional base, especially the military wing, political wing, mostly working in separate tracks, logistics, and others.

The last element of the Buzan's model is ideational, in which the group needs an ideology to square itself within the surrounding environment, and with its different branches. To highlight their strategies and political agendas, groups need a flag and an anthem to distinct them with defined identity.

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<sup>7</sup> Source: The author based on Eitan AZANI: Hezbollah: The story of the party of God; New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. pp.2-3

### **5.1. The Physical Base**

The physical base is the population of the group and its territory; groups need working force to sacrifice with, during their most likely violent actions.

The size of the violent armed groups is an essential factor; small groups less than 100 are less likely to remain in power; however, significant numbers force facilitate infiltrations and jeopardize operational security. To get to the optimum that satisfies operational needs is the best solution and has a rigorous system of selection. Terrorist groups cannot survive without a steady flow of recruits.

### **5.2. The Ideational Base**

Similar to the state's constitution, groups publish their charter, and inside it defines their understanding of contemporary issues. Religious groups longer than others, though they rarely achieve their goals<sup>9</sup>.

The likelihood of any organization to overthrow a regime based on the organization's religious Ideology is zero, the survivability of religious groups from the (62) percent of all terrorist groups have ended; however, only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have ended<sup>10</sup>.

Religious groups like Qaida, benefit from the fact that group members are motivated by belief structures that demand individual acts, with many or most religions promising rewards in the afterlife. Juergensmeyer describes the "Cosmic War" that religious militants believe they are waging, and that this can make struggles seem more salient than any worldly motivation<sup>11</sup>.

The disadvantage for them is that those religious believers are less likely to change than a person's general political beliefs.

Most researchers found that terrorist groups with ethnic or religious motivation are less likely to end than groups with another type of motivation.

### **5.3. The Institutional Base**

The bureaucratic structure is the most hierarchical of all the structures. These groups have "clear departmental boundaries, clear lines of authority, detailed reporting mechanisms, and formal decision-making procedures. Hezbollah uses this typology because of its widespread."<sup>12</sup>


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<sup>9</sup> HUGHES, William John: The Longevity of Religious Terrorist Organizations; In: Senior Projects Spring 2017. p. 229

<sup>10</sup> JOHNS – LIBCKI (2008) op. cit.

<sup>11</sup> Mark JUERGENSMEYER: Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence; 3rd ed., University of California Press, 2003, [www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt4cgfbx](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/j.ctt4cgfbx), (downloaded: 14 April 2020)

<sup>12</sup> Walter POWELL: Neither Market nor Hierarchy; Network Forms of Organization, 1990. In: Research in Organizational Behavior, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press Vol. 12, p. 813



*Figure 4. Structures of Terrorist Organizations<sup>13</sup>*

An example of all-channel is the Abu-Sayyaf Group (ASG). ASG operates in small cells of four to five. The leadership is loosely coordinated. An example of Hub-spoke is al-Qaida in pre-2001. The market is used for groups with very little organization. Market groups have no discernible leadership, are not centrally controlled, and have no functional differentiation. An example of a market structure terrorist group is the Earth Liberation Front (ELF)<sup>14</sup>.

#### **5.4. Financial Assets**

In the institutional base, financial assets are needed to support salaries, social services, weapons acquisition, and financial incentives for families of killed in action personnel. This needs proper management from the organizations, because mostly they will tend to invest in illicit economic projects like drug trafficking, gold, and diamond operations, these illicit operations make them behave as warlords and can shift their goals from purely political to more corrupted senior members enrichment and their *raison d'être* will shift to be pure survival<sup>15</sup>, FARC in Colombia is an example of this.

Organizations involved in illicit operations like money laundry are more resilient and can survive more than others, but the risk of shifting their objectives.

<sup>13</sup> Joshua KILLBERG: Basic Model Explaining Terrorist Group Organizational Structure; In: *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 2012. 35:11, pp. 810-830.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid

<sup>15</sup> Goals displacement means that the situation when organizational rules and regulations become more important than organizational goals

### **5.5. Armed Capabilities**

In order to act and prove their character, those groups need to build a reputation of violence as Mark Piasolo named it by 'Propaganda by Deeds'<sup>16</sup>. Under this point falls the capability of diversifying violent tactics and reliance on domestic terrorism gives the group more chances to survive<sup>17</sup>.

### **5.6. Maturity**

Another element is the **Maturity** which means that older groups have better chances of survival than newborn ones.

### **5.7. Summary**

In conclusion, the main factors in this circle are group size, group maturity, Ideology, financial assets, leadership and organizational structure, and ability to diversify attacks.

## **6. The Second Circle (State Level)**

This layer represents the base country, the other organization inside the same state, the main elements of this level of analysis are the state weakness which conditions the success of the armed groups, the topography of the state, regime type, and GDP per capita.

### **6.1. State Weakness**

The World Bank defines weak states as "states characterized by poor governance, internal conflicts or tenuous post-conflict transitions, weak security, fractured societal relations, corruptions, breakdown in the rule of law and insufficient mechanisms for generating legitimate power and authority"<sup>18</sup>. One of the famous indexes for measuring the fragile states is provided by the Fund for Peace (PFF) through the Foreign Policy Journal every year.

The leading indicators for deciding about the fragility of states are four main categories: social, economic, security, and cohesion. The PFF suggested nine indicators to measure the index: fractured elites, a weak economy and spread of poverty, uneven developments, weak security apparatus, weak public service, the spread of human flight and brain drain, state legitimacy conflict, the existence of external intervention, the existence of group grievances, the demographic pressure and influx of refugees and IDPs. The main symptoms of weak states that assist the proliferation of terrorism are porous borders that enable terrorists to infiltrate from one state to another and smuggle weapons and finance. Also, their security apparatus

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<sup>16</sup> Andrew SINCLAIR: *An anatomy of Terror*; Palgrave Macmillan Trade, 2003.

<sup>17</sup> Brock BLOMBERG – Khursav GAIBULLOEV – Todd SANDLER: *Terrorist Group Survival*; *Public Choice* 149, 441 (2011), <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9837-4> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

<sup>18</sup> Natasha UNDERHILL: *Countering Global Terrorism and Insurgency*; Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

does not have a monopoly over means of coercive power. State weakness allows insurgency and terrorist groups to develop within its borders.

### ***6.2. Political Involvement***

The violent struggle against the state yields countermeasures by the state against it, and start the process of how to subjugate these organizations, one of the adopted measures is to politicizing their activities which can render the group more acceptable and armless, however, it can strengthen the group if it insists on the military wings to coexist within its political framework.

### ***6.3. Public Support***

Citizens of the host state are subjected to competitions between armed groups and the state for loyalty through public support and providing goods. That provision enables the armed groups to ask for sacrifices from their followers<sup>19</sup>.

### ***6.4. The density of armed groups***

The plethora of armed groups within the state minimize their likelihood to stay alive as they start to compete for the same pool of recruits and mobilization.

### ***6.5. Economy***

The correlation to the economy of the state is not confirmed, but mostly in countries that are having good economies, groups tend to be a nationalist and leftist wing, while poverty leads to having groups more religiously oriented.

### ***6.6. Population Age***

According to a study by Population Action International (PAI), there is a correlation between terrorism and states with high youth bulge; youth bulge exists mainly in MENA, Sub-Saharan Africa, Pacific Islands, Southern Asia, there are currently sixty-two states with two-thirds of their population is under thirty 'very young,' most of the states that are impacted by terrorism are among those states. 'Young States' have more predilection into social unrest. However, this rule cannot be confirmed solely; the state should be prone to terrorism and have ills like corruption, high rate of unemployment, low level of democracy, low Humanitarian Development Index (HDI) that yield frustration among young inhabitants who are more energetic than men in their 50s.

The thesis is that societies with a young and rapidly growing population, with high birth rate, high population growth rate, often end up with unemployment; those disaffected youth are prone to be recruited by a terrorist organization or criminal gangs.

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<sup>19</sup> Martha CRENSHAW: Mapping Terrorist Organizations, Stanford University, 2010. p. 6.

Nigeria is the largest in population in Africa, according to the UN World Population Prospects 2017, the population of Nigeria. Currently, the world's 7th most significant is projected to become – by 2050 – the third-largest in the world. This projected population growth is, however, unlikely to be economically sustainable.

Egypt's population increases of more than one million per year are the largest Arab state with a limited economy, high rate of unemployment, with millions of Egyptians, leave abroad for better chances.

In Afghanistan, nearly 43% of the population is under 14; demographically its population skewed toward less than 14, less than 2.5 % of its population is more than 65 years old. In the Pakistani case, almost 53 percent, falls in the 15–35 years age bracket. While less than 5 percent of the population is over the age of 65<sup>20</sup>. For more representation, nine states from the top ten states of terrorism score were compared with three EU states with a lower terror index; the comparison is about the median age, GDP per capita.




Figure 5. The relationship between Terrorism and Median age, GDP, and unemployment (Source: CIA Factbook and GTI)

From the chart, it can be noticed that terrorism correlates with the median age of the states' population, states with more young people between (15-35) years old are more affected by terrorism, secondly, if the GDP per capita is low, the unemployment rate is high, these are enough symptoms to cause frustration among the youth especially well-educated portion.

<sup>20</sup> CIA World Factbook, 2009, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

### **6.7. Summary**

In conclusion, the main factors to be considered in this circle are state weakness index, state global terrorism index, regime type, the density of armed groups, GDP per capita, state topography, state ethnical background, the political engagement of the group inside the state, and youth explosion.

### **7. Community Circle**

This is the circle, that some groups invest in to have their social incubators, especially states are ethnically or religiously divided, for example, PKK in Turkey based his actions on the Turk Kurds and killed many of them to change their loyalty by force. The main elements in this circle is the existence of preconditions that facilitate social the eruption of social movements, like availability of charismatic leadership, political disenfranchisement, religious divide like between Suna and Shia, the exploitation from an elite class.

### **8. The Third Circle (Regional Level)**

In this circle, the discussion is about state-sponsorship, alliances with other states, and the regional location of the group.

#### **8.1. State -Sponsorship**

Groups usually get their support in this layer from sponsor-state to bloom and flourish. For example, IRA attacks increased after it received support from Libya in the mid-1980s<sup>21</sup>.

