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About Aggression in a Nutshell

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## *CONTENTS*

	Page
<b><i>EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES</i></b>	
<b>Lt. Éva Dudás PhD– Major Csaba Mihály Tóth</b> Cooperation: an increasingly developing response to the new challenges in the national security sphere .....	5
<b>Col. (ret.)Gábor Pócsmegyeri – Ltc. Tamás Koós - Gábor Szilágyi</b> Security geographical analysis of Kosovo .....	13
<b>Gábor Búr PhD</b> „Natural alliance”: Hungarian Foreign policy and the Non-Aligned Movement .....	26
<b>László Tamás Vizi PhD</b> The Hungarian Kingdom’s defensive war against Napoleon in 1805. ....	41
<b><i>CURRENT ISSUES</i></b>	
<b>Ltc. László Uri</b> Some Crime-related Issues of Incomplete Mini-Schengen Zone on Balkans .....	54
<b>Viktor Glied</b> The Water Conflicts in Africa .....	62
<b><i>CONSULTATION</i></b>	
<b>Peter Rada</b> The Rubik’s Cube of Democratic Development a Normative Model of Statebuilding .....	76
<b>Brig.-Gen. István Tarján PhD aspirant</b> The Validity of Security Geography, a new approach and of defining its basic categories .....	87
<b><i>FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES</i></b>	
<b>Maj. János Besenyő PhD aspirant</b> CIMIC activities in the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) .....	95

	Page
<b>Nábrádi Nóra PhD aspirant</b>	
What is assessed in the STANAG Level 2 reading comprehension exam? .....	113
<b>Mónika Burik PhD aspirant</b>	
The Hungarian prison service system and its enterprises .....	127
<b>Maj. Nóra Urbán Psychologist</b>	
About Aggression in a Nutshell .....	134

## ***EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES***

**Lt. Dr. Éva Dudás PhD – Maj. Csaba Mihály Tóth**

### **COOPERATION: AN INCREASINGLY DEVELOPING RESPONSE TO THE NEW CHALLENGES IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY SPHERE**

#### ***Introduction***

In the course of the Euro-Atlantic and EU integration, Hungary has become a member of organisations of integration in which the stability, democracy, the human rights and the rule of law are regarded as common values. Hungary's security and its geopolitical situation is stable, it is not threatened by military aggression and the risk of any other traditional type has been keeping to a minimum. At the same time new threats that the country has to be faced with have emerged – as in the case of many other countries of the world. These threats can be addressed effectively only through wide-ranging international co-operation.

The new fundamentals of the countries' security policy reflect to the changes and these new definitions have a huge impact on the national security policy as well. In the complex system of the new national security, prevention plays an increasing role which requires a more efficient open and secret gathering of information, the widening of the information channels and their permanent refreshment, the thorough analyses, purposeful and quick implementation of the gained information. At the same time, cooperation has been necessarily gaining an increasing importance. In my work, I'm going to address this latter tendency.

#### **THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY<sup>1</sup>**

Currently, the relevant values and interests have been taken into account and the traditional security and defence policy have not been treated as fundamental components any more. The new types of threats are multifold, less visible and predictable. The risks and challenges of the Republic of Hungary have been defined by the National Security Strategy. This strategy builds on the

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<sup>1</sup> 2073/2004. (IV. 15.) Korm. on The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary

basic principles of the security and defence policy of the Republic of Hungary<sup>2</sup> and is in line with NATO's Strategic Concept<sup>3</sup> and the European Security Strategy<sup>4</sup>. Besides the identification of the challenges, it also contains the national values and interests, the analyses of the security environment and definition of the tasks and means, through which Hungary may assert its national security interests in the international political and security system.

In the National Security Strategy the challenges have been divided into three parts. It also includes that the new challenges can be responded to most effectively through cooperation in the framework of international organisations and institutions and other forms of cooperation.

The following three groups are represented below:

1. Global challenges (terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; unstable regions; failed states; illegal migration; economic instability; challenges of the information society; global natural, man-made and medical sources of danger;)
2. Regional challenges (Central Europe; South-Eastern Europe; Community of Independent States; Mediterranean region; Near East and Middle East;)
3. Internal challenges (organised crime; illegal economy and corruption; spreading of drugs; political and religious extremism; demographical challenges;)

After depicting the aims and tasks facing the risks, in the part IV, the instruments to implement in the national security strategy will be given. The National Security Services and their tasks will be addressed here. A crucially important role is given to the cooperation.

“According to the security challenges Hungary is facing, they need to develop and maintain a new type of co-operation with the civilian and military national security services of allied states as well as with respective services of other states sharing an interest in attaining the goals identified in the National Security Strategy.” [1]

In the part devoted to the law enforcement, this idea will be continued:

“Co-operation between national security services and law enforcement authorities – as well as the armed forces, if necessary, and the improvement of

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<sup>2</sup> 94/1998. (XII. 29.) OGY. on The basic principles of the security and defence policy of the Republic of Hungary

<sup>3</sup> The Alliance's Strategic Concept, NAC-S(99)65 24 Apr. 1999

<sup>4</sup> EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, Brussels, 12 December 2003

co-ordination between these bodies and other authorities entitled to supervisory activities constitute a significant reserve of our national security.” [2]

The tasks outlined here are in accordance with the regulation set down in the Act on the National Security Services<sup>5</sup>:

“The National Security Services shall co-operate with one another in the interest of fulfilling their duties... The state agencies and the National Security Services shall mutually promote each other’s work... The National Security Services may co-operate with foreign intelligence agencies on the basis of international agreements and commitments.” [3]

## NATO, THE EU AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

In the multilateral contract system of NATO and the EU, the member state are binding themselves to enhance the capability of realising their strategic objectives in order to safeguard their own security and that of the allied countries. Hungary as an allied nation is committed to guarantee its national ability according to the principle of fair burden sharing. The Alliance constitutes the framework for its members to complement their national efforts as sufficiently as possible. Using their capabilities, the cooperating nations add value to make a notable contribution to the framework of the Alliance while the affected countries’ individual interests, their diversity and specific needs have to be taken into account.

“Hungary provides for its security primarily in the framework of membership in NATO and the European Union, in co-operation with its allies and partners. Membership in these organisations of integration increases Hungary’s responsibilities, as well as the range of instruments and security policy activities serving the purpose of coping with the threats and challenges. The goals and tasks to be fulfilled through the means available to the country emanate from Hungary’s national interests and its global and regional environment.” [4]

“Multinational co-operation will receive an ever increasing role in the development of capabilities. The considerable capabilities that can not be realised with the national resources will be developed with common efforts.” [5]

Being a member of NATO and the EU, Hungary has been involved in completing global tasks. Its field of activities and responsibilities have been hugely enhanced, it responses to its national interests and the security challenges in the framework of integration. However, the national intelligence and counter-intelligence keep being intrinsically important which helps sovereignty. The

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<sup>5</sup> Act 125 of 1995 on the National Security Services

protection of the national security of the country plays a primary role in the future too. The implementation of this task also serves the response to our allied interests.

Since 11 September 2001 the fight against terrorism has been as a core strategic element of the Alliance's work in which all members have to engage. The Republic of Hungary also has to face new types of global and diverse challenges. The multilateral exchange of information obtained from different sources has been quickened. Huge emphasis is laid on the mutuality and collaboration in the protection against terrorism, it serves as a basis of overall information sharing that relies on mutual trust and informing the partners on time.

The EU responded to the events such as terrorist bombings in Madrid in 2004 in a similar way when the organisation increased its supranational capability of fighting against terrorism. At the March 2004 summit, in Brussels, an anti-terrorism package was passed. One of its components is that a group of intelligence analysts was set up directly under the EU. Their task is to establish the compatibility in the national security services of the member states and to create concepts how to recognise, prevent and analyse the threats and challenges that shall be responded to by the member states. It is a further development, that the 5 leading member countries of the EU exchange indirect intelligence information and with the other cooperating countries, they establish and operate a data base that specifically addresses the issues of terrorism. With regard to the above mentioned processes, we have come to the conclusion that the most effective tool in the fight against terrorism is cooperation.

It is set down in the National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary<sup>6</sup> that the national security services need to directly support the crisis forecast and the process of gathering, analysing and evaluating the information that are used in the asymmetric fight, they need to possess the capability required for the defence of the Hungarian military personnel serving in the crisis regions. The services need to develop and maintain cooperation with the civilian national security services. One of the permanent tasks of the professional work has become to establish the capability of enhancing the security building measures for the personnel serving in peacekeeping missions. There is a fundamental need to be able to cooperate on multinational level, to communicate and to exchange information. The operations undertaken by the services involved in the crisis management are often overlapping. The information gathering focuses on the revealing of the threats of the country's military security, on the establishment of the effective activity and security of the Hungarian and allied troops involved in peacekeeping missions, and the support of the decision-making processes in homeland and the allied countries. The

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<sup>6</sup> 1009/2009. (I. 30.) Korm. on The National Military Strategy of the Republic of Hungary

unified intelligence and security doctrine<sup>7</sup> includes the system of intelligence and counter-intelligence tasks. The AJP 2.0. covers both doctrinal and procedural issues. The first part of AJP 2.0 will form the doctrinal baseline for the Joint Intelligence, the intelligence data, the main principles of Intelligence and the execution of the procedures of the Intelligence Cycle. This doctrine will describe the development of information operations as the support of the intelligence of crisis management response operations. The second part will thoroughly address the actions threatening the security and the appropriate security procedures. It defines the basic principles of providing the intelligence data concerning the security and the intelligence protection.

It is crucially important to maintain relations with the national security services of the countries we have to perform common tasks with in international missions. Besides this task, we have to strengthen the relations with the neighbouring countries and also those of the region that have an impact on the security situation of the region i.e. Hungary. In these bilateral and multilateral cooperations, particular importance is attached to the dialogues addressing current professional issues and to outlining a common security scenario. In order to safeguard the regional interests of our country, it shall be take part in the information exchange, the training and preparation of the foreign partners.

The Foreign Intelligence Services attempt to improve their positions under cover of sustaining economic interests and fostering cultural relations in order to get access to the state secrets of our country. It is worth mentioning that some adversary intelligent services tend to gain the relevant information through the co-operation with their partner services. These common efforts focus on the new types of challenges, however, the tasks of detecting and obtaining secret information is sometimes carried out with reluctance. The ambiguous approach to the activities of the national security services rooted in the old and the current interest gaps has to be taken into account. There is a need to find the balance between the counter-intelligence and the collaboration that is embedded in the common interests.

## NATIONAL COOPERATION

The fight against terrorism and organised crime constitute the cornerstones of the role played by the national security services facing the new types of challenges. The National Security Services and the Police are authorised by law to carry out activities in fight against terrorism. Considering the fact that the Police take retrospective – and not preventive – measures during the investigations, the jurisdiction of the National Security Services is primary. Crimes against the state and public security are assigned to the tasks and competence of each national security service except for the Specialised National

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<sup>7</sup> NATO/PfP AJP 2.0

Security Service. According to the Penal Code<sup>8</sup> the terrorist acts also are classified as crimes. The preventive type of the activities of the National Security Services is manifested in the terminology used in the Act on the National Security Services, as the four services have been ordered to detect and prevent the above mentioned crimes. As already mentioned above, the character of the fight against terrorism requires preventive operative measures. The above mentioned services are more experienced in this field than the Police. The wide-ranging multilateral contacts of the National Security Services are also valuable, which underlines the priority of the services in the fight against terrorism. However, the National Security Services shall not exercise investigative authority competences. It means that during the detection of an eventual terrorist act, if the services had gathered enough information in the deception period to instigate the penal procedure, there is a need to forward the information to the Police that are authorised to conduct open investigative proceedings. If one should prepare and attempt or commit eventual terrorist acts in the country, they can be captured only by the special units of the Police involved. Some state bodies carry out tasks integrated in the complex of commitments related to the fight against terrorism. The joint cooperation with the Police in the fight against terrorism is essential because the methods of the prevention implemented by the state organs are not sufficient enough. The Centre of Counter-terrorism has been recently established with the aim of coordinating the activities of these organs whose tasks overly differ from each other.

The tasks of counter-terrorism belong to the competence of the Centre of Prevention of Terrorism and the National Security Office. If there are military concerns, the Military Security Office shall be involved. Practically, it means that the civilian and military intelligences are committed to share all the information that address the terrorist threat of the country and its military defence with the services. However, we have to add that as the terrorist acts launched by terrorist organisations target both civilian and military objects, the intelligence activities aiming to detect these actions are also mixed. The intelligence tasks can be successfully carried out only through closest cooperation and joint actions.

In the fight against terrorism, the Cabinet of National Security plays an essential role. This institution has been established to offer opportunity of the cooperation whose aim would be to coordinate the task of the national security, to prepare the decisions concerning the support of public safety, to discuss the actual issues addressing the governmental measures. According to the decision of the Cabinet, the Commission of Antiterrorism and Coordination has been established aiming to coordinate the different phases of the prevention and intervention phases in the fight against terrorism at the highest level.

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<sup>8</sup> Act 4 of 1978 on The Penal Code

Organised crime permanently attempts to assert interests beyond the legal economic sphere with the help of the capital obtained by committing crimes, and to establish ever developing relations with the prominents of the civil service system and the political life. Illegal economy, corruption and organised crime are reinforcing each other and they mean risk for the national security. The Center of Coordination Against Organised Crime has been founded with the aim to gain, implement and control the information collected to prevent, disrupt and detect the organised crime. The secret services and the law enforcement organs have to increase the effectiveness of the practical cooperation so that the competence and jurisdiction need to be distinguished, the information have to be shared, the crimes and phenomena whose revealing requires common actions have to be defined.

In the rapidly developing information societies both the technology and the individuals are supposed to catch up with the information and telecommunication standards. The huge amount of the information, the rapid technological development of the environment and the permanent need for the information requires the modernisation and the synchronisation of the instruments, the establishment of a common communication that serves to prepare the decisions in the field of the information gain. Establishing a common information base, a centre of evaluation and analysis would be beneficial that would help the security and the law enforcement organs to coordinate the detecting, preventing, deterring and disrupting crime activities, to synchronise the means and the tools that are available and this way, to increase the effectiveness of the cooperation. Fusion of data processing used in the military environment could be a helpful pattern in the intelligence activities carried out by the secret services as well. The advantage of this fusion is that the bodies of the law enforcement and the civil services that are facing challenges could contribute to the system forwarding relevant information. This way, it would be ensured that the gained information would not lose their strategic or technical significance in homeland security missions, and the decision-makers could rely on these urgent and relevant pieces of information.

## ***CONCLUSIONS***

The new type of challenges can be responded to through cooperation in regional and multilateral frameworks. The main guarantee of the countries' defence is provided by national self-power and allied co-operation as it is used to be in the past. Through the strategic policy and capability development processes, we contribute to the collective defence and the delivery of crisis prevention and management activities. In the mission of National Security Services, the enhancement of Hungary's role as an allied nation plays an ever increasing role as the international commitments like the establishment of the

security conditions in the peacekeeping mission, can be met only this way. The joint actions and the closest possible cooperation between the Police and the Security Services are crucial in the fight for the stability of the country. The intelligence, counter-intelligence and crime prevention goals and tasks can be most effectively fulfilled through a more rapid information flow and the dynamic and purposeful application of the information. There is a need for the immediate transfer of these information to the organisations that are engaged and authorised to take measures. The most important means include a competent communication, an effective co-operation and a progressive exchange of the experience with experts. The instruments and the methods of information collecting are updated over and over again. Analysing and evaluating the vast amount of information, and the modern information and communication means play an increasingly essential role. Intelligence is important for the government policy formation and operations, that's why the national security services in co-operation with the allied partners have to gain the information and to thoroughly analyse them before forwarding them to the government so that this latter can identify the new information and intelligence needs. This work has to be done by an information gathering and gaining system that offers rapid and integrated demands for information and systematic interpretation and evaluation of the national security data that support the governmental decision-making activities. If we follow a closer look of the establishment of the tasks from a practical point of view, we realise that overlaps can occur due to the task sharing. In order to avoid them, the services should establish a more effective communication, but the most helpful solution would be the creation of the national security strategy.

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## **SECURITY GEOGRAPHICAL ANALYSIS OF KOSOVO**

### ***Introduction***

The country's most important geographical parameters help to make conclusions for the country's and the area's security-geographical classification. Kosovo is located in the eastern area of West-Balkan. The historical past of the country is in tight connection with the post Yugoslavian countries.

The West-Balkan is definable as the north-western part of the Balkan Peninsula in south-east Europe. The first identified ancient population contained Illyrian, Thracian, Greek, Macedonian and Celtic clans, but these different groups couldn't organize a consolidated nation, because they were separated by geographical capabilities. Their improvement was affected by surrounding better

organized or conqueror states. The Hellenistic culture was the first really developed civilization in the area, which made the base of social stratification and gave an alternative to re-organize the barbarian's dwelling places. The Macedonian Empire – over the Greek City States – reached India in the course of their significant conquest on the east. After the breakdown of the Macedonian Empire the Roman Empire had more and more impact on the Balkan Peninsula, at first only on the coastal area, later on the inland territories too. After the Roman times, Franks had control on the western, and Byzantines on the eastern part of the area.

The first Slavic settlers appeared about the 6th century, the first Alban groups before 1000 and in several waves occupied the territories of Serbs fleeing from the Turks. Also around 1000 the Serbs got under the authority of Eastern, the Slovenian and Croatian clans under the authority of Western Church. Before the Turkish subjection the Slovenians made a part of the Habsburg Empire, the Croats of the Hungarian Kingdom like autonomic sections. After the defeat at Rigómező (1448) the Serbs, Macedonians, Kosovars, Montenegrins and Bosnians were under Turkish subjection for 500 years. Figure 1 presents the expansion of the Turkish Empire in Europe at the end of 19th century.



Figure 1 The Turkish Empire about 1870<sup>9</sup>

As far back as Turkish domination there was a conflict between Albans and Serbs in Kosovo because of their religion and social differences. The Serb minority was in disadvantageous position by the reason of suppression both from Turkish and Muslim Albans.

<sup>9</sup> Cambridge Modern History Atlas-1912 ([http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/ward\\_1912/-ottoman\\_empire\\_1870.jpg](http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/ward_1912/-ottoman_empire_1870.jpg) - Downloaded: March 2010)

In the area Crna Gora and Serbia got independence first. After the First Balkan War, on the London Conference in 1913 Kosovo was attached to the Serbian Kingdom; however this event was a new subjection from the Albanian point of view. This affair caused that Serbs got power over the Albans in Kosovo.

When World War I finished the territory formed an individual, unified state in political order. Kosovo was still a part of the Serbian Kingdom and the forced Serb settling continued. Only dictatorial methods could decrease the strains of this common unit which was manifested at the expense of Albans' rights. The Serb national politics cancelled the previous Slovenian and Croatian autonomic rights; moreover they negated the existence of any other south Slavic ethnical groups and regarded the Alban and Hungarian minorities as their enemies.

During World War II with the guidance of Tito<sup>10</sup> a special liberator partisan war evolved and could win without foreign assistance. After the war the fragile ethnical community's government changed to People's Republic. The forming nations – like Kosovo – got more or less autonomy, for example they had the possibility to use their own language and culture in education.

World War II caused heavy damage in the population and in the economy too. More than one million people died, half of the livestock and 20 per cent of the industrial facilities were destroyed and the infrastructural network broke down. Because of these circumstances and economic problems the country became one of the most undeveloped agrarian countries in Europe. Most of the exports were agricultural products and unprocessed minerals.

The country recovered after the demolition of the war and ideal terms for agriculture, like rich soil (loess plains and hills, Bácska, Bánát, northern part of Croatia), continental climate, temperature, sufficient precipitation (average in a year: 600-2000 mm, 1500-2500 mm in mountains, 400-500 mm in the most arid central area of Macedonia) provided individual catering for the country.

Diversified natural conditions, like three-quarter of the territory was forest, outstanding amount and variety of minerals in Europe, high potential of hydropower, high capabilities of relief and hydrogeology, Mediterranean climate on the south, advantages of transportation and cultural heritage made excellent base for the development of economy and international tourism.

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<sup>10</sup> Josip Broz Tito – 1892-1980 – Supreme Commander of the World War II Yugoslav guerrilla movement, the Yugoslav Partisans (1941–45). After the war, he was the Prime Minister (1943–63) and later President (1953–80) of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The differences from Soviet Union's economic structure and the Marshall Aid<sup>11</sup> subserved the economy's fast growing, the trading connections with developed countries made it possible to modernize the manufacturing industry and allowed to acquire up to date technology. But the level of development was unequal by regions and former nations, which caused a tension between the east and west part of the country.

When Tito died in 1980 civil commotions started in Kosovo to require republic rights and accession to Albania. The Serb governance's response was an armed intervention and the long conflict ended with the cancellation of Kosovo's autonomic rights in 1989.

After the Iron Curtain fell down the post member republics became separated states, some of them at the expense of heavy armed fights. The demolition is still under reconstruction. The development of independent states was sharply various, some of them made changes faster, others fell behind. Figure 2 shows the post Yugoslavian countries.

From 1991 the Belgrade Government initiated a siege in Kosovo; practically martial laws were in practice.




Figure 2 The Post Yugoslavian Countries in 2010\*

Responding for the ethnic cleanups in polity, police, hygiene, education and economic institutes an “underground” Albanian “state” formed with its own parliament, government, medical and education system and an independent, Serb impact free economic system.

<sup>11</sup> Marshall Plan – an economical-political plan of the United States for rebuild and recover Europe after the World War II. 16 West-European countries accepted the funds, the Soviet Union and it's ideological partner countries rejected the aid.

\* The map which presents the post Yugoslavian member countries was made in Mollweide, the other maps in UTM projection.

In line with the information of the shadow cabinet the territory's population also adopted a quiet protestation (under Rugova's<sup>12</sup> direction) against the Serb arrangements.

Because this peaceful method was effectless, from 1995 the Tachi<sup>13</sup> led radical forces transcended and started armed attacks against the Serb police, military targets and forces. The Belgrade Government's reaction was heavy ethnical cleanup with police and military activity, which fell into an open armed conflict in 1998-1999.

By the effect of the Serb countermeasures, more than one million Albans had to leave their home, most of them left to Albania.

From 1994 the UN conferred with the Serb Government to deploy troops to Kosovo, but as the negotiations weren't effective, NATO launched an Air Campaign without UN authorization in 1999 (03.26-06.11) to destroy Serb military and economy targets. By the result of the very heavy demolition the Milosevic<sup>14</sup> regime accepted the NATO demands and the KFOR<sup>15</sup> marched to Kosovo in 06.12.1999.

Following the Serb forces secession the Alban citizens returned to their residence in a few months. However the peace support forces were still stationed in the area, the Alban armed forces began ethnic cleanups against the Serb and Roma citizens and as a result of these incidents more than 200.000 people had to abandon their homes.

In the last 10 years the most violent attack with the largest number of victims was in Mitrovica city area, offense Serbs. 28 people died more than 100 houses and 16 orthodox churches destroyed in the attack. The conflicts between ethnic groups and the emigration of Serb citizens are continuing and it is a very hard task for the international forces to provide safety for Serbs.

The Alban-Serb population rate was 70-30 per cent after World War II, when the independence was declared the rate changed to 90-10 per cent.

Several demonstrating thematic maps used to make understanding these issues easier. These maps composed by ArcView 9.3 geoinformatic software

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<sup>12</sup> Ibrahim Rugova (1944-2006) Albanian politician, litterateur, leader of the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) (2002-2006), President of Kosovo (1990-2006).

<sup>13</sup> Hashim Thaci (1968-) Albanian politician, after his philosophy and history studies he became the leader of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), Prime Minister of Kosovo (02.17.2008 -)


<sup>14</sup> Slobodan Milosevic (1941-2006) Serbian politician, templar, President of Socialist Republic of Serbia (1989), President of Socialist Party of Serbia (1990-2005), President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1997-). He was charged with crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), but the trial ended after Milosevic died in his cell.

<sup>15</sup> Kosovo Force

and updated with the data of ESRI, Global Administrative Areas (GAAM), Digital Chart of the World (DCW), Corine Land Cover 2000 (CLC 2000), the climate data of World Climate Data – Current Conditions 1950-2000, the elevation data of SRTM-3 V4.1 and the satellite images of Landsat 7 ETM+ (SLC of 2003-).

## Kosovo

### General geographical parameters



Absolute geographical location: located on the Northern Hemisphere, nearly the same distance from the North Pole and the equator. Relative geographical location: located in a basins area bounded by mediocre and high mountains and the following countries: Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, and Albania (Figure 3).

Figure 3 Kosovo

Kosovo is the smallest country in the region, only 10.887 km<sup>2</sup> total. Expansion from north to south is a little bit more than 150 km, from east to west less than 150 km. It's boundary is 702 km long. The country has no access to sea. Distance from the Black Sea is 475 km, from the Baltic Sea 1225 km, from the Adriatic Sea 75 km.

### Natural geographical parameters

The country's terrain is strongly diversified, between the highest and lowest point the relief difference is close to 2400 m. The midland basins with ideal agricultural terms (Metohija, Plain of Kosovo) are encircled by mountains: Sar Mountains on the south, the high Albanian Alps on the west and mediocre mountains on the north and east. The basins separated by 500-1000 m high mountains. The country's area high seismicity classification, which is under axis is the Vardar Zone, but there is no volcanic activity on the territory. On Figure 4 the characteristics of relief and hydrography can be seen.




Figure 4 Kosovo's relief and hydrography map

Significant rivers are the Morava, Beli (White) Drim, Ibar and Sitnica. The rivers belong to the catchment of the Black Sea, Aegean Sea and Adriatic Sea. There are no important natural lakes, but several artificial reservoirs created for hydroelectric power plants.

The country is located in the temperate climate zone, but in the basins the continental (with dry summers and long, cold, snowy winters), in high mountains (over 2000 meters) the orographic effect (short, cool summers and long, cold, snowy winters) modify the basic climatic parameters. The average annual temperature is 10 °C (Figure 5).




Figure 5 Kosovo's average annual temperature

Temperature values are very differing in basins and high mountains; it is possible that the snow remains for 8-9 month. The depth of the snow can reach 3-4 meters over 2000 meter altitude (Figure 6).




Figure 6 Climate data (Pristina, Pec)

The annual precipitation amount is 600-800 mm, in high mountains close to 3000 mm. Typical is the late-summer – pre-autumn minimum, the late-spring – pre-summer and late-autumn – pre-winter maximum. The most arid months are February and March. In addition relief differences cause unequal regional distribution of precipitation (Figure 7).




Figure 7 Annual precipitation map of Kosovo

More than half of the country's territory is arable farming and irrigation is available on more than 20 per cent of this area. Due to the intense forest demolition the forest rate fell under 50 per cent of the total surface (Figure 8).




Figure 8 Surface coverage of Kosovo

Typical kinds of trees are beech, oak, hornbeam, sycamore and different pines.

Dominant soil types are the following: in valley fluvisols, in basins brown forest soil, loess, sandy clay and in mountains black redzina and chalky soil.

### ***Social factor***

At 02.17.2008 the province governance is peremptorily unattached from Serbia. The country's government is republic under the supervision of UN

(UNMIK). The country is still secured by NATO Multinational Land Forces and the Hungarian Defence Forces is a co-operate member of this formation.

The territory is divided to 5 administrative areas and subdivided into 30 municipalities (Fig. no. 9). The Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General as the head of UNMIK<sup>16</sup> is responsible for the administration control.

The Assembly of Kosovo has 120 members, 10-10 seats are reserved for minorities. Other members elected for 4 year terms, the Assembly passes all laws. Other important administrative organization is the government under the leading of Prime Minister.

Kosovo is currently recognized by 72 UN member states; several members rejected the declaration and considered it illegal.

The education level of Kosovo does not reach the neighbor country's average.

Illiteracy is one of the main problems, strangely high rated with woman and suburban citizens. The education structure follows the European standards. At high level many new private universities were established and a transition started to the Bologna-process.

Kosovo's healthcare system is regulated by a state law. Theoretically this law guaranties the medical support, but the missing infrastructure, institutes and medicines are threaten the medical attendance. The underdeveloped service is not able to diagnose and treat several diseases; in this case citizens have to travel abroad for convenient treatment, what can take long time. The doctor shortage is the highest in Europe and in the area too. The Serb minority has own surgeries, which operated by the Belgrade Government.




Figure 9 Administrative Districts of Kosovo

### *Economy*

The territory's GDP was the lowest in Yugoslavia and is still lower than the average in the post member countries. The most current currency is the Euro (EUR) (Kosovo is not a member of the Euro-Zone, the UN Interim

<sup>16</sup> UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Administration Mission made temporary officially the use of Euro), but on the northern areas where Serbs live the Serbian Dinar (RSD) is accepted too. US Dollar (USD) and Swiss Franc (CHF) are also accepted.

Although the natural capabilities are good, 70 per cent of the provision is imported. The number of agricultural employees is much higher than in developed countries. The most important agricultural products are wheat, corn, potato, vegetables, grape, fruits, sunflower, sugar beet, soybean and tobacco. The livestock substance was very close to full desolation during the war. Nowadays the livestock is only a secondary part of agriculture. Significant kinds are neat, swine, sheep, horse and poultry. The natural capabilities enable low export over the domestic meat and milk needs.

The country’s industry and infrastructure were almost totally demolished during the NATO Air Campaign and the following looting and destruction. The main industrial sections are mining, energy sector, telecommunication, metal processing, precious metals, machine industry, building materials, provision and textile industry. The forestry and wood processing are also important incoming sources. The unclarified ownerships, missing local equity and corruption slow down the inflow of recent investments. The money which is earned and transferred home by those who work abroad is important in the development of economy (Figure 10).




Figure 10 The economic structure and agriculture employment of Kosovo

The country is rich in minerals, but the mining and processing technologies are out of date. There are no funds to modernize the sector. Important minerals are lead, zinc, silver, chrome, nickel, bauxite. The energy industry covers 80 per cent of the country’s needs. The missing 20 per cent is available from neighbor countries’ import or the domestic energy production’s enlargement, which is based on the world 5th greatest resource of lignite.

The country’s railway network’s density and quality are far behind the recent standards. The lines are single and not electrified. 100 km is out of order from the network and few settlements are connected with railway lines. During the war the lines, stations, locomotives and wagons were constantly abused,

nowadays the metal stealing cause problems. The present roadways are narrow with missing signs and bars. The road quality is poor and the hard surface road's rate is low. The local motor vehicle's age is high and their condition is bad. In 2009 the highway's widening between the capital and the Pristina Airport was finished and the construction of a highway connection between Pristina and Tirana is started. The modernization of the country's road and railway network is hindered by high relief differences. The improvement of transportation with neighboring countries is indispensable for economic expansion. The local rivers are not suitable for water transportation (Figure 11).




Figure 11 Kosovo's transportation network

There are 6 airports in the country, but only Pristina Airport (IATA: PRN – ICAO: BKPR) suitable for international service. The location of Pristina Airport and Slatina military Air Base is the same.

Wired telecommunication line service is available in the whole country, cell phone service is also available, but with several problems. The use of internet is the lowest in the area.

In summary natural capabilities are good for agriculture production, but diversified relief causes difficulties in domestic and international transportation network configuration. Natural waters can provide citizens and agricultural needs. The territory is an endangered zone by earthquakes because the Vardar-zone's seismic activity.

Population is growing faster than in the surrounding areas, which generates several problems in the population supply in Kosovo. The ethnical and

religious differences or discrimination make difficulties in economical development and possibilities to ethnic symbiosis.

Kosovo's economy is not able to produce the most of agricultural products for the population. The industrial sector is much more undeveloped than in the surrounding post Yugoslavian member countries. In economic factors the agriculture's low level technical development, the unclarified industrial ownerships, the energy dependence, and the absence of functioning capital cause troubles. The expansion of lignite mining may be able to supply the growing energy needs. The country's GDP per capita value is still lower than in the post Yugoslavian members.

<b>Factors</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>Kosovo 17.02.2008.</b>
<b><u>General factors</u></b>		
Absolute	degree minute [° ' ]	42-35N 21-00E
Relative		M-S-M-A
Area	km <sup>2</sup>	10.887
Boundaries	km	702 / 0
<b><u>Natural factors</u></b>		
Highest point	m	Deravica 2 656
Lowest point	m	Beli Drim 297
Rivers	n/a	Ibar, Drim, Morava
Precipitation	mm	700 – 1.200
<b><u>Social factors</u></b>		
Capital city	n/a	Pristina
Population	capita	1.815.048
Population density	capita/km <sup>2</sup>	197
Urban population	%	49
Ethnics	%	Alban 92
		Serb 5
		Other 3
Religion	%	Muslim 92
		Orthodox 5
		Catholic 3
Age Groups	%	28 / 66 / 6
Illiterate	%	3 / 13
<b><u>Economical factors</u></b>		
GDP national	\$	5,3 bill.
GDP / capita	\$	2.500
Arable land	%	20
Irrigated area	km <sup>2</sup>	110
Economic structure	%	13 / 23 / 64
Unemployment	%	17
Inflation	%	5,3
<b><u>Transportation, telecommunication</u></b>		

<b>Factors</b>	<b>Amount</b>	<b>Kosovo 17.02.2008.</b>
Airport	pieces	7 / 4 / 1
Railway	km	430 / 0
Road	km	1.926 / 1.668
Waterway	km	0
Wired telephone	pieces	106.300
Cell phone	pieces	562.000

*Table Basic data of Kosovo*

Basically Table 1 content based on the CIA Factbook (10.01.2010) data, but also contains different issues' information from bibliography. Explanation of table contents:

- In header: the country's independence date;
- Relative position: first letter of neighborhood countries' names;
- Boundaries: length of land and coastal boundaries;
- Age groups: rates of different age groups (0-14 / 15-64 / 65+);
- Illiterate: rates of illiteracy of men/women;
- Economic structure: national GDP value share in three basic sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary)
- Airports: number of airports (all / hard surface / longer than 3000 m runway);
- Railway: length of railway tracks (all / electrified);
- Road: length of roads (all / pavement);

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**Gábor Búr PhD**

## **„NATURAL ALLIANCE”: HUNGARIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT**

During the Cold War the world split into two camps. Both superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union were afraid of fighting each other directly in a hot war, which could have led to a nuclear strike against each other. Such a nuclear endgame might destroy the whole human civilisation. As they have recognized this very risk they fought instead each other indirectly. They confronted each other and played havoc with conflicts in different parts of the world. To examine the complexities of the Cold War in Europe one needs to go over the borders of Europe to develop a more detailed understanding. Since the end of that era the origins, essence, outcomes and consequences are still a matter of brisk historical debate.