State-sponsor is a double-edged sword; the negative side lies when the group becomes a mere tool in the hands of another state, it can sell it for a better price if that suits its national interest, this what happen to PKK while working in Bekka Valley by the Syrian regime and Syria left them after pressure from the Turkish army in 1998. Another example is the Japanese Red Army, also Abu Nidal Organization, which was a tool in the hands of foreign states and played the role of mercenaries in the hands of their sponsors<sup>22</sup>.

For weak structured organization, state sponsorship is a reason for failure as it contributes to the loss of identity, principles, and eventually public support, while entrenched organizations can decline and live for a limited time without a state support.

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<sup>21</sup> Eamonn MALLIE – David MCJITTRIC: End game in Ireland; London, Hodder and Stoughton, 2001. p.67

<sup>22</sup> Patrick SEALE: Abu Nidal: Gun for Hire; 1992

## **8.2. Alliances**

Some organizations act stronger than sponsorship; they ally themselves with those states; an example is the relationship existed between Hezbollah and Syria, and the role Hezbollah played in the Syrian civil war.

## **8.3. Regional Location**

The regional location is conducive to the survival of the terrorist groups, most researchers, e.g. (Jones and Libicki; Enders, W., & Sandler, T.) use the world bank regional groupings, in which it divided the world into seven specific areas: the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), East Asia and Pacific, North America, South Asia, Sub Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe and Central Asia.

The author questions the validity of the use of this regional location in terrorism studies as it does not fully cover the whole world and mix areas with different attributes like putting Europe and Central Asia in one class, so the one he uses in this study is the following:

MENA, South Asia, Indian Sub-Continent, Australia, Central Asia, Central Europe, West Europe, Nordic States, Baltic States, East Europe, North America, South America, and the Caribbean.

The Initial estimate of terrorism weight in these regions is as follows, based on the density of terrorist actions in these regions:

Every region has a historical mark of terrorism; for example, MENA is the highest<sup>23</sup>, while Nordic states and central Europe are the lowest.

## **8.4. Summary**

In this circle, the main factors that we take into consideration are the availability of alliances, availability of state sponsorship, and regional location.

## **9. Groups Circle**

Social network theory suggests that ties among armed groups linger the survival of armed groups by mobilization.

Types of relations are: adversarial, cooperative or competitive; Cooperative relationships or competitive enhance the survival likelihood of groups as they benefit from each other's experiences, share pools of recruitment, and fight against common enemies; similar cases were in Syria between groups like Hezbollah and other Shia militias like Fatimid. Studies show that terrorist groups update their behavior as new information becomes available<sup>24</sup>. While terrorist groups may learn from each other indirectly, such as through reading news accounts, some studies suggest that direct interaction – training or attacking together – is crucial to terrorist group learning

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<sup>23</sup> Walter ENDERS – Todd SANDLER: Distribution of transnational terrorism among countries by income classes and geography after 9/11; 2006, In: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 2 (Jun. 2006), pp. 367-393.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid

(Forest 2006; Kenney 2007; Horowitz 2010) claim that linkages between groups increase their likelihood of adopting innovative tactics.

Direct cooperation, such as training together or joint attacks, should also be more helpful if one's tie is highly connected. Well-connected groups are likely to have more resources, a broad range of ties to draw on, to make relationship activity more consequential. For example, in the early 2000s, the FARC trained with the IRA – which had previously trained with groups from Germany, Spain, and other locations, FARC greatly benefitted from that joint work likely because the IRA had a great deal of diverse experience it could draw on to share with the FARC.

McAdam (1996) argues that allies are one of the critical attributes of the opportunity structure for social movements. Regarding dissident groups, Lichbach argues that *"coalitions" between dissident groups, while challenging to achieve, could help with resource sharing and increase the probability of their victory.*"<sup>25</sup>

Armed groups like Hezbollah and Amal, who have similar political goals, appeal to the same segment of society, Shia community, in the latter example. Ethno-political groups claim to represent a particular ethnic group, and often multiple terrorist groups claim to represent the same group. Therefore, they compete with each other for resources such as recruits and donations; this can turn them adversarial. Also, terrorist groups should benefit from being connected to groups that are themselves highly-connected<sup>26</sup>.

Philips<sup>27</sup> draws a counterintuitive conclusion by claiming that groups with violent adversarial relationships lengthen their survival because of four main reasons: it can encourage civilians to take a side, encourage crucial innovation, provide incentives to the group members and make it possible to spoil peace talks that if successful lead to the destruction of the terrorist groups.

### **9.1. Summary**

The main factors in the groups' circle are the availability of transnational character, the density of groups in the base state, the networking with another group violently can excel the group's performance.

## **10. The Adversary Circle**

The adversary circle represents the adversary layer that stands against the group, trying to liquidate the group through the adoption of different end methods; in this circle, the adversary circle represents the negative amount that tries to outweigh or offsets the pros of all the other circles.

### **10.1. Adversary Calculations**

*"Our grief has turned to anger and anger to resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done, and great harm*

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<sup>25</sup> LICHBACH, Mark Irving: *The rebel's dilemma*; An Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1995. pp. 255-256.

<sup>26</sup> Brian PHILIPS: *How Terrorist organization survive*; University of Pittsburg, 2012. p. 208.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid*, p. 65.

*has been done to us. We have suffered a great loss. And in our grief and anger, we have found our mission and our moment."* (President George Bush, 2001)

This concept was suggested by the author to mean that the adversary is not necessarily to fight his opponent with all his might; different calculations oblige him not to go to the extreme limit 'Bone Breaking Point' (BBP). An example from ordinary life, supposedly we might get insult from someone. Nevertheless, our reaction would be a simple one, while it is hard to sit idly if the same person touches children or a female.

In this personal level, the adversary calculation was raised, because he hits a sensitive issue, which is the honor, which causes a rise in the magnitude and direction of the reaction, though BBP differs from person to person.

The point that triggered the action from the adversary which I call 'Bone Breaking Point' (BBP), is the threshold point that triggers action from the adversary, while actions below that point can be tolerated or trigger less reaction. To provide historical pieces of evidence about this point put least, Emperor Timur lane defeated Sultan Bayezid in the battle of Ankara in the year 1401 after rude, threatening messages from the Sultan that raised Timur lane's resolve and let the Sultan move his forces from besieging Constantinople to Ankara and ignored the advice of his generals of not attacking the Mongols, all that led to taking the Sultan into captivity and committing suicide after the loss of the war.

The US before September 11, was not tough enough on terrorism, they reacted to explosions in Kenya and Tanzania with rocketing training camps inside Sudan and Afghanistan, when Qaida hit Cole in Yemen, Navy Commander Kirk Lippold, who had been commanding officer of the USS *Cole* said that the American people still did not recognize the threat. It will take some "seminal event" to awaken the public.<sup>28</sup> George Tenet (2007), in his biographical account 'At the center of the Storm' complained about the parsimonious character of the US administrations toward the CIA, before September 11, he complained about the critical lack of resources to tackle terrorism even in the side of unavailability of interpreters. All that changed after the attack<sup>29</sup>.

The American war against the Japanese in the WW2 was not up the right level, until the Japanese drown the US Navy in Pearl Harbor, that Japanese action was the 'Bone Breaking Point' that Americans could not tolerate the Japanese; hitting the world trade center and Pentagon was the BBP that the Americans brought the resolve and determination to fight the Qaida.

Israel's action toward the Popular Palestinian Front was magnified after they assassinated its minister Rabi'am Zeivy in Jerusalem.

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
<sup>28</sup> George TENET: At the center of the storm; Harper Collins, 2007. p.163

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

### 10.1.1. Bone Breaking Point

The threshold that the external enemy will override in order to defeat the organization, and it depends on his resolve.

This point has a dependency on the will of the adversary, the magnitude of the action, the international support. It is the threshold that the external enemy will override in order to defeat the organization, and it depends on his resolve.



**Figure 6: Bone Breaking Point**  
(Source: The author)

This point has a dependency on the will of the adversary, the magnitude of the action, the international support. Moreover, most importantly, it depends on public opinion. Israel needed the pretext to invade Lebanon in 1982 to expel the PLO, FATAH knew about that and acted accordingly, but Abu Nidal decide to shoot at the Israeli ambassador in London, and that was the BBP that Israel looked for (Seale, 1997).

If the enemy hits beyond that point, the political leadership will get the necessary public support to go to the extreme of war; this can get the proper explanation by the securitization theory.

### 10.1.2. The Factors concerning the Adversary Calculation

States weigh their actions toward their perceived enemies in many ways, and these can sum up by:

**The known Devil.** States prefer to keep dealing with the Devil that they already know, and his paradigm of thought is known and expected, and intelligence has their resources inside, rather than an unknown enemy.

**The security voids.** The security void exacerbates the situation, and typically lead to new, unexpected armed organizations that fill that void.

**Adoption of low-intensity conflict.** The group adopts methods of wars that are not materially costly, and their ability to inflict damages is limited.

**Political Reasons.** Which is usually that their persistence can keep the overall enemy divided and weak. For example, contributed to the divide and weakening of the PLO and can be used as a condition.

**Their Public Opinion. States** are concerned about their public opinion before any decisions to react, Politicians attenuate their reactions to their citizens.

**The Good Judgement.** for better use of adversary calculation , enemies need to have good decision-making process which is built on a good intelligence of their adversary , in order not to come to the wrong result, many researchers believe that Hezbollah in 2006 did not intend to have a full scale war, instead he intended to conduct an escalation in the borders for political benefits, the same occurred with Jamal abed-Alnaser in 1967 when he mobilized the Egyptian forces near the Israeli border and shut down the Tiran straits.

### ***10.2. The used End Method***

End method is the method to be used against the group; there are several methods which in general are: military campaigns, Policing, splintering, negotiations, politicizing

### ***10.3. Summary***

In this circle, the main items are the adversary calculation, which depends on the control of the group and the end method adopted by the adversary. The adversary calculation is a variable which conditions the magnitude and direction of the response (similar to victor), in order to measure it or prognosis it, one needs a full awareness of the internal politics of the region away from the mainstream media, an example is a flare-up between Hezbollah and Israel on September 1, 2019.

## **11. The International Circle**

In this level, semi-states strive to get international legitimacy and build relations that undermine their competitors and sustain their existence from economic sanctions.

It is essential not to be put on lists of terrorism that restraint their mobility and financial assets transfers. The collapse of the Soviet Union brought down many groups around who were assisted by the Communist parties, especially those fighting against western ideologies<sup>30</sup>.

## **12. Conclusions**

In this paper, an analytical framework was suggested to investigate the survival of violent armed groups, the model is built of the interaction of the armed group, with its base state, region, international, its main adversary and its networking with other armed groups.

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<sup>30</sup> Claire STERLING: Terror Network; Holt Rinehart, 1981.

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**NATIONAL SECURITY OF MOROCCO TOWARDS MIGRATION: A  
WEAK GOVERNANCE OF A TRANSIT DESTINATION PAR  
EXCELLENCE**

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*Abstract*

Morocco badly lacks regularization programs and requires a pragmatic mechanism of introducing and overseeing the implementation of a comprehensive socio-economic migration policies. The analysis of this paper will go beyond the analysis of immigration and regular migration-policies in Morocco, as well as its impact over the MENA region. Irregular migration is, first and foremost, driven by bad governance, besides the structural factors that often lie beyond the reach of immigration policies. In case of Morocco, bad governance and corruption dominate all sectors, affecting its immigration policies. So far, social policies affect the social security arrangements of irregular migrants, coming from the sub-Saharan region, which does directly influence young Moroccans' motivation to migrate as well. However, the phenomenon of irregular migration from the poverty-stricken South to the industrialized North is significantly argued about in Europe. Nevertheless, illegal migration as a mixed process is incompetently comprehended, due to the extreme rise of far-right parties, accompanying their political rhetoric that puts Brussels' immigration policies at stake. It is a mixture of conflicts and interests between the capital and labor markets, since the European developed states claim their needs for more labor, and yet the contrary is true for the block of poor eastern states, claiming that the African labor takes a big slice of the cake by stealing job opportunities from those who geographically belong to Europe. It is, however, a division in policy making between the west and east of the same Europe.

**Keywords:** Corrupted Governance, Global North vs. Poverty-stricken South, Mixed-Migration, Migration Policies, MENA, Political-Correctness, sub-Saharan migrants, National Security.

**Introduction**

The geopolitical strategy of the African continent and its neighboring Europe is dwarfed not only by its illustrious military history but by what it represents since Napoleonic times. The mysterious controversy of the Global North on one side as the First-World and the extreme misery of the Global South, laying not far on the other edge as the Third-World. From the top of the rock, Spain's Costa del Sol curves, only 15 miles across the hazy Strait of Gibraltar, the shores of Morocco beckon on the horizon. The coastal region of Morocco bows down with age and pressure to the rock of Gibraltar that looks as though it represents power and security to its city. Standing as a fortress and a strong stubborn dwarf of old England, Gibraltar is one of the last pieces of the British empire that one time back in history governed and influenced a quarter of the world. The cliffs of Africa and those of Gibraltar have created what the

Mediterranean world called the Pillars of Hercules. It is the only place in the whole world from where you can see two seas and two continents at the same time.

It is also where the First and the Third World collide, and yet where two divergent civilizations clash each other. Ceuta and Melilla internationally recognized as the Spanish enclaves on the very north African coast, geographically connecting the European and African continents. For the record, Morocco is considered a major transit locality for sub-Saharan migrants joined by Moroccan immigrants themselves besides other migrants from the Maghreb region. Since they all know for sure that once they set-foot-in either Ceuta or Melilla, they are very secure in the European Union territory. As a result of the existence of the EU's mainland on the tip-top of Africa, thousands of young desperate Africans risk their very life attempting to reach Europe through mostly Ceuta and Melilla or by crossing the Mediterranean Sea towards Spain mainly at night. To start their puzzling safari, sub-Saharan migrants illegally cross sometimes more than 4 to 7 countries, which might take very long months, in a very dangerous journey to reach Moroccan shores and then to be smuggled into Melilla or Ceuta.

The Spanish territory in Africa is regarded a pushover gateway to irregular migrants to Europe via the Mediterranean. The location of Melilla and Ceuta as two Spanish coastal-enclaves in northern Africa which constitute exclusively and geographically African mainland officially belonging to the European Union, as the result of which, the solely territory and borders between the first globally industrialized North and the rest of the Third world making two linked continents.

## **1. Geopolitical and historical overview**

The Kingdom of Spain and Morocco laid claim to sovereignty over Melilla and Ceuta as their official territories situated in North Africa. Initially, the Spanish control of the Sovereign Ceuta and Melilla goes back to 1492; in addition to that historical fact, Spain states their claim to the territories based on the majority of the Spanish inhabitants residing both cities who definitely wish and choose to remain Spaniards as well as Spanish under the Spanish constitution. Hence, the most important Spanish enclave of all other is Ceuta due to its geopolitical strategy which is situated at the eastern gateway leading to the Strait of Gibraltar.

It is crucially significant to analyze the Spanish-Moroccan border complexities from a geopolitical perspective based on the strength of what it represents as the biggest gateway of mass illegal migration from the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa. As Tim Marshall highlighted in the introduction of his 2016 book 'Prisoners of Geography'; "Overall there is no one geographical factor that is more important than any other. Mountains are no more important than deserts, nor rivers than jungles. In different parts of the planet, different geographical features are among the dominant factors in determining what people can and cannot do. Broadly speaking, 'Geopolitics' looks at the ways in which international affairs can be understood through geographical factors; not just the physical landscape – the natural barriers of mountains or connections of river networks, for example – but also climate, demographics, cultural regions and access to natural resources. Factors such as these can have an important impact on many different aspects of our civilization, from

political and military strategy to human social development, including language, trade and religion.”<sup>1</sup>

There is a rough estimation that after its independence in 1956 Morocco’s demographical nature would be a state of transit, destination and origin of illegal migrants’ par excellence. So far, the major contemporary worry causing geopolitical disquiet to both Europe and Africa is no more about the territorial disputes but much more about sub-Saharan migrants joined by irregular immigrants from all around the Maghreb region attempting to illegally reach European member states. Many incompatible variables emerge when trying to study and understand the geopolitical reasons that push-and-pull Morocco to be the Transit-Hub and the Catch-22 of illegal migrants from all over Africa. The first claimed variable is that Moroccan policy strive to reduce the weight of migration is with no doubt a hoax. It is all about looking at what causes mostly internal and external migration; therefore, corruption and bad governance is the Catch-22 which make the migration phenomenon unsolvable dilemma for the Moroccan autocracy. Adding to that the imperialistic policies that pressure people to illegally flee and migrate their homeland. Morocco’s major concern should be directed to governing policies that entrench minorities and well-educated individuals striving poverty. Hence, mixed migration in Morocco is a socioeconomic catch-22 that is puzzling-over all the 27 European member states.

Disputedly, Morocco aims at reanimating its policy in the Maghreb region to better improve the national security and become an important political and diplomacy-player in the MENA region. Additionally, Morocco’s strategy is packed by controversies, yet the government’s main objective is to get more of EU’s funding by taking advantage of irregular migrants, smuggling and human exploitation. Between January and August of 2019, FRONTEX, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, discovered 14,824 illegal border crossings at the Mediterranean Sea between Spain and the shores of Morocco, more than 4,213 border crossings were made by Moroccan young men and women.<sup>2</sup> In addition to that, an estimated 30 to 50% of migrants crossing the Mediterranean and successfully arriving at the shores of Southern Spain come originally from Morocco while 70% of illegal migrants are coming from other sub-Saharan countries. Hereby, the number of Moroccan nationals crossing the Mediterranean is considered by Frontex the second biggest nationality group of illegal border crossers at the western Mediterranean gateway.<sup>3</sup>

Eventually what it all comes down to, in the case of Morocco, is a combination of hybrid threats; such as incredible insecurity and high level of corruption due to serious deficiencies in governance. Consequently, the majority of young Moroccans have no other choice left other than to flee to Europe for the sake of a better prosperous

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<sup>1</sup> MARSHALL T.: Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps that Tell You Everything You Need to Know about Global Politics; 2016. p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> The largest group of people entering Morocco were persons of unknown nationality; the third largest group with 733 crossings were persons from Algeria. FRONTEX Flash Report: Irregular migration into EU at lowest level since 2013; <https://frontex.europa.eu/media-centre/news-release/flash-report-irregular-migration-into-eu-at-lowest-level-since-2013-n5pHiA> (downloaded: 30 March 2020)

<sup>3</sup> FRONTEX: Migratory Routes, Western Mediterranean Route; 2018. <https://frontex.europa.eu/along-eu-borders/migratory-routes/western-mediterranean-route/> (downloaded: 30 March 2020)

future. According to “UN Development Program report, 77% of young women and men believe their voice is unheard and have no opportunity to participate in their country’s government.”<sup>4</sup>

The Spanish Refugee Aid Commission submitted the 2017 report in which it explains lack of security, safety and instability in the country of origin and the fact that the Moroccan police have deployed more police officers to control the situation in the Northern Rif region than to promote national security for Moroccan citizens and foreigners as well as the control of its internal national territories.<sup>5</sup> For instance, it is very essential to be aware of what has divided Spanish-Moroccans inside and out of Ceuta and Melilla, and yet what continues to divide Moroccans inside and out of Western Sahara. There is no real study regarding the national security of Morocco towards Migration emphasizing a strategy and good governance that will endorse effective policies of a Transit-destination Par-Excellence which is basically located in terms of geopolitics as a whole.