The Cold War world was separated into three groups. The United States led the West with democratic political systems. The Soviet Union led the East with communist political systems. The third group included countries that did not want to be tied to either the first or the second world. The term „third world” was coined in August 1952 by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy in the magazine L'Observateur. With the Chinese Revolution just three years old and conflict raging in Korea, political thinking was dominated by the Cold War, in which the two ideologically opposed alliances seemed to be leading the world towards an all-out war between capitalism and communism. Sauvy argued, such a perspective ignored the real revolution in international relations: the arrival of the countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America on the world stage. Drawing an explicit comparison with the role of the Third Estate during the French Revolution, Sauvy wanted to convey the colossal transformation represented by decolonization. As in 1789, Sauvy warned, „this third world, ignored, exploited,

scorned, wishes to stand up for itself".<sup>17</sup> To develop a more detailed understanding of the impact of the Cold War upon the processes of political change one needs to understand how all sides actively tried to influence political and economic developments around the world. The United States and the Soviet Union provided military, economic, and technical aid to governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The United States helped Third World governments to fight communism while the Soviet Union tried to establish communist or at least pro-communist regimes. The superpowers and their closed allies offered aid, sold weapons, sent civilian and military advisers and in some cases invaded or helped to overthrow governments. If one side seized control over a certain country the other side tried to compensate itself elsewhere. That was the logic of the Cold War which affected the different regions of the world in diverse way and its impact has changed significantly in time. China, Korea, Vietnam, the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Cuba are only few examples.

This study examines how Hungary, a non-sovereign member of the communist block established links to the non-aligned group of countries, what were the intentions and the benefits of those affiliations. How the political struggle between communism and capitalism affected Hungary's wider international positions, in particular given the importance of Hungary to the dynamics of the Cold War in 1956 and in the years after when the „Hungarian question” was on the agenda. As foreign policy can generally be discussed under several aspects, like regime stability, security, trade and economic policy, national identity and state autonomy,<sup>18</sup> each of which relates to a particular problem, we have to limit ourselves to the last issue. This approach helps us to understand what potential was bearing the connection of Hungary to the Non-Aligned Movement, in a wider sense to the Third World, and why was it relatively important in one particular period (in the years after 1956) and why it had lost again its real significance after the mid-sixties.

### **The origin of the Non-Aligned Movement**

Nobody would question the relevance of the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War but many are of the opinion that this relevance was lost with the end of the bipolar era. And they seem to be right, the organization holds summits only every three years and even that is not very high on the international agenda. The last, 15th summit conference of heads of states and governments of the non-aligned countries was held in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, 11-16 July 2009. As of 2010 there are 53 African, 38 Asian, 26 Latin American

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<sup>17</sup> Martin Evans, Whatever Happened to the Non-Aligned Movement? In: *History Today* 57 (2007) 12, 49-50.

<sup>18</sup> Tomas Niklasson, Regime Stability and Foreign Policy Change. Interaction between Domestic and Foreign Policy in Hungary 1956-1994. *Lund Political Studies* 143. (2006) 69.

and Caribbean and only one European (Belarus) all in all 118 members.<sup>19</sup> In 2004 when 10 new states joined the European Union, two of them, Cyprus and Malta ceased to be a member of the group of non-aligned countries. Since that year they have the status of an observer in that movement. The 15th Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement held in Tehran, 27-30 July 2008 endorsed the application of Montenegro as an observer country of the Movement.<sup>20</sup> In its organization and structure is the Non-Aligned Movement quite unique. First, it considers itself to be non-hierarchical in nature in that there are no countries that contain veto power or have special privileges in certain areas. The movement has neither a secretary general nor a permanent secretariat as it is managed by the presidential troika committee, which includes the former, current and coming presidents of the movement, and an office of coordination in New York which includes representatives of the member states already existing in the UN. The Non-Aligned Movement enjoys a great voting influence on issues such as human rights and UN management and financial affairs. The chair is rotated officially at each summit. The administration of the organization falls to the responsibility of a rotating chair (until July 2009 Cuba, after that Egypt for 3 years) and the rotation is consistent. Secondly, the organization does not have any sort of constitution as many similar organizations do. This was done out of recognition that with so many countries having so many varying viewpoints and priorities, any formal sort of administrative structure would increase divisiveness and eventually lead to the collapse of the organization. Membership in the organization has changed from the original just as requirements. As the organization has matured and international political circumstances have changed, so too have the requirements. There is an obvious attempt to integrate the requirements of the Non-Aligned Movement with the key beliefs of the United Nations. The non-aligned movement has the origin in the anti-colonial discourse of pre-1947 India. Even the term „Non-Alignment” was coined by the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru during his speech in 1954 in Colombo, Ceylon. In that speech Nehru described the five pillars to be used as a guide for Sino-Indian relations, called Panchsheel, the „five restraints”, or five principles. Krishna Menon who also played an important role in the establishment of the Non-aligned Movement and who represented India at the United Nations in 1946 and again from 1952 to 1961 and one of the initiators of the proposal for the Asian-African Conference in Bandung described first the Panchsheel, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as a facile start to a complex diplomacy but later has changed his mind.<sup>21</sup> The five principles, i. e.

<sup>19</sup> The Movement recognizes three categories for participation: Full Member, Observer and Guest. See: XV. Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt, 11-16 July 2009. <http://www.namegypt.org/en/Pages/default.aspx>

<sup>20</sup> The Conference also endorsed the application of the Secretariat of the Commonwealth of Nations as an Observer Organization. (NAM 2008/INF.5)

<sup>21</sup> Menon recalled later: „When I saw the drafting of the Five Principles I thought it had been rather badly written,... I said so to the prime minister (Nehru), and he said, „what does it matter; it isn't a

mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence have been adopted in many other international documents. That meant peace and disarmament, self-determination, particularly for colonial peoples, economic equality, cultural equality, and multilateralism exercised through a strong support for the United Nations. These principles served later also as the basis of the Non-Aligned Movement, emerged even as a slogan or mantra. This sense of shared identity is common to the non-aligned movement ever since. The movement tried to serve as a kind of counterweight to the two rival Cold War blocs and as an international pressure group for the Third World.

This „Thirdism”<sup>22</sup> inspired a wide range of political initiatives. Shortly before the Indian independence Nehru wrote that his country would pursue „a policy of its own as a free state, not as a satellite of another nation”.<sup>23</sup> Nehru clearly stated that non-alignment should be considered not within the classical 19th century European framework of non-involvement, but as a dynamic policy directed against imperialism and in support of national advancement. He also viewed the opposition to Western domination as inseparable from his desire for both national legitimacy and identity and social progress. In the course of a speech in the Indian Parliament in 1951, he stated: „By aligning ourselves with any one power, you surrender your opinion, give up the policy you would normally pursue because somebody else wants you to pursue another policy.”<sup>24</sup> Nehru defended the right of self-determination of nations, the independence and sovereignty of states and the right of every nation to develop freely and to choose, without foreign interference, its own socio-political system. Since the largest obstacle to independence for India, and Third World nations, more generally, was the continued presence of the British and of the other European colonial powers, a proactive and productive foreign policy, specifically anticolonial in tone, was easily located within the discourse of nationalism used throughout the pre-independence period in India. Nehru was the progenitor of the first Asian Relations Conference held in Delhi in 1947. Many of its participants were yet to be decolonised. The concept was to create a ring of

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treaty or anything, it's a preface to this Tibetan business.” See: Abraham Itty, From Bandung to NAM: Non-alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65, in: *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics*, 46, (2008) 2, 195-219.

<sup>22</sup> From a communist revolutionary perspective Mao Zedong formulated a theory of three worlds in which the First World consisted of the then-superpowers (Soviet Union and United States), whose imperialistic policies, as he felt, posed the greatest threat to world peace. Mao placed the middle powers (Japan, Canada, and Europe) in the Second World. Africa, Latin America, and Asia (including China) formed the Third World.

<http://science.jrank.org/pages/11447/Third-World-Origins.html>>Third World - Origins</a>

<sup>23</sup> Jawaharlal Nehru, *Vneshnaya politika Indii*, Moscow 1965, 30-31.

<sup>24</sup> Kristin S. Tassin, „Lift up Your Head, My Brother”: Nationalism and the Genesis of the Non-Aligned Movement, in: *Journal of Third World Studies*, Vol. XXIII, (2006) 1. 147-168.

strong, prosperous, unified nations with a common purpose and goal to throw off the yoke of colonial powers and to create vibrant and self-sufficient nations within a strategically and economically relevant Third World. In December 1954 the so called Colombo powers, India, Burma, Pakistan, Indonesia and Ceylon, decided to meet in Bogor to settle issues regarding a large scale conference. After long debates they decided to invite China to that conference which became the most significant milestone in the development of the nonaligned movement and most important conference of the Afro-Asian Block. It was held in Bandung, in 1955 and hosted by Indonesia. Indonesian president Sukarno. This conference is generally seen as the founding meeting of the nonaligned movement. 29 states were participating, mostly from Asia and six from Africa. Many of them had recently been decolonised and the anti-colonial sentiments were very strong among them. The Final Communiqué of the Bandung Conference condemned colonialism on various grounds. It called colonialism a „means of cultural repression” and defined colonialism as „the subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation”. In their condemnation of colonialism however there existed considerable divergence between the participants as they expressed their opinion on its definition.<sup>25</sup>

### **The Non-Aligned Movement: „the World’s largest Peace Movement”**

Some countries which strictly belong to Afro-Asia were not invited to the conference in the first place on political grounds, e.g. South Africa, Israel, North and South Korea and Taiwan.<sup>26</sup> The five principles were considered as the initiative of the left-wing countries, the Western aligned nations, such as Pakistan and Iraq made as counter-proposal the so called „Seven Pillars of Peace”. Carlos Romulo the head of the Philippines’ delegation was even called during the days of the conference as the „Voice of America”.<sup>27</sup> But the main surprise came from the prime minister of Ceylon, Sir John Kotewala. He delivered his speech maintaining that: „There is another form of colonialism, however, about which many of us represented here are perhaps less clear in our minds and to which some of us would perhaps not agree to apply the term colonialism at all. Think, for example, of those satellite States under Communist domination in Central and Eastern Europe, of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland. Are not these colonies as much as any of the colonial territories in Africa or Asia? And if we are united in our opposition to colonialism, should it not be our duty openly to

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<sup>25</sup> On the fourth day of the Conference (21 April 1955), Syrian Foreign Minister Kahled Bey Al Azam named the most important issues: Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria and West Irian.

<sup>26</sup> Volker Matthies, The „Spirit of Bandung” 1955-1985: Thirty Years since the Bandung Conference. In: *Intereconomics* 20, (1985) 5, 207-210.

<sup>27</sup> In 1953 Romulo was a candidate for the position of United Nations Secretary-General but he lost to the Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld.

declare our opposition to Soviet colonialism as much as to Western imperialism?”<sup>28</sup>

Some delegates protested: they were not in Bandung to „listen to the propaganda of John Foster Dulles”, but Kotewala's strongest critic was the Chinese prime minister Zhou En Lai. He adhered to the Leninist doctrine on colonialism, according to which colonialism equaled „capitalist exploitation”. According to that doctrine socialist systems of government could therefore never be colonial. Zhou also might have felt threatened by the analogies between Russian colonialism and Chinese policies, in Inner Mongolia, Uyghurstan or East Turkistan and Tibet. For these reasons Zhou objected to the inclusion of the phrase „colonialism in all its forms”, as proposed by the majority. He finally accepted the face-saving word „manifestations” instead of „forms”, so the conference as a whole could declare that „colonialism in all its manifestations is an evil which must be speedily brought to an end.” As far as Zhou's rejection of Kotewala's observation was mostly based on reasons of a political rather than a conceptual nature, it had little bearing on the conference's observations on the nature of colonialism as a system of „alien domination, subjugation and exploitation.”<sup>29</sup> Finally the conference agreed upon the Ten Principles of Bandung (Dasa Sila Bandung).<sup>30</sup>

The Dasa Sila principles were adopted later as the main goals and objectives of the policy of non-alignment:

1. Respect of fundamental human rights and of the objectives and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
2. Respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations.
3. Recognition of the equality among all races and of the equality among all nations, both large and small.
4. Non-intervention or non-interference into the internal affairs of another country.
5. Respect of the right of every nation to defend itself, either individually or collectively, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
6. A. Non-use of collective defense pacts to benefit the specific interests of any of the great powers.
7. B. Non-use of pressures by any country against other countries.
8. Refraining from carrying out or threatening to carry out aggression, or from using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any country.

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<sup>28</sup> UNP Ceylon Prime Minister, Sir John Kotelawala at Bandung, 1955. [http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/tamileelam/56sir\\_john.htm](http://www.tamilnation.org/intframe/tamileelam/56sir_john.htm)

<sup>29</sup> Making an explicit link between Nazism and colonialism, the Bandung conference also declared its support for the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination, thereby encapsulating a gathering spirit of revolt against European domination.

<sup>30</sup> Ruud Van Dijk (ed.), *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*, Routledge, New York, 2008. 66.

9. Peaceful solution of all international conflicts in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.
10. Promotion of mutual interests and of cooperation.
11. Respect of justice and of international obligations

Six years after Bandung, an initiative of the Yugoslav president Tito led to the first official Non-Aligned Movement Summit, which was held in Belgrade on 1-6 September 1961 with 28 countries participating (25 full members and 3 observers). During the period of Tito's struggle against Moscow it was natural for the Yugoslav leader to seek and find allies among the newly liberated countries. Most of these manifested socialist tendencies in varying degrees, but were opposed, both to their former Western „imperialist” rulers, and to Soviet or Chinese style communism. Yugoslavia's support for these newly independent states of Asia and Africa was also calculated to bolster its own position in Europe. This was for Tito of great importance, particularly in view of the fact that the conflict with Moscow had compelled him to look for closer relations with the West and had resulted in more liberal domestic policies. An alliance with the neutral countries of Asia and Africa was important to him in his struggle against both „Western imperialism” and Soviet hegemony. In December 1954 and January 1955, Tito visited India and Burma, just at the time when it was decided that the first conference of Asian and African nations should take place in Bandung. While in New Delhi he signed a joint statement with Nehru (23 December 1954) in which for the first time the meaning of the policy of nonalignment was explained, neutrality was separated into its „positive” and „negative” aspects and the idea of a third bloc was firmly ruled out as „a contradiction in terms, because such a bloc would mean involvement in the very system of alignments that has been rejected as undesirable.”

Tito's reputation was enhanced after Khrushchev came to Belgrade in May 1955, one month after the Bandung Conference to apologize for Stalin's mistakes. This was mainly the reason why the initiative in organizing and coordinating the activities of the non-aligned countries passed into the Yugoslav leader's hands. He travelled through Asia and Africa and won much sympathy for Yugoslavia and a style of communism that had been accepted even by Moscow as one of „various roads to socialism.” The Afro-Asian countries saw in the Yugoslav system a type of communism which was tolerated both by the West and by Moscow. The Afro-Asian neutrals were impressed by Tito's success in playing the extremes against the middle. This game was possible simply because it appeared that the non-aligned countries could fill an important role in a situation marked by tense relations between two great blocs.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Slobodan Stankovic Summary , RAD Background Report/166, Tito and the Nonaligned Summit in Colombo, BOX-FOLDER-REPORT: 82-3-186,  
<http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text/82-3-186.shtml>

In Belgrade the founding fathers of the movement besides Tito were Nehru from India, Sukarno from Indonesia, Nasser from Egypt and Nkrumah from Ghana. In July 1961, during the preparatory meeting in Cairo for the summit in Belgrade they formulated what they called a political yardstick for determining whether a country is non-aligned or not. (1. Is a country following an independent policy based on peaceful coexistence and nonalignment, or does it manifest sympathy for such a policy? 2. Does it support the struggle for national liberation? 3. Does it belong to any collective military pact that might draw it into a conflict between the great powers? 4. Is it party to any bilateral alliance with a great power? 5. Does it have, any foreign military bases on its territory?) Their action was called „the Initiative of Five”. The Belgrade summit was disturbed by Moscow's resumption of nuclear testing on September 1, the very day the conference, began. This immediately led to a clash between Tito, who supported the Soviet action, and Nehru, who regretted it.

The second summit was held in Cairo on 5-8 October 1964 with 57 countries present (47 full members and 10 observers), the third was organized in Lusaka (Zambia) on 8-10 September 1970 with 64 countries attending (54 full members and 10 observers), the fourth met in Algiers on 2-8 September 1973 with 87 countries taking part (75 full members, 9 observers, and 3 guests, plus representatives of 15 liberation movements were also present, these were given the status of observers, plus 4 international organizations). The fifth conference of non-aligned nations was taking place in Colombo on 16-19 August 1976 with 85 full members, 10 observers, 11 revolutionary, movements and organizations, 3 guests. (Sweden, Austria, and Finland) At that summit Tito was the only survivor of the original „Big Five” of the movement.<sup>32</sup> The sixth conference meeting was held in Havana, September 3-9, 1979. Castro's long shadow was hanging over that summit as for his revolution export-import venture the ties to the Soviet Union was a kind of „natural alliance” and under the chairmanship of Fidel Castro the summit discussed the concept of an antiimperialist alliance with the invader of Afghanistan. The Havana Declaration of 1979 was accenting the national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries in their „struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, racism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc politics.”<sup>33</sup>

At the seventh summit held in New Delhi (instead of Baghdad) in March 1983, the movement described itself as the „history's biggest peace

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<sup>32</sup> Sometimes with Ben Bella from Algeria they are mentioned as the „Big Six” but the later was not present at the beginning.

<sup>33</sup> Cedric Grant, Equity in Third World Relations: a third world perspective, in: International Affairs 71, 3 (1995), 567-587.

movement".<sup>34</sup> Here and later in Harare (1986) and again in Belgrade (1989) in spite of ever-increasing participation there were clear signs of decline of the movement as the end of the cold war was nearing. From the 1960s through the 1980s the movement which already represented nearly two-thirds of the United Nations' members and comprised more than half of the world population, used its majority voting power within the United Nations to redirect the global political agenda away from East-West wrangles over the needs of the Third World. However, in practice, with the exception of anticolonialism, about which there could be strong agreement, the aim of creating an independent force in world politics quickly succumbed to the pressure of Cold War alliances. By the 1970s the non-aligned movement had largely become an advocate of Third World demands for a New International group of Third World states within the United Nations. Through New International Economic Order (NIEO), the Third World argued in favour of a complete restructuring of the prevailing world order, which they perceived to be unjust, as the only enduring solution to the economic problems facing them. At the level of UNESCO, Third World scholars waged a war against unequal cultural exchange through calls for a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO). In general, the Third World wanted a new order based on equity, sovereignty, interdependence, common interest, and cooperation among all states. Given the economic weakness of the Soviet Union, these demands were essentially directed at the West.

### **Between East and West: Hungarian Foreign Policy in the 20th Century**

During the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Hungary was a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire with no independent foreign policy. Once it regained its independence, Hungary had to establish its own Foreign Ministry. The tasks of the Hungarian foreign policy did not change considerably in the last centuries, i. e. staving off foreign invasions, preventing a dangerous combination of hostile neighbours, and finding allies among the powers. With the rise of nationalism in the 1830s, a new task was added, to preserve the territorial integrity in face of the non-Hungarian nationalities and their conationals beyond the borders. There was also a pipe-dream of what might be called the Hungarian imperial idea.<sup>35</sup> After Trianon the intentions have taken the form of giving support to the Hungarians who were detached from Hungary and became national minorities. As most of Asia and Africa were

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<sup>34</sup> András Balogh, *Az el nem kötelezett országok csúcserkezte Új-Delhiben* (The New Delhi Summit of the Non-Aligned Countries) in: *Külpolitika*, 10 (1983) 2, 86-102.

<sup>35</sup> That was the pan-turanist idea of the Hungarian Turan Society founded in 1910 which included many leading scholars like the future prime minister count Pál Teleki. Turanism emerged as an ambitious version of Hungarian imperialism playing up the Asiatic roots of the Hungarians and the supposed close relationship of Hungarian to the languages of Central Asia.

under colonial domination, diplomatic ties existed with the world outside Europe (besides with the US since 1921 and with Japan since 1938) mostly with Latin American countries where the representation of Hungary was taken over by Sweden in 1942.

### **Tryings to escape from foreign political isolation**

In January 1944 the Soviet Union outlined the foreign policy priorities for the post-war period in the different regions of the world. According to this Hungary after the Second World War as the other states of Central Europe was supposed to become the part of the Soviet sphere of influence and should have been treated as a country defeated in the war. The course, which was set by Soviet great power interests determined the Hungarian foreign policy nearly for the next half a century. The Hungarian regime had little freedom to define its own foreign policy interests owing to its structural links with the Soviet Union. During these years, practically no independent foreign policy initiative or position was taken. This was an alignment with the Soviet Union, adopted under the force of circumstances. As Gyula Szekfű, the eminent historian and Hungarian ambassador in Moscow in 1946 put it out: „we have just one neighbour, the Soviet Union”.<sup>36</sup> By 1948 a monolithic, communist-controlled system was imposed upon every country under the occupation of the Red Army, and Hungary, too, became „a captive nation,” a satellite of the Soviet Union.<sup>37</sup>

To break the international isolation immediately after the war the Hungarian government tried to re-establish trade and diplomatic relations with the Latin-American countries in the first place besides Europe. The political efforts and petitions of the Hungarian government concerning this matter were usually turned down by the Allied Control Commission directed by the representatives of the Soviet Union. This is why the representation of Hungarian interests by Sweden continued in many Latin-American countries until 1948, even after in 1946 the first diplomat was sent back to Latin America, legation counselor Ádám Koós to Brazil.<sup>38</sup> He was running a bureau defending Hungarian interests at the Rio de Janeiro representation of Sweden, but in 1948 protesting the communist turn in Hungary he refused to return home. By that time the pluralist era was over in Hungary. In the foreign ministry aristocrats and members of the former ruling classes were branded as the reactionary enemies of the people, they lost their civil service posts one by one. It was in the foreign diplomatic service that they were tolerated the longest, class cleansing

<sup>36</sup> From: Gyula Szekfű, *Forradalom után (After the Revolution)*. Budapest, (1947) 120-121. Quoted by Ignác Romsics, *From Christian Shield to EU Member. Perceptions of Hungary's Situation and Role in Europe*, in: *The Hungarian Quarterly*, XLVIII. (2007) 188, 3-27.

<sup>37</sup> Géza Jeszzenszky, *Hungary's Foreign Policy Dilemmas After Regaining Sovereignty*, in: *Society and Economy*, *Journal of the Corvinus University of Budapest*, vol. 29. (2007) 1, 43-64.

<sup>38</sup> Ágnes Judit Szilágyi, János Sáringer, *Ifj. Horthy Miklós, a Kormányzó kisebbik fia (Miklós Horthy Jr., the Younger Son of the Regent)* Budapest 2002, 33-45.

started there only after the Treaty of Paris was signed. During the Stalinist dictatorship the country had become a peripheral part of the Soviet empire, little diplomatic intercourse happened with the outside world.

In 1947 Hungary established diplomatic ties with Egypt (in the same year as with Turkey), so this country became the first on the list of the foreign ministry from the „third world”.<sup>39</sup> In 1948 followed India and North Korea, the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Argentina took place in 1949, in the following year diplomatic relations were established with Israel, Vietnam and Mongolia, in 1951 with Iran. In later years only Syria followed in 1954 and in the year of the Bandung Conference Indonesia. In December 1955 Hungary joined the UN together with 15 other countries.<sup>40</sup> In 1956 with Sudan and Uruguay were diplomatic relations established, but the later was pending until 1964 because of the Soviet military intervention later in that year.

The experience of 1956 had shown that the Soviet Union would not accept any major deviation from Moscow's policy line. Relations between the Kádár regime and Moscow were clearly characterised by asymmetric interdependence. Furthermore, after „the first war among socialist states”<sup>41</sup> in 1956, the Soviet Union strengthened its control over Hungarian foreign policy through inter-party contacts, diplomatic representatives, the Soviet military and the security police. That led to a negative image and the partial isolation of Hungary and from the West for a number of years.

### **Consequences of the Hungarian uprising for the Non-Aligned Movement**

US secretary of state, John Foster Dulles had suggested already on October 24th that the UN Security Council be convened to discuss the situation in Hungary. The issue was placed on the agenda at the October 28th meeting of the Security Council, the vote was 9 to 1, only Yugoslavia was abstaining.<sup>42</sup> On November 2nd, 3rd and 4th the Hungarian question was also discussed. The

<sup>39</sup> Diplomatic retaliations with Ecuador were re-established in August 1969 but Ecuador asked to modify the date to 1946. This is why in some studies Ecuador stays as first. See: János Dömény, Hungarian-Latin-American Relations after World War II. A Chronology. Cold War History Research Center, Budapest. [http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/chronologies/hung\\_latin.html#1960](http://www.coldwar.hu/html/en/chronologies/hung_latin.html#1960) and also: Miklós Nagy (Hrsg), A magyar külpolitika 1956-1989 történeti kronológia. Hársing, Miklós Nagy, MTA Jelenkorkutató Bizottság, 1993 (Hungarian Foreign Politics 1956-1989, Historical Chronology. Compiled by Miklós Nagy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences Committee for Contemporary History, 1993).

<sup>40</sup> Those countries were: Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Ceylon, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Kingdom of Libya, Nepal, Portugal, Romania and Spain. With that the original membership of 51 countries in 1945 grew to 76 countries.

<sup>41</sup> This term was introduced by Béla Kiraly, in 1956 commander-in-chief of the military guard and military commander of Budapest.

<sup>42</sup> Samir N. Anabtawi, The Afro-Asian States and the Hungarian Question. In: International Organization, Vol. 17(1963) 04, 872-900.

Soviet Union had used its veto to prevent the passage of an anti-intervention resolution in the Security Council. Britain and France managed to shift the Hungarian question from the Security Council to the emergency session of the General Assembly as for the Suez conflict they hoped to gain time. The shift of the issue to the General Assembly elevated the position of the third world countries. 4th November 1956 on „The Situation in Hungary” Resolution 1004 (ES-II) was affirming „the right of the Hungarian people to a government responsive to its national aspirations and dedicated to its independence.” It was adopted by 50 votes to 8 with 15 abstentions. 50 countries voted in favour, 8 against (Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania, Ukraine, USSR), with 15 abstentions (Afghanistan, Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Libya, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia).<sup>43</sup> Those countries voted at later resolutions in the Hungarian question mostly also with abstention.

November 14th the prime ministers of India, Burma, Indonesia, and Ceylon already expressed their uneasiness about the events both in Egypt<sup>44</sup> and in Hungary and their strong disapproval and their chagrin in connection with the aggression and the intervention of great powers against weak countries. They called it a violation of a condition of the UN Charter and of the spirit and letter of the Bandung Conference declaration and the principles expressed in it. They demanded that Soviet forces be quickly withdrawn from Hungary, and that the Hungarian people be granted the right „to decide for themselves the question of their future and to create the government that it wishes to have, without any sort of outside meddling.”<sup>45</sup>

On November 21 the Assembly adopted a resolution sponsored by Ceylon, India and Indonesia which called on Hungary „without prejudice to its sovereignty” to permit United Nations observers to enter. A second resolution sponsored by Cuba urged the Soviet Union and Hungarian authorities to end the

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<sup>43</sup> United Nations Resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during its Second Emergency Special Session from 4 to 10 November 1956 Supplement No. 1 (A 3355) New York, 1956.

<sup>44</sup> The „Suez Crisis” was the tripartite invasion of the Suez Canal zone by the UK, France and Israel. It had started with the withdrawal of the American promise of a big loan for the construction of Aswan Dam. The Russians were coming in when the Americans left. On July 26 Nasser addressed a rally at Alexandria. His speech against British imperialism was also his most vehement, but what foxed his audience was his frequent reference by name to the French builder of the Suez Canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps. Only after the rally did the world discover that „De Lesseps” was the codeword for the Egyptian Army to start the seizure and nationalisation of the canal. The British prime minister Eden called him „Grabber Nasser”. The Suez Canal, Eden said, was Britain’s „great imperial lifeline,” especially for oil. After unproductive discussions at meetings of the Suez Canal Users’ Association the war followed.

<sup>45</sup> Third World Reaction to Hungary and Suez, 1956: A Soviet Foreign Ministry Analysis, Cold War International History Project, Virtual Archive, [http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\\_id=1409&fuseaction=va2\\_document&identifier=82DDDEAF-D628-BF3AFBBD65B5A0ABBCE4&sort=Coverage&item=Asia](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2_document&identifier=82DDDEAF-D628-BF3AFBBD65B5A0ABBCE4&sort=Coverage&item=Asia)

deportation of Hungarian citizens. The Cuban Delegate introduced with the following preface the resolution: „Hungary has become one big cemetery. The acts perpetrated by the army of the Soviet Union in Hungary beggar description. ... Men, women and children are led forcibly outside Hungarian territory. Executions have felled hundreds every day. And all this is being done despite indignant humanity which turns to the U.N. ... as the only means of putting this slaughter, this butchery, to an end.” The resolution repeated the U.N.’s previous demand for withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, called upon the Russians „to cease the deportation of Hungarian citizens and to return promptly to their homes those who have been deported.” A Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, composed of the representatives of Australia, Ceylon Denmark, Tunisia and Uruguay, was established by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 January 1957. It was charged by the General Assembly with the duty of providing the Assembly and all members of the U.N. with the fullest information regarding the situation created by the intervention of the Soviet Union through its use of armed force in the internal affairs of Hungary.<sup>46</sup>

During the days of the uprising and in the months after it there were strong hopes among certain Hungarian intellectuals that India, with her special relationship with the Soviet Union would intervene into the Hungarian-Soviet conflict to reduce the extent of retaliation. There were attempts to send a memorandum outside Hungary via the recently established Indian Embassy. Charge de Affairs Mohammad Aatur Rahman put a lot of effort into making the Indian government and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru use their influence for the sake of Hungarians. Such hopes were almost dashed by a statement of Krishna Menon on October 28 that developments in Hungary were internal matters for the Hungarian people. His statements and the vote against the US resolution on Hungary gave the impression that he favoured the Soviet action in Hungary. He was even quoted as saying that the presence of US and British forces in West Germany was the equivalent of the Soviet occupation of Hungary.<sup>47</sup> There were sharp differences between the Nehru and Krishna Menon. Nehru himself was the first to protest against the Anglo-French-Israeli aggression against Egypt. He spoke of the „collapse of the world conscience” and called for the immediate withdrawal of the three invaders. On the events in Hungary, however, he was initially cautious in „deploring” the Soviet Union. For this he was widely criticised. Later, when Nehru spoke of Hungary more

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<sup>46</sup> On 14 March 1957, the Committee requested the Secretary-General to inform the Government of Romania that the Committee desired to meet Imre Nagy in the interest of a full and effective performance of the functions entrusted to it by the General Assembly. The Permanent Representative of Romania replied on 30 March that his Government considered the establishment of the Committee as contrary to the spirit and provisions of the United Nations Charter, as well as to the interests of international co-operation. General Assembly Official Records: Eleventh Session Supplement No. 18 (A/3592) New York, 1957.

<sup>47</sup> Michael Brechter, *India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World*, London 1968 85-86.

sharply, the Russians reminded him that Hungary was „as important to the Soviet Union as Kashmir was to India.”<sup>48</sup>

In later months there was much criticism led by Nehru, and joined by Indo **PhD aspirant** nesia and Burma of Western policy towards the Soviet Union. Those countries repeatedly questioned the continued UN interest in the Hungarian question. On 17 August 1957 Nehru met in Delhi with the Hungarian deputy foreign minister Károly Szarka and Ambassador Aladár Tamás and told them that India is not agreeing to keep further the Hungarian question on the UN agenda.<sup>49</sup>

### **Search for international recognition**

The foreign policy of Hungary after the events of 1956 was connected with the search for political stability. Even in later years the total subservience to the Soviet Union in foreign policy was the price paid for the modest economic reforms. Without any doubt Moscow had a veto over Hungary's actions. This was easy to maintain because of the „radiant” character of the ties inside of the communist block, the Soviet Union had direct contact with all the partners but ties among the later group were much less closed. Kádár tried by means of pragmatic foreign policy to wring advantages. This was cumbersome but accomplished successfully. At the same time when Kádár remained faithful to Moscow, he could by piecemeal methods gain international room for manoeuvre. Kádár benefited from the rapprochement strategy, which meant a gradual opening of the international arenas. He tried to achieve political stability through external, primarily Soviet, recognition and support. In foreign relations he established relations with the Third World, with pro-Soviet or nonaligned countries and pursued the policy of „peaceful co-existence” of the socialist and capitalist systems.