Critically, the territorial and political disputes in the region do not stand or even make sense just because of the geographical location of Ceuta, Melilla and other Spanish enclaves on the northern tip-top of Africa, but rather it is the legacy of an authentic geopolitical arena as a fact of realities and mentalities of the localities of the Maghreb region. The situation is somehow what Tim Marshall stated in the introduction of his 2018 book “Divided”; *“In Africa, the borders left behind by colonialism are proving difficult to reconcile with tribal identities that remain strong. Across Europe the very concept of the European Union is under threat as the walls go back up, proving that the differences of the Cold War years have not entirely been resolved, and that nationalism has never really gone away in the age of internationalism.”*<sup>6</sup>

### **1.1 Migration Governance: Factors Influencing immigration in Morocco**

Socio-economic and geopolitical factors which directly impact immigrants to seek a better future outside their home land. There are various circumstances pushing young Moroccans to flee the country, the government, however, does not care at all about what is happening and yet has no real solutions on the table. In Morocco, youngsters find themselves drowning in poverty lack of opportunities, depression and starving for freedom and security. For instance, Moroccan middle-class families encourage their children to get out of the country as soon as they get their first high school degree. Hence, the general public on the bottom of the pyramid will do whatever it takes to escape illegally – with broken knees than to stay in Morocco notably those who drop out of school at an early age; otherwise, they end up in jail and the personage of this result is definitely high. The silent majority of young Moroccans possess nothing other than the vitality, independence and teen-age of their

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<sup>4</sup> United Nations News (2019): More than 90 per cent of Africa migrants would make perilous Europe journey again, despite the risks; <https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/10/1049641> (downloaded: 31 March 2020)

<sup>5</sup> CEAR: Refugees and migrants in Spain: the invisible walls beyond the southern border; p. 5. <https://www.cear.es/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/REPORT-MUROS-FRONTERA-SUR.pdf> (downloaded: 30 March 2020)

<sup>6</sup> MARSHALL T.: Why We’re Living in an Age of Walls; 2018. pp. 7-8.

youth, which is not welcomed by the regime, preparing the journey to escape to Europe.

In contrast to western societies, young Moroccans are not taken as the epitome of the Moroccan society in which the sheer pace of economic growth is regarded to set to engender a newly prosperous age of fun, freedom, and social harmony. Consequently, the government's policies target teenagers who are presented as being no more than a sharp end of consumers as empty results of what they are exposed to, yet they are distinguished not by their youth but by a particular style of conspicuous, leisure-oriented consumption. In Morocco the youngsters grow up thinking only about 'Hrig'.<sup>7</sup> Teenage boys and girls have not got dreams of what to become in the future, but rather when to break-out of Morocco and which EU member states one is thinking to live in. Enigmatically, it sounds like if young Moroccan men and women are doomed to hell, at the same time obsessed by the American episode of 'Prison Break' which indeed is very popular amongst Moroccan people due to the fact that the fifth season of the whole series was shot and filmed in Casablanca, Rabat and Ouarzazate. In fact, 'Prison Break' reflects the reality of desperate young Moroccans who take it for granted that Morocco is a huge and complex prison from which they are trying to continuously break out.

Alas, "good fences make good neighbors", is a Moroccan proverb that makes lots of sense; however, it is a maxim that exists in almost all cultures when it comes to drawing borders, it rather has a strong long-standing background and pervasiveness. It is an inescapable reality of the human condition which contradicts the very principles of different cultures and religions when it comes to migration, the situation that gives birth to another famous saying; *"If certain migrants are born poor, it is not their mistake but if they die poor, it is definitely their fault."*

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<sup>7</sup> 'Hrig' is an expression in Moroccan Arabic 'Darija' literally translated to 'Burning' phrase for 'Illegal migration' symbolizing the burning of a migrant's documents and ID evading to be repatriated if caught or arrested by authorities. 'Hrig' also symbolizes the burning of the migrant's miserable past in hopes of a prosperous life in Europe.



*Figure 1. Sub-Saharan Migrants sitting on top of European Border-Fences at Melilla, on the boundary line separating Spain and Morocco<sup>8</sup>*

As a labyrinth, a complicated irregular network of passages, paths and very exhausting roads crossing various countries to reach Morocco, in which it is difficult to find one's safe way to Europe. For a long time, Morocco has been a transit destination for sub-Saharan migrants and refugees dreaming of reaching EU member states. Hence, once these miserable migrants are inside Morocco seeking a permanent residence, the kingdom becomes their permanent Hell. For Moroccans who enter Ceuta or Melilla illegally, trying to cross to Spain, are automatically deported back, because of the bilateral treaty between Spain and Morocco. Nevertheless, it is good news for Sub-Saharan Migrants who will be luckily transported from Ceuta and Melilla to the Barcelona Asylum and Refuge Office (OAR)<sup>9</sup> in main land Spain where their case as refugees or asylum seekers will be treated since most of their countries have no such treaties with the Spanish government. Once irregular migrants enter Spain, they have two options; claim political asylum, or be considered economic migrants. Many Sub-Saharan migrants lack valid passports and IDs having risked their lives trying to cross the Mediterranean, others try to deliberately maneuver to disclose their origins so that Spanish officials could not deport them back home.

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<sup>8</sup> Source: <https://qz.com/917552/countries-are-using-the-eus-greatest-fear-as-their-ultimate-bargaining-chip/> (downloaded: 30 March 2020)

<sup>9</sup> Barcelona Ciutat Refugi. Available from: <https://ciutatrefugi.barcelona/en/international-protection-and-asylum-seeking-spain> (downloaded: 30 March 2020)



*Figure 2. Migrants strive to cross the razor-wire fences separating Spanish enclave of Melilla from Morocco*<sup>10</sup>

### ***1.2 Why Morocco is a Weak State and a High-Risk Partner to European Union!***

Far surpassing Greece, Italy, Libya and Malta, Morocco has become the major gateway for desperate irregular migrants attempting to reach and permanently settle down in one of European member states. In 2018, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), more than 57,250 migrants illegally managed to make their journey to Europe via the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, an average of almost 160 migrants arriving every single day to Spanish territories.<sup>11</sup> Judith Sunderland, a Human Rights Watch (HRW) highlights that definitely Moroccan government is doing ‘a lot of Spain’s Dirty Work’ to satisfy Europe by blocking, beating and harassing migrants whose interest is to cross to Ceuta and Melilla.<sup>12</sup> The first move was that Moroccan government took the responsibility of building a barrier and standing guard at the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla besides the Spanish borders. Morocco benefits from what is so-called ‘Advanced Status Partnership’ with Europe, which gives Morocco economic and political advantages in trade and political affairs. Thus, the European Union accounts for more than half of Morocco’s international trade; nevertheless, the EU provides Moroccan government with billions of Euros in terms of aid for security and development, therefore, in order to stay on very good terms with Europe, Morocco take on the job

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<sup>10</sup> BBC NEWS 2018. Ceuta & Melilla: Spain wants rid of anti-migrant razor wire. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-44485995> (downloaded: 29 March 2020)

<sup>11</sup> JUANA V.: Spain sees new record in migrant arrival in 2018. Half of all undocumented migrants who made the Mediterranean crossing came to Spanish shores; EL PAÍS. 2019. [https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/01/02/inenglish/1546421799\\_623057.html](https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/01/02/inenglish/1546421799_623057.html) (downloaded: 30 March 2020)

<sup>12</sup> Europe’s most fortified border is in Africa; [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LY\\_Yiu2U2Ts&t=324s](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LY_Yiu2U2Ts&t=324s) (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

of protecting Spain's borders, and yet has a real incentive to even do more just for the sake of EU grants and funding.

By far, Morocco has won a reputation for being a mammoth producer of illegal migration in terms of local immigrants as well as migrants from the neighboring Maghreb countries and Sub-Saharan migrants. As such Morocco is geographically a transit gateway to Europe via Spain.

Irregular migration, corruption and bad governance birthmark Morocco as a high-risk co-partner to the European Union notably due to its weak policies towards illegal migration and a willing to set up a healthy governance. The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) placed Morocco 87 out of 180 countries over the last decade.<sup>13</sup> High-level corruption broadcasts almost all public and private sectors which suffer uncontrolled corruption. As a result, it is an advantage for the very few people who possess connections, money, power for the sake of protection to achieve their goals illegally.

*“Moroccan entrepreneurs and foreign investors continue to describe corruption as the primary deterrent to investing in the corrupted kingdom. Thus, drivers of corruption are significantly tied to various attributes amongst which are those linked with the production and exports of the Moroccan ‘Hashish’<sup>14</sup> extracted of the Cannabis plant. As a result, senior officials of the armed forces, the security agencies and entrepreneurs with close ties to the monarchy benefit from unfair advantages by gaining illegal enrichment, and yet the very few continue to use their political connections to deny others the opportunity to compete with them on every level playing field as they are not held to account for engaging in corrupt behavior. The production and export of ‘Hashish’ in the northern region of Morocco is believed to generate revenues well above \$10 billion, a significant portion of which is laundered. Drug-trafficking and drug smuggling networks are tied to the bribery of judges, police and customs officers, as well as public prosecutors. Therefore, the existence of a broadly-based underground economy feeds corruption, in that it often leads to the use of money to convince state officials to commit even crimes. Consequently, the political and economic spheres do not operate independently due to personal connections to individuals well-positioned in the country’s perturbing corruption in such a complex structure remain a source of unjust advantage in all economic and political agreement.”<sup>15</sup>*

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<sup>13</sup> Transparency International; <https://www.transparency.org/research/cpi> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

<sup>14</sup> ‘Hashish’ is derived from the “Kief” plant or the dried resin, of the flowering tops of mature and unpollinated female cannabis plants. It is dried and pressed into small blocks and smoked. Morocco is internationally known by its high quality ‘Hashish’ which is in high demand abroad.

<sup>15</sup> Guilain P. DENOEU: Middles East; Corruption in Morocco: Old forces, New Dynamics & a Way Forward, 2007. <https://mepc.org/journal/corruption-morocco-old-forces-new-dynamics-and-way-forward> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

## 2. Western Sahara's Hybrid Challenges and Borders' Insecurity

Since 1963, 'Western Sahara' has been the longest and largest non-self-governing territory on the entire surface of the whole world. Geographically, 'Western Sahara' is a disputed territory situated in Northwestern Africa, on the Atlantic Coast between Mauritania and Morocco and in the Maghreb region of North and West Africa. It is partially controlled by the self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR)<sup>16</sup> and partially occupied by neighboring Morocco. The question is: how did it all start? So far, to quite clearly understand the geopolitical dilemma of 'Western Sahara', we've got to rewind all the way back to the Post-World War II era and the Decolonization of Africa.

Western Sahara was previously occupied by Spain until the late 20th century, *"on 26 February 1976, Spain informed the Secretary-General that as of that date it had terminated its presence in the Territory of the Sahara and deemed it necessary to place on record that Spain considered itself thenceforth exempt from any responsibility of any international nature in connection with the administration of the Territory, in view of the cessation of its participation in the temporary administration established for the Territory. In 1990, the General Assembly reaffirmed that the question of Western Sahara was a question of decolonization which remained to be completed by the people of Western Sahara."*<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, Morocco has illegally occupied Western Sahara since 1975 in violation of various resolutions and ceasefire by the United Nations Security Council and a decision by the International Court of Justice.<sup>18</sup>

The Maghreb region or North-Africa within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region doesn't usually come to mind when one thinks of turmoil, insecurity, instability and irregular migration crisis from Sub-Saharan region. Basically, the North African states are known for their ancient cities, iconic markets and mostly associated with high-level corruption due to the region is rich with natural resources. Morocco is a major example, the country is involved in an oft-forgotten, decades-long conflict and war in Western Sahara, one that has cost thousands of lives; nonetheless, never seems to grab headlines as its neighbors Algeria, Libya or Egypt.

### 2.1 Counter-Migration Intelligence & Borders Insecurity

Morocco's mixed illegal migration<sup>19</sup> and smuggling of desperate people is generated by drug trafficking, prostitution and organized crime in the big cities of the

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<sup>16</sup> 'SADR' stands for the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic.


Further reading: DAADAOU M.: The Western Sahara conflict: towards a constructivist approach to self-determination; *The Journal of North African Studies*, 2008. 13:2, pp. 143-156, DOI: 10.1080/13629380801996471

<sup>17</sup> United Nations (2016): The UNs and Decolonization; <https://www.un.org/dppa/decolonization/en/nsqt#edn2> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

<sup>18</sup> Stephen ZUNES: Morocco and Western Sahara; Institute for Policy Studies, 1998. [https://ips-dc.org/morocco\\_and\\_western\\_sahara/](https://ips-dc.org/morocco_and_western_sahara/) (downloaded: 30 March 2020)

<sup>19</sup> UNHCR: Asylum and Migration refers to flows of people travelling together, generally in an irregular manner, over the same routes and using the same means of transport, but for different reasons. The men, women and children travelling in this manner often have either been forced from their homes by armed conflict or persecution, or are on the move in search

kingdom notably Casablanca, Marrakech, Fes, Tangier and most of the northern part. Mixed migration takes place most regularly along the lines between two regions of vastly different levels of development, such as the Maghreb region and Sub-Sahara Africa. Nevertheless, the Sahara Desert throughout the length of Western Sahara and the Mediterranean Sea result in formidable obstacles, thousands of people cross them each year willing cross and illegally migrate to Spain through the Spanish enclaves located on the tip-top of Northern Africa. Roughly all Sub-Saharan migrants require help and assistance, and yet they are definitely ready to do whatever the business takes for the act of rendering the help and assistance to gain access to the crime of migrant smuggling and trafficking.



**Figure 3. Mixed migration routes to Western Sahara, Morocco, Spanish Enclaves and Europe**  
 (Source: International Organization for Migration – IOM)

Western Sahara is about the size of Colorado, it is home to roughly 600,000 inhabitants, most of whom are ethnically Sahrawi. True to its name, Western Sahara is a dry and inhospitable desert. However, it is extremely rich in Phosphate deposits and has access to offshore also very rich fishing grounds. It’s the biggest exporter of both phosphate and the best quality sardines in the whole world. As of now, Western Sahara is 80% illegally controlled by Moroccan authoritarian regime. The latter’s claim to the territory is contested by the homegrown liberation movement known as the Polisario-Front.

of a better life. <https://www.unhcr.org/asylum-and-migration.html> (downloaded: 02 April 2020)

In the 1950s, Spain and France began to give up their colonial holdings in North Africa and the Sahel, and new countries started to take shape; however, there still be quite a lot of influence from the imperial powers. Suddenly, we have had newly-free nations like Morocco eyeing territorial borders set-up by the former colonizers and wondering why those borders needed to be respected. One year after Morocco gained its independence, it laid its claim to Spanish-Controlled Western Sahara at the United Nations in 1957. The United Nations took over the case and in 1965, the body called on Spain to formerly decolonize the territory of Western Sahara once and for all. Over the period of eight years, the General Assembly adopted seven resolutions on Western Sahara, each reiterating the territory's right to self-determination.<sup>20</sup> Between 1966 and 1973, the United Nations General Assembly adopted seven more resolutions on the territory of WS, all of which reiterated the need to hold a referendum on self-determination.

It was at this time in 1973 that the Polisario-Front was fully formed. At first, the Saharawi insurgency fought against the Spanish occupiers in pursuit of independence; however, the situation drastically changed in 1975 when Moroccan dictator Hassan II defied a Hague-ruling that was in favor of West-Saharan self-determination. Ex-colonizers dictated on the autocrat what to do as a strategy, the Green March was launched, on November 6<sup>th</sup>, Morocco staked its claim to the territory as over than 350,000 unarmed civilians crossed into Western Sahara. The Green March which of course was neither peaceful nor unforced pressured Spain to handover Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania. The latter gave up its claim in 1979 after a powerful fight from the Polisario-Front took place.<sup>21</sup> The Green March move was condemned by the U.N and eventually triggered the Western Sahara war, which lasted from 1975 to 1991 with the Polisario-Front waging a violent guerilla warfare struggle against the poor Moroccan army. The conflict was bloody mainly during the early part of the war; however, the number of casualties experienced on both sides notably the Moroccan casualties is hard to determine due to unreliable reporting, some put the final death-toll at only 20,000.<sup>22</sup> The conflict led to the displacement of thousands of Sahrawis refugees, some of whom still reside in the Sahrawi refugee camps set up in Tindouf located in Southwest of Algeria. Five camps, Laayoune, Samara, Ausserd, Boujdour and Dakhla have been created in Algeria in 1975 to host refugees who are estimated to be over 173,600 today.<sup>23</sup>

In 1980, Morocco began building what became known as the 'Wall of Shame', finishing it in 1987. The Wall runs for 1,700 miles through Western Sahara, that the Sahrawi people call the 'Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic', and into parts of Morocco. Hence, it is built of sand piled almost 7 feet high, with a backing trench and millions of landmines stretching several miles into the desert on each side of the

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<sup>20</sup> MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara. Chronology of Events; <https://minurso.unmissions.org/chronology-events> (downloaded: 29 March 2020)

<sup>21</sup> GEOFFREY J.: War & Insurgency in the Western Sahara. 2013. pp. 5-17. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/164495/pub1152.pdf> (downloaded: 29 March 2020)

<sup>22</sup> Human Rights Watch Report, Keeping it Secret; The United Nations Operation in the Western Sahara, October 1995. Vol. 7 No. 7. <https://casebook.icrc.org/case-study/conflict-western-sahara> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

<sup>23</sup> Danish Refugee Council: Algeria Western Sahara East of the Berm. <https://drc.ngo/where-we-work/north-africa/algeria> (downloaded: 02 April 2020)

barrier. So far, it is thought to be the longest continuous minefield in the world.”<sup>24</sup> However, the ‘Wall of Sand’ does bring an end to illegal migration or safe and security to Moroccan citizens alike, but rather it brought shame to Moroccan government that engendered segregation as considerable controversy by dividing Moroccans. The population is driven to pursue the official tactic of a ‘Divide and Rule Policy’ has been systematically inherited by the French colonizers. The persistence of the Moroccan autocracy and slavery has completely changed the composition of the Western Saharan population as the government has encouraged Sahrawi people to settle down in different parts of Western Sahara by offering them tax-breaks, subsidies, free food and refueling and one-off payments.

After almost two decades of bloody war between the Polisario Front and the Moroccan regime, the United Nations finally brokered a ceasefire in 1991. However, the ceasefire agreement is still based on a referendum that hasn’t been held yet, as such the territory’s status remains undecided as Morocco maintains its illegal presence. Dramatically since then, several ceasefire violations have been occurred and reported.<sup>25</sup> The United Nations has recently tried to kick-start new peace talks, but progress is moving at a sluggish-pace. The conflict in Western Sahara languishes on as the world continues to avert its case.

The Western Saharan sectarian divide has resulted in years of sectarian violence and thousands of killings. The viewpoint of the government that constructed such division policies and the situation of those who kept out created illegal displacement of individuals which results in smuggling and human trafficking of people.

## ***2.2 Counter-Migration Security and Human-Smuggling***

Human smugglers in Morocco have never boomed as much as today, smuggling turned out to be resilient as business in the kingdom. Nowadays, what drives illegal migration from Morocco as the sending and hosting destination to the global North is neither conflicts nor politics. It is poverty that pushes people under much downward pressure of the outside harsh environment to which they are exposed to. Thus, irregular Sub-Saharan migrants are rather facing the absolute limitations to support their families and themselves. These people do not recognize any borders or the complicated restrictions EU member states impose on them when it comes to visas and passports. “Morocco is a source, destination, and transit country for men, women, and children who are subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Some rural Moroccan girls as young as 6 years old are recruited to work in domestic service in cities and become victims of forced labor, experiencing nonpayment of wages, threats, restrictions on movement, and physical, psychological, or sexual abuse.”<sup>26</sup> The Palermo protocol defines human smuggling as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent

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<sup>24</sup> MARSHALL T.: *Divided: Why We’re Living in an Age of Walls*; 2018. pp. 175-176.

<sup>25</sup> A little-known conflict has been going on in the small north African country of Western Sahara. This war between the Sahrawi indigenous Polisario Front and the Moroccan autocracy has resulted in thousands of displaced Sahrawis and an estimated 20,000 deaths.

<sup>26</sup> United States Department of State (2015): *Trafficking in Persons Report – Morocco*; <https://www.refworld.org/docid/55b73bc011.html> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

resident.”<sup>27</sup> Additionally, “Morocco ratified the Palermo Protocol against Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children, in April 2011 but it reportedly has made little effort to address human trafficking, instead focusing on arrests and expulsions while not proactively attempting to identify trafficking victims mostly sub-Saharan and provide them with the protection and assistance.”<sup>28</sup>

Irregular migrants might be poor, but not stupid. All they need is lack of security and easy borders to cross; therefore, Morocco is absolutely packed with such peculiarities. In order to minimize the risks, Sub-Saharan migrants use their smartphones to manipulate the possible routes through Western Saharan territory or very possibly to be smuggled via Algeria to Morocco trying to reach the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla towards Europe in such frustrating and dangerous journey. As such, Morocco is a transit destination par-excellence based on security deficiency and borders’ dispute on the north and the northwest coast of Africa. Hence, the purpose of human smuggling and migrant’s exploitation in Morocco is directly related to a corrupted system as a whole in a supposed country loaded with poverty, absence of strategy and very bad governance.