In 1957 Prince Wan Waithayakon from Thailand became the United Nations Special Representative in the Hungarian question appointed by General Assembly resolution 1133 (XI). On 12 October 1957 the Hungarian foreign ministry declared that the prince will not get entry visa for Hungary as the Hungarian government considers the resolution 1133 (XI) as invalid. The prince reported on 9 December to the General Assembly that he will not be able to deliver. His function was taken over three days later by Sir Leslie Knox Munro from New Zealand and the Hungarian question slowly disappeared during the

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<sup>48</sup> Inder Malhotra, 50 years after Suez and Hungary. The Asian Age, Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, London, [www.asianage.com/presentation/columnisthome/inder-malhotra/art-ofclinging-to-gilded-chairs.aspx](http://www.asianage.com/presentation/columnisthome/inder-malhotra/art-ofclinging-to-gilded-chairs.aspx) - 36k –

<sup>49</sup> Csaba Békés, D. Gusztáv Kecskés, A forradalom és a magyar kérdés az ENSZ-ben, 1956-1963 (The Revolution and the Hungarian Question in the United Nations, 1956-1963) Magyar ENSZ Társaság, Budapest (2006) 152.

following years from the international agenda. In 1960 secret talks started and on 20 October 1962 ended with a non written agreement between Hungary and the United States and as result, the Hungarian question was not put before the UN General Assembly and as a related development Hungary proclaimed in 1963 a general amnesty for 1956. Keeping the Hungarian question on the UN agenda was a US tactic to highlight Soviet imperialism and with that to promote American influence among nonaligned countries. For the Hungarian side the most important issue in that period was international recognition to break out from a nearly pariah status. After the quick internal stabilisation the Kádár regime achieved in the early 1960s an external stabilisation as well. After the the revolution was put down, Hungary could count only on the fellow Warsaw Pact countries and on China. Already in August 1957 a Hungarian goodwill mission headed by a deputy foreign minister visited India, Burma, Indonesia, Nepal, Ceylon, Syria, Egypt and Sudan. The delegation was received by the leading personalities of the Third World, like Nehru, Nasser and others. In 1960 Sukarno, in 1961 Nkrumah visited Hungary. That was a great victory for the Hungarian diplomacy, especially for the minister in charge between 1958-1961, Endre Sik. In the years he was the head of the Hungarian foreign ministry, 20 African countries achieved independence and became members of the UN. With many of them diplomatic relations were established, missions were opened in Conakry, Guinea in 1959, in Accra, Ghana in 1961 and in Bamako, Mali in 1962. Others followed soon.

### **Hungary and the non-aligned states: natural allies?**

During and immediately after Sik's ministry a real breakthrough happened in Hungary's international relations. As since 1945 the country had no active foreign policy and 1956 put the country into isolation, the general amnesty in 1963 opened the gates, more and more foreign missions were opened abroad and in Budapest as well. In 1950 Hungary received only 24 such diplomatic missions (43rd place in world ranking), in 1955 the number of missions received grew to 32 (46th ranking), in 1960 40 missions worked in Budapest (41st ranking) but in 1965 the number of missions jumped to 59 (that secured the 34th place in world ranking). That number grew further to 64 in 1970 (36th ranking)<sup>50</sup> but the great leap and the time when relations with non-aligned countries were strategically important, was over. In 1970 Hungary had altogether with 55 developing countries diplomatic ties (19 Asian, 27 African, and 9 Latin American). A new era started, when ties with developing countries were kept up mainly from two reasons: the first was to meet the Soviet political expectations, the second was to establish beneficial economic relationships. In the first case it was a must to help the developing socialist countries like North

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<sup>50</sup> Melvin Small, J. David Singer, The Diplomatic Importance of States, 1816-1970: An Extension and Refinement of the Indicator. in: World Politics, 25 (1973) 4, 577-599.

Korea, Mongolia, Vietnam, Cuba, or countries with „socialist orientation”, like Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Ethiopia, Yemen, Congo (Brazzaville) and Mozambique.

In such cases economic considerations played no significant role, but later to open up new markets and to import badly needed goods for the country's economy and for the private consumers became more important. But those expectations never came true, in the years 1966-70 the total value of the Hungarian trade with the developing world was only USD 185 million, i.e. 1,5 % of total foreign trade of Hungary. An other form of support was that in 1970 nearly 750 students were studying in Hungary from developing countries, with 21 countries functioned technical-scientific cooperation and 245 Hungarian experts worked in dozens of countries. (Out of nearly 300.000 altogether.) As the developing countries did not serve for Hungary as hard currency earners, the economic hardships in the 1970s and even more in the 1980s put an end to the economic cooperation. By 1989 Hungary had shrinking ties with them. In the same time the movement of the non-aligned countries lost totally its significance for the Hungarian diplomacy.

**Prof. László Tamás Vizi, PhD**

### **THE HUNGARIAN KINGDOM'S DEFENSIVE WAR AGAINST NAPOLEON IN 1805.**

The events unfolding in France in 1789 came as a surprise to the European powers, hence their reactions were at first uncoordinated, at times even contradictory. In Great Britain, of long-standing liberal traditions, the changes were at first positively received, just as among the Hungarian nobles, who also watched the events in Paris with sympathy at the beginning. The former interpreted the transformative processes in the French capital as steps leading to a parliamentary monarchy, while the Hungarian nobility saw them as a justification of their policy of defending their constitution against Joseph II's absolutistic moves. The initial enthusiasm, however, soon abated. England was

quick to realize that France was an adversary with the ambition to take the lead in Europe, and the masses of Hungarian noblemen also turned against the French ideas that aimed to abolish the feudal economic and social structure with increasing radicalism. The conservative courts of Vienna and Berlin were alarmed by the events in France, the model state of absolutism, but they refrained from open intervention before August 1791. It was only after Louis XVI's unsuccessful attempt to flee and the political turn following the crisis of Varennes that they decided to threaten revolutionary France with a European intervention in the declaration of Pillnitz, signed on 27 August 1791. The French legislative assembly passed its resolution about a reply to the declaration signed by Frederick William II, king of Prussia, and Emperor Leopold II, on 20 April 1792 after heated political debates, declaring war on Prussia as well as on Austria, ruled by the new king of Bohemia and Hungary, Francis I. That launched the French wars that lasted with shorter or longer interruptions until 1815, aimed first to halt the spread of the French revolutionary ideas and later to curtail the French ambitions of the European hegemony. Coalitions followed on each other's heels, at first nominally still against the French kingdom, then against the French republic and finally against imperial France, turning war into everyday reality and peace into a rarity in Europe for a quarter of a century.

Besides England, the Habsburg Empire including the Kingdom of Hungary proved to be France's most determined political and military foe. Except for the fourth coalition of 1806, it was a decisive force in all anti-French leagues, yet little military success could be registered in Vienna before 1813, while failures were galore. The peace treaties terminating the wars of the coalitions resulted in the Empire's loss of significant territories and several million inhabitants, and the monarchy renamed as Austrian Empire only received considerable territorial compensation under the Paris peace pacts conclusively terminating the French wars.<sup>51</sup>

When the French Wars broke out, the military force of the Habsburg Empire consisted of 57 line infantry regiments, 34 cavalry and border regiments, 20 grenadier battalions, totalling some 300 thousand troops. With the hostilities escalating, the number gradually rose, reaching some 550 thousand by late 1813.

<sup>51</sup> *Horváth Mihály*: Magyarország történelme VIII. [A history of Hungary] Budapest, 1873. 206, 219-220, 287-288, 392-396, 477-483; *Pajkossy Gábor*: Az abszolutizmus és a rendiség utolsó küzdelmei. Az első reformtörekvések (1790-1830) [The last struggles of absolutism and the feudal social strata. The first reformist attempts (1790-1830)] In: 19. századi magyar történelem 1790-1918. (ed.) *Gergely András*. Korona Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. 149-150; *Fónagy Zoltán*: A nemzeti mozgalom és a francia háborúk. [The national movement and the French wars] In: Millenniumi Magyar Történet. Magyarország története a honfoglalástól napjainkig. (ed.) *Tóth István György*. Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2002. 337; *Gergely András – Pajkossy Gábor*: A Habsburg Birodalom és Magyarország. [The Habsburg Empire and Hungary] In: 19. századi magyar történelem 1790-1918. (ed.) *Gergely András*. Korona Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. 9-12.

Within this force, the second largest territorial unit – making up 48 % of the Habsburg Empire – was the Kingdom of Hungary, which enjoyed a degree of autonomy based on its separate constitution. Hungary supported 11, later 15 Hungarian and Transylvanian standing line infantry regiments; 10 (later 12) Hussar regiments, 5 grenadier battalions, 17 border infantry regiments and 1 battalion of boatmen. The total force numbered between 116 and 122 thousand people, amounting to about one third of the imperial and royal force at the beginning, later a bit more than a quarter of the standing army, so that every 85th inhabitant of Hungary was rendering military service at time of war.<sup>52</sup>

Hungary's relative independence within the Habsburg Empire is also manifest in the specific Hungarian method of troops replacement. The size of the cadre to be filled by conscription or recruitment was determined and authorized by the Hungarian diets politically controlled by the privileged social strata. The Hungarian parliaments summoned between 1792 and 1801 offered 200 thousand troops, the diet of 1802 another annual 6 thousand, in case of war 12 thousand, the diet of 1807 consented to another 12 thousand recruits, all this amounting to some 300 thousand soldiers during the 23 years of hostilities.<sup>53</sup> Thus the Kingdom of Hungary took part in the military events with such a great force, bearing the respective war burdens. During the French wars the convened diets also largely contributed to covering the expenses of warring by levying special war taxes in addition to determining the number of recruits. The privileged social groups – first of all the nobility – also undertook further financial burden by voluntarily offering war aid (*subsidium*) in 1807.<sup>54</sup>

The imperial high command of the Habsburg Empire tended to deploy the regiments and battalions with Hungarian and Transylvanian troops at the most delicate points of the fronts and at the most crucial moments. It was so in the battles of Aspern and Leipzig, as well as in the Italian and Rhenish battlefields. As a sign of the valiance and courage of the soldiers, over three thousand gold and silver awards were distributed among them for deeds on the battlefield, and 88 were honoured with the highest military decoration, the Maria Theresa order of valour.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Ódor Imre: Magyarország és francia háborúk (1792-1815). [Hungary and the French wars (1792-1815)] In: Nagy képes millenniumi hadtörténet. 1000 év a hadak útján. (ed.) Rácz Árpád. Rubicon-Aquila-Könyvek, Budapest, 2000. 255; Dobszay Tamás – Fónagy Zoltán: A rendi társadalom felbomlása. [The disruption of feudal society] In: 19. századi magyar történelem 1790-1918. (ed.) Gergely András. Korona Kiadó, Budapest, 1998. 122-123; Pajkossy: op.cit. 150; Fónagy: op.cit. 338.

<sup>53</sup> Ódor: op.cit. 256-257; Pajkossy: op.cit. 151; Fónagy: op.cit. 338; Benda Kálmán: Magyarország a napóleoni háborúkban. [Hungary in the Napoleonic wars] In: Magyarország története V. 1790-1848. (chief ed.) Mérei Gyula. (ed.) Vörös Károly. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1980. 449, 451.

<sup>54</sup> Benda: op.cit. 465.; Vizi László Tamás: A magyarországi és az erdélyi nemesség a XVIII-XIX. században. [The Hungarian and Transylvanian nobility in the 18th-19th centuries] In: Magyarország, fehérvári polgárság. (ed.) Dr. Szalai Károly. Székesfehérvár, 1996. 18.

<sup>55</sup> Ódor: op.cit. 255-256; Pajkossy: op.cit. 151; Vizi László Tamás: Az utolsó nemesi felkelés magyar kitüntetettjei. [The Hungarians rewarded for their feats at arms in the last insurrection of the

There are no exact figures of the losses. The gravity of the losses is, however, aptly suggested by the expected loss of 100 thousand troops annually. In regard to the Kingdom of Hungary and taking into account the twenty-five years of warfare, this means an estimated 120-150 thousand people or some 4-6% of the adult male population. However, a higher rate of loss cannot, at present, be excluded.<sup>56</sup>

The population of the Hungarian kingdom was not only represented in the theatres of war as part of the imperial and royal army, though. During the French wars, the insurrection, a centuries-old institution of the nobility, was called to arms four times - in 1797, 1800, 1805 and 1809.

The institution of the insurrection dates back to the Golden Bull of 1222, and refers to the military, defensive role of the Hungarian nobility in what was a sort of blood tax, which ensured the nobility's privileges and exemption from taxation for centuries. Reference to it was the basis for their tax exemption up to 1848. The latest occasion on which the insurrection had been called up was in the first phase of the war of the Austrian succession in 1741<sup>57</sup>. The question of the insurrection was raised again towards the end of the 1790s after the outbreak of the French wars in 1792, in view of the growing burden the events had been placing on the Habsburg Empire. The military defeats and heavy losses of the Habsburg Empire required the mobilization of the Hungarian insurrection, as a considerable pool of available reserves. The move was all the more rational, as equipping and maintaining the insurgents, as well as the pertinent military obligations were incumbent on the Hungarian nobility and bodies with noble rights (e.g. free royal towns, counties, etc.) and placed comparatively little pressure on the already overburdened central war budget.

On each of the four occasions the legal prescriptions concerning the organization of an insurrection were adhered to. The basis for the procedure was laid down in Act 63 of 1741, later re-formulated, modified and amended in Act 2 of 1792, Act 1 of 1795 and Acts 2 and 3 of 1808. These spelt out that "*in case of open war*"<sup>58</sup> the insurrection could be called to arms by the king (now Francis I) to defend the country, after due deliberation of the graveness of the situation,

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nobility] (Manuscript owned by the author.)

<sup>56</sup> Ódor: op.cit. 256-257; Pajkossy: op.cit. 151; Fónagy: op.cit. 338; Benda: op.cit. 449, Vizi László Tamás: A francia háborúk katonai hatása a Magyar Királyságra. [The military effect of the French wars on the Hungarian Kingdom] In: A Veszprémi Akadémiai Bizottság régió doktoranduszainak tudományos fóruma. Nyugat-Magyarországi Egyetem Doktori Iskolák. Sopron, 2000. 26.

<sup>57</sup> Zachar József: A magyarországi hadügy jogi keretei, 1648-1848. [Legal frames of the Hungarian military affairs, 1648-1848] Hadtörténelmi Közlemények (HK) 1995. 2. sz. 12-17; Éble Gábor: Az 1741-ik évi fölkelés számereje. [The strength of the insurrection of 1741] HK, 1891. 279-280; Éble Gábor: Az 1741-iki insurrectio szervezése. [The organization of the insurrection of 1741] HK, 1910. 165-198; Markó Árpád: Insurrectio és állandó hadsereg. [Insurrection and standing army] In: Magyar művelődéstörténet IV. (ed.) Domanovszky Sándor. Magyar Történelmi Társulat, Budapest, 1941. 270-274.

and only if "*the standing army could not be expected to halt the enemy and an invasion of the country seemed imminent.*"<sup>59</sup> In keeping with the law, personal, banderial and portal insurrections were announced. Personal insurrection meant ordering the nobility to be personally involved, that is, every nobleman had to render mounted or foot service depending on his financial status, at his own expenses. Exemption and substitution were regulated by separate legal provisions. Secular and ecclesiastical aristocrats disposing over large wealth had to provide their own military contingents or *banderia*. Under the portal insurrection, the noblemen and societal institutions with the privileges of the nobility had to field, equip and maintain troops depending on the number of their serfs and size of their estates. Thus the insurrection did not remain limited to the nobility but affected directly and on a mass scale the different non-privileged groups of Hungarian society as well. The nobles insurrection referred, thus, not merely to the duty of the Hungarian nobility to personally go to war but a peculiar Hungarian institution of medieval origin effective until the 19th century: a pattern of army organization and recruitment, encompassing the entire society of Hungary, affecting every social stratum.

The man entrusted with organizing the insurrections was the king's younger brother, the Archduke Joseph, palatine of Hungary. On all four occasions, an adjutant-general, an aide-de-camp and an orderly officer were appointed to aid him. An insurrection had its own general staff headed by the quartermaster general as chief of staff. An insurrection had its own staff of engineers, artillery officers, engineering corps, army catering corps, postal service, judge-advocate, chaplain, medical officer and medical corps. To see to the administrative matters of the insurrection, the *Insurrections General Commando* was set up.<sup>60</sup> Preparatory work was done in each county by the organizing committee headed by the Főispán [lord lieutenant]. They assessed the wealth of the noblemen and determined the quotas of the personal insurrection and set up the sections and battalions into which the insurrectionaries were divided in. These conscriptions also served as the basis to determine and levy the contributions to the costs of equipping and maintaining the portal insurrection.

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<sup>58</sup> Corpus Juris Hungarici. Magyar Törvénytár 1000-1895. [Collection of Hungarian laws] (eds.) Tóth Lőrincz, Dr. Kolosvári Sándor, Dr. Óvári Kelemen, Dr. Márkus Dezső. 1657-1740. évi törvénycikkek. Budapest, Franklin – Társulat, 1900. Act XLVI of 1681 299, 303.

<sup>59</sup> Corpus Juris Hungarici. Magyar Törvénytár 1000-1895. [Collection of Hungarian Laws] (ed.) Dr. Márkus Dezső. 1740-1835. évi törvénycikkek. Budapest, Franklin – Társulat, 1901. Act II of 1808. 377.

<sup>60</sup> *Gömöry Gusztáv*: A magyar nemesi fölkelések. 1797 és 1800-1801. [Insurrections of the Hungarian nobility. 1797 and 1800-1801] HK, 1888. 51, 57; *Takáts László*: Az utolsó magyar nemesi felkelés csapategészségügyi szolgálatának működése 1809-ben. [The activity of the medical corps of the last Hungarian insurrection of noblemen in 1809] Honvédorvos, 1962. 4. sz. 321-331; *Gyalóka Jenő*: A magyar nemes insurrectio reformtervei 1797-től 1809-ig. [Plans to reform the Hungarian noblemen's insurrection from 1797 to 1809] Századok, 1925. 128.

The counties also organized insurrection treasuries (*cassa concurrentionalis*) to collect the extraordinary taxes imposed on the nobility by the county assembly to finance the portal insurrection, the voluntary offers and other donations. This fund served to cover the clothing, arming and equipping of the insurgents as well as their provisioning in the course of the campaign. The handling of the fund was strictly regulated and the revenues could only be spent on the noble insurrection.<sup>61</sup>

After the second muster of the insurgents, usually held at the seat of the county, the commanders of the insurrection districts took over the conscripted and already equipped insurgents and started them towards the gathering camps where the insurgents were drilled.

From the announcement of an insurrection to their march to the army camps at least two, or more often three months would pass. This period brought to the surface all the organizational handicaps and the difficulties associated with mobilizing masses of people in the framework of the insurrection. As the insurrection had no peace-footing, they had no trained officers or drilled rank and file. Arms, clothes and all sorts of equipment were missing. As a call to arms could only be made when the attack of the enemy was looming large, everything had to be done in the last minute, with hodgepodge, hasty organization.<sup>62</sup>

In the four insurrections called up during the Napoleonic Wars, some 114 thousand insurgents received military training. Although in 1797 and 1800 the insurrection was announced, the insurgents conscripted and equipped, and they were also combat ready after several weeks of training, as a result of the ceasefires (Leoben, 18 April 1797; Steyer, 25 December 1800) the wars ended before their deployment and peace was made between the warring parties soon after in both instances. At that time it seemed so that the major clashes would avoid the Carpathian Basin and the main armed conflicts of the early 19th century would be far removed from the territory of the Hungarian kingdom.

However, the peace of Lunéville between France and the Habsburg Empire on 9 February 1801 and the peace treaty signed with England in Amiens

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<sup>61</sup> *Vörös Károly*: A magyar nemesi felkelés a napóleoni háborúk korában. [The insurrection of the Hungarian nobility during the Napoleonic wars] In: A Nógrád Megyei Múzeumok Évkönyve. VII. Salgótarján, 1981. 95.

<sup>62</sup> *Gyalóky Jenő*: A magyar nemesinsurrectio 1805-ben. [The insurrection of the Hungarian nobility in 1805] HK, 1925. 258, 274; József nádor iratai (Magyarország újabkori történetének forrásai. József nádor élete és iratai) II. [Documents of the Palatine Joseph. (Sources of the history of Hungary in the modern age)] 1805-1807. Publ.: *Domanovszky Sándor*. Budapest, 1929. (JNI. II. 1805-1807.) 146-150.; *Domanovszky Sándor*: József nádor élete.(Magyarország újabkori történetének forrásai. József nádor élete és iratai I.) I/1. [The life of the Palatine Joseph. (Sources of the history of Hungary in the modern age. The life and documents of the Palatine Joseph)] Budapest, 417-418.

on 27 March 1802 did not bring lasting peace to the continent. Neither party lived up to the obligations stipulated by the peace contract, which led to renewed hostilities between England and France in May 1803. The conservative Prime Minister, William Pitt the Younger, famous for his anti-French sentiments, once more at the helm of the government in London after 1804, started to organize a new coalition. Pitt had the parliament vote for two million pounds sterling as an initial aid for the allies. The third coalition against France came into being with the English-Swedish agreement signed on 3 December 1804 and the English-Russian pact concluded in St. Petersburg on 11 April 1805. After being successfully wooed by both Britain and Russia, the Habsburg Empire too joined the coalition on 9 August 1805. The government of Vienna received 1 million pounds sterling from London to prepare for the war and England promised to pay another 4 millions per war year. In response the coalition, Napoleon gave up the plan of invading England and struck an alliance with Bavaria, Baden, Württemberg and Nassau. Although the war operations had begun already in late August 1805, Napoleon only declared war on the emperor of Austria and king of Hungary, Francis I, on 23 September.<sup>63</sup>

Though at the beginning of the campaign, the encounters took place far in the west, it could be concluded from the earlier wars that sooner or later the theatre of war would draw closer, or even reach, the Hungarian frontier. Palatine Joseph reckoned with this possibility and started to prepare for an insurrection on 5 September 1805, though he had limited jurisdiction without the consent of the Hungarian parliament. The moves to be done prior to parliamentary approval included the elaboration of the plans of organization, conscription of the insurgents, preliminary acquisition and provision of their arms, clothes and other equipment and the nomination of the higher ranking officers. Plans were also made to divide the insurgents into infantry battalions and mounted squadrons, and then into divisions, with calculations about the expected changes in the strength of the insurgent districts. The palatine pressed for rapid preparations as he knew from the insurrections of 1797 and 1800 that at least three months were needed for the equipping and training of the insurgent army after the diet's approval.<sup>64</sup>

The Archduke Joseph inspected the equipping committee in Óbuda and the stocks at the arsenal of Buda. He reported on what he had seen to the

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<sup>63</sup> On the precedents, causes and detailed process of the war up to the peace treaty, see: *Bánlaky József*: A magyar nemzet hadtörténelme. [The war history of the Hungarian nation] 20. rész. Budapest, 1941. 215-262; *Wertheimer Ede*: Ausztria és Magyarország a tizenkilencedik század első évtizedében. [Austria and Hungary in the first decades of the 19th century] I. Budapest, 1884. 233-255, 303-323, 340-368, 369-395; *Horváth Mihály*: op.cit. 269-270; *Gömöry Gusztáv*: Ausztria hadereje az 1792-től 1866-ig folytatott háborúkban. [The military strength of Austria in the wars between 1792 and 1866] HK, 1893. 403-404; On the implications of the war for Hungarian war history, see: A magyar katona vitézségének ezer éve. [One thousand years of Hungarian military valiance] II. (ed.) *Pilch Jenő*. Franklin-Társulat, Budapest, 1933. 158-165.

<sup>64</sup> *Gyalóky*: op.cit. 257-258, 274.

monarch on 24 September. In his letter he noted that there were a mere 5-6 thousand muskets in Buda, and there was not enough cloth for making the uniforms. The palatine urged for the quick completion of regimentals and the delivery of usable muskets and pistols to the arsenal in Buda so that sufficient army clothes and weaponry be available at the time of announcing the insurrection. In his letter he asked the help of the ruler, his brother, for the fitting out of 36 thousand infantrymen. The monarch forwarded the request to the War Council. However, in vain did the palatine plan to set up "*an attractive (insurgent) army ... whose soldierly bearing could be revealed by their outfit and weaponry*", the War Council's reply on 5 October foiled the archduke's plans. With reference to the scarcity of the imperial and royal army resources, most of the palatine's requests were turned down in Vienna. They suggested that the garments for the insurgents should be acquired in Hungary and promised to deliver a mere 20 thousand "*lighter*" muskets and a few more insignificant items of equipment for money.<sup>65</sup> Thus the efforts of the palatine to equip the insurgents with arms and uniforms were unsuccessful. The War Council even refused to transfer the required number of officers of the standing army to lead the insurrection.<sup>66</sup>

The Archduke Joseph's haste to field the insurrection was verified by the martial events in the main theatre of war in the first half of October. With dazzling quickness, Napoleon drove a wedge between the Russian and Austrian forces, and launched an unexpected onslaught towards the Danube valley where the situation of the imperial and royal forces turned critical in the vicinity of Ulm, in part at least due to the commander, general Mack who, taken by surprise, could not settle on a course of action to follow through on.

In the knowledge of these alarming and depressing war news the Hungarian diet opened in Pozsony on 13 October 1805. The convocation of the diet had been decided upon in Vienna in late August, for obvious political reasons. The Hungarian chancellery had let it known that several counties were dissatisfied because the announcement of the previous insurrections had not been preceded by parliamentary resolutions or offer. The court wished to place the insurrection on a legal footing, but towards the end of the summer it could not anticipate the critical military situation it would be facing at the time of the opening of the diet in mid-October. The monarch, who had come to Pozsony straight from the battlefield, desperately entreated the Hungarian nobility for military and financial support. After Francis I's speech soliciting for help, the palatine Joseph addressed the estates, and as commander-in-chief of the insurrection, he assured the monarch of his assistance.<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>65</sup> JNI. II. 1805-1807. 146-149; *Domanovszky*: op.cit. I/1. 417-418.; *Gyalóky*: op.cit. 276.

<sup>66</sup> *Gyalóky*: op.cit.277, 293-304.

<sup>67</sup> *Horváth Mihály*: op.cit. 271-274.

However, the at once entreating and firebrand speeches of the king and the palatine failed to elicit the diet's offers for the war immediately. The deputies did not settle to thrashing out the military issues before the arrival of the news of the repeated defeats of the imperial army. On 17 October 1805 first General Mack capitulated with 23 thousand troops and 59 field-guns, the next day Lieutenant General Werneck surrendered with his 12 thousand men, 120 guns and 500 carriages of ammunition and provisions.<sup>68</sup> That cleared the way for Napoleon towards Vienna in the Danube valley, which alarmed not only the imperial capital but also the Hungarian diet. The heavy losses and grave defeats of the imperial and royal army on all fronts had brought the war within reach, eliciting immediate response from the Hungarian deputies. With these precedents and under these circumstances, the diet passed act 1 of 1805 on 27 October, consenting to calling the „noble insurrection” to arms.

By the first days of November 1805, the military situation of the Empire had turned critical. On 2 November Napoleon marched into Linz, and since the Russian army kept clear of the French, shunning a decisive encounter, Vienna was almost up for grabs. Hearing this news, the palatine – in agreement with the monarch – interrupted the organizing work of the insurrection in the Transdanubian district and in most counties of the Cis-Danubian area. The palatine had every reason to presume that preparations for an insurrection would hinder the conclusion of an armistice and would irritate the enemy reaching the frontier. His move, however, only postponed the setting up of the corps of the counties concerned, without releasing them from the duties of the insurrection and its preparations.<sup>69</sup> The ruler's opinion about the noblemen's insurrection, however, changed by 12 November. On that day, the French marched into Vienna, which transformed the military and political situation at once. Aware of the changed circumstances, Francis I ordered the palatine invested with full power a few days earlier to announce the insurrection and call the nobility of Hungary to arms officially.<sup>70</sup>

When the insurrection was announced, preparations launched by the palatine in the early autumn were well under way in the districts. Headed by Joseph, the high command of the insurrection was formed and field marshal baron Antal Sztáray, lieutenant generals baron Károly Ott, baron Zsigmond Szentkereszty and baron Péter Duka were appointed as commanders of the Cis-Danubian, Trans-Danubian, Cis-Tiszan and Trans-Tiszan insurgent districts, respectively. To organize the administrative matters of the insurrection, the *Insurrections-General-Commando* was established with retired lieutenant general Mihály Fábry at the helm. Similarly to the insurrections of 1797 and 1800, the chief of the general staff was brigadier general Móric Gomez y

<sup>68</sup> Horváth Mihály: op.cit. 275-276; Gyalóka: op.cit. 272-273.

<sup>69</sup> JNI. II. 1805-1807. 188-190, 300-301, Domanovszky: op.cit. I/1. 432-433, Gyalóka: op.cit. 278.

<sup>70</sup> JNI. II. 1805-1807. 176-178, 189-190; Domanovszky: op.cit. I/1. 431-432.

Parientos. It was planned to arrange the insurgents of each district into separate divisions, each consisting of two infantry and a cavalry brigades.<sup>71</sup>

From among Archduke Joseph's measures taken in the first half of November 1805, an ordinance dated in Pozsony on 7 November and addressed to field marshal baron József Alvinczy deserves special attention. In it, the palatine asked the commander-in-chief of Hungary to order immediately the "*transfer of the garrisons of Komárom, Esztergom, Vác, Székesfehérvár, Ercsi, etc. to settlements along the Danube below Pest*" owing to the unfavourable military events in the main theatre of war.<sup>72</sup> The palatine's order was fulfilled by the units concerned within a few days. What that implied was that after the withdrawal of the imperial and royal line infantry, the town-dwellers had to assume the duty of guarding the towns. The inhabitants were obligated to do so under oath, and also by article 11 of act 1 of 1805. That initiated the organization of the local militia. This became all the more urgent as on 15 November 1805 the French troops of marshal Louis-Nicolas Davout led by cavalry general Vialanne crossed the Hungarian border around Pozsony, captured the city of coronations, occupied some parts of the counties of Pozsony, Nyitra and Trencsén, and there was no telling whether they would continue their advance towards Buda or not.

In view of the expected advancement of the French troops, in late November 1805 the high command decided upon setting up a military cordon along the Esztergom-Bicske-Székesfehérvár line under the commandship of imperial and royal brigadier general János Andrássy. The looming threat was only lifted on the first days of December, as on the eve of the prospective decisive encounter - on 30 November - Napoleon ordered the demilitarization of the occupied areas. The French troops were withdrawn from the region of Pozsony and ordered to head towards Austerlitz. Thus the French occupation only lasted a few weeks.

The disastrous defeat of the Austrian-Russian forces in the battle of Austerlitz on 2 December 1805 determined the subsequent outcome of the war. In spite of that, the organization of the Hungarian noblemen's insurrection gathered momentum. The palatine was of the opinion that the war might be resumed, which would have meant the shift of the operations to the territory of Hungary. In his letter written to emperor Francis on 3 December - unaware of the disaster of the previous day, he noted that "*judging by reports coming from various parts of the country*" "*the morale of the insurgents was good*" and "*within a fortnight the noble insurrection could be pitted against the enemy.*"<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> *Gyalóky*: op.cit. 267-269, 277.

<sup>72</sup> Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, (HL) [War historical archives] Budapest. 1805-11-4 1/2. (83-84. fol.)

<sup>73</sup> *Domanovszky*: op.cit. I/1. 444; JNI. II. 1805-1807. 234; *Gyalóky*: op.cit. 286.

However, the palatine's optimism about the combat-readiness of the insurrection in mid-December appears to be disproved by the figures. At least one month was needed to make the insurgents in the Trans- and Cis-Danubian districts fit for fighting – as the organization of the insurrection was interrupted there on 8 November 1805 – and they could not have been prepared for combat before mid-January 1806. The palatine could only have the insurgents on this side and that of the river Tisza on his mind when he wrote the letter of 3 December, as in those regions the organization of the insurrection had been going on undisturbed.<sup>74</sup> They alone were adequately equipped – but not trained – to be thrown into action in the middle of December 1805.

The news of the defeat at Austerlitz reached the palatine on the morning of 6 December, and in the evening he also received the monarch's official note. On the next morning, he summoned a military conference during which important decisions were taken concerning the insurrection. With the exception of the counties of Moson, Sopron, Vas, Árva and Liptó, the palatine ordered the immediate mobilization of the entire insurgent cavalry. Székesfehérvár and Veszprém were chosen as places of gathering in the Transdanubian district.<sup>75</sup>

The armistice concluded on 6 December 1805 by the warring parties - of which the palatine was only informed several days later - created a new situation as for the insurrection. Point 3 of the armistice stipulated that the units of insurgents organized up to 6 December did not have to disband, but no organization could follow after that date. The palatine, however, urged for the continuation of the preparations instead of stopping the organization of the insurrection. The excessive French demands voiced during the peace negotiations implied the potentiality of the resumption of the fighting. Upon the palatine's order, the district commanders and the generals appointed to their sides hurried to make the strategic designation of the insurgent troops. The original plans, however, had to be modified. No time remained to set up the planned infantry and cavalry brigades.

The preparatory work, radically accelerated and spurred on by the palatine in early December, could not last long. In his rescript dated 15 December 1805, Francis I prohibited any further move aimed at increasing the combat value of the insurrection. That was certainly in connection with the French-Austrian peace talks entering the final stage. The peace was eventually signed in Pozsony on 26 December 1805, which put an end to the war started in the autumn of

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<sup>74</sup> J.: A borsodi nemesinsurrectio 1805-6-ban. [The insurrection of the nobility in Borsod in 1805-6] HK, 1925. 177-179; *Gyalóky*: A biharvármegyei nemes insurrectio 1805-ben. [The insurrection of the noblemen in Bihar county in 1805] HK, 1916. 438-442.

<sup>75</sup> *Domanovszky*: op.cit. I/1. 447; JN. II. 1805-1807. 239-241, 371; *Gyalóky*: A magyar nemesinsurrectio 1805-ben. [The insurrection of the Hungarian nobility in 1805-6] HK, 1925. 286.