The concept of ‘mixed-migration’ is peoples’ life-based displacement that could be interpreted as “a process of moving, either across an international border, or within a State. Encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes refugees, displaced persons, uprooted people and economic migrants which includes all sorts of irregular migration.”<sup>29</sup> It is true that globalization brings mobility and global displacement of people, and consequently more and more people feel they are more citizens of the world. The controversy is that, on the one hand, ‘mixed-migration’ gives rise to the far-right movements in European societies that are fearful and have cultural anxieties which become very fragile. On the other hand, people who are forced to leave their homeland are doing so not for cultural clash or religious’ sake, but rather they are the most individuals escaping poverty and ready to adapt in their imagined and supposed new society. Basically, the integration of immigrants is regarded as coming to resemble the native-born, which is a two-way process. The same as for irregular migrants who decide to migrate to Europe because simply the majority of whom adapt into the lifestyle once in Europe, and yet unconsciously native-born Europeans also change and adapt to the cultural contributions the new comers bring with them. So far, common people do not understand that it is a multifaceted dimension of integration influenced by the country of origin as well as in the intended country of destination.

Spain alone could not dismantle irregular migration networks crossing the Mediterranean from Morocco. Smugglers are working around the clock every single

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<sup>27</sup> United Nations (2018): United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto; <https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

<sup>28</sup> Global Detention Project; Morocco Immigration Detention, 2014. <https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/africa/morocco> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

<sup>29</sup> IFRC (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies), 2012. The phenomenon of migration: Its significance or meaning in human societies throughout history. <https://www.ifrc.org/en/news-and-media/opinions-and-positions/speeches/2012/test/> (downloaded: 01 April 2020)

day as smuggling facilitation is going on. Thus, the Moroccan government does not possess any political approach or intention to stop human trafficking networks. As a result, profit-seeking criminals and the mafia networks continue to grow and make political connections inside the government, which is one of many insecurity failures dealing with smuggling people and drugs into Europe. In September 2013, Moroccan government made an announcement that startled the country's civil society, it claimed that it would be reforming its national migration policy. It is an attempt of Moroccan government to get some more millions of Euros from Europe, another funding that will definitely end up faster in the pockets of greedy ministers in charge of immigration policies who enrich themselves at the expense of the people. The call was for the drafting of a new comprehensive policy on immigration with the intention of providing a path to regularization for irregular migrants, the majority of whom originates from Sub-Saharan countries. As the recent migration crises and unemployment in Spain, Italy and France, sub-Saharan Migrants tend to get the Moroccan permanent residence and then prepare their next plan towards Turkey applying for a touristic visa, which will make it easier for them to enter Greece or cross through Eastern Europe to Germany and to the rest of Scandinavian countries. This tactic is increasingly successful and working to irregular migrants via Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Morocco, often using the region as a point of transit to Europe.

## CONCLUSION

Not far from the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, sub-Saharan migrants seeking passage to Europe every single day. Since the early 2000s, the European Union has pressured, at the same time provided Morocco with millions of Euros to block irregular migrants transiting the country. Morocco is not reluctant to act as a policeman for Europe by doing the dirty job; Moroccan government has over time become a cheap and natural detention center for sub-Saharan irregular migrants. As the recent migration crises made it clear, sub-Saharan Africans are increasingly migrating at the first place to Morocco via Western Sahara, Algeria and Tunisia, usually using the region as their excellent hub and the point of transit to the European member states.

There are certainly many other factors to take into consideration whilst tackling the phenomenon of mixed migration particularly when the host countries are enduring corruption, unemployment that leads to extreme poverty, economic recession and policies hostile to migrants in general. In such contexts, there is no magic recipe to apply literally and establish an atmosphere of coexistence between the global North and the global South.

The points discussed in this paper should purposely serve a holistic picture which aims at creating an opportunity for mostly irregular migrants and refugees alike, the same as in their new communities to benefit from each other economically, socially and culturally. In order to avoid triggering over-emotionalism of dependence and potential loss of sociability for introversion and extremism, irregular migrants neither should be abandoned nor left to the fate of their corrupted governments; they should rather be offered better opportunities as their basic human necessities at least as all human rights organizations suggest to make full use of their potentials.

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ATTILA MÁTÉ KOVÁCS

**STRANGER THINGS – THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES RELATED TO THE INTERNET OF THINGS**

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*Abstract*

The Internet of Things (IoT) is often seen in the context of a fourth industrial revolution, which will take interconnectedness, based on the internet, on a new level. Increased data collection, thoroughly monitored customer and user behavior, and the increased need for data miners and analysts are all part of this transformation. Security concerns, however, are not only there, but with new platforms and methodologies in the business world, new ways of attacks, obtaining data, and making service providers unavailable emerged. Germany aims to implement a 10-15 years-long strategy to accelerate its economy's digitalization and maintain its status among the world leaders in terms of industry and research. In this current era of digitalization, the security of data, different digital applications, and various organizational procedures have become extremely important. Safety, security, and resilience in the cyber world are gaining recognition today. This is a wide concept which has driven the attention on a global level. The European Commission Communication “Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector” released in July 2013 was one of the first policy documents published by a European Union institution to influence the December European Council. Today various human factors and the right education also play a vital role in the growth and understanding of cyber resilience and have given birth to many cyber resilience programs.

**Keywords:** Internet of Things, industrial revolution, industry 4.0, Germany, european commission, European Council, cyber resilience

**1. INTRODUCTION**

In the 2013 European Council Conclusions<sup>1</sup>, heads of state and government highlighted the importance of effective common security and defence policy. The need for strong military capabilities and a healthy, innovative, and competitive European defence technological and industrial base was also underlined.

The above also led to the setting of specific tasks by heads of state and government for the European Defence Agency. In terms of capability development, the agency received support for four key programmes: remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS), air-to-air refuelling, satellite communications, and cyber defence.

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<sup>1</sup> European Council Conclusions (19-20 December 2013), pp. 6-7, <http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-217-2013-INIT/en/pdf> (downloaded 14 April 2020)

The military recognizes cyberspace as the fifth domain of operation other than, air space, land, and the sea. The accomplishment of a common military operation in the other fields is facilitated by, and reliant on the guaranteed readiness of, and accessibility to, cyberspace.<sup>2</sup>

And while the role of cybersecurity for European Union member states was prioritized in 2013 and authorized by the Council, cybersecurity in the EU also includes the cyber defence dimensions.

Cyber defence and security refer to the body which is responsible for handling the technologies, procedures and various practices designed not only to protect the programs, networks, and data but also devices from any attack or unauthorized access from an external resource. This type of security might also refer to the technical security of information.

Cybersecurity is also one of the urgency actions that are underscored by the capability development plan of the EDA. Whereas cyber resilience, security, and safety might refer to the measure of how an organization can be able to manage a cyber-attack or any breach of data while conforming various business activities effectively.<sup>3</sup>

The main aim of this type of security is to ensure that all the operations of an organization are well protected and any threat or breach would not be able to demobilize the business setup. Although some of these threats for an organization might be intentional where a hacker attempts to hack into the business system, while some might be unintentional in case of a failure to maintain software at the end of management.

## **2. ROLE OF CYBER, SECURITY, SAFETY AND RESILIANCE**

Cybersecurity, safety, and resilience are considered as the most suitable preventive measures for counteracting any human error in case of ill-maintained software and hardware where they are insecure. So the role of cyber resilience is to be able to actively protect the whole organization taking into account all the considerations and components of the organizational infrastructure. Over the period of time, cyber safety, resilience, and security have evolved involving the four basic components, i.e., threat protection, recoverability from the damage, adaptability, and durability of the system.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>2</sup> LEISTERER, H.: New EU cyber security legislation; Q & A with Andreas Schwab Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society (HIIG) Published On: 14 Jul 2016.

<sup>3</sup> LANTTO, H. – ÅKESSON, B. – SUOJANEN, M. – TUUKKANEN, T. – HUOPIO, S. – NIKKARILA, J. – RISTOLAINEN, M.: Wargaming The Cyber Resilience of Structurally And Technologically different Networks; Security and Defence Quarterly, 2019.

<sup>4</sup> JANICKE, H. – JONES, K. – MAGLARAS, L.: Security, Privacy and Trust in Cyber Physical Systems; ICST Transactions on Security and Safety, 2016. 3(7), p.151724.

The main task of the ETEE platform within the EDA is the coordination of cybersecurity and defence training and education for member states. The existing training is harmonized and standardized, and the new courses are offered to close the gap between training needs and training activities.<sup>5</sup>

The focus on defence, security and resilience also strengthened by EDA's activity shall provide a deeper understanding of a wide array of areas that include state security, cybersecurity, and disaster resilience which involve highly novel applications of systems analysis in enhancing security and resilience across the region by the European Defence Agency. The importance of such endeavours is to measure the possible effect that dangers put on the adaptations of communities into their changing social, industrial contexts and environments.

One key area of attention is the identification of security and the exploitation of individual data by organized crimes. It can involve the identity of securities and the exploration of individual data by organized criminals.<sup>6</sup>

A significant part of the focus on the defence, resilience, and security theme is the resilience of disaster. It has been betrothed in many stakeholder programs of studies including clarification of disaster resilience and trial and making new materials to assess this resilience in the community of the EU member states.<sup>7</sup>

Four main work strands are defined by the defence part of the EU cybersecurity strategy; to build the EU's cyber defence policy framework; dialogue with the international partners and other major stakeholders; to build capabilities of cyber defence with the member states of the EU; and promotion of the civil-military dialogue.<sup>8</sup>

The perception of the public may be that cyber defence is mainly technology-related and not an issue for humans/public. Technology is evolving very fast. To do away with technical weaknesses; therefore, human factors are quickly developing as the primacy, which displaces issues of technology. The human being is and continues to be the most precious cyber defence asset where awareness and know-how of people is a vital necessity for a European defence philosophy which enables operational capability that is acceptable in the technological age of today.

Decision-makers shall also be able to understand the importance and complexity of cyber factors and the impact of cyber operations when making decisions. Thus, in

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<sup>5</sup> MIRAGLIA, P. – OCHOA, R. – BRISCOE, I.: Transnational organized groups and fragile states; OECD. Development Cooperation working papers, International Center for the Prevention of Crime and the Clingendael Institute, 2012.  
<https://www.oecd.org/dac/accountable-effectiveinstitutions/WP3%20Transnational%20organised%20crime.pdf> (downloaded 14 April 2020)

<sup>6</sup> FICHTNER, L.: What kind of cyber security? Theorising cyber security and mapping approaches; University of Hamburg, 15 May 2018 DOI: 10.14763/2018.2.788

<sup>7</sup> MIRAGLIA – OCHOA – BRISCOE (2012) op. cit.

<sup>8</sup> WILLIAM H.: Fostering a cyber security mindset; Michigan State University, 19 Jan 2017. DOI: 10.14763/2017.1.443

order to attain acceptable operative cyber defence proficiency, it is vital to have a cyber defence focus during training, exercises, and education.<sup>9</sup>

However, a challenge for the military both now and in the coming times will be how to grow and retain enough qualified people who are trained in cybersecurity in their armed forces. The group of young cyber endowments who have the perspective of becoming a specialist in cybersecurity is very small. This is in spite of the fact that the technology market in cybersecurity is wide and still emerging. Therefore, the military needs to get newer inventive ways to brand the military an attractive option for individuals with cybersecurity talents if they want to get the right people available.<sup>10</sup>

### ***2.1. Threat Protection***

With the evolution of technology over the period of time, the threat of cyber-attacks has also increased. Today the basic security and orthodox safety measures are not effective enough to protect the organizations anymore. The companies today need to take the right steps in order to ensure their cyber resilience.<sup>11</sup>

Initially, the companies are required to work on email attacks which are now becoming the most common type of cyber threats. Moreover, the organizations also need to go beyond their anti-spam and anti-virus software and design more authentic mechanisms for the organization. This would also ensure that there is no gap between the email securities of the organization, which might require the IT team of the organization to take into the assistance of a third party. But investing in such solutions has now become extremely important for the safety and security of the organization

EDR or End Point Detection and Response are considered as the most suitable option for the organizations in the current business scenario against various cyber threats. These EDR tools play an important role in monitoring the endpoint and other network events within the organization by not only recording the information available but also in detecting, investigating and reporting all the activities within the organization. Detection of various threats within the organization are often facilitated by the effective utilization of analytic tools which play an important role in cyber resilience, security and safety of the organization by not only deflecting the common threats but also by facilitating the identification of ongoing attacks in their initial stage.<sup>12</sup>

### ***2.2. Recoverability***

This is among the most important abilities of the organization to act normally and to function in accordance with the aftermath observed by the organization. An effectively designed ransomware attacks which can help in encrypting the data of the organization, help it either pay the ransom to the attacker or to potentially lose the

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<sup>9</sup> MIRAGLIA – OCHOA – BRISCOE (2012) op. cit.

<sup>10</sup> WILLIAM (2017) op. cit.

<sup>11</sup> TAGAREV, T.: DIGILIENCE - A Platform for Digital Transformation, Cyber Security and Resilience; Information & Security: An International Journal, 2019. 43(1), pp. 7-10.

<sup>12</sup> DARLING, J.: Systems Approach Solution: Cyber Security and Power Industry Resilience; Engineering & Technology Reference, 2016.

data. this protection requires to either maintain the thorough backup of the data maintained on a different network which can be later used or restored.<sup>13</sup>

It would not be wrong to say that running a simulation of a data breach of the organization or network; it definitely helps in strengthening the security measures and the cyber resilience by enhancing the digital safety for the organization.<sup>14</sup> It is one of any organization's most important responsibilities to assess all the steps which the organization might observe in case of any breach of data in order to escalate the security measures, being able to communicate with the customers on time and also to inform the stakeholders of all the relevant information and also to be able to inform the relevant law enforcement agencies against such acts of breach.

### ***2.3. Adaptability***

Since these acts of breach are constantly increasing with the increasing digital exposure of the organization systems, there is a need for the organizations to continually redefine their strategy against these breaches and also to protect the infrastructure of the organization. This can be done by evolving the security measures and also by adapting to the changing trends of the business scenario against any probable future threats.

The security teams responsible for cyber resilience of the organization need to design new strategies for the detection of any threats and keep on developing new plans against these threats to ensure the safety of the organization. It is extremely important that the infrastructure of the organization keeps on evolving, especially designing a built-in administrator tracking system in order to identify the threats on time.<sup>15</sup>

It would not be wrong to say that adaptability is the key component when it comes to cyber resilience, security, and safety of an organization. It helps in generating the desired user awareness, educating the intended audience and also in recognizing the actual root of these threats by also being able to automatically remove these threats on time.

### ***2.4. Durability***

The durability of these cyber resilience programs helps in enhancing the success factors of the organization. If the organization has designed the right set of resilience, an effective safety plan, and a secure digital working environment it would be able to enhance its productivity over the period of time and also would be able to no integrate the right security measures according to the needs of the organization.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> TAGAREV (2019) op. cit.

<sup>14</sup> ZHU, M. – LIU, P.: Reviewing the book “Principles of Cyber-physical Systems” from a security perspective; ICST Transactions on Security and Safety, 2015. 2(4), p.150480.

<sup>15</sup> DE CRESPIGNY, M.: Building cyber-resilience to tackle threats; Network Security, 2012(4), pp. 5-8.

<sup>16</sup> TAGAREV, T. – SHARKOV, G. – STOIANOV, N.: Cyber Security and Resilience of Modern Societies: A Research Management Architecture; Information & Security: An International Journal, 2017. 38, pp. 93-108.

### 3. ROLE OF HUMAN FACTOR IN CYBER RESILIENCE, SECURITY AND SAFETY

Mistakes made by humans are inevitable; we all are prone to making mistakes one way or the other. Especially when it comes to cybersecurity, the human factor plays the most important role and at the same time are the biggest challenge an organization might face. It can be said that human error is one of the leading reasons for the cause of data and security breaches across the world.<sup>17</sup>

There are a number of socially engineered threats that are often ignored as they are in most of the cases preying on human errors. Such threats focus on adapting to the psychological manipulation of the users and making them act in the direction intended. This can most commonly be observed in case of email attacks like phishing where the network demands the users to click on a certain link, malware download or even asking for the password and financial authorization from the users.

It is now the responsibility of the users to identify and always double-check the sender before clicking any link or sharing any personal information to any digital network. Even if the source seems to be legitimate or trusted, there is still a chance that they might be fake id and might infect the network just by the simple tap.<sup>18</sup>

In order to deal with human errors, it is important to enable computer systems to develop and manage a plan or roadmap which is not only accessible physically but also mentally where the users can easily get a hold and understanding of this plan. Optional or contingency based automation may help the users identify the difference between the malware and actual information available to them.

Moreover, users should also be able to integrate the safe encryption and authentication of the data as required by also being able to move to the right cloud-based solutions.

All the users within the organization must be aware of a set of rules and some basic actions which would help in ensuring cyber resilience, security, and safety of an organization:

- Must always use a strong and difficult to guess and should also keep on changing it at regular intervals.
- Must regularly update the operating system and other software and especially antiviruses to ensure the security of the organization.
- Must keep a regular backup of all the important files all the time.
- A habit of using encryption codes and digital signature should be develop in order to prevent any malpractice.
- Individuals should always be vigilant, especially when it comes to adopting security practices and surfing online.

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<sup>17</sup> TRAN, H. – CAMPOS-NANEZ, E. – FOMIN, P. – WASEK, J.: Cyber resilience recovery model to combat zero-day malware attacks; *Computers & Security*, 2016. 61, pp. 19-31.

<sup>18</sup> MAGLARAS, L., FERRAG, M., DERHAB, A., MUKHERJEE, M., JANICKE, H. and RALLIS, S.: Threats, Countermeasures and Attribution of Cyber Attacks on Critical Infrastructures; *ICST Transactions on Security and Safety*, 2018. 5(16), p.155856.

- Users need to be very careful when it comes to fighting against socially engineered attacking techniques.
- Users should only share limited personal information on the online forums

#### **4. CYBER EDUCATION, TRAINING, EXERCISE AND EVALUATION (ETEE) PLATFORM**

With the increasing number of digital threats, a number of steps are being taken to prevent these threats. ETEE platform is one of the steps towards cyber resilience, security, and safety. These are the training programs that are harmonized with the increasing demands of cyber resilience and also play a huge role in filling the gap between the training needs of the relevant users.<sup>19</sup>

EDA has a structured needs analysis for cyber defence whereby it does the development, piloting, and delivery of different defence and cybersecurity courses. These courses range from basic awareness, expert level to decision making. The collaborative project ideas for EU member states include mutually increasing the availability of virtual cyber defence training and exercise.<sup>20</sup>

In response to a requirement by the member states to fill the skills gap in cyber defence, EDA played a significant role in the development of the design proposal of the ETEE platform. This was done by following the outcomes of the relevant feasibility study which were properly adapted to the needs of the member states.

Thus member states also agreed to start work on a platform that provides member states with education, training, exercise, and education (ETEE). The training services are mostly in the field of cybersecurity and defence. The platform is led by the European Defence Agency.

The main task of the ETEE platform within the EDA is the coordination of cybersecurity and defence training and education for member states. The existing training is harmonized and standardized, and the new courses are offered to close the gap between training needs and training activities.<sup>21</sup>

Further, the EDA will liaise with the European Security and Defence College for the building and implementation of the platform. For sustained delivery in the future, the EDA will seek to migrate existing initiatives on education, training, and exercises to the ETEE platform.<sup>22</sup>

These training programs are designed based upon the EDA Cyber Defence Training Needs Analysis, and the experiences gained in the past in order to take the right initiative with the right set of capability development plans for the organizations. Moreover, these training programs are also established along with the CSDP training

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<sup>19</sup> SHALAMANOV, V.: Towards Effective and Efficient IT Organizations with Enhanced Cyber Resilience; Information & Security: An International Journal, 2017. 38, pp. 5-10.