1805.<sup>76</sup> Under the peace agreement, the Habsburg Empire lost the province of Venice, Tirol and Voralberg, so it was but a crumb of comfort that the French troops left the territory of Hungary.

The signing of the Pozsony peace did not entail the immediate dismissal of the 15-20 thousand insurgents<sup>77</sup>, nor did it put an end to the insurrection in a legal sense. Quite to the contrary. Questions concerning the insurrection remained on the agenda and sharp political debates unfolded about the evaluation of the insurrection. Even the monarch and the palatine exchanged letters of a harsh tone on the issue. The palatine Joseph defended the insurrection and stressed the sacrifice made by Hungary for the success.<sup>78</sup>

The royal decree disbanding the insurrection was eventually signed by Francis I on 28 February 1806. The king only used general phrases of thanking the persons, headquarters and authorities rendering services for the sake of the insurrection, although the palatine had made a detailed petition a few days earlier. He also informed the monarch of the actual number of insurgents fitted out. According to his calculations, until mid-December 1805 Hungary had mobilized 20,239 insurgents.<sup>79</sup>

The insurrection of the Hungarian nobility was mobilized for the third time during the Napoleonic Wars failed to smell powder again. Unlike the insurrections of 1797 and 1800 which were combat ready and only the early termination of the fighting prevented their employment, the organization of the insurrection of 1805 was still largely underway when the peace was concluded – not to speak of the Trans- and Cis-Danubian districts where organization picked up speed only after the ceasefire. In the latter areas, no further steps were taken to recruit and equip the insurgents after the middle of December. Not even their gathering or first muster took place,<sup>80</sup> whereas an insurgent army mobilized in time and deployed on the western frontier of Hungary could have drained considerable French forces from the main theatre of the war in Bohemia. A more provident and consistent war effort by the imperial and royal high command could have used the insurgents more effectively against Marshall Davout's 3rd Corps, thus keeping it away from the battlefield of Austerlitz. However, the announcement of the insurrection tarried, the imperial command paid little heed to its equipping. Thus the insurrection could not become the strategic reserve of

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<sup>76</sup> HL. 1805-13-8. (379-382. fol.); *Domanovszky*: op.cit. I/1. 447; JNI. II. 1805-1807. 371; *Gyalókey*: op.cit. 286-287, 305, 307; *Dékáni Kálmán*: Nemesi felkelés számára megállapított egyenruhatervezet. (1806.) [Uniform design determined for the noblemen's insurrection (1806)] HK, 1916. 205-207.

<sup>77</sup> *Domanovszky*: op.cit. I/1. 447; JNI. II. 1805-1807. 392; *Gyalókey*: op.cit. 287.

<sup>78</sup> *Gyalókey*: op.cit. 289; JNI. II. 1805-1807. 462; *Domanovszky*: op.cit. I/1. 453; JNI. II. 1805-1807. 258-261, 425-430, 436-437; *Horváth Mihály*: op.cit. 288-289.

<sup>79</sup> *Domanovszky*: op.cit. I/1. 454-457; JNI. II. 1805-1807. 436-443.

<sup>80</sup> JNI. II. 1805-1807. 459-463; cf.: *Gyalókey*: op.cit. 287, 289-290; *Horváth Mihály*: op.cit. 287.

the last phase of the war of 1805 or an active participant of the military operations. It was only the fourth – and last – insurrection of the Hungarian nobility that saw action in support of the imperial and royal forces of the archduke John, under imperial-royal command, as they clashed with the forces of Napoleon's adopted son, Eugene Beauharnais, viceroy of Italy, in Kismegyer near Győr. The defeat sustained there terminated the series of the insurrections of Hungarian noblemen spanning nearly seven centuries.

### *Appendices*

1. The Archduke Joseph, palatine of Hungary, the commander-in-chief of the insurrection of the Hungarian nobility (1776-1847)
2. Insurgent cavalymen and infantrymen from the period of the French wars
3. The commander of the French forces occupying the north-western Hungarian counties, Marshall Louis-Nicolas Davout (1770-1823)
4. The commemorative tablet in German of the Peace of Pozsony signed on 26 December 1805, erected in the gateway of the archiepiscopal palace of Pozsony. There is no Hungarian variant of the text in the building
5. A street-plate from Paris commemorating the peace of Pozsony but showing the German name of the town instead of the Hungarian
6. Francis I, king of Hungary (1792-1835) and emperor of Austria (1804-1835)

## ***CURRENT ISSUES***

**László Uri**

### **SOME CRIME-RELATED ISSUES OF INCOMPLETE MINI-SCHENGEN ZONE ON BALKANS**

*Among other things the European Union declared the free movement of persons and goods. The Schengen Agreement allows the abolition of internal borders and the joint control over the external borders. As a synonym for Schengen similar agreements in limited geographic dimensions are labelled as mini Schengens. This is what exactly happened in the case of Albania, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro. The presidents of those countries declared their commitments to the free movement of people. The agreement was widely accepted as a mini-Schengen zone in the Balkans<sup>81</sup> by the public. Among other countries Serbia was not invited to the meeting. Is there a unified thinking in the Western Balkans? Apart from disregarding a comprehensive interpretation the agenda on organised crime is of great significance. Although there is no counter-indication of the intention, due to the incomplete list of participants a potential dysfunction can be generated by the lack of prospective cooperation.*

#### **The borders of the region**

Marking the borders of the Balkans region is not a simple issue. There are several approaches including a geographic and a pejorative version too. Therefore no imaginary unified border line can be drawn with any legal references. It can be perceived that the Balkans identity is not equally received<sup>82</sup> – while the majority accepts it others wish to get rid of the stigma and there are some who are categorised in this group in spite of their will. The Balkans is a geographic region of South-East Europe usually including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, a part of Turkey, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia. The Balkans *stigma* can be experienced when some from the above mentioned cluster disagree with their classification or new, otherwise non-befitting, states are attached to this grouping. For a false classification or the incorrect use of “Balkans” as an unjustified and pejorative adjective sometimes it is enough to disregard the

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<sup>81</sup> <http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006284022/four-presidents-push-for-mini-schengen-zone-in-balkans.html> 28<sup>th</sup> June 2010. Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN). By Petrit Collaku

<sup>82</sup> Tabajdi, Csaba: A Nyugat-Balkán és az Európai Unió ma. [The Western Balkans and the European Union Today] Balkán-tanulmányok Központ. 21<sup>st</sup> March 2006. p. 2.

historic past or to compare the development levels and state of public in some countries. The multitude of differences of the Balkans should be tolerated, the mentality of peoples in the multiethnic region and the long-term impact of the healing wounds caused by the modern civil war must be understood. From geographic and demographic aspects the European Union has 27 Member States<sup>83</sup> with a combined territory of 4.330.000 km<sup>2</sup>, 500,000,000 inhabitants; the candidate states have a combined territory<sup>84</sup> of 780,000 km<sup>2</sup> with 78,250,000 inhabitants; and on the basis of the above mentioned Balkans classification the 12 countries have<sup>85</sup>, a combined territory of 1,550,000 km<sup>2</sup> with 144,600,000 inhabitants<sup>86</sup>. The notion of “Western Balkans”, marking a separate territory, was borrowed from the European Union vocabulary and this geographic area mostly includes former Yugoslav republics<sup>87</sup> and their successor states – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia –, and also Kosovo and Albania. However, the civil war following the regime change *inflicted* serious wounds which further eroded the acceptance of the previous territorial identity. This may also mean that the image of individual countries can further be modified after the disintegration of Yugoslavia and as a result of the EU accession of some of these states. Naturally, in the long run the question may come up, how far the European Union wishes to expand its southern boundaries.

### **Allies and Alliances**

Even the most powerful states need to build an alliance as their borders are limiting them and this way their geopolitical interests can be extended. It has also happened in history that players with *ideologically* completely different political structures followed their strategic *priorities* differing from ideology<sup>88</sup>. At the same time, due to other reasons<sup>89</sup>, the lack of an often seemingly logical treaty or the invitation of an improper number of players into an alliance cannot be justified. Nevertheless, in a comprehensive way states have four objectives in the international system: security, independence, welfare, status and prestige. The point of foreign policy decision making is to choose which one of them to emphasise and at what price. States can increase their security levels through

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<sup>83</sup> [http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-member-countries/countries/index\\_hu.htm](http://europa.eu/about-eu/27-member-countries/countries/index_hu.htm)

<sup>84</sup> Among others Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey.

<sup>85</sup> Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Slovenia are already member states of the European Union.

<sup>86</sup> [www.cia.world.factbook.com](http://www.cia.world.factbook.com)

<sup>87</sup> From 31<sup>st</sup> January 1946 Yugoslav Federal People's Republic then from 1963 Yugoslav Socialist Federal Republic, and later – to date – successor states: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia (official name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.

<sup>88</sup> Treaty of Nonaggression Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secret Additional Protocol. "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 1939". Signed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov. Moscow, 23 August 1939.

<sup>89</sup> Serbia was not invited to the meeting analyzed in the study paper because of its non-recognition of the independence of Kosovo. <http://mti.hu/cikk/486394/>

reducing their vulnerability, and / or repelling the potential attacks of their potential enemies. The methods are: isolation, self-reliance, neutrality / non aligned status, setting up alliances, or “hiring” an external power. “... In my interpretation an alliance comprises security cooperation between two or more independent states ...” “... An alliance is a universal component of policy, regardless of location, or time ...” “... An alliance is a central feature of international political life ...”<sup>90</sup> States are created by powers which identify the level of threat and the assistance expected from each other.

The above quotations clearly indicate the *priority* of an alliance, its exceptional position and role, the kind of its identifiability in international relations. Naturally, the central themes of the negotiations by the four presidents, conducted at different locations on rotational basis, do not have such content but they clearly indicate the tendency of alliance-building efforts. Making false conclusions should be avoided here but alliance-building should be enlarged when the interests of law enforcement are taken into consideration. On January 1<sup>st</sup> 2008<sup>91</sup> visa liberalisation agreements were introduced between the EU and five Western Balkans countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. According to the conclusions of the Commission Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia met all the criteria in their agendas therefore the nationals of these countries have been allowed to enter the Member States of the European Union without a visa since December 19<sup>th</sup> 2009. In accordance with the provisions of Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council, issued on 10<sup>th</sup> June 1999 persons living in Kosovo and those with citizen certificates issued for the territory of Kosovo, are reasonably excluded from under the visa-free regime related to Serbia<sup>92</sup>. On 17<sup>th</sup> February 2008 Kosovo declared its independence<sup>93</sup> but the scope, the alliance building, and law enforcement cooperation within the mini-Schengen zone formation has not been enlarged due to the above mentioned reason.

### **Security risks and challenges**

General security risks and challenges are closely connected with each other and are intertwined. These are as follow: instable regions; failed states; economic instability; illegal arms trade; challenges of information society; global natural, civilisation threats, and health hazards; organised crime;

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<sup>90</sup> Stephen M. Walt: *The Origins of the Alliances*. USA Cornell University Press, 1987. p.1.

<sup>91</sup> Council Decree 1244/2009/EC (30<sup>th</sup> November 2009.) on the modification of Decree 539/2001/EC listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas when crossing the xternal borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement. The Official Journal of the European Union, L 336. 2009. 18. 12. p. 1.

<sup>92</sup> Council Decree 1244/2009/EC on the modification of Decree 539/2001/EC. p. 1.

<sup>93</sup> Serbia does not recognize the declaration of independence and regards the region as Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohia.

proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (wmd); drug trafficking; terrorism; poverty; and illegal migration. The characteristic features of Western Balkans region include, inter alia, a multitude of ethnic groups, of native languages, and cultures; overlapping ethnic and political borders; antidemocratic regimes; centralised national economies; Soviet-type armed forces; historic hatred and revengefulness; a lack of cooperation; and rivalry for the possession of strategic resources<sup>94</sup>. Global risks and challenges – although due to their cross-border nature they cannot be confined to the territories of individual states – do not have equal influence on each of the countries. They may occur in different ways and with different weights, their impacts are able to dramatically transform the natural or man-made environment of various groups of people<sup>95</sup>. Crimes should be prevented instead of penalising them therefore crime-prevention should be in the focus of efforts. Precise surveillance, intelligence, information collection, and its efficient use comprise the basic pre-condition of crime-prevention<sup>96</sup>. None of the above factors can be disregarded at the quantitative analysis of security risks and challenges, however, their combined occurrence should not be expected everywhere. The local analysis of security challenges should highlight organised crime, drug crimes, terrorism, illegal migration, and corruption. High unemployment rate, poverty, corruption, and the interests of organised crime comprise a proper hothouse of illegal migration. The current target countries of illegal and uncontrolled migration are mostly the developed European Union Member States.

### **The Amsterdam Treaty**

The Amsterdam Treaty is one of the treaties amending the charters of the European Union. This treaty, inter alia, introduced changes in the field of common foreign and security policy, and through the restructuring of the third pillar it played an outstanding role in the intensification of cooperation in the field of internal issues and justice. The Amsterdam Treaty<sup>97</sup>, concluded on 2<sup>nd</sup> October 1997 provides on the integration of the Schengen Agreement, also known as *Schengen Acquis*, concluded on 14<sup>th</sup> June 1985, into the framework of the European Union.

### **The implementation of the Schengen Agreement**

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<sup>94</sup> Rácz, Lajos: Az európai biztonság néhány geostratégiai aspektusa. [Some Geostrategic Aspects of European Security] in *Hadtudomány*, Vol. X. Issue. 2. July 2000.

<sup>95</sup> Lt. Gen, Botz, László PhD: Hazánk biztonsági rendszerének helyzete és felkészültsége a várható fenyegetések elhárítására. [The State of the Security System of our Country and its Preparedness to Prevent Potential Threats] in *Felderítő Szemle* issued by the Military Intelligence Office of the Republic of Hungary, Budapest, Vol. VI. Issue 1. March 2007. p. 15.

<sup>96</sup> Lt. Gen, Botz, László PhD: p. 26.

<sup>97</sup> The Treaty of Amsterdam. Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and certain related Acts. Amsterdam, 2 October 1997. Article K.12. 5. p.19.

On 19<sup>th</sup> June 1990 the agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement on the gradual abolition of checks at the internal EU borders was signed. Here follows a short excerpt from it without an intention of completeness. The internal borders can be crossed anywhere without a personal check except for cases of public safety or national security interests<sup>98</sup>. Along the external borders a unified-level border control shall be conducted. A common policy should be implemented on visas and on the movement of people<sup>99</sup>. Those who possess a visa are allowed to travel without any limitations in case they meet the entry requirements<sup>100</sup>. The Parties reinforce the international agreements on the legal status of refugees without any geographic limitation<sup>101</sup>. Police authorities shall provide a support to each other in order to prevent and investigate crimes.

Those who keep a person under surveillance in their country in the framework of an investigation who may have taken part in criminal acts due to which an extradition may be initiated are authorised to conduct surveillance on the territories of other Parties if the latter has authorised the cross-border surveillance on the basis of a legal aid request<sup>102</sup>. A surveillance can be conducted due to the following crimes: murder, manslaughter, rape, arson, forgery, theft and robbery, reset, blackmailing and hostage taking, human trafficking, illegal trade in drugs or psychotropic substances, violation of laws on weapons and explosive materials; abuse with the use of explosive materials; illegal transportation of toxic or harmful materials. Those involved in the prosecution of a person caught in the act of committing or participating in one of the above listed crimes are authorised to continue the prosecution on the territory of another Party without its preliminary permission<sup>103</sup>. The Agreement has provisions on extradition and on the implementation of mutual criminal legal aid too<sup>104</sup>.

### **The Schengen information system**

Although the provisions on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement are not universally applied the potential security problems stemming from the abolishing of internal borders a number of measures had to be taken in order to counterbalance *deformation*. In the framework of such measures a unified border control was introduced along the external borders while within the Schengen zone the law enforcement agencies of individual Member States

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<sup>98</sup> Agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement concluded on 14<sup>th</sup> June 1985. The Official Journal of the European Union, L 239/19. 2000. 22. 9. p. 3.

<sup>99</sup> Agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement: pp. 7-8.

<sup>100</sup> Agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement: p. 11.

<sup>101</sup> Agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement: p. 16.

<sup>102</sup> Agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement: pp. 23-24.

<sup>103</sup> Agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement: p. 28.

<sup>104</sup> Agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement: p. 36.

are entitled to conduct so called “in-depth” border control. This is allowed by the Schengen Information System created (SIS) by the data-provision of the Schengen countries, supporting the data exchange between the Member States. In the framework of the Agreement’s provisions on the movement of people the SIS allows an access to the warning signs related to persons and objects through an automated data-request procedure<sup>105</sup>. Information society – as part of globalisation – and its development level greatly defines, among other things, how wide the digital gap is. Not only a technological background is necessary but as many as possible data bases need to be accessed and linked in the shortest possible period of time.

### **Illegal migration**

The rapidly growing European Union faces an increasing security policy challenge presented by illegal migration since Europe is flooded by hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants every year expecting better living conditions. The real danger comes from the illegality of the migration, from its uncontrolled feature, and the related crimes based on and benefiting from illegal migration. These are: man-smuggling; human trafficking; drug and weapons trade; organised crime; prostitution; forgery of travel and personal documents; increase of black economy; corruption; and various categories of crime of violence. The classification of illegal migration is rather complicated. The common platform is that illegal migrants are persons who enter a country illegally, stay in a country illegally, and work there illegally (or do not work at all). Naturally, the combinations of the above categories make the definition of the category even more complex as persons entering a country through illegal border crossing (either at a border station or across the green border) and people who enter a country legally but “turn illegal” because their stay exceeds the validity of their permit; or those who “entered the territory of a third country without permission”<sup>106</sup>.

### **Law enforcement and cooperation**

During the Cold War the western state borders of the so called Eastern Bloc were physically blocked. The regime identified what types of human behaviour were to be regarded as crimes and what were not. Therefore the list of major crimes was *limited* and different. This is why certain types of crime did

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<sup>105</sup> Agreement on the implementation of the Schengen Agreement: p. 55.

<sup>106</sup> Dobák, Imre, PhD student: Ukrajna biztonságföldrajzi szerepe az illegális migráció folyamatában. [The Security-policy Role of Ukraine in the Process of Illegal Migration] in: Publications by the Military Security Office, International Scientific Conference on Specific Areas of Security Policy and Altered Security Environment 24<sup>th</sup> May 2007. pp. 1-2.

not exist or their legal classification was not as extensive<sup>107</sup> as it is today<sup>108</sup>. Due to the above mentioned reasons there was no cooperation<sup>109</sup> or *coordination* of cases. After the Cold War not only the almost hermetic borders disappeared but new types of crimes appeared or some were re-classified therefore they were classified as legal state of affairs by the legislation. Naturally, not only a long-existing demand but actual relations also contributed to the modification of penal codes<sup>110</sup>. The cross-border traffic has increased in its physical, legal, and structural aspects. Besides a fundamental demand in security, need, the protection of citizens, the maintenance of public safety, and various international cooperation all contribute to the process resulting in making *cooperation* a natural component of law enforcement workers' activities besides their basic work. Fast flow of information, shortened writ time, formal and subsequent informal personal relations, trust, and command of foreign languages comprise the basis of the successful cooperation of law enforcement agencies.

### **Conclusion**

With the focus on the law enforcement interests of the state the issues of legislation, of the accession to various international and regional organisations, the conclusion of treaties, and the first steps of interstate cooperation are all relegated to the scope of political sphere by the state commitment and hierarchy. The legal background to be established, the state intention, and mutual interests cannot present an obstacle to the law enforcement activities of the agencies, stemming from their fundamental missions. Although in accordance with international law the states have clearly marked borders neither old nor new challenges have obstacles. Among others, cross border crime does not respect border marks and needs no passport at all.

Although the region as a geographic entity can have several territorial interpretations, from the aspect of security policy it should be regarded as a geographic area larger than a country. As it has been indicated, the definition of Balkans and even the definition of Western Balkans resulted in various self-definitions. Furthermore, those coming from this region but not regarding themselves as persons belonging to the region are likely to intend to get permanently rid of the pejorative adjective. A part of the presidents at the

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<sup>107</sup> Act V. of 1961. on the Penal Code of the Hungarian People's Republic. Drug abuse – Paragraph 198.

<sup>108</sup> Act IV. on the Penal Code of 1978. Human trafficking – Paragraph 175/B; Terrorist act – Paragraph 261; Abuse of firearms or ammunition – Paragraph 263/A; Participation in conspiracy - Paragraph 263/C; Drug abuse – Paragraph 282.

<sup>109</sup> Act V. of 1961. :Paragraph 8.(4).

<sup>110</sup> For example criminal acts against national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups; against medical intervention and the research in the field of medical sciences; against public safety and security; against information systems and data; war, economic, and financial crimes.

meeting, however, did not want to avoid stigmatisation but simply neglected to invite one of the determining therefore indispensable player of the region, Serbia. Therefore this political decision may present a barrier to all types of criminal cooperation which could have been derived from the character of the meetings.

The lack of cooperation and the resulting delayed responses have not only Balkans consequences but can also damage the preventive interests of the entire European Union. The Implementation of the Schengen Agreement can provide a clear picture on how the security vacuum generated by the abolishment of internal borders is compensated by the European Union. However, the multitude of opportunities is not a sufficient pre-condition. The Schengen achievements can only be exploited through a close cooperation between states. The meeting, inter alia with the involvement of Serbia, would have been a dress rehearsal of a prospective enlarged Schengen cooperation.

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**Viktor Glied**

## **THE WATER CONFLICTS IN AFRICA**

### **Introduction**

Currently there are 1.1 billion people living in the world that have no regular access to enough clean, potable water, while this figure is expected to triple in the coming decades. Pessimistic scenarios include even higher estimations, stating that 66 percent of the world's population might lack proper supplies of potable water by the year 2025. It is quite evident that the most serious problems of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are the continuous water pollution and the growing lack of water supplies. This expectation is supported by the fact that 5 to 8 million people die and around 300 million get sick every year, because they consume contaminated or polluted water, especially in the ecologically vulnerable regions of Africa and Asia.<sup>111</sup> The lack of water supplies leads to numerous consequences: rates of agricultural production drop as natural disasters and extreme weather conditions (aridity, drought, heavy rainfalls) occur, the area of gradually eroding lands decreases and populations have no access to elementary food supplies. These circumstances force hundreds of thousands of people to find new places and environments for living, and this procedure has already begun. Having no other solution, masses of people view migration as their only way out of poverty. The targets of this migration are not only urban areas, but other regions with a developed industrial or agricultural sector also. Although a large portion of migration happens inside a country's borders, ethnic-religious tensions might turn violent between 'aborigines' and newcomers, especially within rural or early modern societies. A few such

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<sup>111</sup>In countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southwest Asia, Central and South America.

examples include the Mauritania–Senegal Land Conflict or the regions of Borana (Ethiopia) or Darfur (Sudan). The causes of the turmoil are not only ecological, but most researchers agree that desertification and environmental changes play a major role. Scientists of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have found a definite connection between desertification, land degradation and the sources of conflicts, especially in the case of the slow, but permanent decrease of rainfall, which causes tensions between pastoral nomad and agrarian societies, and communities of modern, industrialized agriculture.<sup>112</sup> Several researchers of the field claim that causes of ecological and social problems should be sought in the global climate change rather than in a regional scope. Population density in the central region of Darfur (site of a humanitarian catastrophe) rose from 3 per km<sup>2</sup> to 18 per km<sup>2</sup> in the last few decades,<sup>113</sup> while climatical-ecological properties of the region have dramatically changed in the same period. There is an incident similar to the Darfur crisis breaking out in the conflict zone of Oromia/Borana in South Ethiopia. In this region itinerant pastoralists sneaking through the Somali border expropriate water wells used by the locals, and the armed Muslim troopers joining them cause an increasing number of problems. In 2009 more than 70 000 Ethiopians fled the area and hundreds have lost their lives in conflicts. Besides ethnic, religious and ecological problems, the main source of tension is the growth of agricultural land areas that cross traditional paths of nomads, therefore requiring the wanderers to graze on pastures that are under agricultural production.<sup>114</sup>

A forecast produced by the Worldwatch Institute in 1988 already emphasised that the lack of water supplies was going to cause ‘the most critical resource shortage of the third millennium’.<sup>115</sup>

There are numerous tendencies related to water scarcity:

- The general water demand has tripled since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.
- There is significantly more water subtracted from the environment than the amount of precipitation can supply.
- The level of groundwater decreases in a fast pace on every continent.
- It is still agriculture that uses the most amount of fresh water (almost 70 %) globally, with production effectiveness stagnating.

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<sup>112</sup>Sudan. Post-Conflict Environmental Assessment, United Nations Environmental Programme, (2007). 81.

<sup>113</sup>Ibid, p. 85

<sup>114</sup>Kebebew, F. – Tsegaye, D. – Synnevag, G.: Traditional Coping Strategies of the Afar and Borana Pastoralists in Response to Drought. Drylands Coordination Group, Mekkele Univesity, Norway, 2001. 23.

<sup>115</sup>Brown, Lester R.: State of the World 1988: A Worldwatch Institute Report on... Worldwatch Institute, Washington, 1988. 22.

The unstable system of Asian and African countries with numerous ethnic-religious minorities, born in the decolonisation period after the Second World War, has always carried a possibility of conflicts rising. Also, artificially designed borders mostly do not follow natural borders of ecological units, therefore from time to time, diplomatic or violent incidents occur for the possession of rivers, lakes, river basins and soil.<sup>116</sup> Violent conflicts are rarely fought for natural resources only, these goals are usually auxiliary to other economical, ethnic or religious causes. Still however, so called ‘new wars’ fought by high-tech means, and guerrilla warfare are often aimed at polluting multinational companies and powers monopolising national or community resources, such as water or energy sources.

Securing long-term water supplies is an elementary goal and task to every country. The quality of public services and the competency of public service organisations varies in different regions and countries, although in large parts of Africa there are no water supply and distribution networks. Priorities often change, especially if we think of balancing the importance of food supplies, public water supply or the water required by the industry. It is clearly a no-win situation that requires consideration, especially if we add the necessity of power production to the problems. Soft diplomacy is rarely used by some African and Asian countries that use firmer methods to support their claims. The elements of influencing political decision-making are rather different from those in the countries of the North – the emphasised presence of different religious or cultural values leads to irrational steps (from our point of view).

There are 261 registered international water bases, of which more than 50 are on the African continent. In Africa there are 34 rivers that are shared by at least two countries, while 28 rivers are shared by three or more (Volta, Limpopo, Orange, Ogooue, Okavango and the Senegal River). Ten countries lie on the banks of both the Congo and the Niger, while eight countries lie on the banks of the Zambezi and four countries are around Lake Chad. There are more than 300 major groundwater bases on the continent, with most of these ‘crossing borders’ of the countries above them.<sup>117</sup>

Sharia (the sacred law of Islam) mentions the ancient necessity of sharing water and the root of the word itself means ‘the path to shared water’. This tradition is of growing importance as out of all the water on Earth only 3% is fresh water, that includes a major part frozen in the polar regions or unavailable for consumptions as groundwater. Therefore it is not surprising, that mankind

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<sup>116</sup>Besenyő, János: Az Afrikai konfliktusok és kezelésük sajátosságai, a békefenntartó műveletek során szerzett tapasztalatok - Felderítő Szemle, VII. / 3., September 2008., p. 5-15.

<sup>117</sup>Rajasekaram, V. – Simonovic, S. P. – Nandalal, K. W.: Decision Support System for Reservoir Water Management Conflict Resolution. In: Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management, ASCE. November/December 2005.

uses 45 % of all the available fresh water resources, with the ratio increasing to 70 % in the coming decades. The main cause of this increase is a boom in the population of North-, Central- and East-African, Central- and South-Asian and Far Eastern countries that currently face elementary problems with public water supply, which will result in an even higher demand for water supplies. The larger part of this demand is created by industrial and agricultural use. In the latter case it is very common that owners (that use traditional production methods and do not follow modern principles) over-irrigate, which leads to salinization, further decreasing lands available to agricultural production. Environmental scarcity is expected to lead to 5 different types of conflicts in the coming decades:

1. local conflicts, that stem from the failure of local resources;
2. ethnic and social tensions, caused by migration;
3. internal wars, insurrections, coups d'état, independence movements, affecting larger regions;
4. armed conflicts between states, with the goal of possessing raw materials;
5. global problems that increase the confrontations of North-South and East-West, or even the discrepancies of civilizations.<sup>118</sup>

All these may expand the interpretational domain of the causes leading to the birth of conflicts, thus giving a new context to the term 'environmental security'.

A report made by the World Water Council in 1998<sup>119</sup> collected the names of the regions, which may become sites of a potential conflict that stems from chronic drought. As possible places of a future clash-zone in Africa, the organisation mentions the Mediterranean region, the Nile Basin, the Sahel and the Congo Basin. The water deficit of the region is basically the amount needed for the food production to supply the population. Therefore, since 2006 the fight for water takes place on the world's grain markets. A recent boom of food prices in 2007 was partially caused by the increase in growing plants for biofuel use or as energy crop, although this explanation alone may be misleading. The appearance of speculative capital on the commodity market is abnormal and caused only virtual demand for some agricultural products. In April 2008 investors opened positions in the world's main commodity exchanges for four times the amount of wheat produced annually in the world, eight times in case of corn and 19 time in case of soy. Economic processes encouraged farmers to start

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<sup>118</sup> Homer-Dixon, T.: Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1999.

<sup>119</sup> Gleick, P. H.: The World's Water 1998-1999: The Biennial Report On Freshwater Resources. World Watch Institute, Washington, 1999.

producing crops that were purchased at a high price from 2006 to 2008.<sup>120</sup> The main cause of the market overreaction was that beginning from 2001 the amount of world's grain stocks was halved. It could have been a development, caused by the limitation of forces influencing the markets, but in fact the main reason was the evolving population boom, the rising energy prices and the tense global economic situation. Since the prices on different markets are inter-connected, the rise of raw materials did affect the global market of food (including grains).

*'Regions currently affected by drought will have to face a lack of water supplies in the future also'* – claimed the researchers at the Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI). The organization presented its report at a New York meeting of The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development in 2004, painting a slightly pessimistic view on the interaction of different factors, but the document is still considered a milestone in reviewing the topic. Malin Falkenmark, a head researcher at SIWI says that agricultural use uses up to 70-90% of all the water supplies available in developing countries. If the amount of available water decreases, crops produced in the agricultural sector will not get access to enough nutrients. The average water need for producing the daily nutritional average is 2000 litres minimum, which is five times higher than the average water consumption of a human. These data may help to explain why the amount of water used for irrigation is 70% (or more) of all water consumption. Water use increases in the industrial and communal sectors, which increases competition among water-using sectors and causing agriculture to 'lose'.<sup>121</sup> Speculators – using the defenceless situation caused by food insecurity – increase prices, sometimes joining forces with companies and NGOs that have interests in trade. Sudan for example would have a gigantic agricultural potential, but the decade-long wars are huge setback. By gaining dominance over natural resources in Africa, China is able to increase its influence in other sectors also. Analysts say that the winners of this competition are not necessarily the countries that have a strong military power, but the ones that are financially stable. Egypt (with a population of 80 million) relies on grain import since the end of the 1990s, and it currently imports almost as much grain as Japan. Cairo has to cover 40% of its grain needs from import, because the growing population increases its import dependence. Algeria (population: 34 million) covers more than 50% of its grain supplies from import. The water demand of producing the grain (and other agricultural products) imported by the Middle East and North Africa is four times more than the water output capacity of the Aswan Dam on the Nile, totalling 84 billion m<sup>3</sup>.<sup>122</sup>

### **North Africa and the Nile Conflict**

<sup>120</sup> Many countries introduced legislation against extra profit, e.g. by prohibiting export. This had a very negative effect on producers.

<sup>121</sup> Brown, L. R. Plan B 3.0: Mobilizing to Save Civilization (2008) [http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/PB3/PB3\\_Hungarian\\_Ch04.pdf](http://www.earth-policy.org/Books/PB3/PB3_Hungarian_Ch04.pdf)

<sup>122</sup> Ibid.

North Africa – just as some countries in the Middle East – faces serious water shortages, which are going to worsen as the population grows in the following decades. The countries in the greatest danger – including Algeria, Libya and Egypt – have taken measures to solve the problem, but there is no guarantee for the success of their efforts. With help from UN Funds, the European Union (and to a smaller extent Washington and Beijing), these states could begin the development of their water pipe and drainage systems, and started to set a sustainable future for their water economy that focuses on rationalising industrial and agricultural water consumption, including the collection of rainfall, restructuring irrigation, the construction (and development) of sewage treatment facilities and an increased monitoring activity (measuring the pollution levels of lakes and rivers). While the majority of the Maghreb-countries have to face national political conflicts only, Cairo's efforts to secure the water output capacity of the Nile is blocked by international issues also. Egypt (that is able to solve disputed issues by military force) shares the Nile and its headwaters with nine countries (Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea), while the river supplies water to 97% of its population. Nowadays, agriculture is the main source of income for Egypt's population, and it uses up 90% of the water supplies. Less than 10% of the river's water reaches the Nile Delta, which has started to become a wetland, providing a good environment for the spread of diseases. The conflict of Egypt and the other affected countries has deepened when the Sudan government initiated a river engineering programme (with the constructions of dams, and the modification of river courses) in the 1970s and then in the 1990s. Cairo has initiated several Nile-treaties (1902, 1959) echoing the regional dominance of Egypt and the interests of the former great powers of the colonization era. In the last 150 years Egyptian leaders have also declared that they are ready to secure the essential water supplies by arms – although (except for some minor incidents) they did not have to put this principle in practice. After signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 president Sadat stated, that in the future Egypt will go to war for one reason only: if its water supplies are in danger. The same was echoed in a presidential speech from 1980, in which Sadat threatened to use military force against Ethiopia, if Addis Ababa continues with its river engineering plans (and would do the same against Khartoum also). Considering this, it is no surprise to hear that Egypt has complete invasion plans against North Sudan, North Chad and Southeast Libya.

After the end of the civil war and the war with Eritrea, the economy of Ethiopia started to grow, and the population boom from the 1970 started to reach critical heights, so the government announced its plans to build 200 smaller dams on the Nile, using about 500 million m<sup>3</sup> of water for purposes of irrigation and generation of electricity by hydropower. Ethiopia planned to place another

3,7 million hectares of land under irrigation to increase agricultural production with the aim of reducing the famine that affected almost 3 million people. These plans would have cut the water output by 15% on the upper side of the river. Cairo could not accept the plans, since the Nile provides food for 85% of its population of 80 million, and it therefore needs every drop of water the river can provide. At the same time the Egyptian government started large, water-consuming projects, that would put 200 000 hectares of land under agricultural use and at the same time move 7 million people to desert areas, west of the Nile. Researches doubted that the river could provide enough water for both projects. India provided huge amounts of direct investment for the realisation of the Ethiopian plans, while there are currently 350 major projects under construction, funded by Delhi, concentrating on the energy sector of the country. In 2008 the Indian government announced plans to increase its African investment by 500 million dollars annually, until it reaches the level of Chinese investments. India's status as a major power in Africa is getting hard to doubt.<sup>123</sup>

Naturally, the mentioned investment projects could not have been realised without foreign capital. Until the middle of the nineties development was mostly supported by former colonising powers (France, Great Britain and other countries of the European Community), but now the primary donor in investments of the energy sector is China, that is also starting gain influence in political and economic matters. Beijing's foreign aid policy is different from methods previously used in Africa, since the Asian country asks only for 'open' investment opportunities (and sets no conditions, like Americans and Europeans do). It is quite tempting for African leaders that the Chinese do not expect the authorities to work in a democratic manner, a competitive political system, respecting human rights or the transparency of governance. Also, Asian investors work much cheaper than their competition, since they realise their plans using Chinese materials and human resources,<sup>124</sup> with major state funding at their disposal. The amount of Chinese foreign aid and direct investments directed to Africa in 2006 exceeded 6 billion dollars, with the value of China's trade with the continent reaching 56 billion.<sup>125</sup> Foreign investments are supported by the China Exim Bank (founded in 1994) that provided long-term loans to Chinese investors and African countries. At the end of 2006 there have been 259 projects at least partially financed by the bank, in 36 countries, mainly in infrastructure-development. There are two major hydroelectric facilities. The Merowe Dam on the Nile is the largest energetic project in the history of Sudan.

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<sup>123</sup> Mwangi, B.: Indian Investment in Africa: In the Shadows of China. African Path, 2008/7.  
<http://business.africanpath.com/article.cfm?articleId=68347>

<sup>124</sup> Sometimes convicts are used as workers on construction projects.

<sup>125</sup> Linden, E. J.: China Exim Bank in Africa – Opportunities for Strengthening Environmental Standards for Hydropower in Sudan.  
[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic\\_id=1421&fuseaction=topics.event\\_summary&event\\_id=224956](http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1421&fuseaction=topics.event_summary&event_id=224956)

The costs (of around 1.8 billion dollars) and the technology of the project are mainly provided by China. More than 50 thousand people were expatriated from the site of the construction; the ecological and social effects are very hard to estimate. The forcibly removed farmers organised protests against the construction of the dam, but police forces shot at the protesters on numerous occasions. The Chinese workers have denied request from the Sudanese locals to use their water wells to provide water for their animals, and they therefore need to find new wells or alternative sources of the water they need. Several international NGOs and experts have protested against the construction project that started in 2003, but the Sudanese government has classified the impact studies...

States of the Nile-region have tried to solve their indifferences by dialogue for years. The Technical Cooperation Forum was founded in 1967 and since it was expanded by environmental and development workgroups (in 1992) it functions efficiently. Except for Eritrea, all countries around the Nile have started negotiations for the sustainable use of the river and the development of regional partnerships. The process was named Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) and started in 1997 with support from the World Bank, the UNDP and Canada's International Development Agency. This temporary form of cooperation was set off in Dar es Salaam by the Nile Council of Ministers responsible for Water Affairs (Nile-COM) in February 1999. Another milestone is the creation of the secretariat based in Entebbe, in November 2002 that is responsible for the execution of political and economic decisions, named Technical Co-operation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin (TECCONILE).

### **West Africa**

The amount of precipitation has decreased by 15-30% between 1968 and 1973 in West Africa, causing the three most important rivers of the region – Niger, Volta and Senegal – to decrease by 40% in capacity. Since West Africa's 17 states share only 25 river basins, this radical change has generated much tension between the countries. The main source of disputes is the river Niger between Nigeria and Niger, the river Senegal between Mauritania and Mali, the river Volta between Ghana and Burkina Faso, and Lake Chad between Nigeria, Cameroon and Chad. Most of these countries are in the Sahel, where global climate change itself causes a lot of problems, such as desertification, water shortage, migration and soil salinization. Larger countries of the region – such as Nigeria, Niger or Mauritania – have based their energy production and irrigation systems on hydroelectric plants. A total of 20 hydroelectric facilities are planned to be built on the Niger River by the bordering countries, while Guinea and Benin would also build 4-5 dams each. The decreasing volume capacity of the

river and the hardships of big “water” constructions are early signs of possible conflicts. Nigeria (with a current population of 130 million) has suffered worsening power outages since the 1980s. Abuja aims to solve the problems by two hydroelectric constructions. Although the Kainji and Jebba hydroelectric plants planned on the Niger River cost almost 135 million dollars, they may bring 1.6 million hectares of unused land under agricultural production. This process could help the hundreds of thousands of farmers, moving in from the north to avoid desertification, and the produced energy may – temporarily – solve the problems of the affected regions. However, tensions may rise, as the countries on the upper side of the river (Niger and Mali) also announced their plans to build two dams on the Niger. Nigerian experts are afraid that these projects could decrease the river’s capacity by up to 10% annually, which would endanger Abuja’s plans. The two criticising countries have plans for some inconsiderate projects themselves. The West African power has built two giant dams (Tiga and Challawa) on the river Yobe that flows into Niger (and indirectly Lake Chad), putting enormous lands under irrigation. Since the projects were inconsiderate of hydrologic, economic and ecological effects, the capacity of Yobe decreased by 60% by the beginning of the 1980s.<sup>126</sup> Therefore the river now only accounts for 1% of the water supply of the Lake Chad. The decreasing water supplies caused hardships in several autonomous regions of Nigeria that have protested against the constructions. As a consequence the federal government set up a mediation council in 1999 that articulates the requests of the farmers living by the river Yobe towards the authorities.

The Niger Basin is a traditional North-South migration route, where the refugees and immigrants from Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali and Niger use the river to move towards Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Benin and Cameroon in search for possible jobs at coffee, coconut and banana plantations. During droughts many fishermen of the Bozo and Somono tribes (living on the banks of the Niger) hit the road towards the delta, but unable to find jobs many find themselves in the militant group Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) or other guerrilla groups or join other refugees. MEND started its fight against polluting oil companies in 2006 and attacks oil wells, pipelines and service facilities often leaving hundreds of people injured. Environmental degradation however, is not only a problem in the Niger Delta. Attacks of the insurgent Revolutionary United Front (RUF) from Sierra Leone and Liberia made tens of thousands of people flee from the Guinea-border towards the north, in the direction of Fouta Djallon, into Mali. This ‘runaway’ caused ecological harms (deforestation, overgrazing, water pollution) that has only begun to be estimated

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<sup>126</sup> Bart, J. M.: Pre-water audit for the Komadugu-Yobe River Basin, northern Nigeria and southern Niger(IUCN - The World Conservation Union, Federal Ministry of Water Resources and Nigerian Conservation Foundation) Kano, Nigeria, 2005. 11-14.

since 2006, after heads of government of the Niger Basin signed a common action plan in 2004 to preserve the flora and fauna of area.<sup>127</sup>

From the 1970s relations between Ghana and the Republic of Upper Volta (called Burkina Faso from 1984) started to freeze, because of disputes with sharing the Volta River (the Black Volta, White Volta and Red Volta). Accra started the biggest waterborne construction of its history in 1965, which created the Akosombo hydroelectric plant and Lake Volta. The latter covers an area of 8500 km<sup>2</sup> and is currently the world's largest artificial lake. The Akosombo Dam plays a very important role in Ghana's economy as it provides 95% of the country's energy supplies. After a few years of drought the water capacity of the Black- and White-Volta decreased and the low level endangered the operation of the hydroelectric plant. Burkina Faso announced its plans to build three dams at the end of the 1980s, but then it could give satisfying replies to Ghana's questions related to the remaining water output capacity. By the 1990s Burkina Faso's situation deteriorated and the government had to find swift solutions to health problems the population brought about. They first announced the construction of the Ziga dam, which was created to solve the water supply problems of the capital, Ouagadougou. Then they publicised plans to further projects that included more than 1500 smaller water-related constructions. As tension rose, Ghana threatened to use military force when Burkina Faso flooded 7000 hectares of agricultural land in North Ghana as part of the construction efforts of the Bagre dam. Further problems included massive pollution of the river, extinction of autochthonous plants (while water hyacinth and several species of shellfish proliferated). Currently there is no sign of a resolution to the conflict and neither party seems to be willing to compromise.

The conflict between Senegal and Mauritania that stemmed from the overuse of the 1700 km long Senegal River, lead to open military actions at the end of 1989. The majority of Mauritania's land is made up deserts and semi-desert meadows. The population's main source of income – as in many other African countries – is agriculture. Numerous years of drought in the 1970s lead to a nationwide famine, so the government decided to increase agricultural output. To provide continuous irrigation the Mauritanian authorities financed the construction of dams on the Bafing River (in Mali), at the Senegal Delta and in Senegal (the Manantali and the Diam Dams). The construction of the three dams was co-financed by the three states and were completed in 1988.<sup>128</sup> The failure of the cooperation was caused by the aforementioned environmental factors and other political indifferences (even though the use of the Senegal River has been regulated by a joint committee since 1963). Talks have been formalized in 1972,

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<sup>127</sup> Golitzen, K. G.: The Niger River Basin. The World Bank, Washington, 2005. 69.

<sup>128</sup> Hamerlynck, O. – Duvail, S.: The rehabilitation of the delta of the Senegal River in Mauritania. Fielding the ecosystem approach. IUCN Mauritania. Switzerland and Cambridge, 2003. 27-29.

when Mali, Mauritania, Guinea and Senegal created the OMVS, in English the Senegal River Basin Development Authority. After a period of drought the cooperation halted, and while Mali protested, Senegal and Mauritania both have started their own project. As the opportunity of irrigation was developed, the lands along the Senegal River became more and more valuable, so the Mauritanian government decided to nationalise the coastal areas that belonged to Senegal. This caused almost 7000 Senegalese farmers to leave the lands that provided their main source of income. Hundreds died in the stalemate actions of the two opposing parties between 1987 and 1991. The two countries entered negotiations in 1990 when French, German and Saudi diplomats intercepted. Foreign financing was promised for numerous agricultural and water management projects if the parties were to compromise. The countries worked on finding a solution on sharing the operation costs of the hydroelectric plants and the compensation given to Mali (for the decreasing water output). Mediation activities of the Organisation of African Unity failed by the end of 1990, by the time more than 250000 people have left the region. On 18<sup>th</sup> July 1991 Senegalese president Diouf and Mauritanian president Taya signed a temporary peace agreement. The final resolution ending the conflicts of the countries along the Senegal river was concluded in the early 2000s.<sup>129</sup>

### **Southern Africa**

Co-operations created to counter environmental challenges are very rarely seen in the news, unlike armed conflicts. Some countries fight their way through to become regional political leaders (using their economical and military potential) and then 'ask' their neighbours to enter bilateral trade agreements on the exchange of crucial raw materials. A good example of this type is the Republic of South Africa that itself needs more and more resources. Its rivers are polluted and the water needs of its industry and agriculture are still on the rise. In 1986 Pretoria helped a military coup d'état against the Lesotho government and after thirty years of futile discussions, the new executive power agreed to water trade in a few months. Currently Lesotho's only viable chance of development is its 'vast' resources of water, the 'white gold of Basutoland' and also the usage of hydroelectricity in the co-operation with its neighbour, under the auspices of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. The water of the enclave is extremely important for the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereening industrial region of South Africa, while Maseru does not only receive financial compensation, but essential technical development of its infrastructure also.<sup>130</sup>

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<sup>129</sup> Berga et al (eds.): Dams and reservoirs, Societies and Environment in the 21. century. Raylor and Francis Group, London, 2006. 66.

<sup>130</sup> Further reading: Morenth, Péter: A lesothoi vízprojekt című cikkét. In. Afrika Tanulmányok 2008. II. évfolyam 3.

Nine countries (Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Zambia, Botswana, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Tanzania and Mozambique) share the basin of the Zambezi River. Origins of water economy co-operations trace back to the 1950s, when Northern and Southern Rhodesia entered a joint project to build a hydroelectric plant. Both countries supported the expansion of hydroelectric power generation, as the north needed energy for the development of copper mining, while the south required energy to connect its industry and agriculture to world trade. The Kariba hydroelectric plants, aimed to solve the mentioned problems, were built from 1953 till 1963, and now form a 760 km long curve on the border of Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Kariba Dam currently provides 34% of the electric supplies of the two countries. When Zambia gained independence in 1964, the Rhodesian federation broke up and the investors had to decide how to finance and share the gains of the hydroelectric plant. The parties decided to end the construction through a joint committee, the Central African Energetic Cooperation (Central African Power Corporation, CAPCO) and resolve their disputes. CAPCO was put under the control of an organ consisting of two Zambian and two South Rhodesian ministers. After the crisis period following Zimbabwe's independence (1980) the case of the hydroelectric plant was not brought up, right until 1987, when the operators formed the Zambezi River Authority (ZRA) to effectively manage and develop, in an integrated and sustainable manner, the water resources of the common Zambezi River and the Kariba Dam Complex for power generation and other uses. Nowadays the Kariba Dam is operated jointly by the Zambian and the Zimbabwean governments, sharing the costs and the profits equally. The authority of the ZRA has weakened, the operative work is done by an executive body, that is controlled by the joint committee of ministers. Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia have created a common action plan (ZACPLAN) in 1987 about the future use of the Zambezi River. The plan contained 19 projects supported by the UN, although – without effective political will – only one was realised. In 2002 the secretariat of the South African Development Committee (SADC) initiated discussions with the affected countries about the water use of the Zambezi River. This led to the formation of the Zambezi Watercourse Commission (ZAMCOM) that creates general programmes and supervises operations in relation to the sustainable development of the river.

One of the cleanest rivers of the continent, the Okavango runs through the countries of Angola, Botswana and Namibia. Its delta, one of the untouched natural wonders of Africa is inside Botswana. Angola (amidst a civil war) previously did not lay emphasis on the usage of the river, while Botswana and Namibia only used it for communal consumption and minor agricultural projects. As population grew in the latter two countries, they started development projects in the early 1990s and brought new land under agricultural

production. To supervise common projects, a joint committee (OKACOM) was formed in 1994 to harmonise the development plans of the countries in the Okavango Basin. Interests of the partners very quickly turned out to be completely different, so Angola and Namibia (lying on the upper part of the river) frequently ignore Botswana's needs. As the river runs on the border of Namibia and Angola for numerous hundreds of kilometres, the situation of the two countries is extremely sensitive. Pointing at the Ramsar Convention, Botswana announced in 1996 that it would block the river engineering plans proposed by Windhoek and Luanda, because those would have a negative effect on the Okavango Delta, and also the tourism, traffic and industry of the inner regions. Botswana initiated a wide international co-operation, in which large, multinational NGOs as well as small, local civil activists were represented. Namibia argued that it faced serious water shortages and it had to provide water for its growing population in the inner regions. Angola argued that it only wants to 'protect' the Okavango from the harmful practices of its Southern neighbour. The Luanda government hinted at the possibility of forcibly securing the water output they require. OKACOM has so far been unable to tackle indifferences. Although Angola is an active participant in negotiations, a compromise is yet to come.

Namibia and Botswana faced a diplomatic conflict in 1996, being unable to decide where the island of Sedudu/Kasikili belongs. This case was an important example of the many lands in Africa, which have a status defined by decades (or centuries) long decisions. The importance of the strategically located island rose in the last decade. Because of the low level of water in the river it is now dry for 8-10 months annually and thus it is possible the build on its land. The two countries brought to case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague that decided the island to fall under Botswana's jurisdiction. Namibia accepted it with the condition that its ships may cross the waters around the island, and that Botswana will not house army units on the disputed territory.<sup>131</sup>

Different regions, far from each other very often have to face the same water-related problems, which are mainly affected by the communal water use of a growing population, unsustainable water consumption of a developing industry and agriculture, water pollution and political-economical conflicts of interest. I tried my best to take into account all major regions of Africa, to give typical examples that can emphasise the roots of different conflicts. There are several initiatives and dozens of programmes aimed at solving water conflicts. Still, it is up to the African people to work out the solutions, with the international community needed to watch for the efforts and to help the people of the continent.

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<sup>131</sup> Alao, A.: Natural resources and conflict in Africa. University Of Rochester Press, 2007. 225.

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# ***CONSULTATION***

**PETER RADA**

## **THE RUBIK'S CUBE OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT A NORMATIVE MODEL OF STATEBUILDING**

### **Introduction**

If we would like to identify the ultimate challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> century we will be not able to name a single phenomenon, actor or threat. The media covers only the spectacular events from the international politics, thus we can easily think that terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or international criminal activities are isolated events or phenomena. However, we have to admit that the root of all challenges lies in the changed conditions for development. The states are prone to fail and state failure is a development trap from which the country cannot escape from itself. Consequently, the ultimate challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> century is the complex constellation of state failure which gives floor to negative spillover of new threats.

At the same time, we also have to admit that any reaction of the international community presupposes a political decision. The decision makers, however, need clear advice. For instance, today, after nine years in Afghanistan or seven years in Iraq we can feel some apathy on the level of decision makers, especially in Europe. It is reasonable but definitely wrong attitude. It is understandable that a politician sees the problem of state failure and statebuilding as a too complex puzzle which cannot be solved. *Id est*, it makes no sense to sacrifice time, money or the lives of the people involved in the reconstruction process. On the other hand, a politician may feel a moral duty to help people living under inhuman conditions, or may understand the security threat of untreated state failure. In conclusion, we need a new model which defines the problem clearly, which answers the question why we have to deal with failed states. We need a model which collects the experiences of former historic and normative statebuilding models, which can respond the query of what to do. And finally, we need a model which can show how we have to manage the complex interdependencies of the different dimensions of development. This is the model which is introduced by this article. The starting point is the belief that democracy, or a functioning state is too difficult, if not

impossible, to achieve in a failed state. But when Ernő Rubik invented his famous cube in the 1970s it was also held impossible to solve. The cube is a perfect analogy that six different dimensions can develop interdependently through different stages of development.

The Rubik's cube model is not a masterplan for statebuilding but it proves that we can follow and repeat certain scheme during the process. Furthermore, the model is an exact summary of the existing statebuilding models and it aims at simplifying the thinking about state failure and the solutions

### **The changes in the international system and new definitions**

The increasing number of both democratizing countries and failing states drew attention to the necessity of rebuilding the security architecture that was designed according to the realities of the Cold War. Although, there are several ways to address state failure, most of them are ineffective. Even if the problem of state failure is not a new phenomenon, there are no clear and comprehensive frameworks which could help analyze, explain and forecast the events and phenomena associated with it. After the end of the Cold War, the term state failure appeared in the political lexicons. Humanitarian claims for intervention in states which fail to perform the necessary functions became stronger after the pictures of depressing events from Somalia to Cambodia perambulated the Western media at the beginning of the 1990s.

The shift towards a more (national) security oriented approach was forced by the regrettable events of the simultaneous terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The attacks shocked the world, but more importantly woke up the world's alone superpower from its strategic slumber. The events finally raised the attention of foreign policy scientists and researchers on the external consequences of state failure. After 2001, several studies addressed the relationship between the accumulated knowledge on failed states and the policy decisions. (see eg. Dorff 2005) Many theorists and policy advisors believed that statebuilding is the general cure. (see eg. Dobbins 2007; Fukuyama 2004)


After the end of the bipolar world system, anarchy, which was envisaged by Thomas Hobbes, became the rule in the weak states. Simultaneously, the scholars (Cooper 2003; Fukuyama 1993; Sorensen 2001) celebrated the victory of democracy in the post-modern world. It is true that on systemic level democracy became "the only game in town" defeating, or losing its counter-alternative organizing principle. But the anarchy of the international system, which penetrated in several weak performing states, encumbered the realization of the "end of history". The gap between the pre-modern states and post-modern democracies has grown constantly.

Per definition state failure is an international phenomenon which does not know borders and spills over neighboring countries, creating regional and in the worst case scenarios international instability. In the world of sovereign states, sovereignty protects all states from intervention under the aegis of the international law, but “cooperative sovereignty” (Marton 2008) means that sovereignty is not evidently attached to the state. The territory of the world is the common good of the world’s population and the states have the duty to protect the population living on the given territory. Territoriality in this sense is not a right but a duty to control the sovereign portion of the world’s territory. The definition of state failure is the failure of the control of this territory which puts the population of the country and the population of other countries in danger. The fact that failed states are not able to develop by themselves does not necessarily mean that external actors cannot give useful assistance. In line with “cooperative sovereignty”, the external actors become responsible for the reinstallation and maintenance of the control over the territory. Statebuilding means the rebuilding of the state’s capacity of control the sovereign share.

Several studies were born on the analogies between statebuilding experiences in the past and present. The historical examples help understand the complexity of the process but are unable to provide clear and copyable blueprints. On the other hand, it is evident that normative models (see eg. Dobbins 2007; Etzioni 2007; Paris 2004) and logical frameworks of statebuilding draw conclusions from the historical examples. Thus, these examples are indeed necessary because they lead us to deeper understanding that statebuilding is influenced by the complex constellation of different latent and manifested factors, dimensions and sequences.

### **The Rubik’s cube model**


The ultimate challenge in interpreting a complex model is the enormous number of variables that influence each other and consequently change the final outcome of statebuilding. Contrarily to most of other statebuilding models which evaluate specific cases and try to extrapolate the findings to other cases, the Rubik’s cube analogy is a schema for thinking about different cases at the same time. The number of permutations resonates with the number of different options during statebuilding; however, the solution methodology also shows that the outcome is always the same despite of the number of different variations. With the use of the Rubik’s cube analogy there is a possibility to incorporate the high number of variables and different “take off situations”.



*The Beginning and the End Situation of the Solution Process of the Rubik's Cube.  
Source: Hardwick n.d.*

The general rule is that there is a list of well defined instructions for implementing the process from a given initial state, through well defined successive states to a desired outcome. The originality of the algorithms is the fact that they are strategies for transforming only the necessary parts without scrambling the already solved problems. These strategies can be applied several times even in case of different parts during a sequence. Similarly, statebuilding is sequenced process but the gradual development of the different dimensions at the same time. Thus, the possible interim setbacks cannot indicate the failure of the dynamic process. The model incorporates the interconnected development of the six dimensions, the security, the institutional, the economic, the societal, the domestic and the external dimensions through four steps. These steps are satisfying the basic needs, interim authority, emerging local actors and national level development.

In the first sequence, there is a need for at least a minimal state that is able to maintain the achievements for the next sequence. During the first sequence, the real stakeholder is the international community and the external actors that are present in the given country. From the point of view of the external actors, the goal of this stage is to create an environment in which the exit strategy is a viable option in the future.



*The Centerpieces of the Rubik's Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.*

The first sequence of statebuilding represents the fundamental basis for future development. Without completing this, the other sequences cannot be successful. Basic needs are present in all dimensions, however, does not cover comprehensive statebuilding stages. Basic needs can be satisfied if there is a minimal state present that can maintain basic security and order in most of the

territory of the state. The goal is to find or create hope for further development. Assuming, that the state is incapable to maintain security, the foreign military intervention is unavoidable to reestablish peace and security. Nevertheless, the success of the intervention depends on other external factors, such as on the willingness of the interveners, on the size and scope of the intervention, on the role and reaction of the neighbors, and on the domestic capacities that represent the limits of foreign presence. The security-military dimension shows the general state of peace and security from that the statebuilders can conclude on the size and scope of the needed action. The external dimension has to answer the questions: who is able to take the role of leading the statebuilding, and what are its limits? Whilst the domestic dimension gives clear picture about the feasibility of any plans. As long as we believe that external-domestic balance is important, we can understand why more external effort is needed in situations, where domestic limits are high, that is the capacity of local actors is low. This argument resembles to Michael Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis' triangle of peacebuilding. Where the hostility is higher, the destruction will be more severe and the necessity of heavier international assistance is bigger. The efforts and success to resolve civil wars depend on three factors: the degree of hostility; the extent of local capacities remained after the war, and the scope of the international assistance. (Doyle et al 2006: 4) The lower is the local capacity and the bigger is the hostility in the given country, the bigger effort has to be made by the international community. The triangle's territory represents the opportunity for solution, and the bigger is this territory, the bigger is the hope for solution.




*The Nexus between the Level of Hostility and the Local Capacities for Solutions and the Scope of Necessary International Involvement. Source: Doyle et al 2006: 68*

Nevertheless, it seems that the three important dimensions in this stage are the ones on the vertices of the triangle introduced by Nicolas Sambanis and Michael Doyle. However, the importance of the economic, societal and the institutional dimensions are latent, because the real effect of failure in these will be revealed only later. For instance, prior democratic experience, the level of economic development, or the homogeneity of the society all are factors which made former complex interventions easier to succeed. In case of Germany after the Second World War, the high level of education and industrial know-how, the

strong traditions of rule of law, existing culture of protected property rights, and belief in free trade made the job of the occupying powers easier. Similarly, in Japan the honorific culture that respects the victor and the discredited former ideology, and in addition, such as in Germany, the highly developed economy and society made Japan a ready market for the American statebuilders. (Bali 2005; Dempsey 2001; Dobbins et al 2004; Jennings 2003) Similarly, the same complexity of interdependent development of dimensions explains the unprecedented and unanticipated success of democracy in India. In India, the domestic vertex of Sambani and Doyle’s triangle would have given little hope. India was not an industrialized country and the middle class was underdeveloped, moreover, the society was deeply divided along ethnic, religious and cultural lines. But the legacy of the British colonialism, such as the strong centralized state with capable civil service and the democratic elite, made India able not to fail like Pakistan. (Shakar 2001)

According to the logic of the sequences, the second stage of statebuilding has to contribute to the achievements of the first step. After securing the basis of development in all dimensions, the statebuilders have to prepare the local actors for the transition. As it can be seen, the external actors still have the final authority, however, this power should not be permanent, and the local actors should not be socialized for the trusteeship. The goal of this sequence is to identify the right directions of future development. Using the Rubik’s cube analogy, it means that the statebuilders have to identify the right “edge groups”, i.e. the nexus among the dimensions.




*The Composition of the Edge pieces of the Rubik’s Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.*

It is still less important to force the local actors to have a perfect performance, but it is crucial that they become slowly part of the process. It means that the external actors have to find the appropriate stakeholders of development, who will be the basis of power transition. During this process, the most important goals are avoiding renewed fighting, strengthening the rule of law through a strong transitional authority, providing the key public goods and services, and beginning reconciliation. Winning the war does not lead automatically to sustainable peace. The appropriate interim solutions need the joint effort of the external and the local actors even if it slows down the process for a while. This stage can be only successful if the root causes of the former

conflict are not present or they are weaker than the attractiveness of development. This is the key of the future because external actors cannot be present indefinitely. Consequently, the final indicator of success of this stage is the increased ability of the local actors to bear the responsibility of development in the future.

In the interim stage, the significance of the security-military, the external and the institutional dimensions seem to be stronger. However, the economic dimension is also extremely important, but it is closer relation with the societal and the domestic dimensions. It is clear that the presence of foreign actors is the key, the development of security situation depends on them, and also they will shape the frame of the institutions. On the other hand, the locals can only have an organic role in the statebuilding process if the economy develops. Furthermore, the societal conflicts can be mediated easier if the locals are willing to change the situation and the opportunity costs of new economic development are higher than the motivation for renewed fighting.

The third sequence of the statebuilding process began in a situation where the external actors prepared the environment for power transition and the local stakeholders are identified. This stage is for making these stakeholders feel the responsibility for the statebuilding process.



*The Sound Composition of the Rubik's Cube. Source: Hardwick n.d.*

In all dimensions, the most important goal is to increase the ownership of the local actors. Ownership can range from loose attachment to a program, to actual controlling authority. In case of complex statebuilding, there is a need of excessive external involvement and responsibility in the first two stages due to the fact that the cause of conflict was the inability or unwillingness of the state to develop the country and provide better life for the people. Emerging local ownership indicates that the statebuilding process, and the external assistance are responsive to the local needs and consistent with the local capacities and priorities. The statebuilding exercise will only be perceived as legitimate in the eyes of the people when the local factor is significant and sustainable. It does not necessarily represent real self-determination in all dimensions; it rather implies steps which are more than vaguely defined external prescriptions for local authorities to participate in the development. However, giving the real political ownership to the local actors is only the final step of statebuilding,


managing the expectations of the people and the local stakeholders are the key of this sequence. The most important areas where the enhancement of local ownership is necessary are the administration of justice and the civil administration. Both postulates are only realizable if the security environment allows looser control by the international forces, which obviously implies that local ownership in the security dimension has to increase, as well. Local participation and ownership needs broader consent of the society. Therefore, there are several technical tools which can help the process. For instance, the translation of materials and documents, which are related to the statebuilding process, and the media appearance are crucial. Trainers are important actors of this stage, who help locals understand the sequences and the needed participation better through consultations and trainings on political issues such as the demobilization and reintegration process, the security sector reform, or the recruitment for political offices. Concluding from personal experiences<sup>132</sup> with programs in Kosovo and Afghanistan, an external actor can only work sufficiently where the local counterpart is also able to participate. We have to recognize that a talented, open-minded and educated layer of young experts is emerging in all countries where the external community is present. The young experts had opportunity to adapt certain knowledge from the external actors but at the same time these young experts understand the local dynamics better. They are the bridge between “neo-trusteeship” and full local independence in the statebuilding process.

From the external actors’ point of view, local ownership means the possibility to leave the country. The problem is that in reality the external statebuilders sink into the quagmire of mutually reinforcing dilemmas about the effectiveness of statebuilding when the locals have more space. The self governing local structures are not always effective and rather contradict the goals of the statebuilding process; the short term operational requirements and the long term needs are usually conflicting; and the identification of local partners is not always easy as the external actors do not want to empower the potential spoilers of the statebuilding process. Gradual ownership transfer is the way forward, when the short term requirements are reduced and the statebuilding means more investment in educational projects. (Narten 2009)

During the last stage of statebuilding, democratic structures have to become dominant in all dimensions. We would easily think that the institutional dimension is more important because of the institutional nature of the last stage but it would lead to false conclusions. The main problem with most of the international mechanisms is the simplistic conditional nature of such programs. One good example is the logic of the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund, which presumes that institutional change can reform the whole state.

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<sup>132</sup>The author worked for the International Centre for Democratic Transition since 2007. The ICDT has programs related to Afghanistan and the Western-Balkans.



*The Composition of the Rubik's Cube Before "the Last Move". Source: Hardwick n.d.*

The final goal of the stage of national level development and eventually the statebuilding process is to put the country on the path of sustainable national development, where the country becomes the member of the coherent and interdependent international networks and where the institutions of the state are able to exploit the domestic endowments and the security of the state, the economy and the society are in a sound harmony. This sequence aims at preparing the country to be integrated in the global economy, which eventually serves the security of the given country and the international community. Statebuilding obviously cannot aim at building a developed state from a failed state, but we can say that a statebuilding process is successful, when the state is able to maintain its internal and external security, possesses functioning institutions, it is able to manage its debt, provides economic growth, manages the societal conflicts in a peaceful way, and balances the external interdependency and its domestic capacities. To sum up, the outcome of the statebuilding process is in an ideal-typical case a state which is able to develop with the help of its own capacities and is not overly dependent on the external conditions. In the final sequence, the main question is not how to create or maintain physical stability, but how to preserve institutional stability of the state which is the final guarantee of security, too.

The dilemmas of the last stage follow from the quality of the institutions. The main question is how much state we need, and what the role of free automatisms in the development is. This is the sequence when questions and dilemmas emerge on the extent of liberalization, decentralization, privatization or marketization of the economy. The conflict management ability of the state is also a crucial characteristic in this sequence. It is generally accepted that states with democratic institutions and functioning democratic mechanisms are more able to handle societal and economic conflict peacefully. Therefore, the participation of the wider public in development is necessary. This sequence is the appropriate time to expand participation in decision-making processes, because the institutions are strong enough, and the societal grievances will not hold the same possibility of renewed conflict than democratization in former stages. Democracy is not the only possible outcome, but without the feedback from the people the state is not able to sustain development in the complex

interdependent world, because it is unable to collect all the information needed without the real participation of the people.

### ***Conclusion***

State failure became the single most important threat in international development, and we have to recognize that development failure is a threat to democratization and to international security in the end. It is easy to read from the literature on democratization and statebuilding that the only acceptable outcome of statebuilding is the functioning state, id est a liberal democracy. The complexity of statebuilding is reflected in the big number of different models on statebuilding. The reality eventually shows that statebuilders have to face the Rubik's cube of development, because the number of variables is high and different in each individual situation whilst the goal is the same in each case: a liberal and functioning democracy.