<sup>20</sup> LEISTERER (2016) op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> MIRAGLIA – OCHOA – BRISCOE (2012) op. cit.

<sup>22</sup> LEISTERER (2016) op. cit.

and education for various sectors of the audience according to their needs and demands where they would be able to fulfill their needs more effectively according to the trends and demands in the global market scenario.<sup>23</sup>

The training program also contains a highly unique application of design methodologies and system analysis, enhancing resilience and securities across these areas. The importance of these developments is evaluated on the likely outcomes that such dangers impact on the communities and the adaptation in the environments to come from the study.

## 5. OPPORTUNITIES OF IoT

We live in the age of Big Data. From cars to social media, from CCTV cameras to indoor sensors, there are multiple ways currently employed to collect data about individuals, groups, societies, and mankind itself<sup>24</sup>. This amount of data must be systematized and analyzed in order to provide meaningful results, however, which requires a significant number of experts all over the world: according to a 2011 report of McKinsey, the United States alone will need 140 to 190 thousand data analysts<sup>25</sup> in order to be able to comprehend the data it collects.

Nevertheless, Big Data is only a segment of a much larger process that is usually referred to as the Fourth Industrial Revolution or Industry 4.0. Following the first from the 18<sup>th</sup> century, which led to mechanization, the second with electrification and the third that began computerization<sup>26</sup>, the Fourth Industrial Revolution is based on the Internet of Things (IoT), an interconnected network of household appliances, tools, and devices.

### 5.1. How does it work?

The Internet of Things is a system among our tools, household appliances, and other devices we use, connected to the internet. The way it is working is based on the simple idea of interconnectedness: from the lightbulbs at home to the shelves in the stores, from the parking meter to our tablets, all devices are connected to the internet. *“For example, ‘Waze’ is an application of social media that generates social data about traffic. Users can provide information about hazards, traffic density, location of police, and other data. Combining Waze with sensor-based media provides users with a unique view of traffic and the context (hazards, police, etc.)”*<sup>27</sup> (O’Leary, 2013, p.57).

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<sup>23</sup> ZHU – LIU (2015) op. cit.

<sup>24</sup> EINAV L. – LEVIN J.: Economics in the age of big data. Science Magazine, 2014. Vol 346. Issue 6210. pp. 715-721.

<sup>25</sup> LOHR, S.: The age of big data; The New York Times, 2012. <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html> (downloaded 22 April 2017)

<sup>26</sup> BLIGH-WALL, S.: Industry 4.0: Security imperatives for IoT – converging networks, increasing risks. Cyber Security: A Peer-Reviewed Journal. 2017. Vol 1,1. p. 61-68.

<sup>27</sup> O’LEARY, D.E.: ‘Big Data’, the ‘Internet of Things’ and the ‘Internet of Signs’; Intelligent Systems in accounting, finance and management, 2013. Vol 20. p. 53-65.

There are four major building blocks of the IoT: first, the hardware. This helps producing the data via monitoring user behavior. The second block is communication. This makes it possible to send data from one tool to a data center or to another device. The third block is the software part, which required to methodization of the collected data. Fourth: applications. These are the tools that help understand and analyze the collected data, which leads to better understanding of device performance, user behavior and other crucial aspects (IOT platforms, 2015).

One of the primary results of this transformation is the accelerated digitalization of businesses [17]. As IoT is capable of delivering time to value in a decreased amount of time, it will increase productivity, resulting in more substantial gains for business owners. According to a PWC analysis, the European industry sector can expect 110bn euros of additional revenue, thanks to Industry 4.0 [17].

## 5.2. Potentials of the Future

The Internet of Things is continuously growing: approximately 25 billion devices and appliances will be connected to the internet by 2020, while it will provide around \$11 trillion in business opportunities, which is circa 11 percent of the world's economy (IOT platforms, 2015). The expansion will also be seen in both data and its usage: the International Data Corporation (IDC) expects the amount of data in the world to reach 44 zettabytes by 2020 (IOT platforms, 2015), resulting in the focus of businesses shifting from selling products to selling data itself. This will also lead to the emergence of new industries completely built around such data, methodizing, analyzing, buying and selling it.

A great example of how a country can aim to utilize the fourth industrial revolution's benefits can be seen in Germany and its "I40" program that seeks to provide opportunities in the fields of "*customer-specific design, flexibility through CPS-based networking; improved decision-making and early verification of design; adaptation of resource consumption; interactive collaboration of workers and systems; and improved work-life balance by flexible work models*"<sup>28</sup>. This program, and in general the German way of approaching Industry 4.0 will be discussed later, but first some concerns regarding the whole process must be introduced.

## 6. SECURITY CONCERNS

Although it may seem a completely new challenge for security professionals, Industry 4.0 often overlaps with previously discovered cybersecurity issues such as the protection of information technology systems, the physical security of buildings or offices and the protection of operational and monitoring systems.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless it definitely brings novelty as well: any kind of attack can have a much larger impact due to interconnectedness and the always increasing amount of data collected from various sources. Therefore the security of data is one of the key elements of cybersecurity within the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

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<sup>28</sup> Digital Transformation Monitor (2017): Germany: Industrie 4.0.  
[https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/monitor/sites/default/files/DTM\\_Industrie%204.0.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/growth/tools-databases/dem/monitor/sites/default/files/DTM_Industrie%204.0.pdf) (downloaded: 23 December 2017)

<sup>29</sup> BLIGH-WALL (2017) op. cit.

### 6.1. Types of concerns

One of the key concerns regarding Industry 4.0 is regarding availability: as data is connected in hubs, shutting them down can cause significant problems for a whole network of devices and services, and thus, to businesses.<sup>30</sup> Regarding cloud computing, availability is a similarly major issue. It is also important to mention confidentiality: as cloud computing is an increasingly important segment of data management, service providers must ensure the confidential treatment of the data they are entrusted with. Confidentiality is also a key question with Big Data itself as often data is collected anonymously, and it should remain as such.<sup>31</sup>

### 6.2. Types of attacks

It is also important to discuss the most typical ways of attacks against systems within Industry 4.0. The first is the creation of new infrastructure, where any member of a specific, decentralized system can launch an attack, making identification much more difficult. Another method is retrofitting, where Industry 4.0 technologies are integrated into older ones, and exploited by their already known vulnerabilities.<sup>32</sup> Cloud manufacturing can also be dangerous: this method includes the creation of fake cloud computing technologies and may lead to unlawful data collection. The production of digital twins to copy all data coming and going through the original one is also a widely used method.<sup>33</sup> These are only a few examples, but their combination or the involvement of other attacking strategies can cause a serious threat to Industry 4.0 technologies.

## 7. ARE WE PREPARED – A GERMAN EXAMPLE

Germany is among the first countries to focus on the implementation of Industry 4.0 technologies on a state level. They introduced the “Industrie 4.0” initiative to tackle the challenges this new industrial revolution brings and maintain Germany’s position as one of the leaders of industrial production in the world. The aim of the *Industrie 4.0* program is to mix public and private funding in order to “drive digital manufacturing forward by increasing digitalisation and the interconnection of products, value chains and business models. It also aims to support research, the networking of industry partners and standardisation”.<sup>34</sup> This is a mid-term program, with a 10-15 years long manifestation period. Nevertheless the *Industrie 4.0* must tackle several challenges as well: one of them is the balancing between various interests of sectors and industries. Also it offers to small and medium-sized enterprises the chance (SME) to join temporary production networks based on their value, however, the constant changes from one network to

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<sup>30</sup> DELOITTE: Industry 4.0 and cybersecurity; <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/tr/Documents/risk/industry4-0-cybersecurity.pdf> (downloaded: 22 December 2017)

<sup>31</sup> RUBIO, J. E. (2017): Analysis of cybersecurity threats in Industry 4.0: the case of intrusion detection; <https://www.critis2017.org/Presentations/OralPres43.pdf> (downloaded: 22 December 2017)

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Digital Transformation Monitor (2017)

another increases instability, which must be addressed<sup>35</sup>, similarly to the previously mentioned methods of retrofitting, fake cloud computing and so on.

In sum, Germany is aiming to accelerate its economy by implementing the developments of the new IoT system, while researching and improving it in the same time. Their aim is to increase revenue by the increased digitalization of systems; nevertheless the security concerns and challenges must be addressed in order to make this program successful. The German approach is interesting for other states as well, as it can show the direction of development for national and international economies worldwide.

## 8. CONCLUSION ON EDUCATION

Cyber resilience, security, and safety are now among the most important concepts with the increasing digitalization across the world. With the evolution of technology where it has explored new ventures for the business organizations, on the same side it has also paved its way for the increasing number of threats for the organization, data and information stores. Although human error plays a vital role against the security breach of many different networks, it can also be said that there is a pressing demand for the organizations to continually keep on improving their security systems to ensure cyber resilience and also to ensure the right safety plan in action.

And from both a general and specific EDA perspective, human beings are the users and the last specialists of cyber defence lines of defence. For both assailants and protectors, technology is the enabler with which they try to fulfill their purposes and achieving their aims. In this sense, there is no variance between the cyber area and the earlier ones.<sup>36</sup>

To ensure cyber resilience, several steps are taken on a global level; ETEE is among one of these important steps. This is a training program to create awareness and education on a global level. It can be concluded that although the risk of cyber threats is increasing, there is also an increasing demand to generate more educational and training programs to generate the right set of awareness among the users.

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<sup>35</sup> Germany Trade & Invest (2014): Industrie 4.0 – Smart manufacturing for the future. [https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/EN/Invest/\\_SharedDocs/Downloads/GTAI/Brochures/Industries/industrie4.0-smart-manufacturing-for-the-future-en.pdf?v=8](https://www.gtai.de/GTAI/Content/EN/Invest/_SharedDocs/Downloads/GTAI/Brochures/Industries/industrie4.0-smart-manufacturing-for-the-future-en.pdf?v=8) (downloaded: 23 December 2017)

<sup>36</sup> KEENE, S. D.: Silent partners: Organized crime, irregular groups, and nation-states. Army War. College (U.S.), 2018. <http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/download.cfm?q=1392> (downloaded 14 April 2020)

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