In the world of sovereign states, sovereignty protects all states from intervention under the aegis of the international law, but "cooperative sovereignty" means that sovereignty is not evidently attached to a state. The territory of the world is the common good of the world's population and the states have the duty to protect the population living on a given territory. Territoriality in this sense is not a right but a duty to control the sovereign portion of the world's territory.

The large number of different solution models called the attention to the necessity of a comprehensive, complex but new schema which incorporates in a single framework all the dimensions and steps which are present in the different models. Statebuilding necessarily means more than the simple reconstruction of narrow state functions. It is important to build a state which is legitimate and effective, id est a democratic and functioning structure. Statebuilding in this sense rather means shaping the environment which allows and strengthens "good state functions" by maintaining a healthy balance between legitimacy and effectiveness of the institutions. Furthermore, the state has to become able to influence not only these institutions but the environment, as well.

When Ernő Rubik invented his cube it was held impossible to solve. Today, only a few months ago, there was published an algorithm which solves the cube in 20 moves from every possible beginning situation. It is strikingly similar to the general thinking about statebuilding and democratization, according to which it is impossible to describe statebuilding exercises in a single model which handles all the dimensions and steps together. It is beyond doubt that the Rubik's cube analogy can be used as schema for thinking. The model pays attention to the interaction and development of the different dimensions in each sequence. Differently from other normative models which overemphasize

the role of a single dimension, such as security, the Rubik's cube analogy introduces the dynamic and simultaneous development of six dimensions: security-military; institutional; economic; societal; external and domestic. The connection among the dimensions is different in each sequence and the beginning situation is also not the same in case of different countries.

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## **Brigadier-General István Tarján**

### **THE VALIDITY OF SECURITY GEOGRAPHY, A NEW APPROACH AND OF DEFINING ITS BASIC CATEGORIES**

#### **1.The Validity of Security Geography**

We may have met the term of security geography several times, but in most cases those were limited to one of its segments. Such are the criminal- or the military geography, which are – wrongly – identified with security geography.

Does security geography exist at all? Dr. Mária Rédei's opinion is expressed in her lecture titled "On the Edge of Geosciences"<sup>133</sup> as follows:

"The study of the limits of a science helps in our analysis to mention its fields and the continuously appearing new trends. The question of limit can be brought up from the side of the new content, with regard to the new indicators, which later with more or less regularity get into the study and become a part of the science. And there are new topics that may seem far fledged, and attracting a lot of attention, but later not followed upon. This is the time when we ask the question: is this still geography? A few examples for the new or recurring fields of the last decades: ethnic and religion geography, criminal and security geography, regional income differences, information society, e-economy, trade

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<sup>133</sup>Lecture at Ócsény – Pécs Conference "Our Geography" 17-18 March 2005

and public administration, civil application of military fields, globalisation and local economy, foreign capital, social capital, contact and human capital, spatial availability, proprietor structure change, new areas of demography, as international migration, lack of employment, health state. We have seen examples of certain issues getting linked to natural environment and thus to geography only incidentally, so these did not become regular.”

According to the lecture quoted above “geography is a science that is connected responses to actualities, because it provides a view in the affairs of the world... From the aspect of geography it is a novelty that several previous processes are in a phase that their spatial differences are being analysed, or regional evaluations have been conducted. E.g. the local differences of demographic processes. This strengthened the interest in spatial science and developed a certain spatial awareness.” I believe these assumptions are perfectly acceptable and progressive. In case the geographical science does not want to become a warehouse of frozen knowledge, it must seek and provide answers to those actual problems that its tools and methods allow to research.

If needed, with new methods. Since 2004 at rectors’ conferences it has been a reoccurring issue, that the future belongs to those educational institutes which leave their own ivory towers and mediate such values to their students that can be converted easily into social life and economy. The key in all cases is interdisciplinarity. Of all this concludes to: if this is true to education, it must be true a hundred times more to sciences. I.e. such sciences are needed which produce valuable results – first of all for the society – and they aim at such fields of research from the beginning. For today’s complex problems that cannot be studied by one science only can be efficiently answered only by such sciences that for the cause integrate or if necessary merge with other fields.

Tamás Bíró demonstrates the problem very tangibly in his article “Why is Linguistics Interesting for a Scientist of Nature?”<sup>134</sup> when he writes: “ ... sciences tend towards interdisciplinarity. More exactly the traditional division of sciences lose validity. Let us take for example questions of environmental protection which encompass fields from biology, geology, hydrography, chemistry, and technology, hard mathematics for economy and parts of physics, geophysics, chemistry, biology, geology. Beyond these, a “fusion” process has begun among sciences. The first part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century linked physics with chemistry (by quantummechanics) and our age is also a bridge-building period between chemistry and biology (biochemistry).”

As we will see later, security geography is absolutely complex. Its diverse nature and character of involving multiple sciences make impossible for one researcher to make authentic assumptions of all of its elements.

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<sup>134</sup><http://nyuz.elte.hu/archiv13/szam12/nyelvi.htm>

Security questions can be approached from several points of view. From its geographical aspect I have to refer to the lecture by Lt-Gen (ret.) Dr. László Botz titled “The status and readiness of the Hungarian security system to counter expectable threats”<sup>135</sup>. “At the European security sphere threats, risks and challenges appear not only in regional, but in global form, they establish a hierarchic relation, their influence is different in time and space.” Space and time is a system we live in and have always belonged to the research field of geography. Based on the above, factors affecting security work in time and space thus there is a field of geography that focuses on this field.

Furthermore, considering a definition of the subject of geography by prof. Dr. József Tóth<sup>136</sup> – “geography is simultaneously a natural and social science, because its subject is a peculiar new type of space, which is an interaction of social-economic-infrastructural-natural spheres, thus its internal structure is multirooted.” – the answer is evident; security can be studied by the tools of geography.


## 2.A New Approach to Security Geography, Defining Related Terms

### 2.1. A new approach to security geography

The base definition of security geography was given by Dr. István Kobolka, as “integrating category, encompassing several sub-fields (criminal geography, state security geography, social security geography, environmental security geography, military geography, etc.). Security geography researches may provide new opportunities for efficient crime-fighting and basis for different measures and methods in consideration of local characteristics.”

#### The subdivisions of security geography

Dr. István Kobolka took up a pioneer role in defining the concept of security geography. As all concepts, this can be approached from multiple sides, and it is hardly divisible with the sense of completeness. Security is such complex and multi- and elements.



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
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General geography I (2002) (ed.: Dr. József Tóth), Páris: Campus Kiadó Budapest, p. 17

Dr. Kobolka István: A Magyar-Szlovén és a Magyar-Horvát államhatárok biztonságföldrajzi kérdései különös tekintettel szervezett bűnözésre PhD disszertáció Pécs 2002 p.11

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For example, if I approach from the side of complex study of space social sphere, we could take Dr. József Tóth's tetrahedron model as basis.



This means, that in the spatial-study of security geography all results and researches from sciences that study these four spheres must be listed as influencing factors. We can easily agree that it is impossible, even if we have not mentioned yet the analysis to research time as a vertical element.

Coming back to Dr. Kobolka István's definition, I have to agree that it is a sub-discipline, however, I disagree that it can be only applied to support efficient crime-fighting. It is undeniable that paving a new road is the hardest in forming new theses, but I believe that by today such a restricted definition of security is inadequate.

I am in a more advantageous position, as since the birth of the definition, several fundamental documents have been given birth to, which make it easier to

define factors affecting security at least in a broad sense. Such is the national security strategy of the Republic of Hungary, listing strategies of branches.

“Based on the national security strategy the strategies of branches are developed including military, national security, law-enforcement, economic-financial, human resource, social, IT and information protection, disaster-relief, and environment security, and counter-terrorism, which define measure on the field of security in the wide term.”<sup>138</sup>

According to my theory, the elements of national – and thus in general – security can be derived from the Government Decree, even if that has not been made with the sense of completeness. This makes the subdivisions of security geography more concrete.

## *2.2. Defining a few terms*

Before we fix the definition and categories of security geography, I believe it is important to clear a few terms used in this issue.

My experience is that many misunderstandings came from the frequent usage of the term strategy of national security, besides national security strategy. Maybe because they sound almost the same, it is easy to mix the two up. Carefully read, the relation of the two is evident: strategy of national security is just a part of the national security strategy.

Here, I would like to correct Dr. Kobolka István’s definition in the sense when he mentioned state security geography among the subdivisions of security geography. Naturally, it must be a mistype, as since 1990 we talk about national security. The security of the nation is such a state – defined by internal and external factors –, in which the elements of the governmental institution (legal, local and central state, and financial elements) function according to their role stated by the Constitution, unhindered in their sovereignty. By this we could still use the term ‘state security’ as it refers to the elements of the state.

The definition of the two terms – state, nation – may make the difference clearer. While we can consider the state as a political union holding the highest power over a geographical area, the definition of the nation varies in time and space. There are two contradicting views. One is the state-nation, the other is the culture-nation. The concept closest to me holds that a nation is a historically formed, lasting human community bound together by common language, geographical location, economy, and spiritual community of culture, i.e. not the existence of state determines national identity. Based on the concept of nation

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<sup>138</sup>annex to 2073/2004. (IV.15.) Gov. decree on the national security strategy of the Republic of Hungary

preferred by me, it is evident, that the Hungarian services have to work for the security of the whole nation.

There are views saying that “the biggest difference between the former state security and today’s national security services is that the national security services do not have political functions.” There is some truth in it, if we consider that before 1990 state was used in the meaning of the highest level of the power structure of the ruling class and the main goal of the state security services was to keep that ruling class in power. Naturally, today such function does not exist any more.

### **3. The concept of security geography, and its structure**

#### *3.1. The concept of security geography*

It is undoubtedly true of Dr. István Kobolka’s definition, that security geography is an integrating category, encompassing several fields – but as I mentioned above – it is a restricting assumption, that “security geography researches may provide new opportunities for efficient crime-fighting and basis for different measure and methods in consideration of local characteristics.”

Let us start from what we mean under security today. This must be cleared if we wish to study it with the tools of geography. Lt.-Gen. (ret.) László Botz in his aforementioned lecture stated the following: „During the general study of security in the past century the development of the term and the terminology and the transformation of its content has taken place. The post WWII international relations tightly connected the term of security to defence, defence-terminology, and aimed to counter a threat – usually an external attack.“

In the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the new approach was based on the recognition that the security means prevention – based on political, legal, institutional, infrastructural, communications and international guarantees – the prevention of the activation of the threats.

Considering all these, I would modify the definition of security geography as the following:

“It is an integrating category encompassing multiple sub-fields. Security geography researches – based on political, legal, institutional, infrastructural, communications and international guarantees of prevention – may provide new opportunities to prevent activation of threats, security risks they may give new bases for the opportunities and methods of the different interventions in consideration of local characteristics. ”


By this we can evade the problem of narrowing the area of research of security geography to the security of an individual nation or state, as security exists in other dimensions as well. (e.g.: security of international bodies, organisations, like NATO, IMF, etc.)

### 3.2. The subdivisions of security geography

Although security – and thus security geography – cannot be narrowed down to one nation, for setting up its sub-categories the elements of the national security strategy may provide a good basis:

- Military strategy
- Law-enforcement, migrational, and disaster-relief strategies
- National security and counter-terrorism strategies
- Economic-financial strategy
- Welfare policy
- Environment-protection strategy
- IT and information protection strategy
- Human resources and development strategy
- Strategy of culture

The chart below shows the possible sub-divisions of security geography:



Some of the terms may feel strange now yet, but looking through the elements of security geography, we can find already existing ones (military, migrational, HR, etc.). At the same time the theory I set up now may inspire others to study their fields from the aspect of security as well. Many times, we

tend to neglect security issues of security, because we cannot estimate the threats, and also because security is very expensive. Inside the professional sphere we call this attitude “there’s no problem, until there’s no problem”. At huge disasters, negative events in society, when analysing them, many times it turns out that a lot of things could have been prevented by the consideration and analysis of security aspects.

As an example, our latest disaster, the red-sludge flood brings up the involvement of several fields from the security point of view. The environment-protection could have conducted a research to locate hazardous material dumps to cross-check if the sites are tectonically safe and if yes, whether any changes have occurred that could lead to disaster. The yet undeveloped security geography can be involved as well. For installation-based national security protection must be conducted too. The organisations considered as parts of critical infrastructure must be preventively handled, i.e. factors that may lead to malfunctions must be identified in time. (I consider the aforementioned storage a part of the critical infrastructure.) The issue of law-enforcement and disaster-management security comes up more tangibly above all. Although the response forces reacted quite well considering the circumstances, there were still problems that could have been prevented by preliminary studies, analyses, and drills (coordination, logistics, etc.). But the involvement of all elements is evident in the prevention and management of the damages (economic, financial, HR – saving, creating jobs, welfare policy).

The elements of security geography are in natural co-relation and not in subordination to each other. Several of the elements must be involved in a security geography research, but not necessarily all. At such projects it is important which security geography branches we take. By defining adequate researches in the security aspect several tragedies, damages, events can be prevented. We, security experts and researchers must call our colleagues expert in the different fields for a common thinking and highlight the security risk factors of the individual elements. I wanted to add to this by the correction of the definition, but most of all by structuring of security geography. As all definitions, mine reflects a certain aspect. I believe that there are other solutions as well. The aim is to create a more accurate definition, on that the comments of my dear readers are welcome.

## *FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES*

**Maj. János Besenyő**

### **CIMIC ACTIVITIES IN THE AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN (AMIS)**

In the armed forces of First World countries, Information Operations (INFOOPS) are little short of being considered a new branch of service. According to the NATO definition, INFOOPS is a military function, which influences the intentions, comprehension and ability of enemy forces through advising and the coordination of military information operations in order to achieve the desired impact, thus supporting the mission goals of the allied forces. On a tactical level, it means the influencing of the decision-making system of local (political, religious, etc.) leaders with a view to achieving that their decisions create an advantageous position for the commander and the troops.<sup>139</sup>

Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) is an essential capacity of information operations. While CIMIC activities have been increasingly efficient at the Hungarian units serving in various missions and formations (KFOR contingent, Afghanistan PRT, etc.), Hungarian soldiers have seen service in individual assignments, including under the aegis of the UN, the EU and the AU.<sup>140</sup> In such missions, CIMIC activities often manifest themselves quite differently from those under Hungarian conditions or in NATO-led missions. I would like to share my relevant experiences obtained in 2005, in the Darfur peace-keeping mission led by the African Union. I hope that these pieces of information will also prove useful for others (I work as a functional expert in humanitarian aid in the Expert Group of the Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations Centre of the Ministry of Defence). It should, however, be noted that the views expressed below reflect my own personal experience rather than the position of the Hungarian Defence Forces.

Before I proceed, I would like to share a few pieces of information on Darfur and the situation there. **Darfur**, originally *Dar fūr* ('the Fūr people's home) is the name of a region in western Sudan, adjacent to the Central African

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<sup>139</sup>[http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/missziok/infoops\\_es\\_bekefenntartas\\_koszovoban](http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/missziok/infoops_es_bekefenntartas_koszovoban) (downloaded 02.02.2010)

<sup>140</sup>[http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/missziok/reszvetel\\_bekemuveletekben](http://www.hm.gov.hu/honvedseg/missziok/reszvetel_bekemuveletekben) (downloaded 02.02.2010)

Republic, Libya and Chad. A conflict of international scale has been going on in the region since 2003.<sup>141</sup>

Darfur covers an area of 493,180 km<sup>2</sup>, about the size of France. The region largely consists of an arid plateau and the Jabal Mara Mountains rising to 3,000 metres. In 1989, following the military coup, General Omar El-Bashir ordered that the territory of the earlier sultanate, annexed by the British to Sudan in 1917, be divided into three federal states.<sup>142</sup>

They are Garb Darfur (West Darfur), Djanub Darfur (South Darfur) and Samal Darfur (North Darfur), their centres being respectively Al Geneina, Nyala and El Fasher.

The population of Darfur is app. 7.4 million. The economy is mainly agriculture-based, the main crops are fruits, tobacco and grain crops. Main languages: Arabic, Beigo, Daju, Erenga, Fongoro, Fulbe, Fur, Kujarge, Massalit, Sinyar, Tama and Zaghawa.<sup>143</sup>

In 2003, a bloody insurgency broke out in Darfur, in which the Arab-controlled Sudan government was opposed to two African insurgent groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The rebels were accusing the government with giving preference to Arabs over Africans.<sup>144</sup>

The government responded with bombings and the deployment of military and police units and later of the 'Janjaweed' militia (armed Arab horsemen). The Janjaweed are charged with the massive violation of human rights, including mass murder as well as the pillaging of the non-Arab population of Darfur and rape.

By spring 2004, thousands of people had been killed and hundreds of thousands had been forced to leave their homes due to the humanitarian disaster afflicting the region. The Arab paramilitary troops, however, continued looting, including the raiding of refugee camps in Chad.

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<sup>141</sup>Mohamed H. Fadlalla: Short History of Sudan, p. 57

<sup>142</sup>J. Millard Burr, Robert O. Collins: Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster, p. 287

<sup>143</sup>Mohamed Fadlalla: The Problem of Dar Fur, pp. 23-28

<sup>144</sup> J. Millard Burr, Robert O. Collins: Darfur: The Long Road to Disaster, pp. 292-293



a region the size of France.<sup>148</sup> Partly because of that, and partly in order to prevent the first independent AU peace-keeping mission from failure, a decision was adopted on increasing the number of the contingent as soon as possible (Addis Ababa meeting of March 19<sup>th</sup> 2005). According to the decision, by September 2005, the strength of the mission reached 7,731 (6,171 soldiers and 1,560 policemen).<sup>149</sup> In 2006, the leaders of the AU intended to increase the strength of the mission by a further 4,000 troops. That objective, however, failed due to the reluctance of the participating states and the lack of funding. According to General Romeo Dallaire, leading the UN mission in Rwanda, the success of the Darfur mission would have required the sending of at least 44,000 peace-keepers, which, however, did not come about.<sup>150</sup>

Since the AMIS was unable to pacify the region, the UN took charge of the control of the operation on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2008.<sup>151</sup> While UNAMID, the new mission, has also witnessed a number of problems and challenges, the situation has more recently been stabilised to a certain degree, even if experts claim that hostilities may renew at any time. Over 200,000 people are estimated to have been killed and at least 2.5 million have been displaced.

The UN first called attention to the Darfur crisis in 2003, giving top priority to the adoption of the decision that would offer a long-term solution to the problem for the Security Council and two successive UN Secretaries-General. In addition to the efforts for a political solution, the UN, in cooperation with its partners, has given the highest amount of aid to Darfur and the refugee camps set up in Chad and the Central African Republic.<sup>152</sup>

The Darfur Peace Agreement, achieved under the aegis of the African Union (AU) and with the support of the UN and its partners, was signed on May 5<sup>th</sup> 2006.<sup>153</sup> An intensive diplomatic and political campaign has been conducted in order to involve non-signatory parties in the peace process. In addition to that, the UN has provided logistics and technical support to the observers sent to Darfur since 2004 as well as drawn up and implemented plans for the multidimensional peace-keeping operation and the setting up of a joint UN-AU 'Hybrid Force'.<sup>154</sup>

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<sup>148</sup> Center on International Cooperation: Annual review of global peace operations, p. 42 and János Besenyő: Logistic Experiences: The Case of Darfur, p. 42

<sup>149</sup> <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/321/37/PDF/N0532137.pdf?OpenElement> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>150</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: The African Union: challenges of globalization, security, and governance, 86-87. oldal

<sup>151</sup> <http://unamid.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=890> (letöltés ideje: 2010. 02.03)

<sup>152</sup> Robert O. Collins: Civil wars and revolution in the Sudan: essays on the Sudan, pp. 158-159

<sup>153</sup> Center on International Cooperation: Annual review of global peace operations, p. 30

<sup>154</sup> Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, pp. 10 and 47

The decision adopted at the November 16<sup>th</sup> 2006 high-level meeting in Addis Ababa (attended by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the representatives of the five permanent members of the Security Council, delegates of the Sudan government, AU countries and other countries and organisations having political influence in the region as well as some countries sending troops to the African Union Mission in Sudan) proposed the establishment of a joint AU-UN peace-keeping force. Sudan gave its approval to the deployment of the contingent in June 2007. The operation of the contingent officially began on January 1<sup>st</sup> 2008, by incorporating existing AU troops in Darfur into its organisation.<sup>155</sup>

On July 30<sup>th</sup> 2004, by Resolution 1556, the Security Council adopted an arms embargo against all non-governmental entities and individuals in Darfur, including the Janjaweed militia.<sup>156</sup> Resolution 1591, adopted in 2005, increased the severity of the sanctions by extending the validity of the arms embargo and ordering a travel ban against and the freezing of the assets of four individuals, including two insurgence leaders, a former commander of the Sudan air force and the leader of the pro-government militia. Unfortunately, as Sudan, as a state, was not included in the embargo, the Janjaweed have been continuously supplied with weapons and equipment by government forces.

UN humanitarian organisations are currently coordinating the largest aid campaign worldwide, in an attempt to give assistance to about 4.2 million people afflicted by the Darfur crisis. Of these, 2.5 million have been forced to migrate within Sudan, whereas 236,000 currently live in refugee camps in Chad. This year alone, Darfur will receive an aid of \$650 million. Coordinated by 13 UN agencies, the Red Cross and the Red Crescent and 80 NGOs, over 12,000 humanitarian aid workers currently operate in the region, helping those in distress.<sup>157</sup>

In recent years, the lives of hundreds of thousands of people have been saved by this humanitarian activity. The mortality rate has been reduced below the critical level and general malnutrition has been reduced by fifty percent compared to the peak of the crisis in mid-2004. Nearly three-fourths of the Darfur population now have access to healthy drinking water. However, the forceful displacement of the population has continued as a result of raids from all sides, affecting app. 140,000 people during the first five months of 2007 alone.<sup>158</sup> A lot of refugee camps, however, have reached the limits of their capacity and tensions have grown with the increase of the number of refugees.

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<sup>155</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/unamid/background.shtml> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>156</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: *The African Union: challenges of globalization, security, and governance*, p. 86

<sup>157</sup> [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan\\_africa/sudan/](http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/sudan/) (downloaded 02.02.2010)


<sup>158</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: *The African Union: challenges of globalization, security, and governance*, pp. 87-88

Despite the relative ‘peace’ in Darfur during recent months, most refugees have not dared to return to their ransacked homes. Instead, they are attempting to stay at the camps for as long as possible.<sup>159</sup>

The humanitarian mission and its personnel are particularly exposed to violence. Since June 2007, 132 persons employed by the mission have been kidnapped for various periods, 35 convoys have been assaulted or ransacked and 64 vehicles have been hijacked. Some NGO’s have withdrawn from the country because of the violence.<sup>160</sup>

According to UN estimates, over half million people still have no access to any kind of humanitarian assistance in Darfur. Since, however, in February 2007, that number was 900,000, the efforts, often entailing major sacrifices, of the humanitarian workers, with a view to accessing people in the areas afflicted by the crisis have been successful, despite the unchanging security situation. The UN has put the Khartoum authorities under continuous pressure with a view to improving the security of aid workers and the accessibility of the population, as a result of which a joint communication was issued in April 2007 by the Sudan government and the UN in order to ensure and promote efficient humanitarian activities in Darfur.

The map below shows the major refugee camps, with the estimated number of their inhabitants:



Source:

[http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/Darfur\\_refugee\\_camps\\_map.gif](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/Darfur_refugee_camps_map.gif)

<sup>159</sup> <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2009/0828/p99s01-duts.html> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>160</sup> <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/15187.html> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

62 percent of the Darfur aid campaigns are financed by donors, having earmarked \$396 million of the desired \$652 million since June 15<sup>th</sup> 2007, primarily for food aid. Since some other areas are rather underfinanced, further offerings are required.

Let us, however, return to 2005, the year the Republic of Hungary contributed to the operation of the EU-AU JLOC-Joint Logistic Operational Centre by sending a military advisor (logistics specialist).<sup>161</sup> Appointed for the position of the expert, I travelled to the mission area on June 28<sup>th</sup> 2005, setting to work without delay.

We were responsible for the full supply and servicing of the Darfur mission. The mission area was divided into 8 sectors. A unit the size of a battalion was deployed in each sector by setting up camps operated by the force of about a company in addition to the battalion command.<sup>162</sup> The camps were established in the vicinity of major settlements and refugee camps in the clear hope that they would have a positive influence on the security of their respective area. While initially it went according to plan, later on the AU was no longer able to guarantee even the security of its own camps.<sup>163</sup>

The sectors were divided in a way that they were assigned under national control, i.e. the unit deployed in each sector (Rwandan, Nigerian, Senegalese or South African) gave the sector commander and the substantial part of the staff. Since Nigeria and Rwanda sent the most troops, 3 battalions each, each could control 3 sectors, while the Senegalese and South Africans shared the remaining two.<sup>164</sup>

A Gambian company and a Kenyan military police unit were responsible for servicing the mission command and the alert service. The soldiers were under the command of a Nigerian general. Some of the policemen were accommodated in the same camp as the soldiers, while a smaller part permanently remained at the posts set up in the refugee camps. The policemen were under the command of a South African police general.

The following map shows the locations of the AMIS sectors and the camps:


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<sup>161</sup> Markus Derblom, Eva Hagström Frisell, Jennifer Schmidt: UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa, pp. 40-41

<sup>162</sup> Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, p. 31

<sup>163</sup> <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/apr/27/world/fg-peacekeepers27> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>164</sup> János Besenyő: Logistic Experiences: The Case of Darfur, p. 49



*Source: AMIS*

The Cease Fire Committee (CFC) was also located at the general headquarters in El Fasher. While it was led by the politician heading the mission, the work was in fact done by his deputy, a French general delegated by the EU (civilian employees were also under his command). Unfortunately, the soldiers, policemen, the members of the ceasefire committee and civilians were all carrying out their tasks without any kind of coordination or joint command. In fact, open hostilities were not uncommon between them.<sup>165</sup> Obviously, it negatively affected work until these components were finally put under joint control in late 2006.

At that time the mission's military component did not have a separate CIMIC division (G9). Such issues were addressed by the operational division (G3), the logistics division (G4) and the ceasefire monitoring committee when it was necessary.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>165</sup> Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, pp. 40-42 and János Besenyő: Logistic Experiences: The Case of Darfur, p. 55

<sup>166</sup> Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, pp. 20-21

As is known, the CIMIC can be applied in Crisis Response Operations (CRO), when military leaders are required to take into consideration the social, political, cultural, religious, economic, environmental and humanitarian factors of the operational area. In addition to the above, they also need to reckon with the presence of a large number of international and non-governmental organisations, whose objectives, techniques and future activities must be reconciled with military interests. The presence of the media and the (legitimate and less justifiable) expectations of the local and the international community present an added challenge in peace-keeping operations. It results from the above that efficient relations between civil organisations and the military are of fundamental importance with a view to resolving the conflict. While CIMIC would therefore be responsible for the communication between the military and civilians, the borderlines often become blurred, often requiring CIMIC experts to also maintain relations of a political nature.

As is known, the long-term objective of CIMIC activities is to establish, maintain and improve cooperation with the civil population and institutions in the area of operation (governmental and non-governmental, international and regional organisations) in order to ensure the success of the mission (with the slightest possible interference with civilian life!) and the establishment and maintenance of the conditions required for the resolution of the crisis.

Since the mission lacked a special CIMIC division, the following tasks were addressed on an ad hoc basis by the offices of the operational and logistics divisions and of the AU diplomat leading the mission:

- **All levels of communication with civil organisations.**

This was done mainly by civilians, as the staff of the AU diplomat heading the mission included a civilian press communications official and a humanitarian official (the African Union ultimately managed to send a civil expert to the centres of each of the three Darfur federal states to work in cooperation with the humanitarian organisations). Obviously, the logistics division also maintained a continuous relationship with the non-governmental organisations engaging in charitable and humanitarian activities in the mission area. We often gave them purified and chlorinated water, among other things, or provided, in cooperation with the operational division, armed escort for their shipments or occasional pre-dispensation storage capacity.

- **Involving specific NGO's, which possessed the required information, in the strategic and operational planning of the mission (both before and during the operations).**

This was particularly important in order to prevent unfriendly reception by the communities along the routes of our convoys from. On one occasion, we

only a minimum number of armed escort were available to protect a convoy passing through a specific region. We added another mistake by failing to negotiate with local leaders (the ‘umdah’) and the armed SLA personnel operating in the region. The convoy was attacked halfway between our camps, near Khor Abechi. Two civilian drivers and five soldiers from the escort were killed in the attack. It was the first major loss of the AU since the launch of the mission.<sup>167</sup> This was a consequence of the fact that the sector commander did not attribute importance to establishing good relations and consult with the ‘civilian’ population operating in the area to a reasonable extent. Obviously there were various other situations and events similar to the above, where their unique experience and local knowledge made civilians valuable to us and where we were able to cooperate with them with comparative success. Unfortunately, since the sectors were enjoying a kind of independence from the mission HQ (due to political and communication-related issues), communication and cooperation with NGO’s was often determined by the disposition, education or the personal interests of the commander.

**- The continuous monitoring and assessment of the civil environment, including the extent of needs and the method of satisfying such needs.**

It partly meant that the civil media communication employee monitored international, regional and local news, putting together a summary made available to the mission components. However, there were frequent problems with the flow of information from the civilians responsible for humanitarian matters, while hardly any information was received from the sectors and the camps unless in crisis situations. The latter included the raid on the town of Sheriya, when the first pieces of information on the conflict were received when the camp of the peace-keeping forces was surrounded by nearly 5,000 refugees without drinking water, food or shelter, added to which a cholera epidemic broke out among them within a week. If HQ had received the required information at the start of the hostilities, the escalation of the situation could have been prevented by negotiations (in which the peace-keepers could have played a mediatory role). The stationing and supply of the people fleeing from the city could also have been organised in cooperation with aid organisations and NGO groups. As I have said, the supply of needs also had an ad hoc nature, varying from sector to sector. In Sector 6, for example, where the South African battalion was stationed, very good relations were established between the inhabitants of the town of Kutum and the Sector command and the other camps within the Sector. In the Kulbus camp, a well was shared by the military and the civil population for a long time without problem (until another well was bored by the Red Cross, supplying locals with drinking water). The South Africans

<sup>167</sup> Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, p. 28

also gave assistance to the restoration of a bridge and supplied useful devices to schools. While similar steps were taken in other sectors, too, they tended to be individual initiatives, which were sometimes supported by the mission command.

At the El Fasher headquarters, a Nigerian Protestant minister organised church service for Christian officers and servicemen. While nearly 65 percent of the mission staff were Christian, since Sudan is a Muslim country, Christian religious services, even within the camps, could only be held under very strict conditions so as not to 'offend' Muslim sensitivity. At the end of the church services, the minister collected donations for the inhabitants of the nearby Abu-Shouk refugee camp, Darfur's one and only Christian church and the adjoining school. For me, that enterprise had added importance as I was personally affected. When I came back for a leave, I could show my sons under what kind of circumstances children had to live in the refugee camps. Horrified at the sight, they responded quite positively, deciding to send toys to refugee children. They took two days sorting their toys. Some toys were put in and then removed from the package three times, being so hard to part with. In the end, I carried two large kits of toys and a huge parcel of powdered instant soup (courtesy of the Knorr company) back to Darfur. Also, the Hungarian Baptist Charity sent money that enabled the construction of four additional classrooms in the school. While I was aware of various such initiatives, they were not officially supported by the mission command.

**- Monitoring activities of the military affecting the civilian sphere.**

This was mostly the task of the reconnaissance (G2) and the operational divisions. Based on their advice, the mission commander issued a uniform command to regulate the relations between the military and civilian organisations. Unfortunately, a number of fields were not covered by the regulation, occasionally enabling different legal interpretations.

**- Cooperation with the other organisations of the mission concerning the resolution or handling of specific situations.**

Among other things, the logistics service and the Force Medical Officer collectively arranged that the wounded inhabitants of a village raided near one of our camps (Graidia) could receive medical treatment. In addition to that, medical treatment was also given on several occasions to local or tribal leaders regardless of their alliance with the insurgents or the government forces. Once we needed to resort to the help of the civilian company (PAE) serving the camps, in order to put nearly 20 injured Sudanese soldiers into safety from the insurgent troops attacking Sheriya. According to local custom, they would probably have been executed by the occupying troops. However, we managed to

put them in a cooling container out of use at the moment, which ultimately saved their lives. In addition to the risk of that move, it was also difficult to justify morally, as the Sudanese military and the Janjaweed kept terrorising, even murdering the local population and the inhabitants of the refugee camps.<sup>168</sup> Some were on the view that these Sudanese soldiers would only have been returned what they had done to the locals. In the end we hid them out of humanitarian considerations so they survived the two weeks of combat. Once the government troops recaptured the town and the soldiers returned to their barracks, relations between the camp and the representatives of the local power spectacularly improved and our work was no longer hampered by them.

**- Providing experts to Quick Impact Projects resulting in benefits for the mission.**

Their success also tended to be rather occasional, e.g. when various buildings had been damaged during the rainy season in the town of Marla located in the South African sector, which the South African technical staff helped to restore. While that enterprise was appreciated by the mission commander, later he refused to give permission to use the mission's equipment in a similar project in another sector. Less than a week had passed between the two incidents and the security situation had not deteriorated in the mission, so nothing could possibly justify the refusal to give assistance, especially if one considers that a minimal expense would have been sufficient to gain the confidence of the population of a village located at hardly one kilometre from the camp. On the other hand, it was arranged that the camp physicians could hold consultation hours and give basic medical treatment to those in need in nearby settlements and refugee camps.

**- Drawing up forecasts and giving advice, if appropriate, to the civilian, military and police leaders in command of the mission.**

While all the divisions referred to above were involved in these activities, the commanders often did not even bother to read the forecasts. Even when harm had been done, the division leaders tended to hold them up for their own protection, without following the recommendations.

These deficiencies alone were sufficient to prevent the achievement of the three chief functions of CIMIC:

- Civil-military communication
- The supporting of the civil environment
- The supporting of the armed forces

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<sup>168</sup> <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/15187.html> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

In the Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine of the Hungarian Defence Forces, civil-military communication is defined as follows:

*'The task of civil-military communication is to provide the required coordination in order to support and facilitate the planning and implementation of operations. The establishment of that communication in the early phase of planning and following the deployment of forces will lay the foundations for the development of further CIMIC functions. This will be an essential basis for the planning and development of the subsequent main CIMIC functions. Communication with the civil authorities and organisations is facilitated, among a lot of other things, by appropriate mass communications. It requires the timely communication of the achievements of civil-military cooperation with a view to facilitating the obtaining of the support of the population, the international and non-governmental organisations.'*<sup>169</sup>

As seen from the above, that function could not be fully achieved, due partly to organisational deficiencies as well as the fact that this area was not given sufficient importance at the beginnings of the mission.

In the Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine of the Hungarian Defence Forces, the supporting of the civil environment is defined as follows:

*'A wide range of CIMIC activities are embraced by the supporting of the civil environment in accordance with the mission of the military forces employed. The support is normally governed by a non-civilian authority. It may encompass a wide range of military resources, including information, personnel, materials, equipment, communication facilities, devices, experts and training. It is normally established when and where this is an essential condition of the implementation of the military mission if local civil authorities and agencies are unable to carry out the specific task. The decision on the extent, duration and quantity of the aid must be adopted on a high level, taking into consideration political, military and civil factors.'*<sup>170</sup>

This should include, among other things, the plans for the evacuation of the civilian population, humanitarian aid (food and water supply), participation in the restoration of the critical infrastructure and, in cooperation with the NGO's, the organisation of the stationing and supply of refugees.

Even that could not be fully achieved, as the mission was only granted restricted rights by the Sudanese government.<sup>171</sup> It must be kept in mind that Darfur is part of Sudan, a functional sovereign state despite its perception as a

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<sup>169</sup> Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine for all services of the Hungarian Defence Forces, p. 10

<sup>170</sup> Ibid.

<sup>171</sup> Samuel M. Makinda, F. Wafula Okumu: The African Union: challenges of globalization, security, and governance, pp. 85-86

‘pariah state’ under economic sanctions, in which members of the government and the militias aided by the government carry out activities against humanity (methodical genocide, the burning down of villages, etc.). In other words, the Sudanese sovereign power is, in theory, functional and it is extremely difficult to change anything from outside. The agreement between the AU and Sudan and the signing of various treaties (SOFA, SOMA) had all been in vain, since they were interpreted by the Sudanese authorities at their will, including deliberately obstructing peace-keeping activities on many occasions.<sup>172</sup> Restrictions (curfews) were often extended to AMIS personnel. The issue of the evacuation of the civilian population was therefore quickly brushed aside whenever it was brought up, pleading that the Sudanese state machinery was working efficiently so there was no need for ‘foreigners’ to meddle in the problems of the local population. It could be observed in other respects that the Sudanese military/police units were, in concert with the Janjaweed militias, doing everything in order to achieve that as much of the native population should leave their homes and relocate into the refugee camps as possible. It had various reasons. Firstly, this enabled government troops to eliminate the supply bases of the rebels (food, shelter, manpower replacement and information flow) with increased efficiency and, secondly, it was easier to control the population in refugee camps.<sup>173</sup>

Since the camps were also under the control of the Sudanese government, humanitarian organisations were required a special permit in order to operate in the camps. During my service, several NGO’s were expelled because of giving some kind of trouble to the Sudanese authorities (for criticising the Sudanese police operating in the refugee camps for failing to defend inhabitants against the cruel acts of militias or often abusing the confidence of the people they were supposed to protect).

Camp infrastructure, as such, was non-existent. The building of wells and latrines and any efforts with a view to organising the life of the camps were the results of the efforts of charitable organisations.<sup>174</sup> As I have mentioned, the AMIS was only involved in such activities unofficially, on an ad hoc basis, especially as it lacked sufficient finances for the purpose.<sup>175</sup> Activities concerning the refugees were mostly limited to the AU installing mobile police stations with Norwegian sponsorship in order to ensure increased protection to the refugees.<sup>176</sup> However, that program only partly lived up to the expectations,

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<sup>172</sup> <http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/un-sudan-officials-obstruct-peacekeeping-darfur> (downloaded 03.02.2010), and Markus Derblom, Eva Hagström Frisell, Jennifer Schmidt: UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa, 38

<sup>173</sup> <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7685248.stm> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>174</sup> <http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/15187.html> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>175</sup> Markus Derblom, Eva Hagström Frisell, Jennifer Schmidt: UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa, p. 24

<sup>176</sup> <http://uniteamholding.com/newsflash/police-stations-in-darfur.html> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

since the AU policemen had very limited opportunities to intervene in the interest of camp-dwellers (lack of authorisation, restrictions on the use of firearms, etc.).<sup>177</sup>

In the Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine of the Hungarian Defence Forces, the supporting of the forces is defined as follows:

*'Within the area of operation, depending on the specific circumstances, commanders may, in various fields and on repeated occasions, need civilian support, the controlling of the population and local resources and, subsequently, access to civilian resources (fuel, food, water) and civilian sources of information. Commanders are required to make all efforts in order that the population accept the presence and the activities of (peace-keeping) troops as legitimate and lawful, with a view to gaining as wide support from the population as possible for the implementation of the operations. In that regard, CIMIC has a fundamental role.'*<sup>178</sup>

While the mission was initially received with great expectations by locals (the expectations concerning the peace-keepers had perhaps even been raised too high), their friendly attitude later turned into indifference or often even into open hostility. I heard a lot of complaints by locals that African soldiers had only come to Darfur to have three proper meals a day and draw a big wage. It is extremely difficult to explain to a person having one meal of millet or durrha a day and meat maybe once a week and having to spread out the daily wage of a peace-keeper (US\$ 120 a day) for an entire month in order to support his family, that we have come to help him. It is particularly difficult if he sees that the observers do nothing but sit in their camps for weeks, sometimes patrol, without really helping civilians, while the same people rule over them who have caused their plight in the first place.

They also took offence when the peace-keepers failed to intervene in order to protect civilians when they were attacked by militiamen. In one of our camps, the distance between the camp and the village was only 6-700 metres, and therefore the relations between soldiers and locals became very friendly. One day the village was attacked, Janjaweed horsemen massacring over twenty people and burning down most of the village together with the mature crop still awaiting harvest, in full view of the observers. While a few soldiers and policemen wanted to intervene, which they did not receive permission for, on the grounds that *'we are but peace-keepers who are not in the position to draw the anger of the belligerent parties upon us and who must maintain our*

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<sup>177</sup> Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, p. 39, and <http://www.usnews.com/blogs/sam-dealey/2009/01/26/the-un-shares-blame-for-darfur-atrocities.html> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>178</sup> Civil-Military Cooperation Doctrine for all services of the Hungarian Defence Forces, p. 10

*neutrality*'. The observers watched the attack to the end, documenting it (taking photos during the raid and subsequently of the dead) and reporting it to HQ.

Understandably, the villagers were later not really disposed to make friends with the peace-keepers. In 2007, unidentified armed persons attacked the camp, killing eight and leaving further eight peace-keepers seriously wounded.<sup>179</sup> Later it was found that one of the attacking groups had come from that village...

When all is said and done, rather than gaining the widest possible support from the civilian population, the AMIS even managed to lose its initial support.<sup>180</sup> Unfortunately, the joint UN-AU *Hybrid Force* was similarly unable to win the effective support of the local population as the latter tended to consider the peace-keeping troops parasites who drew a salary despite failing to protect them from the armed attackers belonging to various groups. In addition to that, peace-keepers also had to face being regarded targets by both government and insurgent troops during attacks.<sup>181</sup> In order to fully achieve these objectives, the African Union would have needed CIMIC abilities, which did not even exist at the time, even if some elements of the organisation managed to incorporate some of the tasks into their sphere of activities. The CIMIC only represented an additional task to the divisions on top of their activities. This ability can be considered available if the following three elements exist and 'function':

- **Theory:** established guidelines, doctrine and concepts
- **Training and exercise:** The ability to translate the doctrine into practice (training, exercise and general preparedness)
- **Physical component:** The availability of the actual capacity, representing a trained personnel, deployed units and support units.

Since the African Union was a recently established organisation (even if its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, had been operating for decades), the AMIS being its first official military mission, it did not have doctrines and guidelines in accordance with the planning system of the organisation or the required system of planning and procedures in the field in question (CIMIC).<sup>182</sup> Obviously, that left its mark on the activity of the mission. While in their declarations, AU politicians have kept emphasising that the Darfur peace-keeping mission was the first independent African mission, this is not really so. Previously, they had launched a mission in the territory of

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<sup>179</sup> <http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc589950.pdf> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>180</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL17742685> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>181</sup> <http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/africa/07/09/darfur.peacekeepers/index.html> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>182</sup> Markus Derblom, Eva Hagström Frisell, Jennifer Schmidt: UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa, p. 25

Burundi, which soon collapsed due to the lack of organisation, insufficient training and the lack of required funding (when South Africa had withdrawn their sponsorship). The UN had to intervene at very short notice by taking over the mission, in order to prevent further loss of prestige.<sup>183</sup> Now it is clear that a similar situation was arrived at in the Darfur mission, which, for that matter, could only be maintained by the serious funding and the provision of equipment by the US, the NATO, the UN and the EU. As a consequence of the typical African circumstances (corruption, scrappy planning, insufficient funds, rivalry, etc.), the EU had to take over the command of the mission yet again, even if this was carried out under a 'joint' UN-AU peace-support operation in order to keep up appearances.<sup>184</sup>

It is already clear that the AU's third mission in Somalia may end up in a similar situation as the only troops so far have been a 2,700-strong contingent sent by Uganda,<sup>185</sup> and 3 Burundian battalions.<sup>186</sup> While the envisaged strength would be 8,000 troops, African countries are reluctant to command the troops they have offered to Somalia.<sup>187</sup>

It shows that despite the quick establishment of the AU, apart from the distribution of the leading positions, they have not been able to carry out any serious work in the field of peace-supporting operations, which has partly been due, as I have said, to the lack of established doctrines and concepts. That does not only apply to CIMIC.

Training, exercises and general preparedness are similarly problematic, due to the fact that, rather than sending the experts supposed to carry out CIMIC activities, the people delegated to the various NATO, UN and EU courses, seminars and conferences are still selected in a sort of 'feudatory' fashion. I remember receiving a training group from the Norfolk NATO command who held seminars on CIMIC activities among other topics, for several weeks.<sup>188</sup> The courses were chiefly attended by the senior officials of the mission, while the executive personnel were only enrolled in the trainings every once in a while. When I left the mission, there was a field officer who had attended all the courses offered for the AMIS by other international organisations, despite the fact that they were completely irrelevant in his position. This reminded me of the situation in Hungary after the fall of Communism, when staff members

<sup>183</sup> [http://www.foi.se/upload/projects/Africa/FOI2561\\_AMIB.pdf](http://www.foi.se/upload/projects/Africa/FOI2561_AMIB.pdf) (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>184</sup> Markus Derblom, Eva Hagström Frisell, Jennifer Schmidt: UN-EU-AU Coordination in Peace Operations in Africa, pp. 40-42

<sup>185</sup> <http://allafrica.com/stories/200907300007.html> (downloaded 03.02.2010)

<sup>186</sup> [http://www.hiiraan.com/news2\\_rss/2009/Aug/burundi\\_sends\\_troop\\_reinforcements\\_to\\_somalia.aspx](http://www.hiiraan.com/news2_rss/2009/Aug/burundi_sends_troop_reinforcements_to_somalia.aspx) (downloaded 04.02.2010)

<sup>187</sup> <http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/AUC/Departments/PSC/AMISOM/amisom.htm> (downloaded 04.02.2010)

<sup>188</sup> Human Rights Watch: Imperatives for immediate change: the African Union Mission in Sudan, p. 33

about to retire were sent on 10-month intensive language courses and other foreign trainings of varying length, while the effective strength carrying out the actual operations were thinking wistfully of such opportunities. Fortunately, while we have left that kind of thinking behind, the AU still appears to be at that stage. Obviously, it would not be a problem if the commanders were the first to receive such types of trainings provided that they drew the required conclusions and applied them in the future or they were incorporated in their training system (Lessons Learned). Unfortunately, this was not achieved while I was in the area and the situation has improved at a very slow pace ever since.

Today, while the mission now employs experts responsible for humanitarian issues and for liaising with the various charitable civil organisations, professional CIMIC staff are still not available, there is no trained personnel or established units specialising in implementing such tasks and the required support capacities are also missing.

After the UN took over the Darfur mission, changes were also effected in these respects, as the leaders of the UN had realised that CIMIC abilities have become indispensable with a view to the success of peace-supporting operations. However, they have been unable to fully make up for the shortcomings of the training of the incoming officers and soldiers. While a remote training program has been launched, its results are still to be seen.<sup>189</sup>

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**Nóra Nábrádi**

## **WHAT IS ASSESSED IN THE STANAG LEVEL 2 READING COMPREHENSION EXAM?**

### ***Summary***

*Being a multinational organisation, NATO has always attached considerable importance to the teaching and testing of the English language, which has intensified in the last few years due to a massive increase in joint military operations. The adoption of the NATO STANAG 6001 in 1976 responded to a need to define language proficiency: it provided (and still does) a common scale with formal descriptions of the base levels in four skills (listening, speaking, reading and writing). All member countries that develop their own NATO STANAG 6001 language testing system must observe and act in compliance with the common scale. This paper, after presenting a brief overview of the STANAG 6001 scale and the testing of reading, examines the four tasks of the STANAG 2 reading comprehension exam accredited in Hungary. The focus of my analysis is on looking at the reading sub-skills the tasks are intended to measure and also relating the text types to the common scale (NATO STANAG 6001 Edition 3).*

### ***Introduction***

Of the two official languages (English and French) at NATO, English has become the operational language, and the teaching and testing of English in NATO countries have had special importance in the last few years due to the accession of new member states and a considerable number of joint tasks, e.g. exercises, training, operations, posting at multinational NATO headquarters. English language teaching and testing carry high stakes for individual military professionals and the member (and partner) countries alike. To ensure interoperability in joint operations or NATO positions, military (and civilian)

personnel must obtain a Standardized Language Profile (SLP)<sup>190</sup> based on the NATO STANAG 6001<sup>191</sup> Language Proficiency Levels, the common scale used in the sphere of language testing. Based on this scale, each country is responsible for the development, implementation and administration of its own STANAG language exam. The testers of each country act independently, nevertheless they have to arrive at a score reported on a common scale (the NATO STANAG 6001, hereinafter STANAG).

### **NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG) 6001 Language Proficiency Levels**

The STANAG language proficiency scale was first adopted in 1976. It met a NATO-wide need to define language proficiency, and “to have a common yardstick among countries that would ensure a shared understanding of the language proficiency of members.” (Dubeau, 2006, p.6) An objective scale was needed, which was applicable to all languages and could be used by different countries. “The descriptors had to be specific enough so that positions, be they military or civilian, could be matched up to proficiency levels, and at the same time, it was important that they remain general enough so that they describe the progression considered to be typical of learners, but not specifically related to any language or language curriculum.” (Dubeau, 2006, p.7)

Although individual countries are responsible for their own STANAG examination systems, there are some fundamental principles and concepts, which all members must observe. The STANAG proficiency level descriptors describe and measure *general functional* proficiency (not knowledge) checked through *global tasks*. The scale is descriptive, not prescriptive, and gives general descriptions for *typical* performances at each level. Level definitions describe proficiency at a *minimally acceptable* level (the threshold), at which level performance must be sustained. Each level represents a *range* of proficiency, rather than a point on a scale. It means that candidates’ performance vary within the same level (from threshold level to mid and high in the range). Each level descriptor consists of statements defining what a person at a certain proficiency level can talk about in the language (*content*), what functions or tasks a person can perform in the language (*task*), and how well a person can use the language (*accuracy*). (BILC, LTS, 2008)

In 2001 the BILC<sup>192</sup> Working Group on Testing and Assessment created an interpretation document to clarify and reinterpret the original STANAG

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<sup>190</sup>The Standardised Language Profiles are recorded using a sequence of four digits to represent the four language skills, which are listed in the following sequence: Listening (L), Speaking (S), Reading (R) and Writing (W). For example, SLP 3321 means level 3 in listening and speaking, level 2 in reading and level 1 in writing.

<sup>191</sup>There are various STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT (STANAG) documents within NATO. The only STANAG referred to in this paper is the STANAG 6001.

6001. The NATO Standardizing Agency integrated the updated reinterpretation in 2003, and officially adopted as an Appendix to STANAG 6001, Edition 2. In 2009 Edition 3 of the STANAG 6001 scale was published. In Edition 3, changes were made to the labels of language levels: five out of the six were altered.<sup>193</sup>

As said above, the testing centres of the individual member (and partner) countries develop and administer their own testing systems. In Hungary, candidates have been assessed in the STANAG language testing system since 1997, as an accredited single-level<sup>194</sup> language exam it has been administered since January 2005. The following sections of this paper focus on the testing of reading skills, its theoretical background, the instruments and methods used to measure reading comprehension at Level 2 (Functional) in the Hungarian STANAG language testing system, and also how the texts are related to the common scale.

### **What do reading tests measure?**

This section considers the concept of reading comprehension and the different reading sub-skills, i.e. what candidates are exactly expected to be able to do when reading a test.

What does reading comprehension mean? And how can it be tested? There are different definitions of the construct of reading, it would be impossible to synthesise them all into one brief expression. Putting it in a simple way, “reading comprehension means understanding a written text, and extracting the information required to fulfil the reading purpose.” (Kontra – Kormos, 2007 p.85) The process of reading is silent and internal, and readers differ in the ways they engage in various reading processes, however, the understandings, i.e. the products they end up with tend to be similar. Testers can only assess the product of reading (i.e. candidates’ answers to the test items), which might be problematic because it can be affected by other skills and background knowledge.

Hughes refers to something similar when he writes that the basic problem with measuring reading skills is that the exercise of receptive skills does not necessarily manifest itself directly in overt behaviour. “The challenge for the

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<sup>192</sup>Bureau for International Language Co-ordination. Within NATO the BILC is the custodian of STANAG 6001.

<sup>193</sup>The six levels (coded 0 through 5) are defined in Edition 2 as:

Level 0 – No practical proficiency; Level 1 – Elementary; Level 2 – Fair (Limited working); Level 3 – Good (Minimum professional); Level 4 – Very good (Full professional); Level 5 – Excellent (Native/bilingual)

In Edition 3:

Level 0 – No proficiency; Level 1 – Survival; Level 2 – Functional; Level 3 – Professional; Level 4 – Expert; Level 5 – Highly-articulate native.

<sup>194</sup>The candidate is tested at one level at a time, which (s)he either passes or fails.

language tester is to set tasks which will not only cause the candidate to exercise reading (or listening) skills, but will also result in behaviour that will demonstrate the successful use of those skills.” (Hughes, 2003, p.136)

In real life, depending on our purpose and the kind of text we are dealing with, we may read in many different ways. When we read, we use a variety of reading sub-skills, which we select according to the purpose of reading and the text type. We may read slowly and carefully to follow and understand an argument, we may read a text quickly to get the gist of it, or we may look quickly down a column in search for a particular piece of information. The reading component in most language exams reflects the wide range of purposes for which people read in real life. Based on the differences of purpose, we can make a distinction between expeditious (quick and efficient) reading and slow and careful reading. The following checklists of the operations that readers perform when reading a text are adopted from Hughes. He also notes the negative backwash effect of some tests in the past that gave expeditious reading less prominence and as a result of this many students have not been trained to read quickly and efficiently. (Hughes, 2003, p.138)

### **Expeditious reading operations**

#### ***Skimming***

The candidate can:

- obtain main ideas and discourse topic quickly and efficiently;
- establish quickly the structure of a text;
- decide the relevance of a text (or part of a text) to their needs.

#### ***Search reading***

The candidate can quickly find information on a predetermined topic.

#### ***Scanning***

The candidate can quickly find:

- specific words or phrases;
- figures, percentages;
- specific items in an index;
- specific names in a bibliography or a set of references.

### **Careful reading operations**

- identify pronominal reference;
- identify discourse markers;
- interpret complex sentences;
- interpret topic sentences;
- outline logical organisation of a text;
- outline the development of an argument;
- distinguish general statements from examples;
- identify explicitly stated main ideas;

- identify implicitly stated main ideas;
- recognise writer's intention;
- recognise the attitudes and emotions of the writer;
- identify addressee or audience for a text;
- identify what kind of text is involved (e.g. editorial, diary, etc.);
- distinguish fact from opinion;
- distinguish hypothesis from fact;
- distinguish fact from rumour or hearsay.

Make inferences:

- infer the meaning of an unknown word from context.
- make propositional informational inferences, answering questions beginning with *who*, *when*, *what*.
- make propositional explanatory inferences concerned with motivation, cause, consequence and enablement, answering questions beginning with *why*, *how*.
- make pragmatic inferences.

From *Testing for Language Teachers (Second edition)* by Arthur Hughes

Before constructing a proficiency reading test and selecting the assessment instruments, testers must identify the situations in which candidates need to read and be aware of what reading operations they have to perform.

Each part of a reading test is designed to measure a combination of reading skills. At intermediate level (and above), candidates are expected to handle a wide range of text types and genres, and text length of over a thousand words.

### **What is assessed in the STANAG Level 2 reading comprehension test in Hungary?**

In this section I will describe the different tasks of the STANAG Level 2 reading comprehension test used in Hungary, and analyse the task types from the aspect of the reading sub-skills they measure, and will also have a look at how they are related to the common STANAG scale. The tasks of the sample test, which is downloadable from the homepage of the Testing Centre at Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University, will provide a basis for my analysis (see Appendices).

It is explicitly stated in the specification<sup>195</sup> of the Hungarian STANAG that a level 2 candidate is supposed to be able to read and understand authentic

<sup>195</sup>The test specification is an official statement about what a test measures and how it measures it. Its major function is to help test designers make sure that the items they develop are consistent with the aim of the test.

material on concrete and abstract subjects. (S)he can read straightforward texts, which may include descriptions of persons, places, and things and narration about current, past and future events. The text can be news items, articles on current military and military-political events. The candidate can understand texts intended for the general native reader. (S)he can answer factual questions about such texts, can locate and understand the main ideas and details. (S)he can readily understand texts that are constructed in relatively high frequency sentence patterns. The candidate may also be able to locate, sort and summarise specific information in higher level texts. (Accreditation document, 2004, pp.273-4)

This Functional (L2) proficiency level descriptor of reading comprehension skills complies with the common scale, though there is one difference: in the common document, candidates are not expected to be able to handle texts on abstract subjects at this level, which is a requirement for candidates sitting the exam in the Hungarian testing system.

In the Hungarian STANAG 2 reading examination candidates are required to complete four reading comprehension tasks in 90 minutes. The first two tasks measure general language proficiency, tasks 3 and 4 are intended to test professional military specialist language. In each case the text type is basically news from the media, straightforward, factual texts, which may include descriptions, narrations or analyses. The content of the texts include facts, events that occur in daily life, or in news of political-military content. Candidates are expected to understand factual information, however, drawing inferences is not a requirement at level 2. The tasks testing general English are worth 15 marks and those testing military language are worth 20 marks. Candidates must obtain at least 21 marks (60%) in order to pass.

**Task 1** is a multiple-choice gap-fill task. It is a gapped text of general language and the length of 1000-1100n from which ten single words have been removed. Candidates must choose from four alternatives (A, B, C or D), only one of which is correct to fit into the text. Each correct item is worth one mark. (see Appendix A)

This task, however being a reading comprehension test, is also intended to measure vocabulary use in context. As with most reading tests, there is an overlap between the testing of reading and vocabulary. This task requires careful reading operations. Referring to Hughes' checklist, in order to succeed in reading task 1, candidates must be able to identify explicitly stated main ideas, interpret complex sentences, interpret topic sentences and infer the meaning of unknown words from context. The text type is – in compliance with the STANAG scale – a descriptive (concrete) piece of information from the media

(printed or online), an article as for its genre, which conveys information and details.

**Task 2** is a text-matching gap-fill exercise, an 1100-1200n long gapped text from which five phrases/clauses have been removed. Candidates must choose from a list to fill each gap. There are three items among the alternatives that do not belong to the text. Each correct item is worth one mark. (see Appendix B)

The gap-filling technique is used in this task to test the ability to identify specific pieces of information. The successful completion of task 2 necessarily involves careful reading operations. Candidates must understand the main ideas of the text in order to be able to choose the fitting phrases from the list correctly. Apart from being a reading comprehension test, task 2 also measures accuracy (or use of English). The right answer must not only make sense, but also fit grammatically, so the awareness of sentence structures is of vital importance. It is a demanding task, since to make the correct choice candidates must recognise the structural features in the sentence as well as identify the right piece of information fitting the blank. The main purpose of task 2 is to test how the candidate is able to make sense of the relationship between ideas in a text using structural and vocabulary clues.

**Task 3** and 4 relate to the same text of the length of 1900-2000n, which is of political-military context. Task 3 is a matching exercise consisting of five questions and is aimed at testing the ability to identify specific information in the text. The paragraphs of the text are numbered and candidates are asked to match each question to the appropriate paragraph. All questions refer to a specific piece of information in a different paragraph. Ideally the words and phrases used in the questions do not occur in the text, so candidates need to be able to recognise synonyms and parallel expressions. (see Appendix C)

Task 3 measures expeditious reading skills, the sub-skills to be used are skimming, i.e. obtaining main ideas and discourse topic quickly and efficiently and deciding the relevance of (a part of) a paragraph to a question. The reading process may also include search reading (quickly finding information on a topic), and some questions may activate scanning operations (quickly finding specific words, phrases, figures, names, references etc). The text type is news from the media of political-military content, where candidates are expected to identify factual information or explicitly stated ideas.

Each correct item is worth two marks, because the sub-skill tested, i.e. locating specific information in a lengthy text in a relatively short time, is a very important expeditious reading skill that military personnel working in multinational environment are required to possess. Classroom teaching

experience suggests, however, that the validity of this task can fall victim to test wiseness, i.e. students develop successful exam strategies without having acquired the proficiency or skill measured at the test. (It may happen in this part of the exam more readily than in the other three tasks.) A good number of students who actually do not understand the main and supporting ideas of the text, having done one or two practice tests, are able to do the task without any mistakes. One reason for that could be the challenge that this type of task poses to item writers, the witty wording of the questions is extremely demanding.

**Task 4** is a multiple choice task related to the same text as task 3. It consists of five questions, each accompanied by five answers, only two of the five options are correct. Each correct answer (two per question) is worth one mark. (see Appendix 4)

This task measures candidates' ability to locate and understand specific pieces of information in a text of political-military context. According to the specification of the STANAG 2 reading comprehension test, along with task 3, task 4 models a frequent realistic reading task for officers and non-commissioned officers serving in assignments which require level 2 language proficiency, i.e. sorting special information from a lengthy text within limited time. Still, it is not primarily the expeditious reading skills that are tested with this task, though, depending on the content of the questions, skimming, scanning and search reading operations may also play a role in the reading process. But it may also involve careful reading operations such as interpretation of sentences, distinguishing general statements from examples, distinguishing facts from opinions or making explanatory inferences concerned with motivation, cause, and consequence, just to name a few sub-skills (without the intention of being exhaustive). It is a highly versatile task type, which can measure a number of sub-skills depending on the actual questions and options (with special emphasis on the distractors) item writers design.

The four tasks of the STANAG 2 reading comprehension exam measure a wide variety of sub-skills, which always occur in a combination and involve mainly careful reading operations. An exception could be task 3, which requires mostly expeditious reading operations. In the first two tasks the testing of vocabulary and accuracy is almost as important as that of the reading comprehension skill.

All the texts used in the STANAG examination system at level 2 in Hungary are authentic or semi authentic: written for competent or native speakers of English ("intended for the general reader" – as referred to in the common STANAG document), rather than for testing (or teaching) purposes.

### ***Conclusions***

In this paper, I have outlined a brief history of the STANAG 6001 scale, which NATO adopted in 1976 in order to have an objective scale to standardise the various levels of language proficiency in member and partner countries. I have also discussed some of the fundamental principles of the STANAG, of which the Content-Tasks-Accuracy statements of the scale are of special importance from the perspective of the subject of this paper. I have listed the reading sub-skills measured in language exams and have looked in detail at the four reading tasks that constitute the STANAG 2 reading comprehension exam in Hungary. I have analysed them from the perspective of the reading sub-skills measured and have related the texts of the sample test to the common STANAG scale from the point of view of their content.

The Hungarian STANAG 2 reading test is made up of tasks that measure a wide variety of reading operations military personnel tend to perform in their work. When the test was developed, the test designers took into consideration the reading skills candidates may need in their assignments, i.e. what they are required to do in the language. Testers identified the situations in which the candidates needed to read and designed tasks which reflect reading in such situations.

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**APPENDICES**

**APPENDIX A**

**Reading Task 1 A, Questions 1-10** Read the text below. Choose the best word (A, B, C or D) for each gap (1-10). 0 is an example. Mark your answers on your **Answer Sheet**.

**MMM, IT LOOKS LIKE REINDEER**

In Hungary, all kinds of exotic meats are ....0.... at major supermarkets. However, there are only few people living in Hungary who have ....1.... reindeer meat. It may ....2.... a long time, if at all, before the staple diet of Lapland is imported here.

One of the ....3.... asked about importing reindeer said that it would be very unlikely that Hungarians would get hooked on the Lapp speciality.

However, reindeer meat is ....4.... according to native Finns. "There is a famous dish we call *Poron Kaäristyf* (Poro meaning reindeer)", said Helena Winnari, a native Finn living in Hungary. "The meat is cooked in butter and cut into thin ....5.... and served with mashed potatoes and a special berry called Poulukka" she said. Winnari added that ....6.... of the Finns only season the meat with salt and pepper.

In Lapland, reindeer meat is processed in a traditional ....7..... It is trimmed, boned, aged and processed into steaks, roasts and sausages, with particular ....8.... made to create products of the highest quality.

In Finland, reindeer meat was ....9.... the ancient man's first "convenience" food. Making sausages or smoking the meat became ....10.... as people had to preserve meat when their food supplies were scarce.

(The Budapest Sun)

Example:

0.     A. harmful             B. available             C. ordinary             D. reasonable

- |     |              |               |               |                 |
|-----|--------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|
| 1.  | A. fed       | B. caught     | C. tried      | D. experimented |
| 2.  | A. take      | B. last       | C. pass       | D. spend        |
| 3.  | A. commerces | B. components | C. Complexes  | D. companies    |
| 4.  | A. charming  | B. delighted  | C. delicious  | D. darling      |
| 5.  | A. rounds    | B. spots      | C. curves     | D. slices       |
| 6.  | A. lot       | B. most       | C. much       | D. any          |
| 7.  | A. way       | B. work       | C. custom     | D. habit        |
| 8.  | A. trouble   | B. effort     | C. struggle   | D. bother       |
| 9.  | A. mentioned | B. spoken     | C. considered | D. told         |
| 10. | A. popular   | B. curious    | C. plain      | D. wide         |

## APPENDIX B

Reading Task 2 A, Questions 11-15 Read the following text and then choose from list A-I the best phrase given below it to fill each of the blanks. For each gap write one letter (A-I) on your ANSWER SHEET. Three of the suggested answers do not fit at all. 0 is an example.

### PROBLEM FLIGHTS

Like millions of people around the country, I took a trip over the July 4 weekend, and what a trip it was. By the time I got home, three of my four American Airlines flights between Washington and San Juan, Puerto Rico, were late, resulting in one missed connection through Miami. Along the way I sat trapped in a plane for three hours, sitting at the gate .....**0**..... on a problem with the plane.

Maybe it was just my misfortune. The airline, after all, recorded roughly .....**11**..... for the first five months of this year as it did for the same period last year. But the annoying sequence of events made me think again about .....**12**..... when they run into trouble on their flights.

By the time we arrived at Miami International Airport more than an hour and a half late, dozens of passengers .....**13**..... Some tried to race to make their flights. With bags in hand, Susan Kimberly of Alexandria ran through the airport maze after arriving within 15 minutes of her next flight's departure. When she got to the gate, .....**14**....., the door was closed and the gate agent said she could not board.

An American Airlines spokesman said a connecting flight .....**15**..... "Holding an airplane and inconveniencing 100 passengers to accommodate a couple of passengers with a late-arriving flight isn't the answer," he said.

(The Washington Post)

- A. although her plane was still there
- B. but the weather was very foggy
- C. as a maintenance crew worked (**EXAMPLE**)
- D. is rarely held for a few passengers
- E. because the plane was one hour late
- F. half as many passenger complaints
- G. which made an emergency landing
- H. what travelers can expect
- I. had missed their connecting flights

## APPENDIX C

**Reading Task 3 A, Questions 16-20** Read the text below and answer the questions on your **Answer Sheet**. Paragraph 2 is an example.

### HUNT ON TERRORISM

1. Abu Ali, the leader of a sizable group of suspected al-Qaeda members or sympathisers, was killed by the CIA in Yemen on Sunday. He was one of the top 15 in the al-Qaeda hierarchy and had been linked to the October 2000 suicide bombing of the warship USS Cole which killed 17 U.S. sailors. Last month, in an attack similar to the Cole bombing, suicide bombers in a small boat blew a hole in a French oil tanker.
2. Abu Ali was one of the two most wanted men in Yemen. The other, Mohammed al-Ahdal, is still at large, according to an intelligence official. They were hiding in the remote mountainous region of Yemen known as the Marib.
3. Yemen is regarded as a hotbed of al-Qaeda activity and one of the refuges to which senior al-Qaeda members fled following the U.S. military campaign in Afghanistan. Local tribesmen in the region are believed to be willingly hiding al-Qaeda members.
4. It is unclear whether the CIA attempted to capture Abu Ali. The official said the CIA must have had a reason for killing him, speculating that Abu Ali was heavily armed when he and five others were blown up by a U.S. missile.
5. U.S. officials say they generally prefer to capture and interrogate al-Qaeda members for information rather than kill them. But capture is much riskier, and there are not always forces available to arrest members of a group who generally travel heavily armed. When opportunities to kill al-Qaeda members arise, U.S. officials say they try to take advantage of them.
6. The tribal groups are feared by the Yemeni government, another reason why a missile attack, rather than an attempted arrest, may have been the preferred response to information about Abu Ali's whereabouts. Early this year, one of the commando operations mounted by Yemeni soldiers was repelled by local tribesmen, resulting in 18 soldiers dead and dozens more wounded.
7. The Pentagon has stationed about 800 special operations troops in the Horn of Africa to hunt down al-Qaeda terrorists in Yemen and surrounding countries. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the United States is establishing a task force to control U.S. commando operations in the region, which is across the Gulf of Aden from Yemen. Rumsfeld said the Yemeni government is actively cooperating in the hunt for al-Qaeda terrorists.

(USA Today)

**Reading Task 3 A, Questions 16-20** Read the text **Hunt on Terrorism** on your **Question Paper** and answer the questions below. There are **seven** paragraphs, but for this task you must choose only **five** to give the answers. Paragraph **2** is an example.

**Example:**

Which paragraph names the region where Abu Ali was hiding? 2

**Which paragraph**

- 16. describes the US plans to fight terrorism in the region? \_\_\_\_\_
- 17. describes how Abu Ali died? \_\_\_\_\_
- 18. mentions a Yemeni attack on terrorists? \_\_\_\_\_
- 19. describes Abu-Ali's suspected crimes? \_\_\_\_\_
- 20. is about people who support terrorists? \_\_\_\_\_

## APPENDIX D

**Reading Task 4 A, Questions 21-25** Read the text **Hunt on Terrorism** on your **Question Paper** again. For each question choose the **two** best answers from list **A-E**. For this task you need the whole text. Question **0** is an example.

### Example:

**0. What happened to the US ship?**

  B    
  E  

- A. It was totally destroyed.
- B. It was attacked by terrorists.
- C. It disappeared near Yemen.
- D. Its load exploded.
- E. Some of its sailors were killed.

**21. Why did the al-Qaeda terrorists move to Yemen?**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

- A. They can hide there.
- B. They get training there.
- C. They get support from the local people.
- D. They use military bases there.
- E. They are safe from the CIA there.

**22. Why was Abu Ali wanted by the CIA?**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

- A. He killed a lot of CIA members.
- B. He was an al-Qaeda leader.
- C. He killed Mohammed al-Ahdal.
- D. He attacked some Yemeni villages.
- E. He was involved in the ship attack.

**23. Why is it difficult to arrest al-Qaeda members?**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

- A. The terrorists were trained by the CIA.
- B. The terrorists are heavily armed.
- C. There are not enough people for operations.
- D. The terrorists are warned about the attacks.
- E. The terrorists use camouflage.

**24. How does the Yemeni government fight terrorism?**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

- A. It cooperates with the US forces.
- B. It sends troops to Afghanistan.
- C. It established a task force.
- D. It organises anti-terrorist operations.
- E. It organises collecting of weapons.

**25. Why do American anti-terrorist forces concentrate on Yemen?**

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

- A. Terrorists killed 18 soldiers there.
- B. Local people fight against terrorists there.
- C. The Yemeni officials support terrorists.
- D. There are a lot of Al-Qaeda members there.
- E. It is a centre of terrorist activity.

(from [www.zmne/szolgalt/nyelvvizsga/stanag](http://www.zmne/szolgalt/nyelvvizsga/stanag))

## **THE HUNGARIAN PRISON SERVICE SYSTEM AND ITS ENTERPRISES**

***ABSTRACT** In the beginning of the 90-ies in the life of the former Hungarian communist prison service companies an important development took place: they were transformed into market-based companies. The economic results of the prison service system have a specific significance due to the fact that they are achieved with the contribution of unskilled workforce. In the life of these market-based companies economic growth and the employment of convicted people are important aspects. Through generating mutual experience gaining processes it would be possible to acquire markets beyond our borders.*

### **Introduction**

In my study I will cover the transformation of the former communist prison service companies into market-based companies, the economic achievements of these companies till our days, and their operation in the past, at present and in the future. The introduction of these companies will not follow the usual pattern, since as parts of a closely interrelated system they execute state tasks. Their main profile is to execute light industrial and agricultural type of activities. Briefly I will analyse the economic results they have achieved from the time of their transformation till our days. I have placed a special emphasis on the last two years, particularly on the extent they had to suffer from the economic crisis and what impact this had on the number of convicted persons employed. I will also cover in what way it would be possible to implement the structural and organisational transformation of these companies as a consequence of the changes of the legal provisions and our accession to the European Union.

### **Transformation of the former communist prison service companies into market-based companies**

The prison service organisation is an armed law enforcement organisation of the state. It is headed by the Minister of Interior as an integral part of criminal justice. The prison service organisation supervised by the Ministry of Interior is directed by the National Headquarters of Prison Service, as a middle level management organisation. At present there are 35 institutes, institutions belonging to this organisation. 31 out of these 35 organisations are budget organisations that operate and carry on their business activities independently,

while 4 operate independently. The number of companies employing prisoners is 12. The position of these organisations and of the prison service institutes and institutions can be seen on Diagram 1.



*Diagram 1: National and county prison service institutes, institutions and companies operating in Hungary*

The prison service organisation executes its activity on the basis of Act CVII of year 1995 on the prison service organisation. Its basic task is to ensure that penalties, measures, criminal procedural coercive measures used by justice involving the loss of freedom, imprisonment established as a consequence of exchanging financial penalty levied due to a rule infringement, and the execution of aliens policing custody within lawful frameworks.

Transforming the former prison service companies into marked-based companies had to be started till June 30, 1993 on the basis of Act LIII of year 1992 and Government Decree 126/1992.(VIII.28.). This was preceded by a wide ranging due diligence assessment involving the prison service organisation. Based on this assessment demands were phrased on the side of National Headquarters of Prison Service including the following: an annual normative budget subsidy for ensuring the employment of the convicted persons should be established, the development of the legal background of budget orders should be taken care of, tax allowances should be provided, and the employment of convicted people should be declared by the law. The years that followed the political system transformation have raised many questions that had to be

solved. The Government, the Ministry of Justice and the National Headquarters of Prison Service were looking for the answers of these in close collaboration on continuous basis. In the framework of this activity Government Resolution 2211/1995 was passed, which decided to transform these companies into kft companies (Hungarian limited liability companies) with a date of January 1, 1994.

### **Employment of convicted people by the prison service companies**

The prison service companies are owned by the state. Their task is to employ the prisoners. Employment is "a requirement that is prescribed by law in the punitive justice system of modern countries. In the prison service system of the European countries the right of convicted persons to work, and their obligation to work are general rights and obligations." (Fekete, 1994. 4.p.)

The profile of these companies was established by their legal predecessor companies. The operation of the majority of the kft companies - based on their specialised activities - belongs under the area of light industry. The agricultural activity of the kft companies is also significant. The scope of their activity can be split into three parts:

- works related to sustaining the institution,
- producing own products,
- job-work.

„The activity of the contracted company is strictly controlled by the leadership of the prison, they collect information about its owners, they examine the conditions of the operation of the company, and they may sign any contract with them only after having done the above. If in any area the company is not clean, then there is no business. The prison service organisation exercises this thorough control repeatedly throughout their relationship.” (Arató – Bányi, 2001. 188.p.)

Making convicted persons work is important from societal aspect and from the aspect of the individuals as well. The state provides allowances for the kft companies of the prison service. It subsidizes the kft companies up to the extent needed. The extent of subsidizing is determined by the prevailing market relations. „And on the other side these companies do not pay any local and any business tax, moreover the convicted persons employed execute their activity not in the framework of an employment legal relationship, but in a prison service legal relationship, which means that public burdens do not have to be paid after them.” (Arató – Bányi, 2001. 191.p.)

Employment is a difficult challenge also, because the kft companies do not have a flexible and fast workforce, and they have to always fight with a lack of money. Employment would be also necessary in order to allow convicted people feeling that they are also doing something useful. Prisons cannot achieve full employment. „ ... it would be practical to adopt the West European model, in which convicted people participate in training courses that are in harmony with the demands of the society, they are learning activities that are useful for the society, and this way, if 10-20 convicted persons would work by professions in 10-15 areas, then already the employment of several hundred prisoners would be ensured. Moreover, these people could continue to work in these professions after they are released from prison as well, since they would learn such things for which there is a demand as well.” (Arató – Bányi, 2001. 194. p.)

The kft. companies do execute their business activities within the walls of the prison, however, under certain conditions it is also possible to employ convicted people at outside workplaces as well. These conditions are the following:

- appropriate and secure transportation,
- ensuring a guarding staff that is appropriately prepared for its task,
- whether the training, personality, criminal act allows him/her to be working at an outside workplace.

Employment of convicted people is that form of employing prisoners in an organised manner, in the case of which work is being done regularly for remuneration. The prisoner may be employed for work by the institute or a company established for this purpose. An admission committee decides admission to the work with indicating the job scope and the employer. They determine the time of work execution, the starting and the end of the work time, the duration of rest periods during work and the schedule of the shifts in the form of a work order. In respect of those, who work on mandatory basis, a legal provision defines their possible remuneration. This means that it may be at least one third of the amount of the minimal wage of the previous year.


For the purpose of sustaining the institute it is possible to order work execution without any remuneration, the duration of this kind of work cannot exceed daily four hours and monthly altogether twenty-four hours. The non working imprisoned people do not have to contribute to the costs of their imprisonment, however, in the case of prisoners receiving pension, the amount of the relevant contribution is subtracted from his/her pension and it is disbursed to the institute.

No matter how much it is a priority to increase the number of convicted people employed, it is not possible to increase it, since even in normal civil life there is a large number of people unemployed, and the demand for unskilled workforce is even less. It would be important from economic aspect as well to have more convicted people employed, because it would be possible to subtract from their earnings the costs of imprisonment, which would reduce the costs of supplying them. The Hungarian prison service tries to achieve that work executed within the prison should entitle the worker to pension.

### **Economic situation of the companies**

The situation of these companies changed several times since their establishment. Their operation is made more expensive by specific additional costs. These kft companies receive state subsidies as compensation for these additional costs, however, the extent of this subsidy has gradually decreased during the past decade, and by today it already does not reach one hundred million HUF per year. From the currently operating 12 kft companies 7 produces losses, only the agricultural kft companies and the paper plant operating in Tököl are producing profit. When these market-based companies were established 9 of them operated in the area light industry and 3 of them operated in the area of agriculture. Due to the changes of the market today there are 8 light industrial and 4 agricultural companies. During the more than one and a half decade that went by for example the furniture industry disappeared from their scopes of activities. The companies have focused more and more on job-work executed for outside companies. The reason of this was that they tried to make up for the decreasing own activity, through the job-work market. The initial assets of the kft companies was represented by the complete asset portfolio of their predecessor companies, which at that time represented 3.7 billion HUF registered capital and 4.5 billion HUF own capital. After the turn of the millennium the assets of the industrial companies decreased, while the assets of the agricultural companies increased, however, altogether, they were able to increase the assets allocated to them, which reached 8.5 billion HUF by 2008 .

The change in the own capital had been distorted by several factors simultaneously. A positive factor was when in line with the provisions of law the real estates of several industrial companies had to be revaluated, and their value had to be increased, which did not involve any actual increase in performance, however, the evaluation reserve of own capital increased. The companies due to the crisis of the light industrial sector gradually loste their markets, their sales revenues decreased, and their costs in some cases increased with an extent that exceeds inflation. The development of profit of the kft companies is demonstrated by Diagram 2 from the time of their establishment.



//Bv. össz – Prison service total, Ipari társaságok – Industrial companies, Mezőgazdasági társaságok – Agricultural companies//

Diagram 2: Development of the profit of Hungarian prison service companies between 1994 and 2008 (million HUF)

Source: László Tóth: The presence of the companies and the plans of their future business operation,

Börtönügyi Szemle /Prison Affairs Bulletin (2009, Issue 2) 4. p.

In year 2009, the companies succeeded in maintaining their operation capability with involving the available resources. As a consequence of this, the profit of the agricultural companies was 36.8 million HUF, while the profit of the industrial companies was -141.1 million HUF, thus their total profit was -104.3 million HUF.

The economic crisis started in year 2008, and the workforce suction impact of the PPP prisons that were handed over in years 2007 and 2008 had an unfavourable impact on the industrial kft companies as well. Their costs increased, while their sales revenues decreased, which had a negative impact on employment. With the decrease of production the number of prisoners employed had also decreased. This was most characteristic of the last five years. This is demonstrated by Table 1.

Table 1: Number of convicted persons and their employment between 2005 and 2009

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
<b>number of convicted persons</b>	16410	14821	14353	14805	15432
<b>employment</b>	4289	4113	4135	3683	3128
<b>employment in %</b>	26	28	29	25	20

Source: Yearbooks of the Hungarian Prison Service, 2005-2009.

## **Planned organisational transformation of the kft companies**

In the interest of avoiding losses similar to the last period and due to the decreasing funding provided by the state it was necessary to review the operation of these companies. This was also prescribed by Government Resolution 2118/2006. The disadvantages of the present system can be summarised as follows:

- the kft companies do not exploit savings that may be achieved by carrying out the tasks jointly,
- some of these companies produce losses and they would need technology development,
- in the case of the majority of the companies the costs are high.

In the interest of stopping the unfavourable processes it would be a solution if some of these companies would be transformed into so-called "public utility companies". The "public utility company" is a new operation form, which is defined by Status Act CV of year 2008. The primary function of these companies is to ensure the internal supply of budget institutions. The internal transformations could take place as follows according to Mr. Tóth: The kft companies of Vác, Márianosztra and Budapest would be merged, and a new kft would be established with Budapest headquarters. This way procurement, service provision and sales would become more efficient. From the three ready-made clothing kft companies and from the shoe manufacturing kft company one public utility company would be established with four premises, which would ensure the clothing and shoe product supply of the prison service organisation and the police. After taking care of internal supply, this public utility company could also increase its revenues by meeting orders received from the outside market. From the currently operating four agricultural companies one agrarian company group would be established, while they would keep their legal independence, and one of the kft companies that produces profit even now, the Duna Papír Kft of Tököl would be left as an independently operating company in the future as well.

## **Summary**

The market-based companies play an important role in the life of prison service, since they solve the employment of convicted people. Their profit achieved recently was actually a deficit. In the interest of increasing the extent of the employment of convicted people in Hungary it would be important to get acquainted with the practice of employment of convicted people applied in the prison service institutes of other countries as well. Through this an opportunity could be opened for employing convicted people more widely.

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## ABOUT AGGRESSION IN A NUTSHELL

*ABSTRACT The spread of aggression in the world, and in Hungary as well, is not only noticeable in statistical figures but also manifests itself in new forms and places. Aggression has already been studied from many different aspects by biologists (ethologists), psychologists, sociologists and doctors but there have also been attempts to look at it from an artistic and historical point of view. In the present paper, following a theoretical outline of the phenomenon of aggression, we intend to focus on the manifestation of aggression in connection with military service. For every army it may be important to recognize in time the strength and forms of aggression and treat it both in peace time and war time.*

### **Introduction**

The worldwide increase in aggression is an issue that interests every member of society. Individuals, families and society all suffer from aggression, which is omnipresent. Aggression that is often not recognized or is misinterpreted can be the cause of many difficulties and tragedies in life. /Hárdi, 2000/

The Hungarian Dictionary of Definitions defines two varieties of aggression: in the political sense it is the practice of making armed attacks on a country (against its territorial integrity or independence), and in the general sense it is defined as violence. According to Nolting /1997/ in psychology there is no generally accepted definition of aggression. The definitions he recommends are based on three different factors: the caused harm, the intention and the deviation from the norm. Hárdi /2000, p24/ summarizes the numerous

approaches in connection with aggression as follows: "We can talk about aggression in case of the appearance of offensive behaviour, hostile inner urges or experiences that usually involve frustration and which can be aimed at the outside world, an individual or the person himself who experiences it; they can be conscious or unconscious, they can manifest themselves directly or indirectly (e.g. sending a present that causes annoyance), or even in a transformed form (e.g. in anxiety resulting from suppressed aggression or in bodily symptoms)".

At the level of society one single act of aggression may lead to disaster, and at the level of the individual a lot depends on how we manage our aggressive thoughts and urges, since this can have a significant effect on our health and relationships.

### **The basic forms and theories of aggression**

The following definition of aggression serves the purpose of clarification since in practice, aggression can be recognized through the forms it takes /Hárdi, 2000/. The most common form of everyday aggression is verbal aggression, which can manifest itself in the content or form of words and can range from hidden hints through subtle irony to rudeness. Aggressive words can be the result of a disagreement, a conflict of interests, the non-performance of tasks and also of offences, which can mainly damage self-esteem. As regards form, it can be shown by the increase of volume, the deepening of tone as well as a change in the speed or rhythm of speech. Darwin also dealt with aggressive behaviour and aggressive acts /1863/ when he dealt with the creation of expressive movements. In addition to facial expressions and gestures, rage and anger manifest themselves in other bodily symptoms, which used to be the necessary means of combat. In such situations the heart rate increases, the blood pressure grows, breathing becomes faster, the blood sugar level rises etc. Group aggression usually appears in crowds /Pataki, 1999/, such as football hooliganism in the world of sports, mass fights in entertainment facilities and mass suicides caused by religious fanaticism. When talking about aggression as a psychological phenomenon, we must emphasize the notion of aggressiveness, which is used to describe an aggressive temperament as a character trait, which determines and motivates personality /Hárdi, 2000/. The best examples are antisocial personality disorder sufferers who are characterized by ruthlessness, cruelty, inadequate control of temper and high irritability. They are often brought into conflict with society, which they are unable to fit into. They are unable to maintain long-lasting human relationships, regard tenderness as weakness and lack real feelings and empathy. They do not necessarily become criminals, and under the right conditions they could find their right place in a community, they could work, for example, in the military or in penal institutions and they could even have a successful career /Döme, 1996/. Aggression can also

be manifested in emotions, such as anger, rage, hatred, envy or jealousy. Anger is the most direct expression of emotional, verbal and physical aggression. Rage is an intensive but shorter form of anger, the intensity of which can go as far as indiscriminateness and a confused state of mind. Hatred is a hostile emotion directed at another person, group or ethnic group, which is often irrational and its roots can be found in life history or the unconscious. Envy towards other people's fortunes, property, position or achievements, is quite common. An envious person does not see how the object of their envy has achieved what they possess. An envious person's self-esteem is usually damaged, their parents may have set them extremely high requirements or they may not have been appropriately appreciated and they always have to prove their suitability. In many respects it is related to jealousy, when one feels that according to one's wishes one has the right to possess certain things or to be in a better position, which another person undeservedly possesses or is in /Hárdi, 2001/. Besides the manifestations of aggression directed at the outside world, Freud /1915/ described reflexive or auto-aggression, which can also have various forms.

Out of the theories analyzing aggression, I would like to treat at length the evolutionary, the neurobiological and the psychological approaches.

According to the evolutionary approach, man is a member of the animal kingdom, which his physiological traits leave no doubt about. As regards his behaviour, man belongs among the highly social animals, and a natural result of his sociality is biological aggression, the capability of creating a hierarchy and non-verbal communication. What distinguishes man from animals is the existence of some further species-specific behaviour mechanisms created by genetic factors /Csányi, 2000/. When discussing human aggression, Konrad Lorenz /1963, quoted by Csányi, 2000/ did not distinguish sharply between biological and cultural aggression. Biological aggression is an important behavioural control mechanism, which is present in some form in every higher animal. At the same time, human aggression has its own human specifics and manifestations. Through learning and under the influence of the given culture human aggression can be forced back to a very low level and can also be raised to a very high level. A peculiar, human-specific type of aggression which must be distinguished from biological aggression is group cultural aggression and its most cruel form: war. The forms of human aggression can be classified as follows /Csányi, 2000/:

1. Territorial aggression: Groups of people from various cultures jointly, or their members individually mark, take possession of and protect an area.
2. Aggression connected with property and possession.
3. Aggression connected with hierarchy: Human groups are organized hierarchically. The hierarchy of spontaneously formed groups of a

lower level of organisation is formed through more or less intense aggressive conflicts.

4. Frustration aggression: If young children are prevented from achieving a goal, if they caused pain or something is taken away from them, they will immediately respond with an aggressive act. Although through socialization they learn various ways of controlling their behaviour in such situations, this kind of aggression still remains the most common even in adulthood.
5. Exploration aggression: This aggression helps a new member of a group with fitting into the hierarchy or creating a new set of rules.
6. Parental aggression: Looking after the offspring occasionally requires aggression. The aim of parental aggression is to influence the behaviour of children.
7. Pedagogical aggression: It is a human-specific form of aggression. It is manifested in situations where someone has to be taught some complicated behaviour, e.g. at school, at work or in the army.
8. Normative or moral aggression: It is also a human-specific type of aggression. Its aim is to make the members of a group accept its norms. The students in a class, the members of a group at work or of a religious community often become aggressive towards another member of the group who deviates from the accepted rules, customs, principles or norms.

When looking at the various types of aggression, we cannot ignore Moyer's classification /1968/, who distinguishes between seven forms of biological and evolutionary aggression:

1. Predatory aggression: when an animal attacks a prey.
2. Inter-male aggression: the aim is to control the females, to achieve power and to dominate.
3. Fear-induced aggression: it results from a feeling of being threatened and the aim is to avoid the threat.
4. Irritable aggression: it is evoked by frustration and is aimed at a potential target.
5. Territorial aggression: it is mainly directed towards the members of the same species.
6. Maternal aggression: when a female reacts with aggression in order to protect her young from harm.
7. Goal-oriented aggression: a form of aggression the aim of which is to achieve a goal.

Fromm /2004/ distinguishes between benign and malignant aggression. The aim of benign aggression is self-defence, the preservation of life and this is biologically based. Malignant aggression does not serve the purpose of

adaptation; it is autotelic, ruthless and cruel. In his book, *The Anatomy of Human Destruction*, he compares the manifestations of animal and human aggression and the causes of aggressive behaviour. The focus of his attention is why non-adaptive aggression develops in humans. He sees certain forms of human aggression as irrational manifestations of instinctive behaviour and unconscious drives, but at the same time in his explanations there is always reference to the complexities of society and man's immediate environment, the multitude of unsatisfied spiritual and material needs, social isolation, the disorders of socialization, people's grudges, etc.

According to the neurobiological approach, aggression is under the complex control of the nervous system and hormonal changes. Aggression is controlled at various levels, which greatly depends on the type of aggression. The brain stem and the hypothalamus play an important role not only in animals but also in humans. The second level is the limbic system, which is directly connected to the hypothalamus. The most important control is performed by the prefrontal region, which is responsible for judgement and decision making. Serotonin is an essential neurotransmitter. Both suicide victims and aggressive criminals have a low level of serotonin. Gamma-amino butyric acid reduces aggression while catecholamine can be associated with attack latencies. The aggression inducing effect of testosterone and androgens is a well-known fact /Hárdi, 2000/. Aggression can have deviant forms, too, which are related to different neuroendocrine changes. In this the serotonerg system plays a determining role and it has a blunting effect on impulsivity, which seems to be the most consistent element of psychiatry. The other main aggression reducing region of the brain is the prefrontal cortex. Experiments have been carried out to examine how the role of these regions changes during aggressive interactions and to what extent they are involved in the development of aggressive behaviour. During the experiments both normal and abnormal aggressiveness (e.g. antisocial personality disorder, explosive disorder, defiant and challenging behaviour, disruptive behaviour etc.) have been studied. The results show that there is a qualitative difference between the behavioural characteristics of normal and abnormal forms of aggression. The changes in serotonerg and prefrontal control are in the background of the differences. The natural aggression of animals induced an intense activation of both regions, partly already in the preparatory phase preceding the aggression. In the case of abnormal aggression there was no parallel activation of these two regions, which indicates that the role of these two regions has been overridden, i.e. they are not involved in the control of aggression, so abnormal aggression can develop /Gyenge, 2010).

Out of the psychological theories one of the most significant approach is the result of psychoanalysis developed by Sigmund Freud /Hárdi, 2000/. For a

long time, Freud did not distinguish the aggressive instinct from the sexual instinct; it was in the 1920s that he first described the development of the aggressive instinct similarly to the development of the sexual instinct. Based on this, he offered his life-death instinct theory. As opposed to the life instinct, which also covers the sexual instinct, the death instinct covers all the instincts towards aggression. When the death instinct turns towards the external world, we talk about aggression and when it turns towards the self, we call it masochism. Aggression turned against the self is the well known basis of depression and suicide.

According to the frustration theory /Dollard, Miller, 1939, quoted by Hárđi, 2000/ frustration caused by unsatisfied needs and unachieved goals leads to aggression. Based on the observations of experimental psychiatry it was believed that every aggression is the result of frustration:

1. The performance of an action to achieve a goal is hindered.
2. Provocation, aggression inducing stimuli, offensive words. Primarily remarks that damage self-esteem, rejection and disregard for the personality.
3. Physical stimuli such as cold, heat, standing in a queue for a long time or over-crowdedness.

Later it was shown that not every frustration causes aggressive behaviour, and not every aggressive behaviour is caused by frustration. During human development there are a lot of factors and effects that make it disputable to claim that frustration is the fundamental or final cause of aggression.

According to the learning theory /Bandura, Walters, 1959, 1963; quoted by Hárđi, 2000/, aggression is the result of learning. Learning means the changing of personality through experience, which can be manifested in emotional life, disposition, habits and the learning of aggression. The best known way of learning aggression is through the imitation of aggressive models. If a child can see his parents fighting and behaving aggressively, it is expected that he will behave in the same way. Punishing a child by beating or shouting is harmful because it can serve as an aggressive model. According to the learning theory approach every aggression produces aggression. The child's peers, other persons who are important for them and relevant groups can also serve as further models. The learning of aggression can also be the result of wanting to draw attention or to gain recognition or advantages.

### **Aggression and aggressiveness during military service**

The notions of aggressive behaviour and conduct are of great significance in a military context. In military terminology these notions are not necessarily

negative or undesirable forms of behaviour. They can refer to the preservation of our own life or that of others, personal integrity or even the means of defence regarding a whole group of people /Doricic, 2007/. There are circumstances when aggressive behaviour is positively required or necessary. At the same time we have to keep in mind the line that separates destructive aggressiveness from the individual's intentional and purpose-oriented actions, which means the exploitation of defence mechanisms. A person who has the tendency to behave aggressively in almost any situation, is unsuited for military service because he is unable to adjust to military life.

Aggressive behaviour is greatly affected by certain environmental and situational factors /Doricic, 2007/. Aggression is often manifested in situations when the individual is put in a provocative environment, which can be frustrating or simply unpleasant. When opposing motives of the same intensity are equally important for the individual, emotional tension and restlessness are created, which is called frustration. In frustrating situations the individual activates his defensive behaviour. Accumulated tension caused by lasting frustration can be manifested in aggressive behaviour. This aggressive tension might even be self-destructive. Human behaviour usually does not adjust well to frustrating situations and in such cases emotional elements outweigh rational elements. Every war is a concrete frustrating situation, which involves endangering life. Such a situation generates a contrast between the goals of an organized and peaceful life and the realities of war and between the desire for peace and situations when one must kill in order to save one's own or other people's lives. In case of very strong frustration, aggressive behaviour might also be directed at situations and objects which are not in any kind of connection with the source of the frustration /Trut, Trlek, Pavlina, 2007/. In such situations hostile behaviour is aimed at weaker, defenceless people. An example for this is when disciplinary punishment is imposed on a soldier by his commander, but fearing the unfavourable consequences, the soldier directs his anger at his comrades, his subordinates or members of his family. In the army, commanders are aware that soldiers' aggressiveness can even be useful because it is what offensive combat actions are based on. It is important to emphasise that this kind of aggression is aimed aggression and only serves as a means, and cannot be associated with aggressiveness as a personality trait. Personal aggressiveness is an undesirable quality in soldiers, since this personality trait is never manifested alone but in combination with other undesirable qualities. The characteristic forms of behaviour of a soldier who is frustrated and whose aggressiveness is growing include the following: causing criminal damage, damaged personal relationships, the lack of mutual trust, disdain for military hierarchy, verbal and physical clashes between the soldiers, absence without official leave, an increase in the number of diseases, permanent complaints about and difficulties in

performing tasks, excessive alcohol consumption and defying the military establishment.

One part of the theories about human behaviour emphasises the importance of learning. Every single form of social behaviour, including aggressiveness, is learned behaviour /Doricic, 2007/. Seeing others behaving aggressively has the same consequences as if the individual himself had behaved aggressively. Seeing his commander's or comrade's aggressive behaviour condoned and accepted by their environment further confirms and encourages a soldier's aggressiveness. Thus, if uncontrolled aggressive behaviour is condoned, it increases the likelihood of aggression manifesting itself in every area of the individual's life.

In most cases the purpose of man's biological aggression is to achieve some kind of personal advantage through getting rid of or socially degrading and enforcing the obedience of the person who has been attacked or threatened. The aggressor rarely wants to kill his opponent or destroy his property; it can only happen in the most extreme forms of aggression /Csányi, 2000/. Group aggression, i.e. war, is always the activity of an organised group or society against another group or society, and its means are always destructive and the objective is to kill the enemy and destroy or take its property and possessions. In case of personal aggression the threat or attack are accompanied by specific physiological changes; very often the aggressor experiences rage towards the person attacked. In war this is rarely the case. War is a group action which has been planned in advance and it is the product of cultural evolution. Its elements are human characteristics, such as aggressive emotions, a readiness to protect the group, dominance and territoriality. War is characterized by systematic planning, leadership, destructive weapons, the designation, dehumanization and ideologization of the enemy.

From the point of view of war it is worth considering the relationship between aggression and violence. Biology and evolution explain aggression, while violence is a social phenomenon /Szabó, 2003/. Violence is always a kind of behaviour which is based on culture, socialization and values. War is the expressive, legitimate form of human use of force and it is also the monopoly of the state. Through history a very important set of rules and several moral aspects of war fighting have evolved.

Every war is a particularly critical situation which is accompanied by the feeling of being in danger and it requires adequate psychological combat preparation /Doricic, 2007/. A wide range of factors affect the level and quality of this preparation. In the interest of understanding and controlling aggressive behaviour and of successful leadership, a lot of attention must be paid to psychological combat readiness in general and the quality of the relationships

between people. In order to improve the morale and performance of the soldiers involved in war, a certain level of aggressiveness is necessary. Unfortunately, besides the aggression directed towards the aggressor with the purpose of defence, which is socially useful, destructive aggression is also present, the consequences of which are harmful. The different forms of aggression are more intensive and more destructive when they are linked to personal goals. In the case of soldiers who are badly prepared or struggle with problems uncontrollable aggressive behaviour is more common. During combat activity, the basic problem of aggressiveness is in the forms and levels of the manifestations of aggressive behaviour. The levels mean the intensity and the forms include verbal, physical and other forms of aggressive behaviour. The actual manifestations of the different levels and forms include verbal abuse or threat, which can even go as far as causing physical harm to the prisoners. The following conditions and situations enhance aggressive behaviour: the feeling of permanent insecurity, sharing responsibility with others, the necessity of action (the compulsion to act).

An abnormal form of aggression and violence was carried out by American soldiers in the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003. They brutally and cruelly tortured and humiliated the detainees. At the time it was characterized as an isolated incident and the responsibility of the soldiers involved in the tortures was emphasized /Lankford, 2004/. However, these soldiers were relatively normal, healthy people when they entered the military and they underwent a serious screening process specifically designed to keep “bad apples” from joining the services. Both in the past and the present there were and there are numerous similar forms of organised group aggression. Researchers more and more commonly put the blame on the training system and the screening process as well as the environmental (situational) factors rather than on the individual and so called dispositional factors. The army should not lure recruits with appeals to a warrior ideology and unrealistic promises of inevitable victory. Instead, the military should target integrity, which is what it takes to be willing to accept temporary defeat in order to protect human rights. Basic training must continue to emphasize the importance of unity and discipline as it prepares soldiers to kill. The soldiers of the future will not need to dehumanize the enemy in order to accomplish their mission.

### ***Conclusion***

The basic meaning of the various forms of aggressive behaviour is a cry for help, the hope of a fast and successful solution to personal problems /Doricic, 2007/. It indicates, that commanders must know their soldiers well in order to be able to monitor their general condition, to find out about their personal problems and situations so that they can provide adequate help for

them. Maintaining quality relationship with the soldiers affects their behaviour and serves as prevention.

Obviously, preventing aggressive behaviour starts in the family in early childhood. During their education it could be important to develop pro-social values in children, such as unity and cooperativity. In order to do this, it is essential to establish a safe and secure environment, balanced emotional relationships and bonds. Later the responsibility of the group becomes more important. Thus, socialization and education can jointly promote the understanding and acceptance of the emotions, religion, culture, etc. of others. All this can reduce the feeling of being different and the creation of prejudices and stereotypes between potential rivals. At an international level, reducing nationalistic tendencies without eliminating patriotic feelings may be important.

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